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Abstract 
 
Despite the current emphasis on person centred, holistic care in health, the concept of 
spirituality has been discussed very little in the field of speech and language therapy (SLT). The 
nursing spirituality literature has proliferated in the last twenty years but, by contrast, very few 
SLT studies exist which mention the spiritual needs of patients with communication problems 
and how they express them. 
Individuals experiencing severe, life-changing events, such as a stroke, may need to engage 
with and discuss their spiritual needs, in order to make sense of what has happened to them. 
The aim of this study was to discover what it is like to express spiritual issues when one has an 
acquired communication impairment (aphasia). I also wanted to discover what it is like to be a 
healthcare professional working with people with communication impairment expressing their 
spirituality. 
I used a phenomenological approach in order to interview eight people with aphasia about 
their spirituality. Participants with aphasia used a variety of strategies to express these ideas, 
which included employing non-verbal communication techniques, such as gesture, writing key 
words, intonation and artefacts. I also interviewed five members of the multidisciplinary stroke 
team (MDT) about what it is like to work holistically with people with aphasia. 
Each interview resulted in a participant story. People with aphasia talked about religious 
themes, such as visions and prayer, but also non-religious life meaning-makers, such as 
gardening and art. MDT members discussed themes such as spirituality as part of their remit 
and giving the patient time to communicate. The stories were then explored through the 
interpretive lens of some concepts propounded by Merleau-Ponty (2002), namely ambiguity, 
lived body, laŶguage aŶd thought, aŶd ǁoŶdeƌ. FƌaŶk͛s illŶess Ŷaƌƌatiǀes ;Đhaos, ƌestitutioŶ 
aŶd ƋuestͿ ǁeƌe also ĐoŶsideƌed iŶ oƌdeƌ to aŶalǇse the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stƌoke jouƌŶeǇ iŶ ƌelatioŶ 
to expressing spirituality. 
People with aphasia can and do discuss their spiritual concerns, particularly when they are 
entering a quest phase of their illness narrative. They employ many non-verbal mosaics in 
order to convey spiritual issues, and are helped by the listener employing a phenomenological 
attitude of openness and attentiveness. Healthcare professionals expressed their willingness to 
listeŶ to theiƌ patieŶts͛ spiƌitual stoƌies, iŶ the iŶteƌests of holistiĐ pƌaĐtiĐe. BeiŶg aďle to 
express spiritual needs can enhance wellbeing, help foster therapeutic rapport, and enable 
people to engage more fully in the rehabilitation process. 
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Prologue: In the beginning….. 
 
Stories and the telling and retelling of stories are integral to the human condition (Frank, 2010, 
p 3). In childhood, we listen to stories in order to be soothed or frightened, calmed or 
prepared for what might lie ahead. Fairy stories are notoriously dark and full of monsters, 
preparing children for possible dangers of life, or perhaps taking the fear away by naming it. As 
children, we share the storytelling process with adults we trust, and in turn we learn to tell 
stories ourselves. Reading to our children can continue long after they themselves have 
acquired the requisite reading skills; it is a joint enterprise, a pleasurable sharing of attention 
and of experience. 
Stories can teach. From the mythical stories of creation to the parables of Jesus, sacred texts 
attempt to explain the inexplicable, and provide guidance in an accessible way. 
Stories can provide a framework on which we hang our experience. Joyful experiences - 
weddings, births, celebrations of all types - are told and retold until they become part of our 
life narrative. Traumatic experience, too, must be formed into narrative, in order for it to be 
assimilated, made sense of. After serious illness, the patient is often heard recounting the 
events - operations, near-ŵisses, tƌeatŵeŶt ďǇ Ŷuƌses. It is as if, iŶ the ͞shipǁƌeĐk͟ of 
catastrophe (Frank, 2013), we make sense of our situation by creating a story, a story to be 
told and retold until we have managed to escape the wreckage and have headed for, or 
attained, dry land. 
Healthcare professionals take a case history (une histoire – a story) in order to hear their 
patieŶt͛s stoƌǇ of illŶess oƌ disaďilitǇ. DoŶe ǁell, a Đase histoƌǇ ďeĐoŵes a jouƌŶeǇiŶg ǁith the 
patient, accompanying them as they travel through, and make sense of, their story (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009). Frank tells of a surgeon who wrote to him and diǀulged that he had ͞fiŶallǇ 
leaƌŶ[ed] the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ takiŶg a histoƌǇ aŶd heaƌiŶg a patieŶt͛s stoƌǇ͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p 
58). Stories of illness are messy and sometimes incoherent, non-sequential and often 
seemingly inconsequential. Facts and events expressed in the narrative may not on the surface 
ĐoŶtƌiďute to ĐliŶiĐal diagŶosis; it ŵaǇ ďe aƌgued that these Ŷaƌƌatiǀes Đloud the ĐliŶiĐiaŶ͛s 
ability to reason clinically and to differentially diagnose. On the contrary, however, hearing a 
peƌsoŶ͛s illŶess stoƌǇ tells us ǁhat the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of that illŶess is fƌoŵ theiƌ uŶiƋue 
perspective (Carel, 2008, p 10), and therefore arguably adds richness and clarity to the 
diagnosis, and more importantly, to the management of the illness experience. If clinicians are 
able to bracket off their presuppositions of what illness and disability are and mean, they are 
more likely to hear and be open to what this particular illness or disability means to this 
particular client. As Elwyn and Gwyn (1999, p 186Ϳ state, if, as ĐliŶiĐiaŶs, ǁe ͞listeŶ ĐaƌefullǇ to 
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the stoƌies ǁe heaƌ͟, this ǁill iŶ tuƌŶ opeŶ up a ͞Ŷeǁ ǁaǇ of listeŶiŶg to the sigŶals ǁhiĐh so 
ofteŶ pass uŶŶotiĐed.͟ 
So, if stories are integral to our lives, helping us face fear, celebrate the important, narrate 
illness experiences and survive calamity, what of those for whom storytelling is difficult? What 
of those whose verbal skills deny them the opportunity to tell their stories? 
Imagine you have survived a catastrophic event. Your life was in danger but you pulled 
through. Instead of starting to formulate your recovery story, your survival narrative, language 
has deserted you. Despite being able to think and reason, to problem-solve and attend, to 
remember and to understand, you have lost the power of expressive language. Vocabulary and 
syntax are gone; you are reliant on some residual speech and non-verbal skills, such as 
drawing, gesture and facial expression. How do you create your story? 
Now imagine what you might want to include in this survival story, which has now become so 
problematic to formulate into words. What has happened to me? Why me? Why did I survive? 
Is this part of some bigger plan? What meaning can this have for me? How do I adjust to being 
this Ŷeǁ ͞ŵe͟? 
This is the scenario that can affect people with aphasia following stroke. The catastrophic 
event (stroke) has deprived them of their verbal skills, whilst leaving the majority of their other 
cognitive skills intact. How do people with aphasia create their survival narrative? How do they 
grapple with existential questions which can arise following life-threatening illness? How do 
they tell their spiritual stories? 
 
This thesis describes how eight people with aphasia expressed their spiritual stories to me, and 
how members of the multidisciplinary stroke team talked about their experiences of listening 
to stories of spirituality in their work. 
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Chapter 1: The Background Story 
 
͞aƌe Ǉou aďle to see aŶd aĐkŶoǁledge the peƌsoŶ ďeǇoŶd eǀeŶ the ŵost oǀeƌǁhelŵiŶg of 
sǇŵptoŵs?͟ 
(Chochinov, 2006, p 94) 
 
Part of my role as a practising speech and language therapist working with people with aphasia 
was to facilitate functional communication. Neuroplasticity and subsidence of oedema and 
other temporary damage demand that clinicians work to improve the language abilities of 
people with aphasia at an impairment level (WHO, 2001), but an equally vital component of 
intervention is to ensure that clients are able to express their basic needs in a compensatory 
fashion, via whatever modality may be viable, not just speech, in order to enable full activity 
and participation, and enhance wellbeing (WHO, 2001). Lessening frustration by enabling 
clients to, for example, ask for a drink or to express that they were in pain was a worthy goal. 
However, I began to recognise, too, that less concrete or more nebulous concepts were not so 
conducive to a picture chart or iPad application. Yet it seemed as important to be able to ask 
͚ǁhǇ did this happeŶ to ŵe?͛ as to ask foƌ soŵethiŶg to eat.  I knew from my own experience 
how illness and bereavement can evince existential questions, and the need to express them. 
As a Christian, I questioned God and priests about why my sister had died so young. She 
herself had written poetry, in an effort to understand what was happening to her: 
 
͞Without ŵe Đoŵe ǁoƌds 
Words, pictures, messages which 
Give this suffering 
Life͟ ;AleǆaŶdƌa CƌosslaŶd, ϭϵϵϱͿ 
 
VoiĐiŶg these iŶtiŵate paƌts of ouƌ life͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀe help us make sense of them. For those with 
intact language skills, this is difficult enough, but what of those for whom language has 
become problematic, elusive? Is it possible for healthcare professionals, such as speech and 
language therapists, to help people with aphasia express more than just their basic needs? 
What follows in this chapter are some definitions of the topics under discussion and a review 
of the current literature relating to speech and language therapy and spirituality. 
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1.1 Aphasia 
 
Aphasia
1
 is the disruption to receptive and/or expressive language, following damage to the 
language areas of the brain, most notably as a result of cerebrovascular accident or stroke. It is 
estimated that 33% of people who have a stroke will present with aphasia (The Stroke 
Association), and that there are approximately 350 000 people currently living with aphasia in 
the UŶited KiŶgdoŵ. Aphasia ŵaǇ affeĐt the iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to eǆpƌess laŶguage ǀeƌďallǇ oƌ 
in written form, or their ability to understand spoken and written language. In severe cases of 
so-called global aphasia, both receptive and expressive abilities may be impaired. 
Language function is normally considered to be located in the dominant (usually left) 
hemisphere of the brain. Although the locationist view of individual brain functions prevalent 
in the nineteenth century is now tempered by increased empirical knowledge of cortical 
functioning (such as via the use of positron emission tomography) and the current 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that ͞eǀeƌǇ ideŶtifiaďle huŵaŶ aĐtiǀitǇ is aĐtuallǇ seƌǀed at soŵe leǀel by both 
heŵispheƌes͟ ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭͿ, it is Ŷeǀeƌtheless a tƌuisŵ that daŵage thƌough stƌoke 
to certain parts of the cortex does result in aphasia of some kind. In general terms, 
haemorrhagic or ischaemic damage to the frontotemporal region known as BƌoĐa͛s aƌea 
usually results in an expressive-type aphasia, where the individual is able to understand 
spoken and written language but has difficulty in expression. Individuals who fall into this 
category may present with word retrieval difficulties and output which is telegraphic in nature, 
and lacking in syntactic complexity. This type of aphasia has been referred to variously over 
the Ǉeaƌs as eǆpƌessiǀe, BƌoĐa͛s aŶd ŵotoƌ.  CoŶǀeƌselǇ, those people ǁho suffeƌ daŵage to 
the cortex more posteriorly, in the teŵpoƌopaƌietal aƌea iŶ a ƌegioŶ kŶoǁŶ as WeƌŶiĐke͛s aƌea 
are more likely to present with difficulties in understanding what is said to them, whilst at the 
same time being able to produce fluent, syntactically correct output, albeit output often 
lacking in meaning. 
This locationist view became unpopular with aphasiologists and speech and language 
therapists in the early 1980s, however, as site of lesion did not seem to equate fully with a 
patieŶt͛s fuŶĐtioŶiŶg. Tǁo patieŶts ǁith siŵilaƌ lesioŶs Đould present quite differently in terms 
of the detail of their language deficit. Hence a conceptual model – the cognitive 
neuropsychological model of language processing (Morton and Patterson, 1980) - was 
propounded. This model (a diagrammatic representation of which is supplied in Appendix I) 
was arrived at through detailed investigations into individual case studies, plotting the areas of 
breakdown in terms of function, and thereby creating a plausible conceptual model of 
                                                          
1
 Aphasia is the most widely used term currently, although some liteƌatuƌe still ƌefeƌs to ͚dǇsphasia͛ 
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language processing at the single word level. Broadly speaking, individuals with more frontal 
lesioŶs ǁho pƌeseŶt ǁith a BƌoĐa͛s tǇpe aphasia aƌe likelǇ to haǀe diffiĐulties at the output 
level of the model, below the level of the semantic system, but possibly including the semantic 
system. The language difficulties of people with aphasia of all types exist in the context of 
other cognitive functions being reasonably and contrastively intact. 
People with aphasia may use total communication strategies (Moss et al, 2004, p 755) or 
͞ƌaŵps͟ ;MĐViĐker, 2007) in order to augment – or indeed replace – their impaired language 
skills. Foƌ eǆaŵple, aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to use ǁƌitteŶ laŶguage ŵaǇ ďe supeƌioƌ to theiƌ 
ability to use spoken language, and so they employ the strategy of writing down words whose 
spoken form eludes them. This also forms the adjunct function of providing a term of 
reference as the conversation progresses. Individuals might also employ gesture or drawing to 
convey an elusive word or concept. Other forms of non-verbal communication can also be 
used to good effect to augment, or supplant language, such as facial expression and 
intonation. 
People who have had a stroke may present with various communication difficulties, such as 
aphasia, dysarthria or apraxia of speech.  Aphasia involves problems with understanding or 
expressing language, whereas dysarthria and apraxia of speech are both motor speech 
disorders, affecting neuromuscular activity, and speech programming and planning activities 
respectively. 
The participants in this study who have had strokes all present with expressive aphasia, in the 
context of intact (or near intact) receptive abilities. In the first group, some presented with 
overlaying speech difficulties, as well as their language problems. They all had some residual 
expressive language and used varying types of alternative or augmentative communication 
systems. 
1.2 Spirit and spirituality 
 
“piƌit is deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the LatiŶ ͚spiƌitus͛, ŵeaŶiŶg soul, Đouƌage, ǀigouƌ oƌ ďƌeath aŶd is ƌelated 
to the ǀeƌď ͚spiƌaƌe͛, to ďƌeathe ;BaƌŶhaƌt,  ϭϵϴϴͿ. ͚“piƌitus͛ ǁas the ǁoƌd used ǁithiŶ the LatiŶ 
ǀulgate tƌaŶslatioŶ of ďiďliĐal teǆts to tƌaŶslate the ɑƌeek ǁoƌd ͚pŶeuŵa͛ ;fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh ǁe 
derive pneumatic – to do ǁith aiƌ oƌ ďƌeathͿ aŶd the Heďƌeǁ ͚ƌuah͛, ŵeaŶiŶg aiƌ oƌ ǁiŶd. The 
spirit (ruah) of God is described in Genesis (1:2) as ͞moviŶg oǀeƌ the ǁateƌ͟, ǁaitiŶg aŶd ƌeadǇ 
to begin the process of creation. Spirit is, therefore, portrayed within the Bible as something 
intrinsic to life, something necessary for life. 
In his 1637 work Discours de la Méthode, Descartes (1980) contests that the soul is distinct 
from the body: 
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͞l͛âŵe, paƌ laƋuelle je suis Đe Ƌue je suis, est eŶtiğƌeŵeŶt distiŶĐte du Đoƌps͟. 
He ŵaiŶtaiŶed that a peƌsoŶ͛s soul ƌesided iŶ the piŶeal glaŶd, aŶd that ǁas ǁheƌe ďodǇ and 
soul interacted (Garber, 2005, p 185).  We have travelled a distance from this belief in an 
aŶatoŵiĐal site foƌ the soul͛s ƌesideŶĐe, Ǉet theoƌies still aďouŶd as to ǁheƌe ouƌ spiƌitualitǇ 
can be said to originate. Foster (2010), for example, discusses the possibility of spirituality 
being found in neurology, sexuality, psychoactive drugs and near-death experiences.  
DefiŶiŶg a teƌŵ suĐh as ͞spiƌitualitǇ͟ is aŶ iŵpossiďle, aŶd aƌguaďlǇ a poteŶtiallǇ ƌeduĐtiǀe, 
task. The spiritual realm reaches into so many different facets of the human condition and 
experience – culture, art, nature, theology, philosophy – that it cannot be comfortably 
minimised into a sound bite.  Its power perhaps lies, in fact, in its inability to be reduced to a 
definable concept (Swinton and Pattison, 2010); spirituality means something different – but 
equally important – to each person. Van der Veer (2012, p 169) puts it like this: 
͞“piƌitualitǇ is ŶotoƌiouslǇ haƌd to defiŶe aŶd I ǁaŶt to suggest that its ǀeƌǇ ǀagueŶess as the 
opposite of materiality, as distinctive from the body, as distinctive from both the religious and 
the secular, has made it productive as a concept that bridges various discursive traditions 
aĐƌoss the gloďe.͟ 
My position from the outset of this research project was that spirituality is what it is to an 
individual, and therefore to each of the participants; that is, spirituality is whatever that 
person considers to be spirituality. I was open to any and all manifestations of how spirituality 
might look. For me, spirituality can and does include religious belief, but also awe in nature, 
and human relationship. As we shall see, the participants also expressed myriad concepts of 
spirituality, as they experienced it. 
Yet, many authors have at least attempted a definition, and most people have an 
understanding of what spirituality is even if they have difficulty in then putting that 
understanding into words. It is perhaps useful to gather some of the terms which are 
frequently mooted in attempts to define spirituality, in order to start to create some of the 
vocabulary which may be helpful.  So it is that Cobb, Puchalski and Rumbold (2012, p vii) talk 
aďout ͞puƌpose aŶd ŵeaŶiŶg of huŵaŶ eǆisteŶĐe͟, “ǁiŶtoŶ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϵͿ of ͞ŵeaŶiŶg, 
puƌpose, ǀalue, hope aŶd loǀe͟ aŶd VaŶieƌ ;ϭϵϵϵ, p ϵϳͿ of hoǁ ͞spiƌitualitǇ floǁs fƌoŵ ďeiŶg 
fullǇ huŵaŶ͟.   
Egan et al (2011, p 3) propose that there are three main positions when it comes to the 
possibility of a definitive definition of spirituality. The first position asserts that there is not 
enough agreement amongst the definitions that exist in the literature, and that this hinders 
useful research in the area. The second is that there is commonality in most definitions, so that 
most people in most disciplines understand what is meant by the teƌŵ ͚spiƌitualitǇ͛. The thiƌd 
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position is that there is indeed no consensus as to definition, but that this is immaterial and 
does not affect the ability of people from all disciplines to study spirituality. 
Some definitions include a religious element (Van der Veer, 2012), however it is recognised 
that spirituality is distinct from religion (McSherry and Cash, 2004; Swinton, 2010; Swinton and 
Pattison, 2010), ďut that ƌeligioŶ ŵaǇ ĐoŶstitute a paƌt of soŵeoŶe͛s spiƌitualitǇ. “tƌiǀiŶg foƌ 
some clarity in the terms associated with definitions of spirituality, Koenig, King and Carson 
(2012, p 46) devised three distinct groupings, namely people who are religious and spiritual, 
those who are religious but not spiritual, and those who identify as neither spiritual nor 
religious but humanistic or secular. Perhaps we may add a fourth grouping, which has become 
so accepted a term that its acronym is now widely used (e.g. Harvey, 2016); that of spiritual 
but not religious, or SBNR (Erlandson, 2000). 
Spirituality may or may not constitute the same phenomenon as religion. Many people without 
adherence to an organised religion nevertheless describe themselves as spiritual beings. 
Some putative definitions of spirituality contain the words ͚meaning͛ aŶd ͚purpose͛, aspects 
not necessarily allied to the concept of a god or higher being. Viktor Frankl, an Austrian 
neurologist and psychiatrist, who spent three years in Auschwitz and Dachau, alludes to his 
spirit being able to rise above all hardship in order to find meaning in the meaninglessness and 
horror of the concentration camps: 
͞I seŶsed ŵǇ spiƌit pieƌĐiŶg thƌough the eŶǀelopiŶg glooŵ. I felt it tƌaŶsĐeŶd that hopeless, 
ŵeaŶiŶgless ǁoƌld, aŶd fƌoŵ soŵeǁheƌe I heaƌd a ǀiĐtoƌious ͞Ǉes͟ iŶ aŶsǁeƌ to ŵǇ ƋuestioŶ 
of the existence of aŶ ultiŵate puƌpose.͟  ;FƌaŶkl, ϮϬϬϰ, p ϱϭͿ. 
Relationship and love are, for Frankl, integral to this spiritual freedom, as illustrated by the 
words he writes when thinking about his wife, who, in fact, he never saw again: 
͞IŶ a positioŶ of utteƌ desolatioŶ…ŵaŶ ĐaŶ, thƌough loǀiŶg ĐoŶteŵplatioŶ of the iŵage he 
Đaƌƌies of his ďeloǀed, aĐhieǀe fulfilŵeŶt.͟ ;FƌaŶkl, ϮϬϬϰ, p ϰϵͿ. 
He speaks of ͞spiƌitual fƌeedoŵ͟ ;FƌaŶkl, ϮϬϬϰ, p ϳϱͿ, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe ǁilled iŶto ĐoŶtiŶuatioŶ, 
even in the most dire of circumstances: 
͞MaŶ can preserve a vestige of spiritual freedom, of independence of mind, even in such 
teƌƌiďle ĐoŶditioŶs of psǇĐhiĐ aŶd phǇsiĐal stƌess.͟ ;p ϳϰͿ. 
For Frankl, then, the spirit can be viewed as a separate facet of the human condition, one that 
can rise above the body and mind, but one that is nevertheless integral to the whole; in fact he 
views spirituality as the central kernel of being, around which the mind and body form (Frankl, 
2011, p 35). 
Spirituality, then, remains a vague and ill-defined phenomenon, but perhaps justifiably so 
(Swinton and Pattison, 2010). It seems apposite that this thesis seeks to explore this concept 
which is so difficult to put into words with a population for whom creating words and putting 
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thoughts and concepts into language is inherently difficult. McGilchrist (2010) puts forward the 
compelling argument that the human capacity for reverence, awe and spirituality, is housed in 
the right hemisphere of our cerebral cortex, with the left being the hemisphere of logic, order 
and, of course, language. This will be discussed further on in the thesis; for now, it is 
interesting to note that the very essence of what spirituality might be is difficult to enunciate, 
to verbalise; perhaps its residence in the right, non-dominant, so-called non-verbal 
hemisphere renders definition impracticable. 
1.3 Body, mind, spirit 
 
Speech and language therapists (SLTs) have long worked with people with aphasia in order to 
maximise their residual linguistic and functional communication skills. As a profession, 
emphasis is placed on an holistic approach to therapy and intervention, seeing the client as a 
whole person, in a person-centred way (Koubel and Bungay, 2008; Health and Care Professions 
Council, 2013; Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists, 2016).   
TheƌapǇ ĐlieŶts ĐaŶ ďe ƌegaƌded as ͚tƌipaƌtite͛ iŶ Ŷatuƌe; that is, the esseŶĐe of the iŶdiǀidual 
comprises body, mind and spirit. As we have seen, Frankl (2011) extends the concept of a 
peƌsoŶ͛s ǁholeŶess ďeiŶg depeŶdeŶt oŶ the iŶteƌaĐtion of all three aspects (body, mind, 
spirit), by suggesting that, not only should all aspects be present, but that the spiritual aspect 
creates the inner core around which the body and mind develop. 
Seeing the client as tripartite in nature, SLTs working with people with aphasia have become 
accustomed to assessiŶg aŶd iŶteƌǀeŶiŶg ǁith the ͚body͛. Impairment-based assessments and 
interventions, exemplified perhaps in the cognitive neuropsychological model of language 
processing and the assessments that partner it, such as the Psycholinguistic Assessment of 
Language Processing in Aphasia (Kay, Lesser and Coltheart, 1992) and the Comprehensive 
Aphasia Test (Swinburn, Porter and Howard, 2004) have long been the bedrock of aphasia 
therapy. SLTs hoping to maximise the period of spontaneous recovery, providing the best 
support and environment in which spontaneous recovery and perhaps neuroplasticity (Vargha-
Khadem et al, 1997) can take place, will advocate this emphasis on working with the body 
element of their tripartite clients. In more recent years, although therapies which focus on the 
body and impairment still maintain a large presence both in the efficacy literature and also in 
practice, emphasis has shifted slightlǇ to iŶĐoƌpoƌate the ͚mind͛ within therapy. This is 
exemplified in the literature of the last 20 years, which has focused on the psychosocial 
elements of living with aphasia (Code and Herrmann, 2003; Hilari et al 2003). Issues of quality-
of-life (Cruice et al, 2003; Hilari et al, 2003) and identity (Ellis-Hill and Horn, 2000; Shadden, 
2005) have rightly begun to be more thoroughly explored. 
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But ǁhat of the ͚spiritual͛ aspect of the tripartite client with aphasia? Do SLTs address this 
aspect as part of their management of the tripartite client – and should they? If we consider 
Masloǁ͛s ;ϭϵϱϰͿ HieƌaƌĐhǇ of Need, aƌe ǁe as “LTs foĐusiŶg oŶlǇ oŶ those Ŷeeds at the ďase of 
the pǇƌaŵid ;ie phǇsiologiĐal aŶd safetǇ ŶeedsͿ aŶd Ŷot ďeiŶg ĐogŶisaŶt of ouƌ ĐlieŶts͛ Ŷeed to 
progress to self-actualisation? Greenstreet (2006, p 13) believes that self-actualisation is linked 
to spiƌitualitǇ aŶd is eǀideŶĐed iŶ ͞peƌsoŶal autoŶoŵǇ, self-acceptance, open communication 
and interaction͟ ;ŵǇ italiĐsͿ. It ŵaǇ ďe iŶĐuŵďeŶt oŶ the ǁhole stƌoke ƌehaďilitatioŶ teaŵ to 
enable the person with aphasia to convey that self-actualisation, and the speech and language 
therapist is best placed in terms of training to fulfil a prime facilitative role.  
Given that the NHS constitution cites dignity and respect as key ways of showing person-
centred, compassionate care (NHS England), and that the Health and Care Professions Council 
deŵaŶds that its ƌegisteƌed ŵeŵďeƌs ͞pƌoŵote aŶd pƌoteĐt the iŶteƌests of seƌǀiĐe useƌs aŶd 
Đaƌeƌs͟ ;HCPC, ϮϬϭϲͿ, treating the body, mind and spirit facets of our clients seems to be a 
professional imperative. Chochinov (2006, p 94) clarifies the correlation between holism and 
dignity: 
͞aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg patieŶts as ǁhole peƌsoŶs is oŶe of the ŵost aƌdeŶt pƌediĐtoƌs of ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg 
digŶitǇ͟. 
Holism is at the heart of modern healthcare, and is integral to the practice of healthcare 
professionals, including SLTs. Other healthcare practitioners, such as chaplains are accustomed 
to aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg aŶd ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith the ĐoŶĐepts of ͞total Đaƌe͟ aŶd ͞total paiŶ͟, a teƌŵ 
adopted by Dame Cicely Saunders, physician, nurse, social worker and founder of the hospice 
movement (Fitchett and Nolan, 2015, p 197). The term encapsulates all facets of human 
suffering, be they physical, psychological or, indeed, spiritual.  It acknowledges that both 
physical and mental illness may be accompanied by existential pain, often illustrated by 
ƋuestioŶs suĐh as ͚ǁhǇ is this happeŶiŶg to ŵe?͛ oƌ ͚is this all there is?͛. 
1.4 Spirituality and illness 
 
Throughout history, it seems that mystics and holy people who are suffering through mental or 
phǇsiĐal ill health haǀe eŶjoǇed a ͞privileged access to the divine͟ (Clark Power et al, 2008, p 
375), almost as if the suffering has drawn them closer to God or to spiritual wholeness. 
Perhaps the most well-known example of this is Julian of Norwich, the fourteenth century 
aŶĐhoƌess aŶd ChƌistiaŶ ŵǇstiĐ. JuliaŶ ǁƌote iŶ heƌ ͞‘eǀelatioŶs of DiǀiŶe Loǀe͟ of the diǀiŶe 
͚shoǁiŶgs͛, oƌ appaƌitioŶs that appeaƌed to heƌ as she suffeƌed a seǀeƌe illŶess. It seeŵs that 
sickness brought JuliaŶ ͞ǀiǀid peƌĐeptioŶ͟ ;JuliaŶ of NoƌǁiĐh, ϭϵϵϴ, p ϯͿ ǁhiĐh eŶaďled heƌ to 
see and feel more intensely. She was close to death (p 5), and she relates mysterious 
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sensations (such as the pain in her body completely disappearing) and visions (such as blood 
trickling down from a crown of thorns on the crucifix in front of her). 
The title of the poem by St John of the Cross - ͞Daƌk Night of the “oul͟ - has been adopted by 
the Roman Catholic church to refer to a spiritual crisis in a journey towards union with God, 
such as that depicted in the poem. St John was imprisoned and it is thought many of his poems 
were borne out of this suffering (Thompson, 1999, p 8). 
The French author, Jean Vanier, has devoted his life to living and working with people with 
learning disabilities, believing that to become fully human, one must grow spiritually through 
ƌelatioŶship ǁith otheƌs. He fouŶd that ͞ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ life ǁith ŵeŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ ǁho haǀe 
iŶtelleĐtual disaďilities…taught [hiŵ] a gƌeat deal aďout ǁhat it ŵeaŶs to ďe huŵaŶ͟, iŶ teƌŵs 
of loneliness, belonging, inclusion, freedom and forgiveness (Vanier, 1999, p 6). 
All these examples suggest particular access to spirituality through illness, disability and 
suffering. There exists, perhaps, a human need to question and to reach out for existential 
answers when in the midst of physical or emotional hardship: 
͞eǆisteŶtial eǆpeƌieŶĐes suĐh as seƌious illŶess aŶd the death of a loǀed oŶe haǀe aŶ uŶĐaŶŶǇ 
ǁaǇ of stoppiŶg us iŶ ouƌ tƌaĐks, as ǁe pause to ƌefleĐt oŶ life͛s ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt ŵeaŶiŶgs͟ 
(Burke and Neimeyer, 2012, p 127). 
Koenig (2012) carried out an extensive and comprehensive review of the quantitative research 
studies published between 1872 and 2010 concerned with the effects of spirituality and/or 
religion on different aspects of health.  He stressed in this systematic review that he was not 
eǆploƌiŶg studies that iŶǀestigate ͞supeƌŶatuƌal oƌ tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶt foƌĐes͟ (p 13) but rather what 
effect belief in these forces might have on physical and mental health. He concluded that the 
majority of research (quantitative studies) on religion/ spirituality and health involved studies 
on mental, as opposed to physical, health. Factors associated with religion/spirituality that 
were shown to have positive effects on mental health in the majority of studies included 
ĐopiŶg ǁith adǀeƌsitǇ, a seŶse of optiŵisŵ, aŶd ideŶtified ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd puƌpose iŶ oŶe͛s life.  
In terms of physical health, Koenig (2012) found many studies that demonstrated a positive 
correlation between religion/spirituality and health outcomes. These included studies into 
coronary heart disease, hypertension and stroke, as well as dementia and cancer. Better 
health behaviours in people who profess to be religious or spiritual (such as better diet and 
lower alcohol and drug consumption, better coping strategies and higher levels of social 
support), all led to improved health outcomes. When he looked at studies related to longevity 
aŶd ƌeligioŶ/spiƌitualitǇ, KoeŶig ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ĐoŶĐluded that ͞the Đuŵulatiǀe effeĐts of ‘/“ [siĐ], if it 
has any benefits to physical health, ought to have an effect on mortality. The research suggests 
that it does.͟ He Đited ϲϴ% of studies eǆaŵiŶiŶg the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ ƌeligioŶ/spiƌitualitǇ 
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and mortality predicted significantly higher longevity, whereas 5% of the studies reported 
lower mortality. 
Koenig (2012) concludes his systematic review with implications of the research for clinical 
interventions. He proposes eight key reasons why spirituality should be incorporated into 
healthcare: 
- Unmet spiritual needs may negatively impact health outcomes and increase mortality 
- A patieŶt͛s spiƌitualitǇ/ƌeligioŶ iŶflueŶĐes theiƌ aďilitǇ to Đope ǁith illŶess oƌ disaďilitǇ 
- A patieŶt͛s ƌeligious oƌ spiƌitual ďeliefs ŵaǇ affeĐt the deĐisioŶs theǇ ŵake aďout theiƌ 
medical care 
- A doĐtoƌ͛s ƌeligious oƌ spiƌitual ǀieǁs ŵaǇ iŵpaĐt oŶ theiƌ ĐliŶiĐal deĐisioŶ-making 
- A patieŶt͛s ƌeligioŶ/spiƌitualitǇ ŵaǇ affeĐt ďoth theiƌ ŵeŶtal aŶd phǇsiĐal health 
- A patieŶt͛s ƌeligioŶ/spiƌitualitǇ ŵaǇ iŵpaĐt the soƌt of suppoƌt sǇsteŵ they have 
available to them 
- Failuƌe to addƌess patieŶts͛ spiƌitual/ƌeligious Ŷeeds ŵaǇ haǀe Đost iŵpliĐatioŶs ;foƌ 
example, not being willing to turn off a life support machine) 
- Healthcare systems in the developed world demand that patients are afforded respect 
at all times, and that includes respect for their spiritual beliefs 
Evidence linking spirituality with improved health outcomes (Koenig, 2012) has resulted in the 
emergence of a mind-body-spirit paradigm in Western medicine, or a bio-psycho-social-
spiritual model (Sulmasy, 2002), where the person is seen as a complete individual comprised 
of many facets, as opposed to a disembodied illness entity. 
1.5 Spirituality and healthcare 
 
Until the eighteenth century, when science and reason began to take precedence, religion and 
healthcare were inextricably linked. Pre-enlightenment, body and soul were treated together. 
Religious orders took care of the sick, and throughout the Middle Ages, medics were in fact 
also clergy (Koenig, 2012). Up until the 1950s, female nurses wore a wimple-like headdress, 
and senior female nurses can sometimes be refeƌƌed to eǀeŶ todaǇ as ͚sister͛; both these facts 
bear testament to the legacy of nuns carrying out early healthcare. 
As science began to gain dominance in the eighteenth century, care of the body and soul 
began to become separate. As science provided better diagnoses and treatments for physical 
complaints, so the spiritual aspect of patients became disconnected and seemingly irrelevant. 
In this biomedical model, the physician was seen as the expert, bestowing his knowledge and 
skill on ignorant patients. Physical illness had a cause; pathogens and bacteria were discovered 
using newly invented machinery, and medicines were devised which targeted these. But in this 
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new world of positivism and proof, of cause and effect, did the soul get subsumed, so that only 
part of the patient was being treated? 
If the science-oriented nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced a biomedical model 
of care, where positivism was king and medics enjoyed a certain hegemony, recent years have 
seen a resurgence of the spiritual in healthcare, with holistic practice and the patient as expert 
in their own condition being the prevalent narratives. 
If we accept that, as well as religion in some instances, spirituality encompasses concepts such 
as purpose, meaning, love and value, it is not unsurprising that it then becomes an important 
component of illness, health and well-being. 
From an international perspective, the World Health Organisation has recognised for some 
time the integral role that spirituality plays in health and well-being, and this is perhaps best 
illustrated in the development in 2002 of a field-test instrument (questionnaire) designed to 
measure quality of life and health. The tool comprises 100 questions relating to such issues as 
pain and fatigue, body image and relationships. In addition, however, there are 32 Spirituality, 
‘eligiousŶess aŶd PeƌsoŶal Beliefs ƋuestioŶs, suĐh as ͞to ǁhat eǆteŶt do Ǉou feel Ǉouƌ life has 
puƌpose?͟ aŶd ͞to ǁhat eǆteŶt do Ǉou feel spiƌituallǇ touĐhed ďǇ ďeautǇ?͟ ;WHO, ϮϬϬϮďͿ. 
More locally, in the aftermath of the situation in Mid-Staffordshire
2
, the NHS strove to create a 
more values-based approach within healthcare staff, instilling values such as respect, dignity, 
compassion and working together for the good of the patient (NHS England). Central to these 
values is a person-centred approach which has been the bastion of UK and other healthcare 
pre-registration programmes for many years (HCPC, 2013; NMC, 2015). 
Literature exists which suggests that attending to the spiritual needs of patients is not only 
desirable from a respect and dignity perspective, but that alleviating spiritual distress and 
encouraging spiritual expression may contribute to the healing process (Koenig, 2012), or to 
the iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to Đope ǁith illŶess. McClain, Rosenfeld and Breitbart (2003) carried out 
several standardised assessments of spirituality, depression, hopelessness, and attitudes to 
impending death, and discovered that ͞spiƌitual ǁell-being offers some protection against end-
of-life despaiƌ iŶ those foƌ ǁhoŵ death is iŵŵiŶeŶt͟ ;p ϭϲϬϯͿ. Theiƌ aƌguŵeŶt is that spiƌitual 
Đaƌe ŵaǇ help ͞ďolsteƌ͟ ;p ϭϲϬϯͿ psǇĐhologiĐal fuŶĐtioŶiŶg ǁhiĐh eŶaďles adjustŵeŶt to death 
and dying. 
If addressing spiritual needs is seen as a national and international imperative in health, 
healthcare professionals need to ensure that this prerogative is open to all, including those 
                                                          
2
 In the late 2000s, high mortality rates in Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust were reported and failings of 
patient safety and quality of care identified in the Francis Report (Francis, 2013) 
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who find verbal expression difficult, such as people with learning disability, dementia or, 
indeed, aphasia. 
Although, as already discussed, spirituality is notoriously difficult to define, within the specific 
sphere of spirituality in healthcare, Murray and Zentner (1989, p 259) offer the following 
attempt: 
͞A ƋualitǇ that goes beyond religious affiliation, that strives for inspiration, reverence, awe, 
meaning and purpose, even in those who do not believe in any good. The spiritual dimension 
tries to be in harmony with the universe, and strives for answers about the infinite, and comes 
iŶto foĐus ǁheŶ the peƌsoŶ faĐes eŵotioŶal stƌess, phǇsiĐal illŶess oƌ death.͟ 
Is this a helpful definition or does it restrict us in our thinking about spirituality? McGilchrist 
(2010) posits that too often in science and in research we are tempted to reduce constructs 
into manageable, graspable concepts, which in turn negates their full meaning. In terms of 
spirituality in healthcare, Bash (2004, p 15) would appear to agree: 
͞If ǁe aƌe ĐlaiŵiŶg that theƌe is aŶ oǀeƌ-arching, inclusive description of spirituality that fits all 
– or even the majority of – patients aŶd ĐlieŶts, ǁe aƌe ŵistakeŶ.͟  
“ǁiŶtoŶ aŶd PattisoŶ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϮϮϲͿ disĐuss the Ŷeed foƌ a ͞thiŶ, ǀague, aŶd useful 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of spiƌitualitǇ͟ ǁithiŶ the field of ŶuƌsiŶg Đaƌe.  They argue that if people within 
healthcare, both patients and care-pƌoǀideƌs, aƌe usiŶg the teƌŵ ͚spiƌitualitǇ͛ aŶd fiŶd it 
ŵeaŶiŶgful aŶd useful, the task of aĐadeŵiĐs aŶd otheƌs is to ͞uŶdeƌstaŶd the fuŶĐtioŶ aŶd 
direction of the language of spirituality, not to question its validitǇ oƌ ƌight to eǆist͟ ;p ϮϮϵͿ.  
It would seem that, definitive definition or not, spiritual issues can and do impact on illness, 
well-being and healthcare, and as such perhaps healthcare professionals should be ready to 
offer ͞suppoƌtiǀe-expressive interventions that encourage the expression of feelings towards 
illŶess aŶd ĐhaŶgiŶg life ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͟ (Chochinov, 2006, p 98). 
1.6 Spirituality and nursing 
 
Just as nursing retains the vestiges of religion, so, as a profession, it continues to embrace the 
concept of spirituality being an important part of healthcare. 
There exists a plethora of articles related to spirituality in the nursing literature since the 
1980s, and nursing continues to be the profession at the forefront of regaining a spiritual 
dimension to healthcare, following the dominance of the biomedical model of the nineteenth 
and first half of the twentieth centuries. Nurses have contributed widely not only to 
understanding spirituality and spiritual care in their own profession, but in healthcare in 
general (e.g. McSherry and Cash, 2004; Swinton, 2010; Hudson, 2012;). Academics with a 
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nursing background, such as Swinton (2010, p 19), have provided helpful definitions and 
meanings of spirituality and spiritual care.  
Perhaps Ŷot uŶsuƌpƌisiŶglǇ, giǀeŶ that ͞a holistiĐ appƌoaĐh is estaďlished as ďoth a philosophǇ 
aŶd a ŵodel of Đaƌe͟ ;Ellis aŶd LloǇd-Williams, 2012, p 257) in the world of palliative care 
nursing, the palliative and end-of-life care literature is a rich source of spirituality and nursing 
articles. People coming to the end of life are likely to consider issues of existence and meaning, 
death and suffering: 
͞the ƌepoƌted desiƌe foƌ spiƌitual aŶd/oƌ ƌeligious ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs iŶĐƌeases at eŶd of life and 
severe illness situations͟ ;Beƌg et al, ϮϬϭϮ, p 45). 
For example, Carroll (2001) carried out semi-structured interviews with palliative care nurses, 
in order to explore their experiences of providing spiritual care for patients with advanced, 
terminal cancer. These nurses defined spirituality using terms such as soul, essence, core and 
interconnectedness and they recognised that, as well as physical pain and discomfort, their 
patieŶts Đould ͞also eǆpeƌieŶĐe psǇĐhologiĐal aŶd spiƌitual distƌess͟ ;p ϵϭͿ. All the Ŷuƌses 
interviewed recognised the need for spiritual, as well as physical and emotional, nursing care.  
Reid (2012) agrees that spirituality and addressing spiritual needs has a place in the care of the 
dying, and acknowledges that nurses (as well as other healthĐaƌe pƌofessioŶalsͿ Ŷeed to ͞look 
ďeǇoŶd ŵediĐal theƌapies as theǇ listeŶ to people ǁho aƌe stƌuggliŶg ǁith theiƌ dǇiŶg͟ ;p ϭϮϮͿ. 
In their study, Ronaldson et al (2012) compared spiritual care given by palliative care nurses 
with that given by acute care nuƌses, ďǇ usiŶg ƋuestioŶŶaiƌes to ŵeasuƌe the Ŷuƌses͛ spiƌitual 
perspectives and their spiritual care practice. The study found that nurses working in palliative 
care had both higher spirituality perspective scores, and more developed spiritual care 
practice. It is perhaps interesting to speculate whether being a palliative care nurse enhances 
oŶe͛s spiƌitual peƌspeĐtiǀes, oƌ ǁhetheƌ those iŶdiǀiduals ǁith a ŵoƌe deǀeloped idea of 
spirituality and spiritual care are attracted to that specialism. 
Unsurprisingly, spirituality also features highly in the cancer care literature, supporting the 
idea that life-threatening disease often forces us to confront the numinous, as existential 
questions come to the fore (Burke and Neimeyer, 2012, p 127). Swinton et al (2011) 
interviewed fourteen women in the first year after a diagnosis of breast cancer. Using a 
heƌŵeŶeutiĐ pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal appƌoaĐh, theǇ eǆploƌed the ǁoŵeŶ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐes post-
diagnosis, and whether spirituality was useful in terms of coping with that diagnosis. One key 
finding which emerged from the rich qualitative data was that the women often needed time 
and space to reflect on existential issues, and that this reflection may include spiritual and 
religious reflective practices.  
Other nursing literature includes the voices of patients talking about their spiritual needs, 
distress and well-being. For example, Mohlzahn et al (2012) conducted in-depth interviews 
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with various groups of people with severe illness, in order to tell their stories of spirituality. 
Participants included patients with end-stage renal disease, cancer and HIV/AIDS, the nurse 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that ͞Ŷaƌƌatiǀe iŶƋuiƌǇ…pƌoǀides a ǁiŶdoǁ iŶto uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the 
experiences of people living with serious illnesses and the multiple narratives used in facing 
eǆisteŶtial life ƋuestioŶs͟ ;MohlzahŶ et al, ϮϬϭϮ, p ϮϯϰϵͿ. PaƌtiĐipaŶts aƌe Ƌuoted ǀeƌďatiŵ, iŶ 
order to illustrate the themes uncovered in the study, namely reflection on spiritual, religious 
and personal beliefs, crafting beliefs, finding meaning, and transcendence beyond words. The 
authors hope that the richness of the narratives will give clinicians a deeper understanding of 
spiƌitual issues ƌelated to seƌious illŶess, ǁhiĐh iŶ tuƌŶ ǁill ƌesult iŶ ͞ƌespeĐtful Đaƌe͟, ǁheƌe 
spiritual and personal beliefs are recognised and acknowledged. 
Narayanasamy, Gates and Swinton (2002) describe an empirical study, where learning 
disability nurses were encouraged to discuss critical incidents which illustrated how they met 
the spiritual needs of the clients with whom they worked.  This departure from the interview 
technique led to rich and revealing discussions of spiritual care in action with this client group. 
Other papers, such as Daly and Fahey-McCarthy (2014) also aim to describe how nurses 
provide spiritual care to a particular client group, in this instance people with dementia. Rather 
than gathering empirical evidence, they seek to shed light on the idea of people with cognitive 
iŵpaiƌŵeŶt still ďeiŶg spiƌitual ďeiŶgs, aŶd ĐoŶĐlude that ͞the need to explore spiritual care in 
deŵeŶtia is pƌessiŶg͟ ;p ϳϵϬͿ, Ŷot least ďeĐause of the gƌoǁiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ of people liǀiŶg ǁith 
dementia (Harrison Denning et al, 2016). Carr, Hicks-Moore and Montgomery (2011) explore 
the possiďilitǇ that ͞spiƌitual ideŶtity might actually increase and strengthen as dementia 
pƌogƌesses͟ ;p ϮͿ, aŶd iŶteƌǀieǁed people ǁith deŵeŶtia, theiƌ faŵilǇ ŵeŵďeƌs aŶd 
healthcare professionals to create spiritual stories, in which themes were identified. 
Despite the rich wealth of literature pertaining to nursing and spiritual care, not all nurses 
agree that spirituality is necessarily a separate part of the care they provide, and struggle to 
differentiate spiritual care from everyday person-centred care. Bash (2004), although not a 
nurse but a minister in the Church of England entering into the nursing/spirituality debate, 
poses thorny questions about definitions and measures of spirituality in healthcare, and in 
nursing in particular.  He sees spirituality in healthcare as divided into three discrete definition 
aƌeas, ŶaŵelǇ ͞the ŶoŶ-theistic, the theistic, and a via media͟ ;p ϭϮͿ. It is this latteƌ ĐategoƌǇ 
with which Bash the Anglican priest takes issue, because he believes it uses religious language 
to talk about secular matters – what he desĐƌiďes as a ͞ƌeligioŶless ƌeligioŶ͟ ;p ϭϮͿ. His 
contention, however, is that spirituality not only defies definition, but also defies positivist 
measurement or analysis. Although spirituality does not, according to Bash (2004), lend itself 
to nomothetiĐ iŶǀestigatioŶ, he ĐoŶĐedes that ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal eǆpƌessioŶs of that 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ ;p ϭϱͿ ŵaǇ ďe ŵeasuƌed. 
23 
 
PaleǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϴ, p ϯͿ is a ƌaƌe ďut loud disseŶtiŶg ǀoiĐe iŶ the ŶuƌsiŶg liteƌatuƌe, pƌoŵulgatiŶg a 
͞ƌeduĐtioŶist appƌoaĐh͟ to spiƌitualitǇ. He argues that claims about spiritual care made in the 
ŶuƌsiŶg liteƌatuƌe aŶd elseǁheƌe aƌe uŶsuďstaŶtiated aŶd ofteŶ ͞gƌatuitous͟ ;p ϯͿ. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast 
to Bash (2004) who believes that spirituality cannot and should not be measured in any 
scientific way, Paley (ϮϬϬϴͿ iŶsists that spiƌitualitǇ͛s doǁŶfall is pƌeĐiselǇ that it is Ŷot 
͞aŵeŶaďle…to sĐieŶtifiĐ studǇ͟. He Đlaiŵs that ͞spiƌitualitǇ is aŶ iŶǀeŶtioŶ of the late ϮϬth 
ĐeŶtuƌǇ͟, aŶd ͞a deeplǇ aƌtifiĐial, shalloǁ aŶd…uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ ĐoŶĐept͟ ;p ϵͿ. Of Đouƌse, as a 
nurse, he does not dispute that patients – particularly those suffering severe illness and 
disability – can experience distress which is not physiological, but he claims that these can be 
understood in psychological and neuropsychological (i.e. nomothetic) terms.    
Occurring less frequently in the nursing spirituality literature is the voice of the individual with 
communication difficulties, be that because of dementia, learning disability or aphasia. There 
exists, of course, an inherent difficulty in hearing the voice of the participant who has reduced 
or absent communicative competence. Although narrative and storytelling can be a rich source 
of qualitative data, this approach can be problematic for those with limited language skills. The 
speech and language therapist may be best placed to facilitate these narratives. 
1.7 Spirituality and speech and language therapy 
 
Compared with nursing, speech and language therapy is a relatively young profession, with the 
first reference to speech and language therapy being traced back to the late nineteenth 
century, and a course beginning at the Central School of Speech Training and Drama Art in 
1906 (Stansfield and Armstrong, 2014). Initial therapy interventions tended to focus on 
stammering, but as world events evolved, subsequent therapy intervention in the first half of 
the twentieth century revolved around war veterans with psychological and neurological 
injuries. It seems that the profession grew out of necessity following head injuries and shell 
shock sustained by soldiers in the Great War. Unlike nursing, SLT developed independently in 
response to an identified need, and did not draw on an existing profession or institution, as 
nursing drew on religious orders. The origins of SLT would therefore seem more inherently 
secular in nature, and the profession appears to be one in which spirituality and religion have 
not, until recently, played a part. 
A study of the literature using the search engines Medline, CINAHL, Library Search and Google 
Scholar reveals an embryonic interest in spirituality within speech and language therapy
3
.  
Whilst other health and social care professionals, most notably nurses, occupational therapists 
                                                          
3
 Speech-language pathology was also included in the literature search, the title used in the United 
States and Australia 
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and social workers, have well and truly grasped the baton and started to explore the extent to 
whiĐh spiƌitualitǇ plaǇs a ƌole iŶ theiƌ patieŶts͛ liǀes aŶd iŶ the Đaƌe pƌoǀided to theiƌ patieŶts, 
speech and language therapists have only just left the starting blocks. 
Why should spirituality concern speech and language therapists in their management of clients 
with speech, language and swallowing difficulties? Does the spiritual realm enter into the 
therapy room, or should it? In this outcomes-driven world of healthcare where quantitative 
results are often seen as king, is there room for the nebulousness of the numinous? 
Spillers (2007, p 191) opened up the dialogue within the field of speech and language therapy 
ďǇ ƌeŵaƌkiŶg that ͞aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁith a ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ disoƌdeƌ ĐaŶ haǀe 
spiƌitual iŵpliĐatioŶs͟. “he posits that aŶǇ disaďilitǇ oƌ illness (including communication 
disability) can bring up issues of a deep and existential nature and that perhaps as clinicians we 
should be ready and willing to listen to these issues as expressed by our clients. Spillers (2007) 
sees this not only as an empathic and humane undertaking, but also one that could be integral 
to the suĐĐess of tƌaditioŶal theƌapǇ pƌogƌaŵŵes, iŶ that ͞[ƌ]esolutioŶ of these spiƌitual issues 
ŵaǇ uŶdeƌgiƌd ĐlieŶts͛ aďilities to faĐe aŶd sustaiŶ the ĐhaŶges that the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
disoƌdeƌ iŵposes upoŶ theŵ͟ ;p ϭϵϮͿ. “pilleƌs ;ϮϬϭϭͿ lateƌ deǀelops heƌ aƌguŵeŶt, asseƌtiŶg 
that speeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapists aƌe iŶtegƌal to the ͞soul ǁoƌk͟ ;p ϮϯϭͿ Đaƌƌied out ďǇ ouƌ 
clients, as they attempt to redefine themselves after illness and create a new, meaningful 
eǆisteŶĐe. The theƌapeutiĐ ƌelatioŶship, she suggests, ŵaǇ ďe ǀieǁed as ͞aŶ aĐt of 
ĐoŵŵuŶioŶ͟ ;p ϮϯϲͿ, aŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt ĐoŶduĐiǀe to the ǁell-being and sense of belonging of 
both the clinician and the client. 
Spillers et al (2009) gave a presentation at a conference hosted by the American Speech-
Language-Hearing AssoĐiatioŶ ;A“HAͿ iŶ Neǁ OƌleaŶs, eŶtitled ͞Exploring the role of 
spirituality in professional pƌaĐtiĐe͟.  In this study, SLT clients (both adults and children), 
clinicians and student SLT practitioners were interviewed, to obtain qualitative comments, and 
given a Likert-sĐale ƋuestioŶŶaiƌe to Đoŵplete. QuestioŶs uŶdeƌ ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ iŶĐluded ͞ǁhat 
is spiƌitualitǇ?͟ ͞is it the ƌole of the “LT to disĐuss spiƌitualitǇ ǁith theiƌ ĐlieŶts?͟ aŶd ͞should 
spirituality be included in SLT pre-ƌegistƌatioŶ ĐuƌƌiĐula͟. IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, although oǀeƌ ϴϬ% of 
adult SLT clients stated that it was appropriate for SLTs to address spirituality within their 
caring remit, and 92% of the adult clients reported that spirituality played an average to very 
large role in adjustment to their communication impairment, only 35% of the practising SLTs 
felt that it was appropriate for them to address spirituality in their clinical practice. There 
seems to be, from this albeit limited example, a marked disconnect between what clients feel 
is part of the SLT role in regards to spirituality and what SLTs themselves feel is within their 
professional remit. Interestingly, 65% of SLT student practitioners were open to inclusion of 
spirituality in the pre-registration SLT curricula. 
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Most recently, Mathisen et al (2015) have considered spirituality and religion, citing their 
͞laƌgelǇ ŶegleĐted ĐliŶiĐal ƌeleǀaŶĐe͟ ;p ϮϯϬϵͿ ǁithiŶ the spheƌe of speeĐh aŶd laŶguage 
therapy. TheǇ Đite the Woƌld Health OƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s IŶteƌŶatioŶal ClassifiĐatioŶ of FuŶĐtioŶiŶg, 
Disability and Health – pastoral interventions (2001) and the WHO International Classification 
of Diseases: Australian Modification of Health Interventions of the International Classification 
of Diseases and Related Health Problems (2002a), as possible imperatives for speech and 
language therapists to consider the spiritual facet of their clients, if they are indeed to treat in 
an holistic manner. Indeed, one of their implications for practice is the suggestion that SLTs 
begin to use WHO spirituality/religion coding in their goal setting and outcome measures (p 
2320). Given that religion/spirituality has been shown to provide coping strategies for people 
with illness (Koenig, 2012; Homan and Boyatzis, 2010), may lead to healthier lifestyles (Koenig, 
2012) aŶd that ďeiŶg aǁaƌe of a ĐlieŶt͛s spiritual concerns may foster empathy, compassion 
and rapport (Mathisen et al, 2015, p 2312), MathiseŶ et al ;ϮϬϭϱ, p ϮϯϭϱͿ ƋueƌǇ ǁhǇ ͞feǁ SLPs 
iŶĐlude it iŶ theiƌ ĐliŶiĐal pƌaĐtiĐe.͟ TheǇ Đite a pƌeǀious studǇ of oĐĐupatioŶal theƌapists ;OTͿ 
by Kirsch et al (2001), which explored why OTs were reluctant to include spirituality in their 
assessment and intervention with clients, and proposed that similar issues and attitudes may 
be influencing SLTs. These included a lack of or perceived lack of pre-registration training in the 
area, a lack of time, willingness and opportunity, a perception that it was outside of their scope 
of practice, and a difficulty in thinking about and expressing their own spiritual beliefs. 
Although needing to respect professional boundaries, Mathisen et al (2015) propose that 
spirituality could be encompassed in SLT practice in a number of useful ways. Firstly, SLTs may 
be involved in carrying out spiritual assessments, such as the FICA Spiritual Assessment Tool © 
(Puchalski, 1996). Arguably, SLTs may be the best-placed professionals to facilitate completion 
of such a word-based assessment with clients with communication impairment. Secondly, SLTs 
may find it useful to use religious artefacts and texts within therapy sessions, in order to make 
those sessions meaningful and functional for the client. Thirdly, use of WHO coding in pastoral 
and spiritual care may make for more holistic and client-centred goals.  
Negative impacts of not including spirituality in SLT practice include the following: 
- Therapy may become superficial by not including religious or spiritual beliefs 
- Good therapy outcomes may be negated by not considering spiritual issues which may 
impact on the success of therapy 
- Without SLT help, clients may be unable to access meaningful spiritual resources or 
practices ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ help ǁith the ͞ƌestoƌatiǀe, healiŶg oƌ eduĐatioŶal pƌoĐesses that 
would enhance or sustaiŶ theƌapǇ goals͟ ;Mathisen, 2015, p 2318)  
Integration of spirituality into the frameworks and practices of speech and language therapy 
have not occurred to date. There is no mention of spirituality in either the American Speech-
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Language-Hearing Association (2016), nor the Speech Pathology Australia (2015) scope of 
practice document. In the United Kingdom, SLTs refer to two main documents in terms of the 
scope of their clinical practice: Communicating Quality Live (Royal College of Speech and 
Language Therapists, 2016) and the Clinical Guidelines (RCSLT, 2005). The term spirituality 
does not appear in either of them. 
The literature pertaining to spirituality in speech and language therapy is therefore, at the 
present time, limited. Spillers being from the United States and Mathisen and her colleagues 
from Australia, my chapter (MacKenzie, 2015) in Speech and Language Therapy and 
Professional Identity (Stokes and McCormick, 2015), and a subsequent 2016 article in the 
Journal for the Study of Spirituality (MacKenzie, 2016) are to date (and to my knowledge) the 
only publications about spirituality in the field of speech and language therapy in the United 
Kingdom. 
1.8 Spirituality and other therapies 
 
Occupational therapists (OTs), by contrast, seem to have travelled much further than the other 
therapies (by which I mean physiotherapy and speech and language therapy) along the road of 
inclusion (or not) in their clinical work of issues relating to spirituality. In their conference of 
2004, occupational therapists drew up a definition of spirituality: 
͞“piƌitualitǇ ĐaŶ ďe defiŶed as the seaƌĐh foƌ ŵeaŶiŶg aŶd puƌpose iŶ life, ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ oƌ ŵaǇ 
not be related to a belief in God or some form of higher power. For those with no conception 
of supernatural belief, spirituality may relate to the notion of a motivating life force, which 
involves an integration of the dimensions of mind, body and spirit. This personal belief or faith 
also shapes aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe oŶ the ǁoƌld aŶd is eǆpƌessed iŶ the ǁaǇ that he oƌ she 
lives life. Therefore, spirituality is experienced through connectedness to God/a higher being, 
aŶd/oƌ ďǇ oŶe͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith self, otheƌs oƌ Ŷatuƌe.͟ ;JohŶstoŶ aŶd MaǇeƌs, ϮϬϬϱͿ. 
Because OT is inherently interested in the integration of all facets of the client in occupation, it 
makes intuitive sense that spirituality be included in models of occupation, and indeed it is, 
such as in the Canadian Model of Occupational Performance (Canadian Association of 
Occupational Therapists, 1997). In fact, not only is spirituality included in the model, it is at the 
very centre of it, surrounded by other personal facets of the human condition such as the 
physical, cognitive and affective.  
Kang (2003), another OT this time in Australia, has produced a new practice framework which 
she Đalls the ͞psǇĐhospiƌitual iŶtegƌatioŶ fƌaŵe of ƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ oĐĐupatioŶal theƌapǇ͟. “he 
discusses the fact that spirituality encompasses centredness, connectedness, transcendence 
and meaning, and how these aspects of our clients can sometimes be neglected by healthcare 
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professionals. Her framework therefore aims to encourage OTs to engage with the spiritual 
facet of their clients in a systematic way. 
Physiotherapy (Turner and Cook, 2016, p 59) and speech and language therapy (MacKenzie, 
201ϲ, p ϳϵͿ seeŵ to ďe laggiŶg ďehiŶd, iŶ teƌŵs of disĐussiŶg spiƌitualitǇ͛s ƌole iŶ the theƌapǇ 
arena and in contributing to the literature. Both therapies seek to treat their clients holistically, 
and therefore consideration of the spiritual dimension of their clients seems apposite. Turner 
and Cook (2016, p 65) identified a majority of the physiotherapy respondents to a 
questionnaire who agreed that spirituality was an important component of ͟health, therapy 
and well-ďeiŶg of patieŶts͟. A ŵajoƌitǇ ;ϳϱ%Ϳ deemed their role as one of referral on to 
another professional, and almost a half of all respondents felt that identifying spiritual needs 
was part of their physiotherapy role. Despite this, it seems that pre-registration training did 
not equip physiotherapists for this aspect of their role: 
͞The ŵajoƌitǇ of ƌespoŶdeŶts ;ϳϲ%Ϳ disagƌeed oƌ stƌoŶglǇ disagƌeed that theiƌ aĐadeŵiĐ 
tƌaiŶiŶg had pƌepaƌed theŵ to deal ǁith patieŶts͛ spiƌitual Ŷeeds, ǁith oŶlǇ ϴ% agƌeeiŶg oƌ 
stƌoŶglǇ agƌeeiŶg͟ ;TuƌŶeƌ aŶd Cook, ϮϬϭϲ, p 70). 
Interestingly, the recently published Oxford Textbook of Spirituality in Healthcare (2012) 
contains no contribution from allied health professionals. 
1.9 Spirituality and aphasia 
 
MuŶdle ;ϮϬϭϭͿ, iŶ his ĐapaĐitǇ as hospital ĐhaplaiŶ, has eǆploƌed the ͞existential crisis of 
stƌoke͟ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to patieŶts ǁith seǀeƌe eǆpƌessiǀe aphasia, those ǁho haǀe lost ŵost oƌ all 
their ability to express themselves verbally. He uses FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ tǇpologǇ of illŶess 
narratives in order to explore whether the stroke trajectory of clients with aphasia potentially 
follows a path from one of these narratives to another.  He desĐƌiďes the ͞Đo-ĐƌeatioŶ͟ of the 
therapy process, with the listener attentively co-creating stories with their client. The language 
difficulties of someone with aphasia attempting to tell their story is identified by Mundle, as is 
the onus on the story-listener to become an active and interested participant in the 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, leaƌŶiŶg fƌoŵ the peƌsoŶ ǁith aphasia ͞hoǁ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶd͟ (p 
233). Mundle (2011) also rightly points out, however, that the voice of the person with 
aphasia, ͞uŶŵediated thƌough the falliďle ǀoiĐes of otheƌs͟ is ofteŶ ŵissiŶg fƌoŵ aphasia 
research in general and research into spirituality more particularly. In fact, it is missing from 
his, peƌhaps ďeĐause his eŵphasis as a ĐhaplaiŶ is oŶ the ĐlieŶts͛ spiƌitualitǇ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ theiƌ 
aphasia.  
Another recent and welcome study, carried out by nurse researchers (Bronken et al, 2012), 
reports a single case study of a woman with aphasia and, indeed, direct quotes ensure that her 
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voice is heard. The researchers encourage storytelling of her stroke journey, not just verbally 
but through many expressive modalities, including symbols, signs, gestures, pictograms and 
drawings. The participant is given the opportunity to tell and retell her illness and disability 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe, as it is ƌeĐogŶised that ͞foƌ stƌoke suƌǀiǀoƌs ǁith Ŷoƌŵal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aŶd 
language skills, assistance with framing life stories and illness narratives has been found to be 
aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt paƌt of suĐĐessful ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͟ ;BƌoŶkeŶ et al, ϮϬϭϮ p ϭϯϬϰͿ. Barrow (2008), a 
speech and language therapist, also reports on a single case study of Anne, a woman with 
aphasia, who speaks about the effect of her disability as she lives with her aphasia; spiritual 
issues are, however, not directly mentioned. In this article, the author uses direct quotes from 
AŶŶe so that the latteƌ͛s ǀoiĐe is heaƌd. “he iŶĐludes, too, heƌ oǁŶ ǀoiĐe as ƌeseaƌĐheƌ, 
͞theƌefoƌe the tapestƌǇ of AŶŶe͛s life living with aphasia is ǁoǀeŶ ǁith ŵǇ [Baƌƌoǁ͛s] Ŷeedle͟ 
(p 36).   
This is iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to a studǇ aďout stƌoke patieŶts͛ fatalisŵ, optiŵisŵ, ƌeligioŶ aŶd depƌessioŶ 
by Morgenstern et al (2011), where the subject matter did include spirituality but participants 
with aphasia were specifically excluded, presumably because of the inherent difficulties in 
gaining data from people with little or no expressive output. 
McLellan et al (2014) carried out a sensitive and inclusive study with Māori with aphasia and 
their whānau (extended family). The aim of the study was to explore, describe and interpret 
the experiences of Māori with aphasia, which included spiritual issues, with some people 
͞gaiŶ[iŶg] eŵotioŶal suppoƌt fƌoŵ theiƌ faith iŶ ɑod͟ ;p ϰϲϰͿ. The ƌesearchers understood that 
the voices of both the Māori with aphasia and their whānau were vital in the study, given that 
well-being of one was dependent on, and inextricably entwined with, the well-being of the 
other, and that this indivisibility carried a spiritual dimension: 
͞Foƌ this gƌoup of Māori with aphasia, there was a deep, almost spiritual, reason for taking 
responsibility for the well-being of the PWA [sic]. That is, the indivisibility of individual and 
whānau well-ďeiŶg͟ ;p ϰϲϳͿ. 
McLellan et al (2014) successfully convey the stroke experiences of this specific cultural group, 
using culturally relevant methodology, in order to inform service delivery for this population. 
Other studies in the literature which do address the spirituality of people with aphasia, carried 
out by nursing colleagues, contain no examples of output from the people being studied, i.e. 
the people with aphasia (Sundin, Jansson and Norberg, 2000; Sundin and Jansson, 2003). 
Nyström (2011) ĐoŶsideƌs the ͞eǆisteŶtial ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͟ of being a relative of someone with 
aphasia, and provides some fascinating insights into changed dynamics and identities. 
However, she does not consider these changes from the perspective of the person with 
aphasia themselves, but rather from the perspective of those around them.  
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There is an imperative to hear the voice of the person with aphasia in aphasia research in 
general, and in terms of the research around spirituality in particular. Facilitated storytelling 
and attentive story-listening may present just such an opportunity for people with aphasia to 
express their spirituality. 
1.10 Storytelling 
 
Spirituality is an integral facet of the human condition – and indeed of human suffering and 
pain (Ross, 2010, p 5) – and therefore worthy of being encompassed within the remit of 
therapy, and specifically speech and language therapy. Similarly, storytelling can be considered 
as one way that humans make sense of life events. Specifically, stories and storytelling are 
used frequently in medicine in order to facilitate healing and to make sense of what has 
happened; as FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯͿ saǇs, theƌe is aŶ ͞iŶheƌeŶt need of ill people to tell their 
stoƌies͟. He eǆplaiŶs hoǁ ͞theǇ Ŷeed to ďeĐoŵe stoƌǇtelleƌs iŶ oƌdeƌ to ƌeĐoǀeƌ the ǀoiĐes that 
illness and its treatment ofteŶ take aǁaǇ͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ǆǆͿ. 
Importantly, these stories need a listener in order for them to be stories. An unheard story is 
an untold story: 
͞a stoƌǇ ƌeƋuiƌes listeŶeƌs; it ŵust ďe told͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϲϮͿ. 
Stories in health research and practice can create empathy and mitigate the often marked, 
though sometimes unacknowledged, power differential between the clinician (or researcher) 
and the patient (or participant) ;O͛MalleǇ, ϮϬϭϭ, p 94). Such power differentials are perhaps 
even more prevalent in conversations or encounters when one party has more ability to 
communicate effectively than the other, as is the case with patients (participants) with 
aphasia. Through storytelling and story-listening, a humanitarian balance of power can be 
established: 
͞Naƌƌatiǀe, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, eǆpƌesses the uŶiƋueŶess of eaĐh peƌsoŶ aŶd addƌesses the 
listeŶeƌ, Ŷot as a pƌofessioŶal, ďut as a felloǁ huŵaŶ.͟ ;Huƌǁitz, ɑƌeeŶhalgh aŶd “kultaŶs, 
2004, p 4) 
Through stories, patients are able to create their own illness or disability narrative, which may 
be shaped and sculpted through multiple tellings over time: 
͞The patieŶt͛s illŶess Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is ŵoƌe thaŶ aŶ aĐĐouŶt of sǇŵptoŵs: it is a foƌŵ of self-
creation through autobiographical literary expression͟ ;Huƌǁitz, ɑƌeeŶhalgh and Skultans, 
2004, p 5). 
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1.11 Conclusion to the background story 
 
Although spirituality remains an elusive concept and one that is not easy to define, it has 
nevertheless gained prominence in the healthcare literature over the last thirty years. Nursing 
is at the forefront of research in spirituality in relation to heath and caring, with occupational 
therapy, speech and language therapy and physiotherapy being newer to the debate. 
Various studies have concluded that people undergoing severe, life-threatening illness often 
face - and need to voice - existential questions. One way that healthcare workers have 
attempted to facilitate this is through the use of narrative, or storytelling. 
Given that storytelling is important for the human condition in general, and for coping with 
illness and disability in particular, we need to consider how people with impaired 
communication skills tell their stories. 
In this study, I intend to shed light on the spiritual stories of people with aphasia. There is no 
problem to be solved, no hypothesis to state (Holliday, 2007, p 31), but rather an area of 
humanness to explore with people with an acquired communication impairment. I wanted to 
eŶsuƌe that eaĐh of ŵǇ ƌeseaƌĐh ƋuestioŶs ǁas ͞suffiĐieŶtlǇ opeŶ-ended to allow open-ended 
exploration and the emergence of factors and issues which the researcher might not have 
pƌeǀiouslǇ thought aďout͟ ;HollidaǇ, ϮϬϬϳ, p ϯϬͿ. FiŶlaǇ ;ϮϬϭϭ, p ϴͿ eǆplaiŶs hoǁ Ƌualitatiǀe 
ƌeseaƌĐh Ŷeeds to ďe iŶduĐtiǀe aŶd eǆploƌatoƌǇ, ͞tǇpiĐallǇ askiŶg ͚ǁhat͛ aŶd ͚hoǁ͛͟, aŶd ǀaŶ 
Manen (2016, p 36), too, expounds the need in qualitative research in general but specifically 
iŶ pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal ƌeseaƌĐh foƌ ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to pose the ͞eidetiĐ ƋuestioŶ of ǁhatŶess͟ aŶd 
the ͞foƌŵatiǀe ƋuestioŶ of thatŶess͟. Peƌhaps it is fitting that in a project where an ambiguous 
aŶd ͞ǀague͟ ;“ǁiŶtoŶ aŶd PattisoŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ ĐoŶĐept suĐh as spiƌitualitǇ is uŶdeƌ disĐussioŶ, the 
research questions, too, are, if not vague, at least very open and inclusive: 
 
- What is it like to express your spirituality when you have aphasia? 
 
- What is the lived experience of members of the multidisciplinary stroke team when 
discussing spirituality with their clients with aphasia? 
 
The questions, then, are vague but deep, allowing the reader to be struck by wonder, wonder 
ǁhiĐh ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϳͿ asseƌts ͞ŵaǇ ďe the aŶteĐedeŶt to iŶƋuiƌǇ͟. The Ƌuestions 
͞ǁhat is it like…?͟  aŶd ͞ǁhat is the liǀed eǆpeƌieŶĐe…?͟ƌefleĐt ŵǇ ĐuƌiositǇ as to ǁhat the 
participants had to say, and to how they said it (Moustakas, 1994, p 104). 
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Chapter 2: The Epistemological and Methodological Journey 
 
͞To suŵŵaƌize a poeŵ iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌeseŶt the ƌesult ǁould destƌoǇ the ƌesult ďeĐause the 
poeŵ itself is the ƌesult. The poeŵ is the thiŶg.͟ 
(van Manen, 1990, p 13) 
 
In order to listen to the spiritual stories of people with aphasia, I had to be completely open to 
new ideas and fresh ways of expressing those ideas. My epistemological stance changed and 
developed as I progressed with the study, as I met and interacted with different people, read 
different material and generally grew as a researcher. 
2.1 Qualitative Methodologies 
 
The concept of exploring spirituality with participants with aphasia lends itself to a qualitative 
approach, as the data is to be words and other forms of communicated material, and the 
research is inductive in nature (Silverman, 2006, p 56). Although quantitative methods of 
questioning people about spirituality exist (such as the FICA Spiritual Assessment Tool© 
(Puchalski, 1996) and the Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality 
(BMMRS) (Fetzer Group/National Institute on Aging working group, 1999, in Baldacchino, 
2010)), and undoubtedly have their place in spirituality assessment and research, these could 
be viewed as reductive in nature, in that questions are set, ideas are planted, and multiple 
choice answers are given. By contrast, I wanted to shed light on a concept I had my own ideas 
about, but that I wanted to explore in others, with no preconceived ideas such as are present 
in these questionnaires.  
Spirituality questionnaires are also, by definition, verbal in nature; they demand a high level of 
reading or auditory comprehension, processing skills, and the ability to respond to a question 
by selecting a multiple choice answer, or by generating a verbal response. Although not 
precluding all people with aphasia – those with good auditory and/or reading comprehension 
may be able to understand and respond appropriately – the language-based nature of these 
assessments may make them difficult for some people with aphasia to access. By choosing a 
qualitative approach, I hoped to enable people with aphasia to express novel thoughts about 
spirituality. I wanted to facilitate their comprehension of questions and concepts through 
careful phrasing, use of pauses, and slowing down of my own speech, and I wanted to 
encourage augmentation of their spoken expressions of spirituality with the use of writing, 
gesture, intonation, facial expression and artefacts. In this way, I felt that data would be rich, 
novel and unhindered. 
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As I embarked on the project, many different qualitative approaches presented themselves to 
me. Initially, I found the idea of an ethnographic methodology appealing. A passing comment 
made to me by a chaplain on a stroke unit who used to walk past the people with aphasia on 
the ward because of the very real difficulty of ministering to people who are not able to speak, 
made me fascinated by the idea of how people with severe expressive difficulties make their 
spiritual needs known, and how professionals might be able to help.  This interest led to a 
desire to immerse myself in the life of people with aphasia, in order to experience first-hand 
the difficulties (and successes) of communicating with an acquired language difficulty. 
However, the aŶthƌopologiĐal ƌoots of ethŶogƌaphǇ suggest that oŶe is iŵŵeƌsed iŶ ͞the 
Đultuƌe aŶd soĐial stƌuĐtuƌe of a soĐial gƌoup͟ ;‘oďsoŶ, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϭϰϮͿ, aŶd I ǁas uŶsuƌe as to 
whether people with aphasia constituted such a group. People with aphasia are from all sorts 
of different social groups and cultures; the very fact of their aphasia did not necessarily mean 
that they had entered a new social and cultural grouping. Ethnographies are also often in-
depth and of long duration, a challenge when carrying out a research project at the same time 
as working. Above all, I could never be a member of that group, if indeed such a group exists, 
eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg ǁhat the ŵeŵďeƌs ǁith aphasia eǆpeƌieŶĐed; I Đould Ŷeǀeƌ eǆploƌe ͞the Đultuƌe 
fƌoŵ iŶside͟ ;‘oďsoŶ, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϭϰϯͿ ďeĐause I did not have aphasia. 
Grounded theory was another qualitative approach which I initially contemplated for the 
studǇ. ɑƌouŶded theoƌǇ is aŶ iŶduĐtiǀe ŵethodologǇ, aŶd ǁas appealiŶg to ŵe ďeĐause ͞ǁith 
flexible guidelines you direct your study but let Ǉouƌ iŵagiŶatioŶ floǁ͟ ;Chaƌŵaz, ϮϬϬϲ, p ϭϱͿ. 
IŶ gƌouŶded theoƌǇ, the eŵphasis is still oŶ oďtaiŶiŶg ƌiĐh data, ǁhiĐh aƌe ͞detailed, foĐussed 
aŶd full͟ ;Chaƌŵaz, ϮϬϬϲ, p ϭϰͿ, hoǁeǀeƌ as the Ŷaŵe of the ŵethodologǇ suggests, the 
researcher is hoping also to create an abstract theoretical understanding of the experience 
under investigation. Although the approach was attractive – I did indeed want to explore 
͞ǁhat ouƌ ƌeseaƌĐh paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ liǀes aƌe like͟ ;Chaƌŵaz, ϮϬϬϲ, p ϮͿ ǀis à vis spirituality – I did 
not envisage, or indeed anticipate, that a theory would be arrived at. The aim of the research 
was to shed light on the concept of spirituality, and explore how people with aphasia 
expressed their spiritual needs and concerns; there was no theory to reveal, but rather ideas 
to explore. Charmaz (2006, p 25) summarises grounded theory thus: 
͞seek data, desĐƌiďe oďseƌǀed eǀeŶts, aŶsǁeƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƋuestioŶs aďout ǁhat is 
happeŶiŶg, theŶ deǀelop theoƌetiĐal Đategoƌies to uŶdeƌstaŶd it͟. IŶ this studǇ, data ǁould be 
sought and some questions about whether and how spirituality was communicated would be 
answered, but I did not envisage theoretical categories being developed to give meaning to the 
data, but rather stories would be told, collated and commented upon. 
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2.2 Phenomenology 
 
͞PheŶoŵeŶologǇ is aďout ǁoŶdeƌ, ǁoƌds, aŶd ǁoƌld.͟ 
(van Manen, 2016, p 13) 
Ethnography and grounded theory, therefore, were considered and discounted as potential 
qualitative paradigms for this study. I knew I wanted to find a methodology that allowed 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes to ďe illuŵiŶated, aŶd that eŶaďled the ǀeƌǇ esseŶĐe of these 
experiences to be perceived by the reader. Through reading, seminars and discussion, I 
discovered phenomenology, an approach which resonated with the subject matter, 
participants, methods of the study and with my ontological stance. If ͞[p]heŶoŵeŶologǇ is 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg a pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ƌatheƌ thaŶ eǆplaiŶiŶg it͟ ;“adala and Adorno, 
2002), then this chimed with my desire to understand participants and acknowledge their 
stories, through an unveiling of human experiences to me. If oŶtologǇ is ĐoŶsideƌed ͞a ĐeƌtaiŶ 
ǁaǇ of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ǁhat is͟ ;CƌottǇ, ϭϵϵϴ, p ϭϬͿ, theŶ the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of 
spirituality is what they experience as spirituality, just as my understanding of spirituality is 
what I experience as spirituality. 
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement concerned with the essence of things.  Essence is 
deƌiǀed fƌoŵ the ɑƌeek ǁoƌd ουσίࠧ ;ousiaͿ, ǁhiĐh is to do ǁith ďeiŶg. This fits well with 
Heideggeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϲϮ, p ϮϳͿ ĐoŶĐept of DaseiŶ aŶd its liteƌal tƌaŶslatioŶ of ͚theƌe-ďeiŶg͛.  We 
might consider spirituality as a fundamental part of being, an essential facet of our being 
human.  
Phenomenology is concerned with perceiving this very essence of things. Moustakas (1994, p 
29) talks about the noema – that which is perceived – and the noema is perceived via our 
ĐoŶsĐiousŶess. Moustakas giǀes the eǆaŵple of a tƌee aŶd eǆplaiŶs that the Ŷoeŵa is ͞Ŷot the 
tree but the appearance of the tree͟. We ĐaŶ eǆtƌapolate this to otheƌ oďjeĐts aŶd otheƌ 
pheŶoŵeŶa; foƌ ŵǇ puƌposes, the Ŷoeŵa is the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies, aŶd the spiƌitualitǇ theǇ 
tell me about; I perceive this spirituality noema as I listen. 
A phenomenological orientation might be described as one which seeks to avoid 
depersonalisation (Finlay, 2011, p 8) and promote the acknowledgement of lived experience 
(van Manen, 1990, p 35). As such, it is an approach redolent with therapeutic essence, which 
helps us to understand others in a gestalt manner. As Thomas (2005, p 63) says, using 
pheŶoŵeŶologǇ Ŷot oŶlǇ iŶ ƌeseaƌĐh ďut also iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe, ĐaŶ ͞take ĐliŶiĐiaŶs iŶto the lifeǁoƌld 
of theiƌ patieŶts iŶ a deepeƌ ǁaǇ͟. Phenomenology as a research methodology began to 
appear in the nursing literature in the 1970s (Thomas, 2005, p 66), but what is it about the 
theoretical perspective of phenomenology that renders it so relevant to working with people 
with aphasia and to the study of spirituality with that population? Heidegger (1962, p 24) 
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suggests that ͞eǀeƌǇ iŶƋuiƌǇ is a seekiŶg [“uĐheŶ]͟. Foƌ Heideggeƌ, eaĐh of us is DaseiŶ ;p ϮϳͿ, 
aŶ eŶtitǇ iŶ the ǁoƌld, iŶteƌaĐtiŶg ǁith otheƌs ;͞MitdaseiŶ͟Ϳ. As DaseiŶ, ǁe aƌe aďle to thiŶk 
about our own existence and being. We are Dasein, regardless of ability or disability, our 
aphasia or our intactness of language. Phenomenology affords the privilege of seeking what 
makes a person a person and part of what makes up that personhood is spirituality. 
Phenomenological research is an intersubjective undertaking, and one that makes it attractive 
for the purposes of this study.  This approach demands understanding and empathy, and that 
the researcher be fully present with her participant. Moustakas (1994, p 57) explains that for 
Husserl, arguably one of the founding fathers of phenomenology as a philosophy, the world is 
perceived as a community of people: 
͞EaĐh ĐaŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶd kŶoǁ the otheƌ, Ŷot eǆaĐtlǇ as oŶe eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd kŶoǁs oŶeself 
ďut iŶ the seŶse of eŵpathǇ aŶd ĐopƌeseŶĐe.͟ 
A review of the qualitative literature within aphasiology by Simmons-Mackie and Lynch (2013) 
reveals that qualitative approaches (which include phenomenology, as well as ethnography 
aŶd gƌouŶded theoƌǇͿ aƌe a fƌeƋueŶt ͞guidiŶg tƌaditioŶ͟ iŶ aphasia ƌeseaƌĐh. Qualitatiǀe 
methods per se aƌe ͞ǁell suited to eǆploƌiŶg Đoŵpleǆ soĐial pheŶoŵeŶa suĐh as 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ disoƌdeƌs͟ ;“iŵŵoŶs-Mackie and Lynch, 2013, p 1282), 
and the occurrence of published qualitative aphasia research articles has risen sharply in the 
last decade.  Viewing phenomena from the perspective of the patient in health research in 
general and in aphasia research in particular has become popular, not least with the rise of the 
respect and dignity agenda within the National Health Service (The Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2013; NHS England), and this approach also lends itself to a 
pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal theoƌetiĐal fƌaŵeǁoƌk, ǁheƌe the iŶdiǀidual͛s stoƌǇ is listeŶed to aŶd 
valued.  
If, as HiŶĐkleǇ ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϵϱͿ posits, pheŶoŵeŶologǇ is a ͞philosophy that studies experience, 
aŶd ƌesults iŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg hoǁ ǁe eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟, it seeŵs apposite to haƌŶess this 
philosophical approach in order to create a methodology congruent with the topic under 
discussion, namely the experiences of spirituality of people with aphasia, and their 
rehabilitation team. 
Can one, however, use a phenomenological approach – which is perhaps traditionally 
recognised as primarily verbal - usiŶg iŶdiǀiduals͛ ǀeƌďal ƌespoŶses aŶd ǁƌitiŶg up ǁhat is said 
in text form – with people for whom expressive language is difficult? Is it possible, then, for the 
essence of our human-ness to be expressed without words, or with limited ability to produce 
language? To my mind, if a participant only has non-verbal means to hand – or a combination 
of both verbal and non-verbal – pheŶoŵeŶologǇ ĐaŶ still seƌǀe to ͞ƌeǀeal the ŵǇsteƌǇ of the 
ǁoƌld aŶd of ƌeasoŶ͟ ;Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p xxiv).  Despite the assertion of Simmons-Mackie 
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and Lynch (2013) that many of the qualitative approaches are becoming common in aphasia 
research, the literature suggests that phenomenology is perhaps used less widely, and this 
could in part be due to its perceived inherent emphasis on the verbal. However, in their case 
study of the understanding of rehabilitation with a patient with aphasia, Hjelmblink et al 
(2007, p 94) assert that it is indeed possible to search for and explore meaning in the, at times, 
͞oďsĐuƌe laŶguage͟ of the peƌsoŶ ǁith aphasia.  
As well as the Hjelmblink et al (2007) article cited above, other studies discovered when using 
the seaƌĐh teƌŵs ͚aphasia aŶd pheŶoŵeŶologǇ͛ iŶcluded two by Nyström (2008; 2011). One of 
these (2011) explored the lived experience of being a close relative of someone with aphasia, 
and the other (2008) looked at professioŶal aphasia Đaƌe fƌoŵ the patieŶt͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe. The 
first of these includes the voice of the relative but not that of the person with aphasia. The 
seĐoŶd iŶĐludes the patieŶts͛ oǁŶ ǀoiĐes iŶ the foƌŵ of diƌeĐt Ƌuotes. IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, NǇstƌöŵ is 
a nurse rather than a speech and language therapist. The voice of the person with aphasia is 
also heard in a phenomenological study by Bronken et al (2012), looking at promoting 
psychosocial well-being through stories. However, by their own admission, the voice of the 
peƌsoŶ ǁith aphasia has ďeeŶ ͞adjusted slightlǇ to ĐoŶǀeǇ the ŵeaŶiŶg as ĐleaƌlǇ as possiďle͟ 
;p ϭϯϬϲͿ, so is soŵeǁhat distaŶt fƌoŵ laŶguage ͞uŶŵediated thƌough the falliďle ǀoiĐes of 
otheƌs͟ ǇeaƌŶed foƌ ďǇ MuŶdle ;ϮϬϭϭͿ. 
What had become clear during this investigation of qualitative paradigms was that a 
phenomenological approach was congruent with the research topic of spirituality; my interest 
ǁas iŶ hoǁ the paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s ͚lifeǁoƌld͛ (van Manen, 1990, p 7; van Manen, 2016, p 133; Finlay, 
2011, p 19) presented itself to me, how it was communicated to me. Phenomenological 
approaches also appeared to mirror therapeutic concepts with which I was comfortable, such 
as being attentive, dwelling with the data and allowing oneself to be awed. 
2.3 Phenomenology influences: van Manen, Gadamer and Merleau-
Ponty 
 
Different phenomenologists encouraged me to explore the stories of spirituality in different 
ǁaǇs. Fƌoŵ Husseƌl, I leaƌŶt the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͞Đo-pƌeseŶĐe͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰ, p ϱϳͿ, fƌoŵ 
Heidegger, the concept of ͞DaseiŶ͟ ;ϭϵϲϮ, p ϮϳͿ. WheŶ ƌeadiŶg Moustakas aŶd theŶ, lateƌ, 
Merleau-Ponty, I learŶt that peƌĐeptioŶ is ͞the souƌĐe that ĐaŶŶot ďe douďted͟ ;Moustakas, 
ϭϵϵϰ, p ϱϮͿ; Moustakas eŶĐouƌages the aƌt of Ŷoesis, aŶd eǆhoƌts ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to ͞look, see, 
listen, heaƌ, touĐh͟ ;p ϲϱͿ.  
Phenomenological research may broadly be categorised as descriptive or hermeneutic in 
nature (Finlay, 2011, p 87). Phenomenology as espoused by Husserl is concerned with 
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describing a phenomenon as it presents itself; in research terms, the researcher brackets off 
her own experiences and describes the essence of the phenomenon. Heidegger and, later, 
Gadamer, propounded an hermeneutic pheŶoŵeŶologǇ, ǁheƌe ͞the puƌpose is to ƌeǀeal that 
which lies in, between, and beyond the words while staying close to the phenomenon of 
iŶteƌest͟. ;Cƌoǁtheƌ et al, ϮϬϭϳͿ.   
I adopted descriptive and hermeneutic phenomenology at different stages in the study, and 
when I assumed different roles or identities (see chapter 5 for more on ambiguity of identity). 
At the stage where I was interviewing and collecting the data, and assuming the identity of 
researcher-therapist, I adopted a more descriptive approach, seduĐed ďǇ ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ͛s 
iŵpeƌatiǀe of ͞thoughtfulŶess͟ ;ϭϵϵϬ, p ϭϮͿ, ƌappoƌt aŶd ƌelatioŶship. VaŶ MaŶen tells us how 
it is inappropriate in phenomenological research to expect a conclusion, rather having the aim 
of ͞tƌaŶsfoƌŵ[iŶg] liǀed eǆpeƌieŶĐe iŶto a teǆtual eǆpƌessioŶ of its esseŶĐe͟ ;ϭϵϵϬ, p ϯϲͿ. VaŶ 
Manen helped me to prepare to explore spirituality with the participants with an attitude of 
opeŶŶess, ƌeadǇ to ǁoŶdeƌ at theiƌ stoƌies. DuƌiŶg the iŶteƌǀieǁs, the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ thoughts 
aŶd opiŶioŶs aďout spiƌitualitǇ ǁeƌe Đollated, Ŷoted aŶd appƌeĐiated, usiŶg ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ͛s 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϮͿ.  ListeŶiŶg to the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
conversations and then writing their stories was in some ways a descriptive phenomenological 
task, in that I wanted their stories to be told, unfiltered through my own experiences.  
However, Finlay (201ϭ, p ϭϮϬͿ ƌeĐogŶises that ͞the spaĐe ďetǁeeŶ desĐƌiptioŶ aŶd 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ is aŵďiguous͟. “he ideŶtifies ɑadaŵeƌ͛s suggestioŶ, that iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ŵaǇ ďe 
viewed as pointing out the meaning of something, rather than pointing to something.  
ɑadaŵeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ thoughts on the phenomenological reduction and bracketing brought clarity 
as to how I might listen to the stories with an open and curious mind. Although I was focussing 
oŶ aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg aŶd desĐƌiďiŶg the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ spiƌitual stoƌies in my role of researcher-
therapist, Ŷeǀeƌtheless ɑadaŵeƌ͛s heƌŵeŶeutiĐ pheŶoŵeŶologǇ eŶĐouƌaged ŵe to see ŵǇ 
role as an active one, bringing myself into the research arena. Listening to and transcribing the 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ǁoƌds, theŶ, ǁas a broadly descriptive task, in that I tried to relay the 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ideas faithfullǇ aŶd ǀeƌďatiŵ; theiƌ ǁoƌds ǁeƌe Ŷot alteƌed aŶd Đƌafted as iŶ soŵe 
studies (Crowther et al, 2017). However, as I wrote their stories, my approach became more 
hermeneutic, as they intertwined with my own cultural, clinical, societal, and spiritual 
experiences. 
IŶ oƌdeƌ to poiŶt out the ŵeaŶiŶg of the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies, I also chose to look at, or listen 
to, them through the lens of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s (2002) ideas of ambiguity, wonder, lived body, 
and thought and language. Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ has iŶflueŶĐed ŵuĐh ŶuƌsiŶg research 
of recent years (Sadala and Adorno, 2002; Thomas, 2005; Hjelmblink et al, 2007; Nyström, 
2011; Kitzmüller, Hȁggström and Asplund, 2013). Thomas (2005, p 63) asserts that Merleau-
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PoŶtǇ is aŶ ͞eǆĐelleŶt fit foƌ ŶuƌsiŶg͟, as he taps iŶto the ͞aŶtiƌeduĐtioŶist aŶd aŶtipositiǀist 
staŶĐe͟ espoused by many current nurse researchers and, indeed, nurse practitioners. 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ foĐusses oŶ the ƌelatioŶship of ouƌ ďodies to the ǁoƌld aŶd to 
ourselves; according to Merleau-Ponty, our body is our means of being in the world. People 
who are ill or who have a new disability are ͞liǀiŶg aŶ uŶƌeliaďle ďodǇ͟ ;Kitzŵülleƌ, Hȁggstƌöŵ 
and Asplund, 2013, p 24), which has a different way of being in the world to the body they 
once had.   Although by contrast Merleau-Ponty has been little used in the speech and 
language therapy literature, his emphasis on embodiment, his leitmotif of ambiguity and his 
ideas on thought and language render his work highly applicable to people with 
communication impairment; indeed, one of the chapters in his magnum opus, Phenomenology 
of Perception, is eŶtitled ͞The BodǇ as EǆpƌessioŶ, aŶd “peeĐh͟, aŶd he uses the pheŶoŵeŶoŶ 
of aphasia to illustrate key concepts (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p 202).  
Merleau-PoŶtǇ is kŶoǁŶ as ͞the philosopheƌ of aŵďiguitǇ͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, 2016, p 130), which 
perhaps also qualifies him as an apposite philosopher when a nebulous concept such as 
spirituality is under consideration (Thoŵas ;ϮϬϬϱ, p ϳϯͿ saǇs of hiŵ that he ideŶtifies as ͞the 
philosopheƌ ǁho does Ŷot kŶoǁ͟Ϳ.  Although Merleau-Ponty has thus far been little used in the 
speech and language therapy literature, these key aspects of his philosophical stance also 
ŵake hiŵ aŶ ͞excellent fit͟ ;Thoŵas, 2005, p 63) for thinking about aphasia and spirituality. 
2.4 Phenomenological attitude 
 
Phenomenology requires the researcher to be fully present in and perceptive to the situation, 
oƌ ͞ƌefleĐtiǀelǇ atteŶtiǀe͟, as ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ has it ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϱϴͿ, just as a theƌapist must be fully 
present with her client. Some phenomenological approaches, such as that propounded by 
Husserl, for example, require researchers to bracket off bias aŶd to stƌiǀe foƌ ͞the eliŵiŶatioŶ 
of suppositioŶs͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰͿ, iŶ a pƌoĐess ƌefeƌƌed to as epoĐhĠ. The uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg is 
that researchers need to set aside their preconceived ideas, prejudices and biases, in order to 
listen wholly and completely to what is being told to them, or given to them in the form of 
data. Moustakas ;ϭϵϵϰ, p ϴϱͿ suggests ǁe listeŶ to ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ǁith aŶ ͞uŶfetteƌed staŶĐe͟, 
unhindered by our own ideas, opinions and biases. 
Although thƌough usiŶg epoĐhĠ, ͞eǀeƌǇdaǇ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs, judgments, and knowings are set 
aside͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰ, p ϯϯͿ, this does Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ iŵplǇ a Đold oďjeĐtiǀitǇ. FiŶlaǇ ;ϮϬϭϭ, 
p 23) suggests that it is possible to apply epoché, whilst simultaneously bringing pre-existing 
experiences to an interview: 
͞ďƌaĐketiŶg iŶ pheŶoŵeŶologǇ is ǁƌoŶglǇ uŶdeƌstood to ďe aŶ eǆeƌĐise iŶ oďjeĐtiǀitǇ͟. 
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It would appear that researchers are not being called to distance themselves from the 
participant or from the phenomenon under scrutiny; on the contrary, phenomenology is 
askiŶg theŵ to ďeĐoŵe fullǇ iŶǀolǀed, fullǇ pƌeseŶt, ďut to eŶĐouŶteƌ ͞eǀeŶ the faŵiliaƌ as 
soŵethiŶg stƌaŶge, ǁoŶdƌous aŶd uŶfaŵiliaƌ͟ ;Kiŵ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϱϲͿ. It is thƌough this pƌoĐess of 
phenomenological reduction that we are able to put aside our lifelong prejudices or biases and 
see pheŶoŵeŶa ǁith fƌesh eǇes. TheǇ aƌe ͞ƌeǀisited, fƌeshlǇ, ŶaiǀelǇ, iŶ a ǁide opeŶ seŶse, 
fƌoŵ the ǀaŶtage poiŶt of a puƌe oƌ tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal ego͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰ, p ϯϯͿ. IŶ Husseƌl͛s 
words, phenomenologists are using bracketing foƌ a pƌoĐess of ͞aussĐhalteŶ͟ oƌ a puttiŶg out 
of action of our preconceptions (Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 14). Rather than bracketing and 
then ignoring our preconceptions and all the influences of our lives (cultural, educational, 
social), researchers can acknowledge these prejudices but attempt not to allow them to 
interfere with the acceptance of the other and their stance. 
It would appear, then, that epoché does allow the researcher to bring some of herself to the 
interview to a certain extent, whilst employing a stance of neutrality and openness. This 
ƌesoŶates ǁith the theƌapeutiĐ eŶĐouŶteƌ, ǁheƌe the theƌapist listeŶs ǁith ͞ĐoŶgƌueŶĐe͟ ďut 
also ǁith a ͞ŶoŶ-judgŵeŶtal attitude͟ ;‘ogeƌs, ϭϵϱϭͿ. 
I attempted, then, to be open as I listened to and then tƌaŶsĐƌiďed the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies. 
However, thƌough ƌeadiŶg ŵoƌe of ɑadaŵeƌ͛s ǁoƌk, I ďegaŶ to appƌeĐiate the ͞ĐeŶtƌal 
iŶteƌpƌetiǀe ƌelatioŶship of the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ ǁithiŶ the Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh pƌoĐess͟ ;‘egaŶ, 
2012, p 286). Despite the descriptive nature of data-gathering stage of this study, hermeneutic 
phenomenology, specifically the work of Gadamer, has also exerted an influence, particularly 
in the writing up and analysis of the stories. Gadamer recognises that language is fundamental 
in our understanding of the other and is the primary means by which we share experience with 
others (Regan, 2012). Hermeneutics was initially a term used in relation to interpreting, and 
thereby understanding, biblical texts (van Manen, 1990, p 179). It has since become 
widespread within various disciplines – including health – as a method of understanding things 
fƌoŵ aŶotheƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, ǁheŶ ŵeaŶiŶgs aƌe Ŷot oǀeƌt oƌ easilǇ uŶdeƌstood ďut ͞ƌeƋuiƌe 
soŵe effoƌt to iŶteƌpƌet͟ ;Claƌk, ϮϬϬϴͿ. PeƌtiŶeŶt to health ƌeseaƌĐh and practicum is 
ɑadaŵeƌ͛s iŶsisteŶĐe that ǁe ŵust ͞tƌaŶspose͟ ouƌselǀes iŶto the iŶteƌpƌetiǀe situatioŶ; iŶ 
order to understand the meaning of another we have to bring all of ourselves into the 
interview, conversation or consultation: 
͞But iŶto this otheƌ situatioŶ ǁe ŵust ďƌiŶg, pƌeĐiselǇ, ouƌselǀes͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯϭϰͿ. 
Gadamer employs the metaphor of a horizon in order to illustrate how the teller and the 
listener within a hermeneutic discussion might relate. Each has her own horizon, full of her 
own experiences, prejudices, biases and opinions. Gadamer chooses the picture of a horizon in 
order to convey the all-encompassing nature of the openness to the other: 
39 
 
͞the ĐoŶĐept of ͚hoƌizoŶ͛ suggests itself ďeĐause it eǆpƌesses the supeƌioƌ ďƌeadth of ǀision 
that the peƌsoŶ ǁho is tƌǇiŶg to uŶdeƌstaŶd ŵust haǀe͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯϭϲͿ. 
However, horizons have limits, imposed by the question set between the two interlocutors 
(Gadamer, 2013, p 372), so that there exists a certain liminality at the edge of the question. 
Perhaps this liminality is more pronounced when the subject matter is spirituality; when the 
subject is numinous and indefinable, the liminal space assumes more significance. 
It is only when we have fully appreciated and opened ourselves up to the otheƌ͛s hoƌizoŶ that 
true understanding can begin to happen. We may not concur with their opinion, but we are 
able to understand it: 
͞ǁheŶ ǁe haǀe disĐoǀeƌed the otheƌ peƌsoŶ͛s staŶdpoiŶt aŶd hoƌizoŶ, his ideas ďeĐoŵe 
intelligible without our necessarilǇ haǀiŶg to agƌee ǁith hiŵ͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯϭϰͿ. 
It is ǁithiŶ a ͞fusion of horizons͟ (Gadamer, 2013, p 317) of both parties that true 
understanding begins to occur. Our own horizon continually changes because we have 
constantly to test our prejudices as we listen to the opinions of the other. If we have not fully 
accepted and acknowledged our prejudices, we risk sullying the conversation with the 
͞tǇƌaŶŶǇ of hiddeŶ pƌejudiĐes͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϮϴϮͿ ǁhiĐh hiŶdeƌs uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg. It is the 
recognition of prejudice and the testing of these that gives potency to the hermeneutic 
inquiry: 
͞The ƌeĐogŶitioŶ that all uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg iŶeǀitaďlǇ iŶǀolǀes soŵe pƌejudiĐe giǀes the 
heƌŵeŶeutiĐal pƌoďleŵ its ƌeal thƌust͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϮϴϯͿ.  
ɑadaŵeƌ͛s teƌŵiŶologǇ is useful heƌe. He eǆploƌes the etǇŵologǇ of the ǁoƌd ͚pƌejudiĐe͛, 
claiming it did not originally (pre-Enlightenment) carry the negative connotations it perhaps 
does today.  He gives the accurate definition as: 
͞a judgŵeŶt that is ƌeŶdeƌed ďefoƌe all the eleŵents that determine a situation have been 
fiŶallǇ eǆaŵiŶed͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϮϴϯͿ. 
This implies that prejudice can shift when new knowledge and understanding is accrued, and 
for him this occurs within the fusion of horizons. He provides an alternative term – namely 
fore-meaning – ǁhiĐh aǀoids the ŶegatiǀitǇ ǁith ǁhiĐh ͚pƌejudiĐe͛ has ďeĐoŵe iŵďued.  He 
also eŵploǇs the ĐoŶĐept of ͞foregrounding͟ oƌ ͞abheben͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯϭϬͿ in order to 
describe the process of bringing fore-meanings to prominence. In this process of fusing 
horizons, Gadamer insists that we do not lose ourselves, or hide our fore-meanings from the 
other, but that we use ourselves within the interchange in order to arrive at understanding: 
͞this kiŶd of seŶsitiǀitǇ iŶǀolǀes Ŷeitheƌ ͚ŶeutƌalitǇ͛ ǁith ƌespeĐt to ĐoŶteŶt Ŷot the eǆtiŶĐtioŶ 
of oŶe͛s self, ďut the foƌegƌouŶdiŶg aŶd appƌopƌiatioŶ of oŶe͛s oǁŶ foƌe-meanings and 
pƌejudiĐes͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϮϴϮͿ. 
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More congruent with the subject matter, methods and participants than pure epoché seemed 
ɑadaŵeƌ͛s useful ĐoŶĐept of hoƌizoŶs and fusion of horizons.  Gadamer provided an 
alternative way of being with research participants in a phenomenological study which 
resonated with my desire to empathise with each interviewee, and to bring part of myself into 
the iŶteƌĐhaŶge, ǁhilst siŵultaŶeouslǇ ďeiŶg ͞ĐoŵpletelǇ opeŶ, ƌeĐeptiǀe, aŶd Ŷaïǀe iŶ 
listening to and hearing research participants describe their experience of the phenomenon 
ďeiŶg iŶǀestigated͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰ, p ϮϮͿ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to ɑadaŵeƌ (2013), bringing of myself 
to the interviews and to the study in general necessitated firstly revealing my own fore-
meanings, so that I could acknowledge these and allow myself to be open to the other. 
 
2.5 My fore-meanings 
 
Fore-meanings in relation to my faith and career seemed pertinent to this study, and needed 
to be revealed to myself and to the reader. This is both so that I was able to be, what Gadamer 
;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϮϴϭͿ teƌŵs, ͞opeŶ to the ŵeaŶiŶg of the otheƌ peƌsoŶ͟ during the interviews, but also 
so that the reader of the stories would understand my perspectives.  Gadamer (2013, p 281) 
eǆplaiŶs hoǁ ͞this opeŶŶess alǁaǇs iŶĐludes ouƌ situatiŶg the otheƌ ŵeaŶiŶg iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the 
ǁhole of ouƌ oǁŶ ŵeaŶiŶgs oƌ ouƌselǀes iŶ ƌelatioŶ to it.͟ “o it is that I need to be explicit 
about relevant life experiences, beliefs and upbringing. 
I was brought up by a Christian mother and agnostic father, and going to church was always 
part of my life. I was baptised in the Church of England as a baby and confirmed as a teenager. 
My faith was strong as I grew up; I attended youth groups and helped run the Sunday School. 
When I went off to university, although I sought out churches and church groups, I was 
enjoying the freedom of university life and did not want to feel constrained by what I 
perceived as restrictive Christian rules; I ended up estranged from church and Christianity and 
my faith wavered. When I met my future husband, it transpired that he, too, had been brought 
up in a Christian (Catholic) household but he, like me, had moved away from Christianity, 
never outright rejecting it but not encompassing it in his life. We both started going back to 
church as we approached our wedding, hearing our banns being read, and then just continuing 
to go because we enjoyed it and derived pleasure from the new relationships we were 
building. Shortly before our son was born, we both attended a course which transformed the 
way we thought about God and the church. We became what I would term committed 
Christians, which led in due course to my husband pursuing a career as a Church of England 
priest. Exploring Christianity deeply in the mid 1990s meant that we were exposed to the idea 
of miracles, such as the Toronto Blessing, and to the idea of a powerful Holy Spirit, who could 
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work everyday miracles. The death of my sister in 1995 challenged my beliefs about an all-
loving God; after all, how could a loving God leave three young children motherless? The safe 
birth of our son after a traumatic labour restored my faith somewhat, and events around the 
birth seemed miraculous and God-given. However, when I experienced a succession of ectopic 
pregnancies over the next few years, my faith in God waned once more, and I became angry 
when well-intentioned people told me of supposedly comforting visions of babies I had lost. 
Since that time, I have remained a Christian, with my faith waxing and waning but never 
disappearing. My openness to the miraculous is more muted than it once was, but I still have a 
strong sense of the presence of a higher being, and I still read the Bible, attend church and 
pray. 
I also have a strong sense of the presence of God in my life when I look back at my career. It 
feels as though I have been guided in the decisions I have made and the paths I have taken. 
Although I studied French and German at university, I had always been drawn to medicine. A 
chance meeting with someone with aphasia, and studying a module in French linguistics and 
phonetics, both led me to explore speech and language therapy as a career; it seemed to 
combine the arts (which I had always been told I excelled at) with science (with which I had 
always struggled, though it fascinated me).  I soon realised I had a passion for working with 
adults with communication impairments, and ideal jobs seemed to present themselves, 
despite haǀiŶg to ŵoǀe seǀeƌal tiŵes ďeĐause of the Ŷatuƌe of ŵǇ husďaŶd͛s joď.  I ǁoƌked foƌ 
many years in both rehabilitation and acute settings, with many multidisciplinary team 
members, especially occupational therapists and music therapists. 
As I developed an interest in the spiritual lives and expressions of my patients, I determined 
that spirituality for me included religion and religious belief, but was not, most assuredly, 
limited to it. This stance meshes with many of the definitions of spirituality cited in chapter 1, 
as well as with the thoughts and comments of the participants. By not confining my 
understanding of spirituality to religious belief, I was able to hear more openly the diverse 
spiritual stories given to me. 
My fore-meanings, then, include a wavering but present Christian faith, in the context of a fully 
involved church life, and embracing of myriad forms of spirituality, and a career as a speech 
and language therapist spanning over twenty-five years, the majority of which I have spent in 
neurorehabilitation. These are the fore-meanings I needed to foreground when I listened to 
the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies of spiƌitualitǇ, so that I eŶdeaǀouƌed Ŷot to ͞stiĐk ďliŶdlǇ to [ŵǇ] oǁŶ 
fore-meaning about the thing if [I] want to uŶdeƌstaŶd the ŵeaŶiŶg of aŶotheƌ͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, 
2013, p 281). 
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2.6 Co-creation 
 
Forever at the forefront of my adopted epistemology has been the aspiration to enable the 
voice of the voiceless, or rather the language of the language-less, to be heard. From the 
outset, I recognised that I wanted, as far as was practicable, to include the participants in a 
collaborative and non-exploitative manner. I wanted to ensure that they were not researched 
upon, but rather researched with, with the ultimate aim of the research having been a 
transformative process for them as well as for me, and that they might recognise a practical, 
clinical, relevant application. 
I wanted the voices of the people with aphasia to be heard loud and clear. I wanted this 
research not only to include them but to be inherently about and for them, in a truly 
collaborative and egalitarian way. I researched participatory action research (Koch and Kralik, 
2006), hoping to include my participants every step of the research way, relying on them to 
help me mould the methodology and construct my approach, as well as to tease out the 
results, in a way that was meaningful to them. 
The pƌeŵise of paƌtiĐipatoƌǇ aĐtioŶ ƌeseaƌĐh is ͞ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ƌeseaƌĐheƌs aŶd those 
who are the focus of the research͟ ;‘oďsoŶ, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϭϴϴͿ. IŶǀolǀeŵeŶt of people ǁith aphasia 
in the whole research process seemed crucial if the project was going to be a conduit for some 
sort of change in the lives of people with aphasia. I wanted to empower people with aphasia to 
gain some ownership of the research process. 
The concept of co-constructivism is desirable both from a research and a therapy perspective, 
but in both instances true parity is difficult to achieve, and this has led to a certain amount of 
tension within the research project. As a therapist, I was very aware of the potential (or actual) 
power differential between me (as trained professional, pursuing a qualification, with intact 
language skills) and the participants. They, after all, were generously giving of their time 
because they were responding to my plea for participants; their reasons for taking part were, I 
am sure, multifarious, but may not have included an inherent interest in, or understanding of, 
the project. I was the one with the voice recorder and the official-looking documentation, with 
University logos and tick-boxes. I was the one with an agenda and (albeit loose) set of 
questions. The participants in my first group were literally a captive audience, confined 
through hospitalisation and physical disability to their bedside. Although of course consent 
was carefully sought, still the power rested with me; after all, I could stop and start the 
iŶteƌǀieǁs at ŵǇ ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe, ǁith a ĐuƌsoƌǇ ͞is it OK if…͟ Added to this, of Đouƌse, ǁas the 
language difficulty of each of the participants with aphasia. The communication power 
differential was most marked with those with the most severely impaired language output but 
also limited augmentative or alternative communication methods. So, although the expressive 
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spoken language skills of a participant called Lindy in group 2 are limited, her excellent use of 
the written word mitigates this to a large extent. Because I met this participant at her home, 
potential differences which could lead to a perception of power imbalance, such as education 
level, did not arise; one quick glance at her extensive bookcase demonstrated a woman of high 
intellect and education level. Contrast this with a participant in group 1, Liam, whose 
expressive abilities both verbally and non-verbally were so much more limited; in addition, he 
was not in his own environment, where his competence could shine through, but in a 
vulnerable state in hospital, in the passive role of patient. 
Co-ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg ǁas theƌefoƌe desiƌaďle fƌoŵ a theƌapist͛s peƌspective, and from a researcher-
therapist perspective, but I began to consider whether it was indeed practicable. 
Within the confines of a PhD project, I soon recognised that my pure participatory aspirations 
might not be possible to achieve. In a true participatory model, co-researchers would be free 
to design the methodology and collect data as they saw fit. Time constraints and time 
pressures of the PhD process – imposed both by the fact of my working fulltime and of the 
ethical approval process – meant that participants could not be approached and included until 
after the research planning process had got underway.  
McMenamin, Tierney and MacFarlane (2015, p 917) acknowledge that people with aphasia are 
͞ofteŶ ŵaƌgiŶalised aŶd eǆĐluded͟ ďoth iŶ soĐietǇ aŶd in research. They, however, did 
successfully employ a participatory research methodology (participatory learning and action) 
during their research process ;O͛‘eillǇ-de Brún et al, 2015), which encouraged democratic 
involvement of participants with aphasia who were able to share their emic experiences of 
taking part in a conversation partner scheme. Far from tokenistic, their involvement of people 
with aphasia was at all levels: design, data collection and evaluation. They employed focus 
groups and discussions, using data generation techniques from participatory learning and 
action methodology, namely flexible brainstorming, card sort, direct ranking and a seasonal 
calendar (McMenamin, Tierney and MacFarlane, 2015, p 921), in order to answer their 
research question related to the best and worst things about the scheme, and suggestions for 
improvements to the scheme. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, my research with its subject matter of spirituality did not lend itself 
so readily to a full participatory approach. McMenamin and her colleagues had three discrete 
areas to discuss; I did not have specific questions to be answered but was rather opening up 
discussions around any aspect of spirituality, whatever that may have meant to each 
participant. Topic areas were therefore unformed and nebulous, and interviews became 
conversations, with no boundaries and no preconceived ideas.  Some of the excellent data 
geŶeƌatioŶ ŵethods used iŶ MĐMeŶaŵiŶ, TieƌŶeǇ aŶd MaĐFaƌlaŶe͛s studǇ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ, suĐh as Đaƌd 
sorting, required a predetermined set of concepts and therefore would not have fitted with 
44 
 
the incredibly diverse, individual and idiosyŶĐƌatiĐ data oďtaiŶed iŶ these ͚shedding light on͛ 
interviews. 
In addition, the participants in my study might be divulging intimate thoughts and feelings 
within interviews, necessitating an atmosphere of trust and acceptance. A focus group in order 
to plan methodology perhaps would not have allowed this atmosphere of full acceptance.  
That is not to say that further research on spirituality with people with aphasia may not be 
more participatory in nature. Perhaps now that research has begun with people with aphasia 
and spirituality, and initial concepts have been explored, techniques such as flexible 
brainstorming or card sorting may become more practicable. 
My research project, then, was not co-constructed in the same manner as McMenamin, 
TieƌŶeǇ aŶd MaĐFaƌlaŶe͛s (2015) study, in terms of planning the research methodology, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, I eŶdeaǀouƌed to Đƌeate a ͞Đollaďoƌatiǀe aŶd deŵoĐƌatiĐ staŶĐe͟ (Robson, 2011, p 
ϭϴϵͿ ǁithiŶ the data ĐolleĐtioŶ ďǇ seekiŶg out a ͚ĐƌitiĐal fƌieŶd͛, soŵeoŶe ǁho kŶeǁ ǁhat liǀiŶg 
with aphasia was like, someone who was comfortable with expressing her own spiritual story, 
aŶd ǁhose opiŶioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg hoǁ to listeŶ to otheƌs͛ stories I valued. My participatory 
aspirations in terms of planning the research methodology, then, began with Lindy in group 2, 
with whom I had open discussions at the beginning of the project related to the best way of 
gathering the data. She gave helpful suggestions about suitable questions to ask, and also 
acted as an understanding guide as I began to assume the mantel of research interviewer. 
Lindy may perhaps be viewed, borrowing a phrase from Heidegger (1962, p 155), (Mitdasein – 
being with others iŶ the ǁoƌldͿ, as a ͞Mit-ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͟, that is to saǇ, she ǁas ͚with me͛ in the 
interview design process, and indeed, integral to it. She was an expert collaborator in the 
process of planning how to go about interviewing people with aphasia. 
Although I involved Lindy and other participants in checking back over the data and assuring 
that the meaning I had derived was correct, this was the extent of their involvement.   
Perhaps it may appear disingenuous to refer to the participants as co-researchers, as Finlay 
(2011, p 175) suggests one might; I did not give them enough ownership of all aspects of the 
research design, implementation or analysis. However, Finlay (2011, p 175) does intimate that 
the teƌŵ ͞Đo-ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͟ ŵight ďe used Ŷot oŶlǇ foƌ those fullǇ eŶgaged in all aspects of the 
ƌeseaƌĐh pƌoĐess, ďut also foƌ those eŶgaged iŶ a ͞dialogal ŵethod͟, ǁheƌe the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ is 
Đoŵŵitted to a ͞ƌelatioŶal-ĐeŶtƌed͟ paƌadigŵ. 
Although the planning of the methodology was not co-constructed, the stories, by contrast, 
were co-Đƌeated iŶ ǁhat FiŶlaǇ desĐƌiďes as a daŶĐe, ͞a taŶgo iŶ ǁhiĐh the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ tǁists 
aŶd glides thƌough a seƌies of iŵpƌoǀised steps͟ ;ϮϬϭϭ, p ϳϰͿ. Although plaŶŶiŶg aŶd 
evaluating data is challenging to facilitate with people with aphasia, the collection of data by 
ĐoŶtƌast ŵust ďe Đollaďoƌatiǀe, ǁith the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ skills of ŶoŶ-verbal, augmentative 
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ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, aŶd the listeŶeƌ͛s skills of faĐilitatioŶ aŶd listeŶiŶg ďoth ǀital iŶ the co-
construction of the data. Finlay (2011, p 17) states that at the heart of phenomenological 
ƌeseaƌĐh is the desiƌe to alloǁ the iŶdiǀidual͛s eŵiĐ eǆpeƌieŶĐes to ďe heaƌd; these 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes, ͞ofteŶ aƌise out of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes ǁhiĐh the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ sǇŶthesizes aŶd 
elaďoƌates fuƌtheƌ͟.  
During the conversations from which the stories emerged, I strove to enable the voice of the 
participants with aphasia to be heard. Hence, each participant has their own story chapter, 
and each chapter contains verbatim quotes to illustrate emerging themes or ideas. The stories 
were told, listened to and collated as a collaborative enterprise. 
Constructivism with a population of people with severe expressive aphasia is challenging but 
enriching. Stories are produced verbally but also through gesture, intonation, writing or even 
silence. They are sometimes fragmented, or repeated, or their meaning is hidden. The person 
with aphasia produces a version of their story – through whatever modality is available to 
them – and their interlocutor moulds that story using attentive listening, questions, artefacts 
and acknowledgement. Stories are heard but also facilitated and coaxed. The epistemological 
process becomes at once cooperative and mutual. 
Data in the form of the stories were therefore co-constructed, with the planning of the 
methodology and the analysis stage being carried out non-collaboratively. 
2.7 Illness and disability narratives 
 
IŶ health studies aŶd ƌeseaƌĐh, patieŶts͛ stoƌies ĐaŶ ďe used to eǆploƌe illŶess aŶd disaďilitǇ 
(Holloway and Freshwater, 2007; Barrow, 2008; Brown and Addington-Hall, 2008). At a time 
when control over the body and over a future can seem compromised, individuals can 
successfully steer their stories and construct them as they want in order to navigate through 
that existential crisis: 
͞Foƌ patieŶts facing serious illness, telling their stories is one of the few aspects of their lives 
that ƌeŵaiŶ soŵeǁhat uŶdeƌ theiƌ ĐoŶtƌol͟ ;“hapiƌo, ϮϬϭϭͿ. 
FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ illŶess Ŷaƌƌatiǀe tǇpologies have been used in health literature for some time, 
such as in nursing (Holloway and Freshwater, 2007), chaplaincy (Mundle, 2011) and speech 
and language therapy (Moss et al, 2004; Mitchell, Skirton and Monrouxe, 2011) and these also 
helped in my study in terms of the planning of the interviews, the interviews themselves, and 
the aŶalǇsis of the stoƌies. As FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ǆǆͿ saǇs, patieŶts ͞Ŷeed to ďeĐoŵe stoƌǇtelleƌs iŶ 
oƌdeƌ to ƌeĐoǀeƌ the ǀoiĐes that illŶess aŶd its tƌeatŵeŶt ofteŶ take aǁaǇ͟. Although FƌaŶk is 
perhaps talking figuratively here about lack of patient voice, in the aphasia population this 
concept of giving voice to the voiceless is even more pertinent. He distinguishes three different 
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illness narratives which can be heard in the voices of those who are ill. Although many of his 
examples pertain to illness such as cancer, I believe, like Couser (2016) that his typology can 
also be applied to disability states as a result of illness or accident. The three narratives are: 
restitution, chaos, and quest.  
Restitution allies itself comfortably with the medical model of illness and disability. In this 
narrative, the patient is a passive recipient both of the illness and of its management. The 
medical professional is called upon to cure the illness which has attacked the individual, with 
the ďelief that ͞foƌ eǀeƌǇ ailŵeŶt theƌe is a ƌeŵedǇ͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϴϲͿ. Old ŵediĐal 
terminology is pregnant with restitution phraseology, such as stroke victim, wheelchair bound 
and, indeed, the word patient itself (from the Latin patiens ͞one who suffers or endures͟ 
(Barnhart, ϭϵϴϴͿͿ. PatieŶts aƌe eŶĐouƌaged to adopt a ͚doĐtoƌ kŶoǁs ďest͛ attitude, aŶd ǁait 
͚patieŶtlǇ͛ foƌ a Đuƌe fƌoŵ the eǆpeƌt. 
A restitution narrative may have both a positive and negative impact on the patient. On the 
one hand, speaking in restitutive terms maǇ eŶgeŶdeƌ hope aŶd a desiƌe to ͚fight͛ agaiŶst 
disease, knowing that it can be conquered. It is interesting, for example, that so much 
vocabulary surrounding cancer involves a lexicon of war; brave patients battle the disease, and 
sometimes lose their fight against cancer, often, incidentally, despite the best efforts of 
doctors. On the other hand, a restitution narrative may be unhelpful for those with a lifelong 
illness that cannot be cured, or for a permanent disability resulting from an illness. Their ability 
to accept and get on with and enjoy life may be hindered by an unrealistic aim of complete 
cure. 
FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯͿ, iŶteƌestiŶglǇ, ƌefeƌs to the Đhaos Ŷaƌƌatiǀe as the ͞ŵute illŶess͟ ;p ϵϳͿ, the ͞aŶti-
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͟ ;p ϵϴͿ that ĐaŶŶot ďe told ďut is oŶlǇ ƌeally lived.  In the chaos narrative, individuals 
are adrift, mired in a morass of pain and trouble. Theirs is a hopeless narrative, where there is 
no discernible end to suffering. Whereas in the restitution narrative, modern medicine and 
clinicians are available and ready to heal, in the chaos narrative, there is no hope of recovery; 
no one is in control. Frank (2013) gives examples of the words people living in chaos use, but 
he also suggests that the Đhaos Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is ͞ďeǇoŶd speeĐh͟ ;p ϭϬϭͿ, that the terribleness of 
that state cannot successfully be put into coherent words. This has particular resonance for 
people whose language skills are compromised by the very illness that has plunged them into 
chaos. 
If the restitution narrative aligns itself with the medical model of disability, the quest narrative 
is its antithesis, and exemplifies the social model. In the quest narrative, former patients are 
gettiŶg oŶ ǁith theiƌ liǀes, ͞seaƌĐhiŶg foƌ alteƌŶatiǀe ǁaǇs of ďeiŶg ill͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϭϭϳͿ, 
which mean they can enjoy a meaningful life again. The disease entity may not in itself 
disappear or be cured, as is longed for in the restitution narrative, but nor does it define the 
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individual, as in the chaos narrative. Rather, people in the quest narrative are able to make 
͞sigŶifiĐaŶt ǀoĐatioŶal aŶd peƌsoŶal ĐhaŶges to [theiƌ] life folloǁiŶg illŶess͟ ;p ϭϭϲͿ, aŶd so 
their stories are full of reports of a changed but meaningful existence. The process of therapy 
fits well into this narrative, with the therapist accompanying the individual, as together patient 
and therapist solve problems and compensate in order for the person with a disability to live 
well again. 
The spiritual stories of the people with aphasia were therefore listened to through the prism of 
these disaďilitǇ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes, iŶ aŶ effoƌt to uŶdeƌstaŶd the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stƌoke aŶd aphasia 
journeys. In chapter 5, I explore the different narratives expressed by the participants with 
aphasia, and in chapter 6, I discuss the clinical relevance of listening to disability stories using 
FƌaŶk͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀes.  
Hoǁeǀeƌ, foƌ people ǁith aphasia, telliŶg theiƌ stoƌies ĐaŶ ďe a ĐhalleŶge ďeĐause ͞laŶguage 
ĐaŶ Ŷo loŶgeƌ ďe assuŵed to ďe a ŵeaŶs of eǆploƌiŶg, disĐussiŶg aŶd shapiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ 
(Moss et al, 2004, p 755), therefore communication means other than language often had to 
be implemented. 
2.8 Stories and story-telling: the case for using narrative inquiry 
 
Central to the methodology was hearing the voices of the people with aphasia, to ensure that 
the research was about and for them and other people with aphasia, rather than research on 
them.  
If we accept that in order for a thought to be fully realised or accomplished, it must somehow 
be put into expression (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p 206), then finding a way of enabling that 
expression for people with aphasia is of paramount importance. Stories and storytelling, using 
a Mosaic approach (Clark, 2001) is one way of doing this.  
Storytelling and story-listening are part of the human condition. Stories are intrinsic to being 
huŵaŶ, ͞a ďasiĐ aspeĐt of huŵaŶ life aŶd aŶ esseŶtial stƌategǇ of huŵaŶ eǆpƌessioŶ͟ ;Kiŵ, 
2016, p 6). Stories have formed a part of human existence from as long ago as we have 
records. The indigenous peoples of Australia told their stories through elaborate rock art, 
drawn and painted onto the walls of the caves in which they dwelt. They formed a record of 
their history: 
͞The aƌt iŶ the stoŶe teŵples aŶd the ŵǇthologǇ aƌe the ǀisual aŶd oƌal histoƌǇ of aŶ 
astonishing people who were highly intelligent, eŶeƌgetiĐ, ƌesouƌĐeful aŶd ƌespoŶsiďle͟ 
(Trezise, 1993, p vii).  
Not only did these pictorial stories tell of important animals, such as dingos, echidnas and 
kangaroos, major events (such as a man with a rifle being thrown from a horse (Trezise, 1993, 
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p 50)) and family history (as evidenced by the multifarious discovered handprints) in the lives 
of the aboriginal peoples, but they were also crucial in their spiritual lives, the so-called 
͞Dƌeaŵtiŵe͟.  “o it is that stoƌǇtelliŶg aŶd spiƌitualitǇ aƌe iŶeǆtƌicably linked in aboriginal 
culture. 
Similarly, parables in the Bible were used by Jesus and have been used down the ages often, 
although not exclusively, to explain and to teach: 
͞Paƌaďles…ƌeǀolǀe aƌouŶd oŶe poiŶt of ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ ďetǁeeŶ the aĐtiǀitǇ iŶ the story and 
Jesus͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the kiŶgdoŵ of ɑod.͟ ;Bloŵďeƌg, ϭϵϵϬ, p ϯϬͿ. 
In an oral, preliterate tradition, truths or morals could be explained and understood via a story 
remembered.  Some of these stories have become so ingrained in our collective consciousness 
that they are no longer about religious belief but rather form part of our secular moral learning 
(for example, the parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10: 30)). 
However, parables were not always clear to the listener. In Matthew 15: 15, the disciple Peter 
eǆhoƌted Jesus to ͞eǆplaiŶ the paƌaďle to us.͟  Jesus seeŵiŶglǇ ǁaŶted the listeŶeƌ to eŶgage 
in the process of understanding as much as the storyteller. This is a two-way process, with the 
listeners actively having to open their minds to what was being conveyed. Jesus was employing 
a strategy which Kierkegaard refers to as ͞iŶdiƌeĐtŶess͟ ;“tƌaǁseƌ, ϭϵϵϱ), in an effort to 
facilitate deeper, and more meaningful, understanding: 
͞Kieƌkegaaƌd͛s ǁƌitiŶgs aƌe iŶdiƌeĐt iŶ the pƌiŵaƌǇ seŶse of Ŷot ǁishing to speak to readers 
diƌeĐtlǇ, as fƌoŵ oŶe peƌsoŶ to aŶotheƌ, fƌoŵ aŶ ͚I͛ to a ͚Ǉou͛, ďut to haǀe eaĐh ƌeadeƌ 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate iŶ pƌiǀate ǁith heƌ oƌ hiŵself, fƌoŵ aŶ ͚I͛ to a ͚ŵe͛͟ ;“tƌaǁseƌ, ϭϵϵϱ, p ϳϯͿ. 
There is perhaps a parallel here with conversations with people with aphasia; the meaning of 
what is being communicated may be obfuscated by word-finding difficulties, paraphasias and 
limited syntax, and therefore the listener needs to be proactive in working towards an 
understanding.  
Using the method of story-gathering in order to explore the spirituality of people with aphasia, 
and indeed of the professionals working with them, therefore seemed apposite. Narrative 
inquiry enables the researcher (or the listener) to give free rein to participants, to 
communicate what is important to them, and crucially for this study, in a way that is conducive 
and useful to them. Away from the constraints of responding to closed questions, or forced 
alternative questions which can be imposed by questionnaires and surveys, participants are 
free to express themselves how they want and are able to. In order to shed light on this facet 
of humanness, the best method appeared to be to allow the participants to speak, or rather to 
communicate. Storytellers are able to express freely in their chosen modality and story-
listeners are tasked with working with them so that the story can be successfully told. 
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AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Kiŵ ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϱϯͿ, theƌe is a ͞Đlose kiŶship ďetǁeeŶ pheŶoŵeŶologǇ aŶd Ŷaƌƌatiǀe 
iŶƋuiƌǇ͟. We ĐaŶ gaiŶ kŶoǁledge of phenomena through using phenomenological methods, 
such as subjectivity, phenomenological reduction, bracketing and intentionality, and all these 
methods are well-suited to a narrative approach. 
Van Manen (1990, p 20) describes subjectivity as paying close attention to the object, being 
ƌeĐeptiǀe to aŶ oďjeĐt iŶ oƌdeƌ to fullǇ uŶdeƌstaŶd it. He ƌefeƌs to ďeiŶg ͞stƌoŶg iŶ ouƌ 
oƌieŶtatioŶ to the oďjeĐt of studǇ iŶ a uŶiƋue aŶd peƌsoŶal ǁaǇ͟. IŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe iŶƋuiƌǇ, oŶe is 
involved in the story, actively listening and appreciating the tale. In narrative inquiry with 
people with aphasia, perhaps the role of listener becomes even more involved in the process 
of conveying meaning, as the listener facilitates, probes and encourages output. 
The concepts of phenomenological reduction and epoché - terms often used interchangeably 
(Kim, 2016, p 56) – were a source of intrigue and slight confusion throughout this study, 
perhaps appropriately so, given the ambiguity pervasive throughout. I struggled with wanting 
to be completely objective and open in my listening to the stories, keeping my preconceptions 
at bay, whilst wanting, and indeed needing, to give of myself during the interchanges. Talking 
to the members of the multidisciplinary team, I could not put aside my years as a therapist 
myself. My understanding of what it is like to engage with people with aphasia post-stroke 
eŶaďled ŵe to ͚get aloŶgside͛ these paƌtiĐipaŶts, to eŵpathise, to shoǁ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd, 
hopefully, to engender trust. Likewise, when talking to the participants with aphasia, I could 
not put aside my skills as a therapist in terms of facilitating functional communication, nor 
could I detach myself from my desire to create a therapeutic interview space. I could not 
separate myself from my role of therapist, but nor did I think this was detrimental. On the 
contrary, I think it enabled me to encourage communication about a difficult subject, when it 
might otherwise have proved problematic. As discussed, I doubted if pure epoché was 
compatible with therapeutic interviewing of this nature, and recognised that perhaps 
ɑadaŵeƌ͛s ͞fusioŶ of hoƌizoŶs͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ, p 317) was a more therapeutic method of 
acknowledging my fore-ŵeaŶiŶgs as a ǁaǇ of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the otheƌ͛s. Was I aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁeƌ 
or a therapist during these interchanges? All the participants knew from the information 
provided that I was there in my capacity of researcher, in order to find out about their 
spirituality and its expression. However, I think and hope that the process was a therapeutic 
one for them, inasmuch as they were made to feel at ease, able to express freely in an 
atmosphere of acceptance and unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1951). 
Fusion of horizons, then, is integral to narrative inquiry (Kim, 2016, p 233). It enables the 
researcher to listen attentively and openly to the stories being told, whilst acknowledging her 
own fore-ŵeaŶiŶgs aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐes. It tƌulǇ alloǁs the stoƌies to ͞ďƌeathe͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϯͿ. 
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The final aspect of phenomenology which renders the phenomenological approach suited to 
narrative inquiry is intentionality.  In fact, not only does intentionality lend itself to a narrative 
inquiry approach but it also, to my mind, is a vital aspect of listening to and understanding the 
expressive language and non-verbal communication of a person with aphasia. Kim (2016, p 57) 
eǆplaiŶs that iŶ oƌdeƌ to kŶoǁ soŵethiŶg oƌ soŵeoŶe, ǁe haǀe to eǆeƌĐise ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ͟, ǁheƌeďǇ ǁe atteŵpt Ŷot oŶlǇ to uŶdeƌstaŶd the esseŶĐe of that thiŶg, ďut 
also its intentionality, that is, its being-in-the-world (Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 67).  When 
talking with people ǁith aphasia, I had to stƌiǀe foƌ aŶ ͞iŶsepaƌaďle ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ to the ǁoƌld͟ 
(van Manen, 1990, p 5) of the person with a language difficulty, a world of acquired disability 
and of altered roles. 
Stories and narrative inquiry are rare in the speech and language therapy literature. Indeed, in 
some stroke research studies, participants with aphasia have been intentionally excluded from 
verbally-based (i.e. using iŶteƌǀieǁs, ŶaƌƌatiǀesͿ studies ͞as it had ďeeŶ assuŵed that usiŶg 
these paƌtiĐipaŶts Đould ƌeduĐe data ƋualitǇ aŶd iŶĐƌease ƌeseaƌĐh tiŵe͟ ;MitĐhell, “kiƌtoŶ aŶd 
Monrouxe, 2011).  It perhaps sounds counterintuitive to use a narrative-based method to 
gather data from a population for whom narrative is difficult. However, as Mundle (2011) says, 
͞ŵissiŶg iŶ ŵuĐh Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh iŶ aphasiologǇ aƌe the ǀoiĐes of those ǀeƌǇ peƌsoŶs ǁith 
expressive aphasia speaking for themselves͟. People ǁith aphasia aƌe aďle to tell their stories; 
we just need to be good listeners. 
There is an element of co-construction of narratives with participants with aphasia; as listener, 
the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ is faĐilitatiŶg eǆpƌessioŶ ďǇ pƌoǀidiŶg tiŵe, ͞ƌaŵps͟ ;MĐViĐkeƌ, ϮϬϬϳͿ oƌ 
artefacts (such as in my interview with Joel in group 2). Sometimes, the listener has to clarify 
or paraphrase to ensure the correct meaning has been conveyed and understood. At times, 
during this study, I had to interpret the meaning of a word or phrase in my transcription; 
paraphasias and neologisms
4
 soŵetiŵes ƌeƋuiƌed ͚ďest fit͛ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs. BƌoŶkeŶ et al 
(2012) discuss the case of constructing – or co-constructing - stories with a young woman with 
aphasia, ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that ͞the telliŶg aŶd shaƌiŶg of stoƌies is seen as a primary tool for 
persons struggling to regain coherence and meaning in the chaos that often accompanies life-
ĐhaŶgiŶg disease͟.  The pƌoĐess of Đo-constructing narratives in this study includes facilitation 
of communication between the participant (Maria) and the researcher (a nurse) by a speech 
aŶd laŶguage theƌapist. The ƌeseaƌĐheƌ desĐƌiďes hoǁ she stƌoǀe to ͞aĐt iŶ a ǁaǇ that ŵade 
Maƌia feel seeŶ, heaƌd, aŶd aĐkŶoǁledged as a ĐoŵpeteŶt adult peƌsoŶ͟ duƌiŶg the iŶteƌǀieǁs. 
                                                          
4
 A paraphasia is a word related to but different from the target word. In literal or phonemic 
paraphasias, more than 50% of the phonemes of the target word remain. In semantic or verbal 
paraphasias, an erroneous but semantically-linked (ie linked in meaning) word is selected. A neologism 
is an attempt at the target word which contains less than 50% of the target phonemes. 
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They conclude that it is iŶdeed possiďle to tell oŶe͛s stoƌǇ ǁith aphasia, aŶd that this stoƌǇ-
telling is integral to recovery and coping. 
Similarly, Barrow (2008) explains how she used narrative inquiry in her study of Anne, a 
woman with aphasia in her forties.  She elucidates how both Anne and those close to her were 
able to express stories of living with aphasia, which contained themes of limited competence 
and being disabled as seeming less than whole. Barrow was then able to interpret these 
themes in the context of a ͞gƌaŶd Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͟ of a peƌǀasiǀe Đultuƌe of ƌestitutiǀe ŵediĐiŶe, 
where disability must be fixed.  
Narrative inquiry and story-telling is therefore possible and, indeed desirable, for people with 
aphasia. Narrative inquiry ensured that the voice of the participants was central to the study; 
to paraphrase van Manen (1990, p ϭϯͿ, ͞the stoƌǇ is the thiŶg͟. 
2.9 Communication Mosaics 
 
It was clear that in order to hear the stories of the participants with aphasia, I would have to 
use more than my understanding of the spoken word; I would be collecting data in myriad 
forms. The stories were told through a form of the Mosaic approach, propounded by Clark 
(2001). This approach is co-contructivist in nature, where both researcher and participant are 
͞eŶgaged iŶ the pƌoĐess of ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg ŵeaŶiŶgs͟ ;Claƌk, ϮϬϬϭ, p ϯϯϰͿ togetheƌ. OƌigiŶallǇ 
devised as an approach whereby children were listened to and their opinions respected, it has 
developed to be accepted as a method of knowledge generation for any age group (Clark, 
2011, p 328). 
The Mosaic approach enables children who are pre-verbal or who have limited, developing 
ǀeƌďal skills to eǆpƌess theiƌ feeliŶgs aŶd opiŶioŶs usiŶg ŵethods ǁhiĐh aƌe ͞Ŷot ƌeliaŶt oŶ the 
spokeŶ ǁoƌd͟ ;Claƌk aŶd Moss, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϳͿ.  Methods iŶĐlude traditional observation and 
interviews, but also incorporate non-verbal expressions, such as use of photographs and maps. 
Clark (2001) used this method to explore the feelings and opinions of pre-school children 
attending a play centre; the participants were able to explain what they enjoyed and what they 
did not enjoy so much within their play environment. Similarly, careworkers in a different 
study were able to express how they felt about different parts of their working environment, 
through taking photographs and creating visual maps (Clark, 2011, p 324).  
When the Mosaic approach was first devised, Clark and Moss (2005, p 5) articulated the 
following premises on which it was founded: 
- Children as experts in their own lives 
- Children as skilful communicators 
- Children as rights holders 
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- Children as meaning makers 
A person-centred approach with people with aphasia would look very similar, if not the same. 
By employing verbal and non-verbal techniques, people with communication difficulties are 
enabled to express their opinions, desires and feelings via whatever modality is easiest for 
them. In the research environment, the approach becomes participant-centred, allowing the 
participant to express their opinions and be intrinsic to the process of answering the research 
questions. 
This project used some basic principles of the Mosaic approach, such as encouraging non-
verbal communication methods (such as gesture) and artefacts as objects of reference 
(Ockelford, 1994), and other verbally-based but non-interview methods, such as email, text 
and Facebook. However, some barriers to using it in its full form were identified. For example, 
Clark (2001; 2011) suggests giving cameras to her young participants and enabling them to 
take photographs in order to convey meaning. IŶ this ǁaǇ, ĐhildƌeŶ ǁeƌe aďle to ͚aƌtiĐulate͛ 
favourite areas of the centre, or important people in their day-to-day lives. Although doubtless 
also a useful strategy for people with limited communication due to stroke, the often 
concomitant physical disabilities such as hemiplegia make this physically more problematic.  
2.10 Conclusion to the epistemological journey 
 
My epistemological journey took me through explorations of various methodological 
approaches, including grounded theory and ethnography, before finally deciding on 
phenomenology. Phenomenology proved congruent with the essence of my study, inasmuch 
as I ǁas deteƌŵiŶed to ͞gƌasp atteŶtiǀelǇ͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϵͿ the stoƌies of spiƌitualitǇ 
relayed to me by the participants. My approach whilst collecting the stories was more 
descriptive, and whilst transcribing and analysing the data demanded a more hermeneutic 
approach, employing the work of both Merleau-Ponty (1964; 2002) and Frank (2010; 2013) as 
an interpretive lens through which to view those stories. The stories themselves were listened 
to employing a phenomenological attitude of openness, awe and curiosity (Finlay, 2011, p 77), 
and facilitated through the use of total communiĐatioŶ akiŶ to Claƌk͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ Mosaic method.  
The following chapter outlines in more detail how the stories were collected. 
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Chapter 3: How the stories were collected 
 
͞foƌ ĐouŶtless patieŶts it is the telliŶg of theiƌ stoƌies that helps to ŵake theŵ ǁell͟ 
(Elwyn and Gwyn, 1999, p 188) 
3.1 Introduction to the method 
 
In order to shed light on the experience of people with severe expressive aphasia expressing 
their spirituality, a method of data collection was demanded which was collaborative, 
participant-focused and facilitative; collaborative and facilitative because the communication 
skills of the participants necessitated an approach which maximised their ability to convey 
their thoughts and feelings on the topic, and participant-focused because the study aimed to 
be about and for people with aphasia. 
Constructing the meaning of spiritual stories of people with aphasia was approached from a 
phenomenological perspective, which meant that I was interested in hearing the voices of the 
participants themselves. I was not interested, as some researchers are (Koenig, 2012), in 
determining spirituality or engagement in spiritual pastimes using measurement scales, or in 
the efficacy of certain spiritual practices, such as prayer, in healing (McCullough et al, 2000). 
From the outset, I questioned the feasibility or indeed the desirability of using questionnaires 
or scales with this particular population. For example, the FICA Spiritual Assessment 
Tool © (Puchalski, 1996) is a spirituality questionnaire devised in order to help physicians and 
other healthcare professionals to start to measure and address the spiritual issues of their 
patients. The acronym stands for faith, importance, community and address in care (or 
assessment and plan), and the questionnaire involves a series of questions related to each of 
these areas. Although Puchalski (1996) explains that the tool is not supposed to be a rigid 
checklist, but rather a way of facilitating discussions around spirituality, I still felt that, for the 
aphasia population with restrictions on their ability to give full verbal responses, it was 
preferable to be looser in my questioning style; not using a formalised questionnaire meant I 
was free to make my interviews real conversations. Although some of my questions 
oǀeƌlapped ǁith PuĐhalski͛s ;ϭϵϵϲͿ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded oŶes iŶ the FICA (see appendix IV for the 
topic guides), I was able to approach each participant in a flexible way, treating each one 
differently and individually, depending on the circumstances, and being led by them. For 
example, some interviews took the form of a ͚getting to know you͛ chat, before the subject of 
spirituality could be broached. Spiritual assessments seem in the main to be geared towards 
patients giving verbal responses to verbal questions; I was keen to involve non-verbal 
facilitation in my conversations, as well as to welcome non-verbal responses. 
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I also questioned whether a positivist, quantitative, questionnaire-type method would 
satisfactorily give voice to the participants with aphasia. Although of course it would be 
possible to facilitate a person with aphasia to complete a words-based questionnaire, the use 
of verbal questions requiring verbal responses does put people with problems processing 
laŶguage at a disadǀaŶtage. HaǀiŶg to ĐoŶĐeŶtƌate oŶ the foƌŵ of oŶe͛s laŶguage ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
the content (Blooŵ et al, ϭϵϴϬͿ ŵeaŶs that the spoŶtaŶeitǇ of oŶe͛s thought pƌoĐesses is 
constrained. Questionnaires with fixed questions and restricted possible responses also did not 
feel flexible and creative enough in order to illustrate what spirituality meant to the 
participants. The severity of aphasia of the participants in the first two groups suggested to me 
that a facilitative, conversational approach would be more conducive to both the topic and to 
the communication methods of the participants, and would therefore elicit richer (or, as 
ɑeeƌtz ;ϭϵϳϯ, p ϯϭϮͿ eǆpƌessed it, ͞thiĐkeƌ͟Ϳ data. 
In order to gain insight into expressions of spirituality from a number of different stroke and 
aphasia perspectives, three different groups of participants were sought, namely people who 
had very recently had their stroke (group 1), people who had had their stroke more than six 
months previously (group 2), and members of the multidisciplinary stroke team (MDT) who 
worked on a regular basis with people with aphasia (group 3). 
Purposive sampling (Silverman, 2006, p 306; Robson, 2011, p 275) was used to recruit all the 
participants in all three groups. This study is an exploration or illumination of how people with 
aphasia express their spirituality and, as such, controlling for variables, or ensuring a spread of 
age or experience did not seem relevant. Because of the subject matter being so personal and 
individual to each participant, saturation of data could also not be, and was not, reached. Each 
participant gave their own unique story, so although themes sometimes overlapped between 
participants, saturation was not sought. 
Qualitative researchers must ensure their work is dependable and trustworthy. In a 
quantitative research paradigm, the researcher would be compelled to seek a high level of 
reliability, that is, they would need to show explicitly how each step of the process was carried 
out, so that another researcher would be able to replicate the study (Silverman, 2006, p 282).  
A phenomenological methodology, by contrast, will be carried out differently by each different 
researcher, each perceiving, interpreting and writing in her own unique way; replicability of 
research and generalisability of data are not sought. Similarly, a quantitative paradigm 
demands validity, in order to ͞guaƌd agaiŶst the possiďilitǇ of spuƌious ĐoƌƌelatioŶs͟ 
(Silverman, 2006, p 289), but in a phenomenological study, no correlations are being sought, 
nor hypotheses proved or disproved. The more helpful concepts of trustworthiness (Robson, 
2011, p 155) and rigour (Finlay, 2011, p 264) were instead considered. Trustworthiness was 
ensured by being explicit and transparent about my methods. I attempted to show a rigorous 
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approach to the research by eǆteŶsiǀe use of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ oǁŶ ǁoƌds, so that their original, 
pure voices could be heard throughout. When I came to transcribe the conversations, and 
identify themes, I checked back with the participants that what I had written was a correct and 
true representation of their voice. The research is evaluated in more detail in chapter 6. 
 
The different group members were as follows: 
Group 1: people recently 
diagnosed with aphasia 
Group 2: people living with 
their aphasia for more than 
six months 
 
Group 3: members of the 
multidisciplinary team 
Amy Lindy Speech and language 
therapist 
Liam Joel Occupational therapist 
Rosemary David Physiotherapist 
 Peter Nurse 
 Francesca Lay chaplain 
 
 
AŶoŶǇŵitǇ ǁas pƌeseƌǀed ďǇ usiŶg pseudoŶǇŵs, so that oŶlǇ the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ geŶdeƌ ǁas 
specified.  However, Lindy in group 2 gave permission for me to use her real name, as well as 
to quote from one of her published works (The Sudden Spoon by L.E. Usher). Some facts were 
also changed in the interests of confidentiality. The members of the multidisciplinary team 
were identified by profession but not by name; it was important to be able to ascertain their 
job role in relation to their input with clients. I deemed the experience and time working with 
people with aphasia possibly to be relevant in terms of their ability or willingness to discuss 
challenging issues, therefore their grade was stated. All professionals were qualified in their 
field, bar the lay chaplain who was not an ordained minister but a volunteer. The chaplain in 
the hospital (an ordained minister) had felt that the lay chaplain was more appropriate to 
interview because of his experience of working on the stroke unit; she herself had more 
experience in other clinical areas. 
All the participants in groups 1 and 2 had expressive aphasia, and their particular language 
strengths and weaknesses are outlined at the start of each story. None was formally assessed, 
and so their speech and language therapy diagnoses vis à vis their language and speech skills 
ǁeƌe deƌiǀed iŶ paƌt fƌoŵ theiƌ speeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapist͛s ƌefeƌƌiŶg information (if 
applicable – see appendix III), and in part from my own informal observation during the 
interview or interviews. 
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This decision not to assess formally was a conscious and defendable one. I was uncertain what 
the benefits of a comprehensive, formal assessment of language skills might be. The types of 
language errors and limitations experienced by each participant are amply portrayed within 
their written story, and had need of no further extrapolation. In addition, in order to discuss a 
potentially personal and emotive subject such as spirituality, I felt I needed to forge a level of 
therapeutic rapport (Ardito and Rabellino, 2011; Stokes and McCormick, 2015, p 7) with the 
participants with aphasia. I also wanted to treat them as equals in the quest for an 
understanding of their experiences; I wanted to avoid the power differential between expert 
and client which can be engendered by formal assessment procedures ;O͛MalleǇ, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϵϰͿ. 
Although I have experience in working with people with aphasia, I was not an expert in their 
expressions of spirituality, and I did not wish to be perceived as such. Inevitably, participants 
may have regarded me as expert, and therefore with unintended power, but I tried to mitigate 
this by being as informal in my approach as possible, attempting to foster a relationship of 
friendship, rather than professionalism. So it was that I chatted to Francesca (group 2) about 
our shared university experience, and to Peter (group 2) about gardens. Testament to this is 
AŵǇ͛s (group 1) introducing me to the patient in the next bed as her friend. 
Throughout the interviewing, I atteŵpted to eŵploǇ a ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;ǀaŶ 
Manen, 2016, p 32; Finlay, 2011, p 73Ϳ as opposed to a ͞Ŷatuƌal attitude͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p 
34), ǁheƌe I iŶƋuiƌed ͞ǁoŶdeƌiŶglǇ͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϵͿ aďout paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stroke stories 
and about their spirituality. This involved ͞holdiŶg oŶ to a staŶĐe of ŶoŶ-judgmental 
aĐĐeptaŶĐe, ǁoŶdeƌiŶg opeŶŶess aŶd ƌespeĐtful eŵpathiĐ dǁelliŶg͟ ;FiŶlaǇ, ϮϬϭϭ, p 79). In 
practice, this meant I strove always to present an open and interested mien, through eye 
contact, facial expression and body positioning. 
Data in this study encompasses not only the words the participants said but also the 
neologisms and paraphasias they expressed, the words they wrote, the gestures they made 
and the intonation of their speech. I had originally planned to video-record all the participants 
with aphasia, in order to capture accurately this non-verbal data. However, having videoed an 
interview with Lindy, Joel and then with Peter in group 2, I came to recognise that this method 
of capturing expression was highly invasive and could even be a hindrance to effective and 
comfortable interviewing. I felt vindicated in my opinion about this when I was explaining the 
recording of interviews to a member of group 2 (Francesca).  I said to her that I had been 
intending to video-record participants but that it felt – and she immediately supplied the word 
͞oďtƌusiǀe͟.  Instead, I relied on audio-recording, combined with accurately noting down of 
non-verbal behaviours in my research log as soon as possible after each inteƌǀieǁ. Claƌk͛s 
(2001) Mosaic approach, used by her in interviewing very young, often pre-verbal, children, 
was adapted and employed with the people with aphasia. Clark (2001) encouraged children to 
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express their thoughts and feelings via a number of different modalities. For example, she 
encouraged them to take photographs of specific areas of the classroom and playground, in 
order to illustrate their thoughts about these areas. In a similar way, with my participants who 
were not pre-verbal but rather post-verbal, I wanted to encourage use of any modality useful 
to them which helped them to express their thoughts about spirituality. The mosaics for the 
participants in this study comprised writing (whole words and parts of words), poetry, gesture, 
intonation, facial expression and artefacts. Some participants added to their mosaics by using 
additional communication media, such as texts, email and Facebook.  Thus, the data collected 
produced a colourful mosaic, full of shards of many different communication tiles, which made 
for a rich composite story. 
3.2 People who had just had their stroke (Group 1) 
 
Participants in group 1 were inpatients on a stroke unit in a local acute hospital. People who 
met the inclusion criteria were identified by the speech and language therapist (SLT) on the 
ward, who then informed me via email using a tick list (see appendix III). Inclusion criteria 
were:  having had a stroke resulting in aphasia less than 6 months prior to the interview, being 
medically stable, and having expressive aphasia in the context of good receptive skills. 
There were many difficulties in recruiting to this group of participants. The stroke ward to 
which I had access was short-staffed, which meant that the SLT had other priorities rather than 
identifying and referring potential participants. In addition, there were fewer people who met 
the inclusion criteria than I had envisaged.  Some people were physically well soon after their 
stroke, despite having considerable communication issues which would have made them 
eligible, and were therefore discharged before referral for the study could take place. Others 
were suffering from concomitant medical issues, which precluded their inclusion. 
I organised a convenient time with staff members to enter the ward and talk to the potential 
participants. I made sure I did not interfere with therapy sessions or care. If she was available, 
the SLT took the time to introduce me to the participant. As I was in possession of a research 
passport issued by the NHS Trust, I was able to come and go on the ward as if I were a member 
of staff, which gave me flexibility in terms of number and timings of visits. 
All group 1 participants were interviewed at bedside, either in single rooms or in four-bedded 
bays. The curtains were drawn round the bed space but inevitably the interviews were 
conducted in a noisy environment with minimal privacy. This was particularly evident in my 
interviews with Liam; concentration was problematic for him with so much noise going on, and 
from my perspective, I found it difficult to broach subjects of a sensitive nature with the to-
ings and fro-ings of hospital life going on all around me. In fact, I felt out of place; nursing and 
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other staff were busy dealing pragmatically with the practical details of making people 
physically comfortable and well, whilst I was asking questions of spirituality and numinosity. It 
almost felt irrelevant; I felt irrelevant. 
I met each of the participants beforehand, just to check that they would be happy to be 
interviewed. This also enabled me to begin the process of getting to know them a little, of 
becoming familiar, perhaps even of creating a therapeutic alliance (Stokes and McCormick, 
2015, p 6).  At the first interview, I made sure I explained the research in accessible language, 
and I also read through the accessible information sheet with the participants (appendix II). I 
then gave them the consent form to sign, reading through each question with them to ensure 
understanding.  I realised early on that I needed to spend a good deal of time over this 
process, in order to be confident that the participants fully understood what inclusion in the 
study entailed. Even from a purely physical perspective, gaining consent was time-consuming 
and difficult for the participants; signing a form when you are lying in bed and not able to use 
your preferred hand due to hemiplegia is challenging. For one participant (Rosemary), I had 
the impression that this was the first time she had attempted to write since the stroke; 
responding to her confusion at this new-found difficulty necessitated a respectful and 
thoughtful response. 
Participants in this group were seen more often but for shorter sessions than the other 
participants. Liam was interviewed three times, Rosemary twice and Amy four times, all over a 
period of one week (Liam and Rosemary) or two weeks (Amy). This was for a number of 
reasons; although they were medically stable, they had all recently suffered a stroke and, as is 
common post-stroke (Markus, Pereira and Cloud, 2016, p 451; Michael, 2002), they were apt 
to fatigue quickly. In the busyness of an acute hospital ward, there were many pressures on 
their time, including therapy sessions and the need for personal care. There were also 
mealtimes, which also understandably took precedence over interviews.  
Interviews were loosely based on a pre-devised topic guide (appendix IV) but really became 
conversational interviews (Kim, 2016 p 262; van Manen, 1990, p 63) rather than semi-
structured interviews (Robson, 2011 p 285). It was important to forge a relationship with these 
participants before being able to broach a subject as sensitive or personal as spirituality. I 
believe I managed to do this to a greater or lesser degree with Amy and Rosemary but not 
Liam in group 1; on my last visit to Amy, she asked if I would be able to come and see her at 
home, once she was discharged. 
It soon became clear to me as I embarked on these interviews, that I was talking to 
participants as a therapist. I was not and could not be an objective question-poser, primarily I 
think because of my training and many years practising as a therapist. Interviews were 
facilitative, with many attempts to encourage or facilitate expression via whatever modality 
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was useful to the participant. I could not bracket off (van Manen, 1990, p 175; Moustakas, 
1994, p 85; Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 5; Finlay, 2011, p 23) the therapist in me; it is too much 
a part of who I am. I also think it would have been unhelpful to have bracketed myself off; I 
think I needed to bring myself into the interview sessions in order to forge rapport, which in 
turn allowed the participants to open up and express sometimes quite personal issues. The 
essence of epoché that I did attempt to bring to the interviews, however, was an ability to 
listeŶ ǁith aŶ ͞uŶfetteƌed staŶĐe͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰ, p ϴϱͿ, ďeiŶg opeŶ aŶd aĐĐeptiŶg of ǁhat 
was said to me, without bias or prejudice in my response or mien. Thus, I hope I employed a  
phenomenological attitude (Finlay, 2011, p 73; van Manen, 2016, p 32), meshed with the 
ĐoŶĐept of ͞fusioŶ of hoƌizoŶs͟ ;ɑadaŵeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. The ĐoŶĐept of epoĐhé and the tension 
between the role of researcher and that of therapist are discussed in more depth in chapters 5 
and 6. 
Video-recording seemed particularly inappropriate in an acute ward setting, where patients 
are often in a state of semi-undress, sometimes (like Liam) with a nasogastric tube in situ. In 
the interests of dignity, I quickly recognised that audio-recording would be the optimal method 
of recording the interviews, supplemented by note-taking and reflection immediately after 
each encounter.  
Interviews were therefore audio-recorded only, using a Sony ICD-PX312 digital voice recorder. 
I captured any written or drawn communicative material, either by keeping the paper on 
which words, numbers or pictures were written, or by photographing these. I also made quick 
notes after the interview in my research log, to remind myself of gestures or occurrences in 
general which might not be immediately apparent merely from an audio recording. 
After interviewing, I listened to each of the recordings and made preliminary notes. Listening 
to the interviews helped me picture the interview better, and remember intonation patterns 
aŶd gestuƌes used. IŶ Heideggeƌ͛s teƌŵs ;ϭϵϲϮ, p ϴϬͿ, I took tiŵe to dǁell ǁith ;͞aufhalten͟) 
the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs, alloǁiŶg ŵǇself to ďeĐoŵe faŵiliaƌ ǁith the stoƌǇtelleƌs͛ ǁoƌds, pƌosodǇ 
and tone. I then attempted to transcribe each interview verbatim, including using phonetic 
script (International Phonetic Alphabet) to transcribe neologisms and literal paraphasias. 
Pauses aŶd filleƌs ;foƌ eǆaŵple, ͞uŵ͟ aŶd ͞eƌ͟Ϳ ǁeƌe Ŷoted, as ǁas the suƌŵised 
communicative intent of intonation. Some of the utterances were impossible to transcribe, 
due to concomitant apraxia of speech and dysarthria in some instances, and due to noise on 
the ward in others.  An example of part of a transcribed interview can be found in appendix V. 
Periods of latency of over 2 seconds were also noted in the transcript. The transcriptions were 
then analysed using a thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006), and key themes 
were identified. 
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The thorny issue of epoché needed to be addressed in the analysis, as well as in the data 
collection, stage. Just as I found it impossible, and indeed undesirable, to bracket off my 
experience during the interviews, so I found myself also drawing on that same experience in 
the analysis stage. I brought into the analysis my history, culture, religious background and my 
clinical experience (for example, in interpreting obfuscated meaning in some aphasic 
utterances).  Gadamer (2013) legitimises this need to bring oneself into both data collection 
and analysis, by advocating the use of the hermeneutic circle in order to optimise 
understanding of a phenomenon.  
3.3 People who had been living with their aphasia for more than six 
months (Group 2) 
 
I recruited participants for group 2 in a number of different ways. I visited Stroke Association 
and other communication charity groups and gave a short, accessible presentation about my 
research project. I then invited people to give me their email address or telephone number if 
they were interested in being interviewed. 
One participant (Joel) was taking part in the conversation partner scheme at a local University, 
and expressed an interest in being interviewed. 
Lindy was the first participant I interviewed in this group, and she was very much instrumental 
in co-constructing the topic guide, and in teaching me how to interview about a topic such as 
spirituality. We met a couple of times at her house, where we discussed not only her spiritual 
story but also how I might go about unearthing spiritual stories with other people with 
aphasia.  
These interviews tended to be longer than those for the participants in group 1. The way I 
carried out the interviews, the feedback I gained from them and the number of times I visited 
varied from participant to participant for a number of reasons. 
I viewed Lindy very much as my co-researcher in terms of planning these interviews, so we met 
on 2 occasions to chat, but we were also in contact via email and Facebook. She also sent me 
material extraneous to the actual interviews, such as poems, important jottings and 
recommendations for books. She is about my age, with, like me, a love of literature and cats, 
so we have really become friends, as well as co-researchers. 
Peter, on the other hand, I met only once. I asked via email a few months later whether I could 
go back and visit him but I did not hear from him. During our interview, he shared with me that 
he suffered from mental health issues, and that this seriously affected his ability to take part in 
activities. Although he volunteered to be interviewed after I had given a presentation to his 
Stroke Association group, I got the feeling that the concept of spirituality was not in fact a 
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particularly important one to him. Whatever the underlying reason, he did not consent to a 
second interview. It transpired later in my study that Peter had been admitted to a nursing 
home after a recurrence of his cancer, and he sadly died a year or so after our conversation. 
It was a similar picture with David. Having transcribed his interview, I drew up an accessible 
summary of the key points he had raised and emailed it to him for comments. He did not 
respond, and we did not meet a second time.  
Joel, on the other hand, was happy to be interviewed again. This enabled me to refer to points 
raised in the first interview, as well as to bring to the second interview artefacts that I felt 
might facilitate or encourage expressions of his faith. 
Francesca I also only interviewed once, but when I sent her a summary of our discussion, she 
emailed back some amendments and comments. 
Interestingly, the two participants with aphasia who seemed the most engaged with the 
project were Lindy and Joel, both practising Christians. It could be that these interviews and 
the questions I was asking resonated more with the people of a prescribed faith. It could also 
be, as I shared their faith tradition, that I asked questions more pertinent to them. (David and 
Francesca both said they were spiritual people who believed in something but they did not 
subscribe to a specific religion. Peter referred to himself as an atheist.) 
I met the participants in group 2 wherever it was convenient for them. In most instances this 
was in their home, the exception being Francesca, whom I interviewed in a quiet room 
adjacent to the hall where her communication group was meeting. The loose topic guide 
(appendix IV) was not given to the participants in groups 1 or 2 prior to the interview, as I had 
found whilst talking to Lindy that the conversation would – and possibly should – diverge in all 
sorts of unexpected directions, led by the participant. The guide really played the role of 
prompt for me, if and when conversation lulled. 
As for group 1, all interviews were audio-recorded using a Sony digital recorder. My initial 
interviews with Lindy, Peter and Joel (interview 1) were in fact video-recorded using an iPad or 
a Sony video recorder, but as discussed earlier, this soon came to feel intrusive and 
counterproductive in my attempt to forge rapport with my interviewees. 
What I had initially thought would be semi-structured interviews soon turned into 
conversations and, in some cases, therapeutic conversations. For example, Peter shared some 
intimate details about his mental health and about significant physical health concerns. There 
is, I think, something about the topic of spirituality which can fast-track therapeutic rapport-
building, so that, for example, after my second visit to Joel and a subsequent thank you email 
from me, I received a reply from his wife saying: 
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͞it͛s ouƌ pleasuƌe. AŶd thaŶk Ǉou ŵuĐh ŵoƌe foƌ takiŶg the tiŵe to Đoŵe͟ ;Sarah, private 
email). 
 
OŶĐe Đoŵplete, I listeŶed to all the iŶteƌǀieǁs aŶd agaiŶ ͞dǁelt͟ ;FiŶlaǇ, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϮϮϵͿ ǁith the 
data and noted any themes or topics of interest which immediately presented themselves. I 
then transcribed all the interviews verbatim, again transcribing any paraphasias or neologisms 
phonetically, noting pauses, intonation patterns and gestures (see appendix V).  
Because I decided to abandon my idea of video-recording, I had to quickly write down after the 
interview any non-verbal communication that seemed pertinent. My earliest interview (with 
Lindy) taught me the value of photographing written communication attempts; she uses her 
pen and paper regularly during conversation to supplement her speech, but I found myself 
unable to ask for the sheets of paper to take away at the end of the interview. It felt almost as 
if I would be taking away her thoughts and voice, something that was not mine to take.  
Once the interviews were transcribed, I highlighted emerging themes, again using a thematic 
analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
3.4 Members of the multidisciplinary stroke team (Group 3) 
 
I interviewed five members of the stroke multidisciplinary team (MDT), four (an occupational 
therapist, a physiotherapist, a speech and language therapist and a lay chaplain) from the 
same unit in an acute hospital. The nurse was from a different unit in a different acute hospital 
but the same NHS Trust. The participants were all qualified in their respective professions 
(except the lay chaplain), all had significant experience of working with people with aphasia 
and all were of a senior rank (apart from the lay chaplain, whose job was not part of the 
healthcare bandings).  
I presented my research proposal to a multidisciplinary team meeting on the stroke unit, and 
asked for anyone interested in being interviewed to contact me. Team members were also 
encouraged to take part by a research-active consultant in stroke. 
Most of the interviews took place during the work shift in a quiet room off the ward. The 
exceptions to this were the speech and language therapist, whom I interviewed at the 
University, and the lay chaplain whose interview took place in the hospital chapel. 
Participants were sent the topic guide (appendix IV) prior to the interview, to allow them time 
to reflect on some of the questions. However, in line with the other groups, we did not adhere 
to this guide but rather the interviews became conversations between peers. 
A form of phenomenological reduction (van Manen, 1990, p 185; 2016, p 215), was used in the 
MDT interviews, in that I strove to be open and accepting of all information that was given to 
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me. I was by no means an objective onlooker, however, as I found myself bringing my 
experience as an SLT and as a multidisciplinary team member to the conversations. Part of this 
was creating peer-to-peer trust and understanding; I had to give something of myself and of 
my experience in order to achieve this, and therefore to encourage candour. As with all the 
interviews then, epoché ǁas eŵploǇed iŶ ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ͛s ;ϭϵϵϬ, p ϰϳͿ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the teƌŵ, 
ǁheƌe ŵǇ pƌesuppositioŶs ƌelatiŶg to ǀaƌious teaŵ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ƌoles ǁeƌe held at ďaǇ to eŶaďle 
ŵe to ͞studǇ the esseŶtial stƌuĐtuƌes͟ ;p ϭϳϱͿ of the topiĐ at hand. As for all the interviews, the 
fore-meanings in my own horizon (see chapter 2) were present and acknowledged as it fused 
with the horizon of my interviewee (Gadamer, 2013).  
Conversations were again audio-recorded. If comments were made after the digital recorder 
was switched off, these were noted down and permission asked of the participant to use this 
data. The SLT continued the conversation via text over a few days after the interview. 
Once completed, I listened to each of the interviews and noted down words or phrases or 
concepts which immediately leapt out at me. I then had the interviews professionally 
transcribed. On receipt of the transcripts, I listened to each interview again, and made any 
small adjustments to the transcripts that were necessary. 
Once I had the transcripts in front of me, I was able to identify key themes (Braun and Clarke, 
2006) discussed by each of the healthcare professionals. The themes were then woven into a 
story for each professional, using their own voice to illustrate key concepts. 
3.5 Data: collating the stories 
 
EaĐh paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ ;oƌ iŶteƌǀieǁsͿ ǁas ǁƌitteŶ up iŶ the foƌŵ of a stoƌǇ of theŵes, 
that is the salient themes were identified and then illustrated by direct quotations from the 
peƌsoŶ͛s tƌaŶsĐƌipt. One further story was created by identifying and drawing out overarching 
themes from the stories of the people with aphasia. I was keen for the voice of the people with 
aphasia to ďe heaƌd thƌoughout the ƌeseaƌĐh, at tiŵes uŶfilteƌed ďǇ aŶotheƌ͛s iŶteƌpretation, 
so there are a plethora of direct participant quotes. 
͚Data͛ seeŵs aŶ odd ǁoƌd to aligŶ ǁith ǁhat ǁas ĐoŵŵuŶiĐated to ŵe duƌiŶg the iŶteƌǀieǁs, 
with its positivist overtones and connotations of numbers. However, the etymology of the 
ǁoƌd ͚data͛ – fƌoŵ the LatiŶ ͚datuŵ͛ ŵeaŶiŶg ͚thiŶg giǀeŶ͛ – makes a mockery of my 
squeamishness, and actually renders the term highly appropriate. The words and other 
eǆpƌessioŶs ǁeƌe ͚giǀeŶ͛ to aŶd ƌeĐeiǀed ďǇ ŵe; data did Ŷot just eŵeƌge ďut ǁas giǀeŶ.  
Richards (2Ϭϭϱ, p ϯϲͿ talks aďout ͞ŵakiŶg͟ the data, as opposed to ĐolleĐtiŶg it. “he saǇs that, 
afteƌ all ͞Ǉou aƌe haƌdlǇ aŶ iŶŶoĐeŶt ďǇstaŶdeƌ iŶ this pƌoĐess of data ŵakiŶg͟ ;p ϮϳͿ. The 
interview process itself creates a dynamic and a relationship, and is integral to what data is 
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actually given. At times, the data from the people with aphasia had to be coaxed out; 
appropriate clarification questions were asked, non-verbal communication of my own given, 
artefacts used.  I ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ ǁas Ŷot aŶ ͞iŶŶoĐeŶt ďǇstaŶdeƌ͟ (Richards, 2015, p 27) but an active 
agent in the production of the data, which was given by the participants and facilitated by me 
as researcher. 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
 
The ethical considerations for any research project cannot be overstated and full ethical 
approval is of course essential. I considered the ethical issues involved in this research very 
carefully, not least because I was intending to have conversations with people for whom 
conversation can be problematic. Added to this, I had chosen a difficult and potentially 
sensitive conversation topic in spirituality. I was, in fact, asking people who find talking difficult 
to talk about something difficult. 
For group one, I applied for and received ethical approval from the NHS (REC number: 
14/LO/0718). Interestingly, some concerns the ethics committee expressed were around the 
filming of people in hospital. Although I defended my decision at the time by explaining that I 
was eager to capture all non-verbal communication, I changed my mind, as has been 
discussed, and effectively agreed with the committee that use of video would be intrusive and 
run counter to preservation of dignity. The ethics committee also wanted clarity as to why I 
was not intending to assess the participants in group 1 formally – particularly, I think, in 
relation to gaining informed consent - but essentially my reasoning for this was understood 
and accepted. Group 1 participants were given accessible information sheets and consent 
forms, to ensure full understanding of what they were consenting to. I also talked through the 
information sheet and consent form with them, to ensure comprehension. Participants were 
reminded that they could withdraw from the study at any time, should they so wish. I obtained 
a one-year research passport from a local NHS Trust, which enabled me to enter the local 
stroke unit freely, as if I were an employee. 
As I did not intend to recruit group two participants through the NHS – these participants were 
at least 6 months post-stroke and were no longer in receipt of acute or rehabilitation care – I 
applied foƌ aŶd ƌeĐeiǀed ethiĐal appƌoǀal ǀia the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s FaĐultǇ ‘eseaƌĐh EthiĐs 
Committee. I think it is a moot point whether people living with aphasia post-stroke are 
͚vulnerable͛, since their cognition other than language is usually largely intact, nevertheless it 
seemed sensible to err on the side of caution and apply for full University ethics approval. 
Again, all information and the consent forms were presented in an accessible manner, and I 
talked through both the form and the information sheet with each participant. 
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There was no need to seek full ethical review for group 3, as participants in that group were all 
non-vulnerable adults who were able to give informed consent. Each participant in this group 
was given an information sheet to read and ample time to discuss participation in the study 
with me. They were then asked to sign a consent form, which included permission to be 
recorded. Copies of the participant information sheets and consent forms can be found in 
appendix II. 
3.7 Issues related to interviewing 
 
I had to learn how to talk to people about spirituality. Beginning this project, I was not even 
sure it was possible to discuss these issues with people with whom I did not have a close and 
deep relationship, or with whom I did not share a particular faith tradition. As a practising 
Christian, to an extent I was used to talking to friends and fellow church-goers about their 
Christianity, and to sharing my own faith, but as a therapist-researcher, talking to people 
unfamiliar to me about their definitions and experiences of spirituality was a new and 
unexplored area. I therefore decided to interview some of my own students about their 
spirituality. I advertised for volunteers and was surprised and delighted to have several 
studeŶts Đoŵe foƌǁaƌd. These ͚ŵoĐk͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁeƌe iŶǀaluaďle. TheǇ helped ŵe shape ŵǇ 
questioning, hone my listening, and instilled confidence in me that I was indeed capable of 
conducting such interviews. One of the most important lessons I learnt from these interviews 
(and this was also reinforced by my reading Patton (2002, p 379)) was to leave a very open 
ƋuestioŶ at the eŶd, suĐh as ͞is theƌe aŶǇthiŶg else Ǉou ǁould like to disĐuss?͟ This, I thiŶk, 
enabled the participants to talk about issues that did not or had not fitted into the previous 
questions or discussions, and sometimes resulted in rich elements of the story. 
3.8 Storytelling, story-listening and rapport 
 
Encouraging people to tell their story about spirituality was at once illuminating but fraught 
with methodological difficulties. The ability to tell their story comfortably was dependent on 
many variables, and I felt that the success of my ability to hear the real story varied from 
participant to participant. 
The primary difficulty was a lack of time, time to forge meaningful and genuine relationships.  
With some participants (for example, Lindy, Peter, Joel (group 2) and the SLT), I felt an 
immediate and tangible closeness. On reflection, I think this was due to a number of different 
influences, such as a similarity of age, a shared faith tradition, even a love of cats. Somehow, 
we connected quickly, and this led, I think, to an openness (on both sides) during the 
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conversation. People shared intimate aspects of their faith, and of other aspects of their life, 
such as their mental health. 
With other participants (notably Liam (group 1) and David (group 2)), connection was lacking. 
Why that connection was missing can only be surmised, but may have been in relation to 
gender, age or lack of common ground. This difference in connection definitely impacted on 
the stories conveyed and on their interpretation and is perhaps best summed up by this 
comment from David: 
͞I ĐaŶ iŵagiŶe that Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot…iŵagiŶe it͛s. I tƌied to tell you yesterday. I really do think you 
ǁeƌeŶ͛t eƌ…oh ǁell, Ŷeǀeƌ ŵiŶd͟. 
WithiŶ this stateŵeŶt, I thiŶk, theƌe is a seŶse of ƌeseŶtŵeŶt ;͞I tƌied to tell Ǉou ǇesteƌdaǇ͟Ϳ, 
aŶd a feeliŶg of eǆaspeƌatioŶ ;͞Ŷeǀeƌ ŵiŶd͟Ϳ. I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ feeliŶg aĐutelǇ eŵďaƌƌassed and not 
a little affronted during this interchange, almost as if he had spurned my friendly advances, 
and consented to an interview he was, after all, not invested in. In fact, of course, he was 
perhaps more likely to have been expressing his lack of interest in discussing spirituality with 
me, or his belief that what he might have to convey on the subject was not of interest. He 
might, also, of course, not have felt comfortable with me as a person, a fact I have had to 
ponder on. 
This inability to forge rapport with some participants was a personally difficult one for me, as 
well as being unsatisfactory from a research perspective. As a therapist, the ability to forge 
theƌapeutiĐ ƌappoƌt is paƌt of ŵǇ ƌaisoŶ d͛être. If I was not able to make every participant feel 
comfortable, what sort of a therapist was I? I wrote in my reflective journal at the time of 
iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg Daǀid ͞I felt I didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ ĐoŶŶeĐt ǁith Daǀid͟, ďut ƌefleĐtiŶg oŶ this ǁas a useful 
exercise. It helped me recognise that, as a therapist or as researcher, we do not always 
immediately find connection. Connection is a process which may take time, a luxury I 
unfortunately did not have during this study. I noted in my journal how my interview with 
‘oseŵaƌǇ ǁas ŵeaŶt as a pƌeliŵiŶaƌǇ ͚get-to-know-each-otheƌ͛ Đhat; hoǁeǀeƌ, ďeĐause she 
was quickly moved to another facility, it became our only discussion, and spiritual matters 
were hardly touched upon. Rapport, it seems to me, is essential in storytelling and story-
listening, not least when those stories potentially comprise personal and intimate details. 
3.9 Thematic analysis 
 
The process of drawing out the themes was carried out using a flexible approach, based on the 
work of Braun and Clarke (2006). They recognise that there are essentially two schools of 
thought when considering qualitative analytic methods. On the one hand, there are analytic 
methods which are driven by and wedded to their particular epistemological position, such as, 
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for example, conversation analysis (Robson, 2011, p 373). On the other hand, there are those 
methods which are not reliant on or tied to any particular epistemology or theoretical 
framework. Thus, it is in this case that a phenomenological study, arising from a constructivist 
epistemology uses a flexible analytic approach propounded by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
TheŵatiĐ aŶalǇsis ǁas used foƌ ͞ideŶtifǇiŶg, aŶalǇsiŶg aŶd ƌepoƌtiŶg patteƌŶs͟ ;BƌauŶ aŶd 
Clarke, 2006, p 6). The first step was to familiarise myself with the data (Braun and Clarke, 
2006, p 160); I achieved this by listening several times to the recorded interviews. Each 
interview was listened to and the transcripts read multiple times in order to dwell with 
(Heidegger, 1962, p 80; Finlay, 2011, p 229) and immerse myself in (Robson, 2011, p 476) the 
data. I found this an invaluable strategy, because by listening to the interview again, I could re-
imagine myself with the participant, and could then remember gestures or facial expressions 
which I had not noted down at the time. For groups one and two, this process of 
familiarisation was helped by carrying out the transcription myself, so listening to the 
interviews was followed by multiple additional playings of the recordings as I transcribed all 
the verbal and non-verbal information. Group 3 interviews were professionally transcribed, 
but I endeavoured nevertheless to familiarise myself with these by listening to them several 
times, and then listening to them again with the transcript in front of me.  
Initial codes (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 18) were generated and noted on the transcripts; on 
each script, I highlighted words and phrases that seemed important, and gave broad names to 
the theŵe theǇ illustƌated, suĐh as ͞tƌauŵa of the stƌoke͟, ͞life ŵeaŶiŶg͟ oƌ ͞ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ͟. 
Themes were searched for, reviewed and named (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p 22) at first in 
tabular form (see appendix VI for an example of an annotated script and a themes table), then 
woven into stories for each participant. Some themes common to both groups of participants 
in groups 1 and 2 were in turn woven into their own story. 
Data ǁas ͚giǀeŶ͛ ďut theŶ ŵoulded aŶd shaped iŶto theŵes iŶ aŶ aĐtiǀe ǁaǇ. With the 
participants in groups 1 and 2 with aphasia, I felt I was actively involved even during the 
interview process in nurturing the data and enabling it to come to the fore, through active 
listening and facilitation techniques. Themes, then, did not so much emerge intransitively but 
were actively brought into being.  
Being mindful of rigour, I did attempt to check back with my participants once the data was 
recorded and typed up. Some, such as Lindy and Francesca (group 2), gave written feedback. 
Others were not engaged in this process for various reasons: lack of time (nurse), probable lack 
of interest in the research subject or process (David and Peter, group 2), illness (Liam, group 1) 
and loss of contact (Amy, group 1). 
Because spirituality is notoriously difficult to define, or perhaps defies definition altogether, I 
had no preconceived ideas as to what themes might arise during the conversations. The 
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thematic analysis, then, was inductive in approach, and it was only when I came to analyse 
groupings of data together (that is, all the conversations with people with aphasia) that 
themes common to several participants started to be discovered. 
3.10 Writing a phenomenological study 
 
I have attempted to write the stories, and indeed the entire thesis, in a manner congruent with 
the phenomenological approach. The phenomenological approach is, in turn, congruent with 
the subject matter of spirituality, and with some of the participants having a communication 
diffiĐultǇ. The ƌesults of this studǇ ĐaŶŶot ďe ͞seǀeƌed fƌoŵ the ŵeaŶs ďǇ ǁhiĐh the ƌesults 
ǁeƌe oďtaiŶed͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϭϵϵϬ, p ϭϯͿ; the stoƌies aƌe the ƌesults aŶd the ǁaǇ those stoƌies 
were collected and collated are part of that bigger story. The methodology, methods, results 
and discussion are all part of the same story, which is an evocation of the spiritual stories of 
these individuals. There is no traditional results section, no summary, no conclusion per se, but 
ƌatheƌ a telliŶg of the pƌoĐess of eǆploƌiŶg people͛s stoƌies: 
͞Ǉou ǁill listeŶ iŶ ǀaiŶ foƌ the puŶĐh-line, the latest information, or the big news. As in poetry, 
it is inappropriate to ask for a conclusion or a summary of a phenomenologiĐal studǇ…The 
poeŵ is the thiŶg͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϭϵϵϬ, p ϭϯͿ. 
So, then, the stories are the thing, and within the stories reside the words (and gestures, 
writing, intonation and facial expression) of the people with aphasia themselves. Adopting a 
participant-centred approach along the lines of the person-centred or patient-centred 
approach prevalent in healthcare today (Koubel and Bungay, 2008), I have produced parts of 
the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies ǀeƌďatiŵ, Đoŵplete ǁith pauses, filleƌs aŶd paƌaphasias. This was in 
order to give them their voice, not their voice mediated through me and my preconceptions 
and pre-judgements, but their true, pure, unadulterated voice. I wanted their essence (van 
Manen, 1990, p 177; Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p vii, Finlay, 2011, p 93) to exude through the page 
via their Mosaics (Clark, 2001) of words, non-words, gestures, pauses and writing. 
I have used the first person in most of the chapters of this thesis. This was in order to illustrate 
an acknowledgement that I bring my own experiences, thoughts and beliefs to the study 
(Holliday, 2007, p 120). In some ways, I wanted my own voice to be heard, alongside those of 
my participants. Had someone else with a different life history, different life experiences, 
different beliefs narrated this research, the story would also have been a different one. In a 
sense, I am one of the participants of the study, and this is my story. 
Each story is also in the present tense, a conceit I have used intentionally in an effort to 
position, as Hilary Mantel puts it, ͞the ƌeadeƌ aŶd the ǁƌiteƌ iŶ the saŵe spaĐe, as ǁell as iŶ 
the saŵe ŵoŵeŶt͟ ;Lea, ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
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Above all, throughout the writing, I have attempted to encapsulate concepts of acceptance, 
understanding, reverence and awe: 
 ͞The pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal ŵethod consists of the ability, or rather the art of being sensitive – 
sensitive to the subtle undertones of language, to the way language speaks when it allows the 
thiŶgs theŵselǀes to speak͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϭϵϵϬ p ϭϭϭͿ. 
What follows, therefore, are the participants͛ stoƌies, ďoth those of the people ǁith aphasia 
aŶd those of the stƌoke teaŵ. I tƌied to heaƌ the stoƌies usiŶg a ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ 
(van Manen, 2016, p 32) of attentive listening, wonder and curiosity throughout. I focussed on 
respecting the disability narrative as it was given to me, by attempting to adopt a Gadamerian 
fusion of horizons. Finally, stories were presented in mosaics of inventive and effective 
communication strategies, both verbal and non-verbal. 
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Chapter 4: The stories 
 
͞a stoƌǇ ƌeƋuiƌes listeŶeƌs; it ŵust ďe told͟ 
(Frank, 2013) 
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AŶŶotatioŶs used iŶ tƌaŶsĐƌipts of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs: 
 
…     short pause 
 
(latency)    latency of response in seconds 
 
(comment)    description of non-verbal communication 
 
(word/ phrase)    possible translation of a paraphasia 
 
{name}     actual name removed to preserve anonymity 
 
S:     researcher 
 
[   ]     paraphasias and neologisms written in International 
     Phonetic Alphabet (IPA)   
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The stories of people who had just had their stroke 
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Amy: the homemaker’s tale 
 
͞ the ŵole ƌoused hiŵself aŶd dusted aŶd polished ǁith eŶeƌgǇ aŶd heaƌtiŶess͟ 
(The Wind in the Willows, Kenneth Grahame) 
 
Amy is an elderly woman in her late seventies, an inpatient in hospital following a stroke 
several weeks previously. We meet on the acute stroke unit, having been introduced to each 
other by the speech and language therapist on the unit.  
I meet Amy four times in total; sometimes she is in a single room, at other times she has been 
moved to a four-bedded bay. Wherever our conversations take place, she is always 
surrounded by family photos – mostly of grandchildren – and get well cards. 
 
AŵǇ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
Amy presents with good auditory comprehension skills in the context of significant expressive 
difficulties. Her speech is dysarthric, typified by the imprecise consonants and slower 
articulation often seen in unilateral upper motor neuron dysarthria (Duffy, 2012). Her 
expressive language comprises reduced syntactic complexity and reduced lexical choice. In 
terms of the cognitive neuropsychological model of language processing (see appendix I), her 
deficits are probably at the level of the phonological output lexicon; she produces the 
occasional phonemic paraphasia but no semantic paraphasias during our conversations. 
Amy has good pragmatic skills; she is able to hold eye contact and take appropriate turns in 
conversation. Her social speech is relatively preserved, as evidenced in the following example: 
 
A: You feel all right? 
“: Yeah, I͛ŵ ƌeallǇ ǁell, thaŶk Ǉou, Ǉeah, I͛ŵ ƌeallǇ ǁell 
A: Good  
 
AŵǇ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ŵosaiĐ 
Speech is AŵǇ͛s most used expressive modality, but she supplements this with meaningful 
intonation and occasional use of gesture, such as when she indicates ͚pƌaǇeƌ͛ aŶd ͚ďlessiŶg͛. 
 
Relationship 
MuĐh of ouƌ eaƌlǇ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ ƌeǀolǀes aƌouŶd iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌelatioŶships iŶ AŵǇ͛s life. FaŵilǇ 
photos around her hospital bed lend themselves to discussions about children and 
grandchildren. On some occasions, she explains how they have visited her: 
A: He come to see me 
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S: Ah 
A: AŶd hiŵ…hiŵ aŶd hiŵ 
“: aŶd these tǁo haǀe ďeeŶ, haǀeŶ͛t theǇ, Ǉeah? 
A: Yeah 
S: So, this is all your family 
A: yeah 
S: Mmm 
 
At other times, she is adamant that they have not been, and indeed she seems rather resentful 
of the fact: 
“: “o ǁe talked a ďit last tiŵe aďout…eƌŵ…Ǉouƌ…eƌ…ĐhildƌeŶ aŶd Ǉouƌ gƌaŶdĐhildƌeŶ 
A: I doŶ͛t see theŵ 
“: DoŶ͛t see theŵ? Oh, haǀe theǇ Ŷot ďeeŶ iŶ foƌ a ǁhile? 
A: No 
“: Oh, I͛ŵ soƌƌǇ to heaƌ that…ah…;pause) 
 
She expresses the love her children and grandchildren have for her using both language and 
evocative intonation: 
A: Yeah. They come and see me. They give me a kiss. 
“: Do theǇ? That͛s loǀelǇ 
A: I love you (imitating child, in a sing-song voice) he goes 
“: Ah, that͛s lovely 
A: He said ͞I loǀe Ǉou!͟ he said ͞I loǀe Ǉou!͟… He ƌeallǇ loǀe ŵe 
 
However, she is also very candid in her criticism of the grandchildren and how they behave at 
times: 
S: So what do you say to them? 
A: I saǇ ͞Đoŵe ͚eƌe!͟  
“: Do Ǉou…oh 
A: I saǇ ͞Đoŵe ͚eƌe͟…ďolloĐks…he saǇs ďolloĐks 
S: Oh 
A: He͛s a little…I saǇ ͞ǁhǇ do Ǉou saǇ ďolloĐks?͟…;imitates childͿ ͞soƌƌǇ͟ 
 
and again: 
A: Buggeƌ he is…theƌe ;pointing to photo) 
S: Yep, on the photos – yeah 
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A: ͞I ǁaŶt, I ǁaŶt͟, he goes ͞I ǁaŶt͟ 
 
CleaƌlǇ, AŵǇ͛s Đhildƌen and grandchildren are important to her, and bring her much joy. 
However, she is also quick to point out their faults, even to me, a comparative stranger. I 
wonder if this is a reflection of the trust built up between us, or whether she has become a 
little disinhibited post-stroke (Halpern and Goldfarb, 2013, p 169), saying things she would not 
normally voice in public? 
 
Home 
It is clear that Amy is desperate to get back home after her stay in hospital. She often asks me 
when she will be able to go home, as if I am a member of staff at the hospital: 
A: Oh, I like to go home 
“: You͛d like to go hoŵe 
A: Please 
S: Yeah, of course, I know 
A: Oh, I love to go home 
 
Interchanges like this one leave me feeling somewhat guilty that I am not able to do something 
constructive in facilitating discharge from hospital to home, and also that I am engaging Amy in 
discussions about life meaning and purpose when her overriding desire is not to be in hospital 
at all. AŵǇ͛s use of the ǁoƌd ͚please͛ makes me feel frustrated that I cannot help but also 
almost like I am there under false pretences, that is, that Amy believes I am in fact a member 
of staff with control over such issues.  
Home, and being and doing at home, are recurring themes in my discussions with Amy. When, 
in response to her obvious and keenly felt desire to go home I ask her what it is she is missing 
most about home, she tells me about how she is missing the day-to-day chores: 
S: What are you missing most about being at home? 
A: Washing 
S: Washing? 
(pause) 
A: I do the washing 
S: You do the washing 
A: Yeah 
S: So, do you miss doing those chores? 
A: Yeah 
In another interview, she talks about her desire to get home in order to resume her chores: 
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“: You͛d like to haǀe goŶe hoŵe? 
A: Please 
S: Of course, yeah 
A: Tidy up…Ǉeah 
S: To tidy up the house? 
 
I picture her as a house-proud woman, who has always cared for her family and her home. It 
seems that this role is one that gives meaning and purpose to her life, and is one that she 
misses hugely when she is away from her home.  
I find it difficult to gauge whether Amy lives alone or not. During one conversation, she implies 
that her husband is no longer around, although the information conveyed is not clear and I am 
not convinced that I have fully understood: 
S: Yeah, fantastiĐ…aŶd do Ǉou haǀe a husďaŶd at hoŵe, AŵǇ? 
A: No, no 
S: No 
A: No, he stay there 
S: Stayed there? 
A: He ŵust ďe sleep…;?ǁoƌkiŶgͿ 
S: Has he passed away? 
A: No 
S: No 
A: No 
“: Just Ŷot at hoŵe aŶǇ ŵoƌe… 
 
On another occasion, Amy tells me that she lives with an aunt: 
“: You said Ǉou liǀe ďǇ Ǉouƌself, doŶ͛t Ǉou, at hoŵe? 
A: I liǀe ǁith ŵe…eƌ…AuŶtie. I liǀe ǁith it.  
S: You live with your Auntie? 
A: Yeah 
S: Ah 
A: Yes, she moved in to my place 
S: Did she? 
A: Yeah 
S: So, there are two of you at home? 
A: Yeah 
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Because of heƌ age, it seeŵs uŶlikelǇ that AŵǇ ŵeaŶt ͚auŶtie͛. It might be that she has 
selected the incorrect word in terms of a female relative, a not uncommon error in aphasia 
(Papathanasiou, Coppens and Potagas, 2013, p 134); perhaps she means niece or daughter.  
In our final conversation, Amy tells me that her son is getting her house ready for her return: 
A: Doing my house up 
S: Doing? 
A: Painting 
“: Ah! Who͛s doiŶg that foƌ Ǉou? 
A: My son 
“: Oh, ďƌilliaŶt! What͛s Ǉouƌ soŶ͛s Ŷaŵe? 
A: Eƌ…{name of son} 
S: {name of son}…that͛s a ŶiĐe Ŷaŵe 
A: Yeah 
“: It͛s Ƌuite aŶ uŶusual Ŷaŵe, isŶ͛t it? “o he͛s paiŶtiŶg the house aŶd gettiŶg it ƌeadǇ foƌ ǁheŶ 
Ǉou Đoŵe hoŵe? That͛s ďƌilliaŶt! 
A: (unintelligible) 
S: Be lovely to have it all spruced up  
A: You come and see 
 
This is indicative of how important her house and the state of her house is; the proud 
housewife even invites me to see her home at the end of this interchange. 
 
Pets 
When Amy talks about home and what is important to her at home, she talks about her pets.  
Her response to the question about what gives her life meaning is immediate and unequivocal: 
“: “o, ǁheŶ Ǉou aƌe at hoŵe, AŵǇ, ǁhat kiŶd of giǀes Ǉouƌ life ŵeaŶiŶg, ǁhat͛s the ŵost 
iŵpoƌtaŶt… 
A: I got two dogs 
S: Two dogs? Ah! 
 
and when I return to this question during a later conversation, she is just as adamant: 
“: Yeah. I kŶoǁ I…ǁheŶ I said to Ǉou last tiŵe ǁhat is it iŶ Ǉouƌ life ǁhiĐh giǀes Ǉouƌ life 
ŵeaŶiŶg, Ǉou said ͞dogs͟ – quite quickly you said that 
A: Yeah – theǇ͛ƌe loǀelǇ 
 
Amy goes on to explain that she also has a cat who gives her as much pleasure: 
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“: Oh, Ǉou͛ǀe got a Đat? 
A: Yeah, he go he go goes ǁheƌe…[tǁiŶ] Ǉouƌ legs 
S: Yeah 
A: Oh, love love love 
S: Is he a friendly cat? 
A: yeah 
S: Yeah 
A: Yeah. He love loves me 
“: Yeah, giǀe Ǉou a lot of… 
A: He (unintelligible). He go (unintelligible) 
S: Yeah? Gives you a lot of pleasure 
A: He does, he lovely 
 
In common with some other participants, Amy speaks about her pets with great affection, and 
the animals seem to give her life meaning and purpose. 
 
Amy͛s defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ 
WheŶ I ask AŵǇ ǁhat the ǁoƌd ͚spiƌitualitǇ͛ ŵeaŶs to heƌ, she ĐoŶflates the ĐoŶĐept ǁith 
religious practice in the form of prayer: 
“: If…eƌ…I saǇ the ǁoƌd ͞spiƌitualitǇ͟ to Ǉou, ǁhat does that ŵeaŶ…spiƌitualitǇ? 
A: “aǇ…saǇ pƌayers 
 
However, it is worth noting that I ask this question directly after we have had a conversation 
about prayer, church and blessing, so it may be that religion is at the forefront of her mind. If I 
had asked the question again at a different stage of the conversation, perhaps Amy would 
have given me a different answer. 
In contrast to some other participants (such as, for example, Lindy, Joel and David from group 
2), Amy does not mention God, a god or Jesus in her definition of spirituality, despite her claim 
that her spirituality is about praying. 
 
Religion 
Amy is a religious woman but her opinions and belief about faith only come to the fore 
because I ask her direct questions about this. For some reason – perhaps because we have 
created a friendly and supportive rapport together – I feel able to ask her if she goes to church: 
“: “o, AŵǇ, ǁheŶ Ǉou͛ƌe at hoŵe, do Ǉou go to ĐhuƌĐh oƌ aŶǇthiŶg like that? 
A: Yeah 
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S: Do you? Ah – which church? 
A: Go [lɪəʊ] go same place 
 
and she, in turn, feels able to do likewise: 
A: You…Ǉou go to ĐhuƌĐh? 
S: I do, yeah 
A: You go iŶ the…Ǉou go iŶ the…Ǉou go iŶ the ĐhuƌĐh? 
S: Mm...I go to a church in {name of place nearby} 
A: Oh, yes 
 
Knowing that we both attend church gives us common ground, and allows us to explore other 
areas of faith. For example, in our second conversation Amy intimates how important prayer is 
to her, and how she attends church in order to pray: 
A: Go [lɪəʊ] go same place 
S: Do you? Ah, is that important to you? 
A: Yeah (gestures praying with both hands) 
S: Yeah – saying prayers 
A: WaŶt to kŶoǁ…ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ Đoŵe iŶ [t࠲tʃ] (gestured prayer) 
S: to pray, yeah 
A: yeah 
 
Understandably in her present circumstances, her prayers seem to be prayers of supplication: 
S: So what do you pray about? 
A: I pƌaǇ ͞please help ŵe͟ 
 
but she expresses sadness that often prayer seems to go unanswered: 
“: Did Ǉou fiŶd that…eƌ…ǁhat do Ǉou fiŶd Ǉou get out of pƌaǇeƌ? 
A: DoesŶ͛t help ŵe 
 
Despite this, knowing that members of her church are praying for her appears to give Amy a 
certain sense of contentment, exemplified in this extract, where I inadvertently cue Amy in to 
how she feels about these people: 
A: [pleɪ] pray for me 
S: They pray for you? 
A: Yeah 
S: Yeah, yeah – that͛s… 
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A: Really nice 
 
On my last visit, I take a holding cross with me to give to Amy, partly as a thank you, but also 
because I wonder whether it might be helpful to her in terms of prayer and focus for prayer. 
Indeed, when I ask her what she thinks of when she looks at the cross, she immediately 
mentions prayer: 
“: I ǁoŶdeƌed ǁhetheƌ…eƌ…ǁhat that ŵeaŶt to Ǉou ƌeallǇ. What does that saǇ to Ǉou ǁheŶ 
you look at it? 
A: Pray 
S: Yeah? It says ͞pƌaǇ͟ 
 
and she intimates that it may become a useful tool in her prayer time, although I recognise I 
have asked her a leading question: 
S: Did you find it useful, the cross? 
A: Yeah 
S: Did you hold it? 
A: I…;gestured prayer) 
 
Interestingly, Amy uses gestuƌe ďoth to ĐoŶǀeǇ pƌaǇeƌ aŶd also ďlessiŶg ;she saǇs, ͞he ǁeŶt 
like that͟ ǁheŶ desĐƌiďiŶg a ǀisit fƌoŵ a pƌiest, aŶd gestuƌes a hand on her head), and yet 
gesture is not a natural total communication device during other parts of our conversation. 
Perhaps because the corresponding gesture is so integral to these two concepts, Amy uses 
them naturally, and may even have used them prior to the aphasia. 
Amy gives conflicting information – or I perceive the information as conflicting - when she talks 
about visits from her local parish priest. On the one hand, she tells me about a recent visit 
from him and intimates that this was a positive and welcome experience: 
S: And who was that? Who came to see you? 
A: Er..Father [æʔ] you know him? 
“: Eƌ, Ŷo, I doŶ͛t thiŶk so 
A: He͛s ǀeƌǇ ŶiĐe 
S: Right 
A: He very nice [pipə] 
 
On the other hand, Amy describes a difficulty in communication between her and the priest on 
the same (or perhaps a different?) occasion: 
A: No (pause) [lɔ] come see me. [tʃ] [tʃ] chat 
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S: He chats? 
A: Yeah – cor he does (unintelligible) 
S: Does he? 
A: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhat he saǇ 
S: And who was that? Who came to see you? 
A: Er..Father [æʔ] you know him? 
 
In a later interview, Amy denies that she has had a visit from her priest, and in fact this leads 
me to attempt to find out who her parish priest might be, in order to request a visit: 
S: Good. And does someone from that church come and visit you here? 
A: No, doŶ͛t see theŵ 
S: Would you like that? 
A: Yes 
S: Perhaps I could look into that for you? 
 
I also make a referral to the chaplaincy team at the hospital via the nursing staff after this 
interchange: 
S: What about the chaplain here? Have you seen him? 
A: No 
S: Would you like to see him? 
A: Yeah 
 
Physical discomfort overrides other (spiritual) concerns 
Although Amy and I have conversations about prayer, church and what gives her life meaning, 
such as her family and attending to household chores, the overriding feeling throughout all 
four interviews is that physical comfort takes precedence. So even after a conversation about 
prayer (and possibly the Bible, although this paraphasia is not clear), she immediately reverts 
to her physical needs: 
A: (unintelligible) they got bring [bࠧɪ] I saǇ ŵǇ pƌaǇeƌs ;with gesture) 
S: You say your prayers, yeah 
A: Yeah 
S: Mm 
A: (drinks) That͛s nice 
S: Nice cup of tea? 
A: Yeah 
S: Good 
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Pain, discomfort and hunger are recurring themes throughout all four interviews.  
 
Reciprocity and rapport 
Despite meeting in a very busy, clinical environment, surrounded by medical machinery and 
paraphernalia with very little privacy, Amy and I are able to forge a rapport, almost a 
friendship. In fact, at our last meeting, Amy has this conversation with the woman in the next 
bed: 
Patient in neighbouring bed: Is that your friend then? 
A: (to neighbour) yeah. (to SͿ You͛ƌe ŵǇ fƌieŶd 
 
She also invites me to visit her at home when she is discharged from hospital: 
A: Will you come and see me when I get home? 
“: I͛d like to…  
A: Please 
 
AŵǇ͛s aphasia does Ŷot ƌoď heƌ of heƌ soĐial skills aŶd ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs, aŶd she is eageƌ to 
reciprocate in our interchanges. For example, she expresses pleasure at our meeting up again: 
S: Lovely to see you again 
A: Lovely to see you again 
 
She also takes an interest in me and my life, just as I am doing in hers. She asks me where I go 
to church, and whether I pray. I wonder if our relationship would have got to this level if we 
had not been discussing issues of a sensitive, personal nature. Does the subject matter of 
spirituality encourage a deeper level of relationship in some way? 
 
Illness narrative 
In some ways, Amy presents as a woman still living in the chaos of illness and disability (Frank, 
2013). Pain, discomfort and physical needs override any concern for the spiritual, and this 
seems indicative of the fact that she remains deep in the chaos, deep in the physical difficulty 
of acute illness. She appears to be seeking and expecting restitution, as she almost begs to be 
͞alloǁed͟ hoŵe. The utopiaŶ ĐoŶĐept of Ƌuest, hoǁeǀeƌ, feels faƌ aǁaǇ. 
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Liam: the digger driver’s tale 
 
͞It is eŶough 
To smell, to crumble the dark earth, 
While the robin sings over again 
“ad soŶgs of AutuŵŶ ŵiƌth͟ 
(Edward Thomas) 
 
I visit Liam three times whilst he is on the acute stroke unit of a local hospital. On the first 
occasion, I talk to him about the project and gain his written consent. The subsequent two 
ǀisits aƌe Ƌuite shoƌt, due to Liaŵ͛s phǇsiĐal Ŷeeds, aŶd oŶ these oĐĐasioŶs I audio-record our 
conversations. Although deemed medically stable by the SLT and the rest of the 
multidisciplinary team, Liam is perhaps the least overtly well of my participants. He has a 
nasogastric feeding tube in situ, implying that he has significant swallowing difficulties, so 
significant that he is unable to meet his hydration and nutrition needs orally. He also sounds 
chesty and coughs often; perhaps again an indication of his dysphagia
5
 difficulties. 
Liaŵ is a ƌetiƌed diggeƌ dƌiǀeƌ ǁho used to ǁoƌk ͞doǁŶ the ŵaƌsh͟. At the tiŵe of ouƌ 
meetings, he is in hospital having suffered a second stroke. He is in a four bedded bay in the 
stroke unit. 
 
Liaŵ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ŵosaiĐ 
Liam presents with a complex picture of communication strengths and weaknesses. His 
functional auditory comprehension is reasonable, but the SLT reports that he has more 
difficulty with processing longer, more complex commands. She reports that comprehension is 
helped by writing down key words. The SLT assesses his auditory and written comprehension 
as good, and he is able to make informed decisions about his care, for example the placement 
of a percutaneous gastrostomy tube for enteral feeding.  
His expressive language is characterised by a general paucity of output. His utterances 
comprise quite simple syntactic structures, and he shows limited lexical choice. Echolalia and 
palilalia
6
 abound, as evidenced in this short extract: 
L: He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. 
“: He͛s good 
                                                          
5
 Dysphagia is a disruption to the normal swallow process. Assessing and managing dysphagia is also 
paƌt of the “LT͛s ƌeŵit 
6
 EĐholalia is defiŶed as ƌepetitioŶ of aŶotheƌ͛s utteƌaŶĐe. Palilalia is the ƌepetitioŶ of ǁoƌds aŶd 
phrases. 
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L: He͛s good. He͛s good. He͛s good. 
 
OĐĐasioŶallǇ, Liaŵ͛s palilalia iŵpedes the floǁ of ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ, as he appeaƌs to ďeĐoŵe 
͚stuĐk͛ oŶ a ǁoƌd oƌ phƌase. IŶ this iŶstaŶĐe, I eŵploǇ the teĐhŶiƋue of iŶteƌƌuptiŶg Liaŵ iŶ aŶ 
attempt to break the repetition; perhaps a counterintuitive strategy from an SLT but one that 
seems to work: 
L: Watch it on TV. Watch it on TV. Watch it on TV. 
S: (interrupts) Grasstrack 
L: Yeah grasstrack 
S: Ah, interesting 
 
He uses eǆpletiǀes ;͞I ǁas theƌe fuĐkiŶg…I ǁas theƌe fuĐkiŶg…aďout…half aŶ houƌ͟Ϳ ďut, as 
Liam was unknown to me premorbidly, it is unclear as to whether this is a part of his usual 
lexicon, or whether this is a pathological addition post-aphasia (van Lancker and Cummings, 
1999; Halpern and Goldfarb, 2013 p 46). 
Throughout both interviews, there are marked periods of latency, when Liam either struggles 
to compose a linguistic response, or struggles to process the question fully, or both. These 
episodes vary in length from two seconds to thirteen seconds. I sometimes try and encourage 
a respoŶse afteƌ a peƌiod of lateŶĐǇ ďǇ saǇiŶg soŵethiŶg Ŷeutƌal suĐh as ͞Ǉeah?͟ ǁith 
questioning intonation, or by framing further questions which I hope aid his processing: 
S: Can you tell me a little about what happened to you? How come you are in hospital? 
(6 secs) 
S: Do you remember what happened? 
(7 secs) 
S: You became ill at home? 
 
He does not use any total communication strategies but relies solely on his limited speech to 
ĐoŶǀeǇ ŵeaŶiŶg. Thƌoughout the tƌaŶsĐƌipt, I haǀe ƌefeƌƌed to ͚uŶiŶtelligiďle utteƌaŶĐes͛ aŶd 
͚ǀoĐalisatioŶs͛. ͚UŶiŶtelligiďle utteƌaŶĐes͛ aƌe those ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶ soŵe ƌeĐogŶisaďle 
phonemes but are indistinct and difficult to transcribe. Vocalisations are pure attempts at 
voicing, where no phonemes are discerned. 
I try and facilitate the conversation using a number of different strategies. I give long pauses 
after questions and comments, to allow for processing time. I also employ non-committal 
ƌespoŶses, suĐh as ͚uhuh͛, and a questioning (rising) intonation in an attempt to encourage 
furtheƌ output. I ask hiŵ ǀeƌǇ opeŶ ƋuestioŶs iŶ oƌdeƌ to stiŵulate a ƌespoŶse, suĐh as ͚tell ŵe 
aďout…͛. The “LT tells ŵe that Liaŵ͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg is slightlǇ supeƌioƌ iŶ the ǁƌitteŶ ŵodalitǇ 
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than the auditory, so I write key words for him, in an effort to maximise comprehension, as 
well as to provide a permanent referent for us both as the conversation progresses. 
 
Liaŵ͛s stƌoke stoƌǇ 
Although Liaŵ͛s eǆpƌessiǀe laŶguage is Ƌuite liŵited iŶ sǇŶtaĐtiĐ stƌuĐtuƌe aŶd iŶ leǆiĐal ĐhoiĐe, 
and he takes time to process the question and to formulate a response, he is nevertheless able 
to give an account of what happened to him on the day he had this second stroke: 
S: Do you remember what happened? 
(latency - 7 secs) 
You became ill at home? 
L: (vocalisation) 
(7 secs) 
L: (unintelligible utteranceͿ Do ǁhat I like. What͛s that? What͛s that? 
S: OK 
L: What͛s that? ;unintelligible) 
S: So, the next thing you knew there was a banging on the door? 
L: Mŵ…ŵŵ…;4 secs) banging on the door 
“: Mŵ…aŶd ǁho ǁas that, ďaŶgiŶg oŶ the dooƌ? 
L: “tƌoke…I had stƌoke 
“: You͛d had a stƌoke 
L: Yeah, had a stroke 
 
He ƌeŵeŵďeƌs ͞stƌoke people͟ ĐoŵiŶg to help hiŵ: 
S: and who was banging on the door, Liam? 
L: Stroke people, stroke 
S: Right 
L: Stroke people 
S: Right 
L: Stroke people 
“: ‘ight…so theǇ͛d come to help? 
L: Yeah (yawnsͿ Ǉeah, Đos theǇ͛d Đoŵe to help, Ǉeah. “tƌoke people, Ǉeah 
 
and also being taken to hospital: 
S: and what happened next? 
L: Stroke people {name of hospital in neighbouring town} 
S: Right, you went to {name of hospital} 
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L: Yeah {name of hospital} 
S: Mm 
L: Yeah, I was admitted. I was admitted 
S: Yep 
L: Yeah, I was admitted. Yes, I went to {name of hospital} 
S: Right 
L: I was admitted, right? So I was admitted 
 
However, unlike some other participants (such as Lindy in group 2, for example), Liam 
remembers little else about the time immediately after the stroke: 
“: “o do Ǉou ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ŵuĐh aďout that tiŵe? WheŶ Ǉou ǁeƌe… 
L: No  
“: …iŶ the {name of hospital} 
L: Yeah, no nothing. Nothing at all. Nothing at all. Nothing at all. Nothing at all. Nothing at all. 
 
He does admit to a certain amount of fear when he suffered his second stroke but, not for the 
first time, I am aware of how leading my questions can be: 
S: So, it must have been quite scary 
L: Yeah 
S: Yeah? 
L: Yeah…ŵust haǀe ďeeŶ Ƌuite scary, yeah 
S: Yeah 
L: Mm 
 
Pets 
I find myself asking a leading question, too, in a section of one of our conversations which 
revolves aƌouŶd Liaŵ͛s Đat: 
S: Bet you miss him, do you? 
L: Yeah 
S: Mm 
L: Miss…ŵiss hiŵ 
 
In response to my question about what gives his life meaning, Liam talks about the importance 
of his cat, Tom: 
What are the most important things to you in your life? 
(8 secs) 
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L: I Đat…eǀeƌǇthiŶg 
S: Your cat? 
L: MǇ Đat͛s eǀeƌǇthiŶg, Ǉeah…Đat Ǉeah Ǉeah 
(2 secs) 
S: Tell me what your cat means to you 
L: (unintelligible) 
S: Everything (I guess)? 
L: Everything 
 
He desĐƌiďes hiŵ as ͞good͟: 
S: So, Tom is your cat? So tell me about Tom 
(3 secs) 
L: He͛s good. He͛s a good Đat 
S: Yeah? 
L: He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. 
S: (interrupts) can you describe him? 
L: Yeah I ĐaŶ. Yeah I ĐaŶ. Yeah I ĐaŶ. He͛s a good Đat. 
S: Tell me what he looks like 
L: He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. He͛s a good Đat. 
S: He͛s good 
L: He͛s good. He͛s good. He͛s good. 
S: So, does he bite and scratch? 
L: No no 
 
but is otherwise unable to explain or express how Tom lends meaning and importance to his 
life: 
S: Why is he so important to you?  
L: Ǉeah, he is…he is he is he is he is 
(7 secs) 
“: CaŶ Ǉou thiŶk ǁhǇ he͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou? 
(11 secs) 
We͛ll Đoŵe ďaĐk to that, Liaŵ. We͛ll Đoŵe ďaĐk to that. 
 
One can only surmise that, perhaps like Lindy and Amy, he derives companionship and a sense 
of responsibility for another living being, although this is not made clear in his responses. 
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Family 
Although Liam explains on my first visit that he has parents who are still alive, a brother and a 
sister and some nieces and nephews, he does not appear to have a partner or children himself. 
Apart from this short interchange about family at our first meeting, Liam only refers to his 
family again in response to some direct questions of mine: 
“: Haǀe Ǉou…haǀe Ǉou…haǀe Ǉou had soŵe ǀisitoƌs? 
L: (unintelligible) when they come 
S: Yeah? Have your parents been in? 
L: No 
S: No? 
L: No nobody 
S: No? 
L: No parents 
S: Not your parents. How about {name of brother}. Has he been in? 
L: No (unintelligible) 
S: or {name of sister} 
L: Yeah {name of sister} 
S: {name of sister} ͛s ďeeŶ iŶ? ɑƌeat stuff! I ďet it ǁas good to see heƌ. 
L: Yeah 
S: Yeah? 
(pause – 5 secs) 
 
Liam does not volunteer the importance or otherwise of family members in his life, and does 
not mention his family in response to my question about what gives his life meaning. 
 
Sport 
Sport, on the other hand, seems integral to his life, and to enjoyment and meaning-making in 
his life. He manages to expand on his answer about the enjoyment he derives from Grasstrack, 
and in so doing helps an obvious new-comer to this sport to understand better what it 
comprises: 
“: “o, Liaŵ, ǁheŶ Ǉou͛ƌe at hoŵe, ǁhat do Ǉou eŶjoǇ doing? 
L: Grasstrack and that 
S: Grasstrack 
L: ɑƌassstƌaĐk…Ǉeah 
S: Tell me about that 
L: ɑƌasstƌaĐk. ɑƌasstƌaĐk…that͛s ďig poǁeƌful ďikes 
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S: Bikes? Ah, OK 
 
Here is an illustration of fleeting connection between us; Liam understands my lack of 
knowledge and understanding about the topic by my intonation and facial expression, and is 
quick to elucidate his response to facilitate my comprehension. 
I understand how a sport such as Grasstrack can be a source of enjoyment for Liam, but want 
to explore its centrality in his life: 
S: OK – let ŵe ask Ǉou aŶotheƌ ƋuestioŶ…ǁhat͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou iŶ Ǉouƌ life? What͛s 
important? 
(pause – 8 secs) 
L: ɑƌasstƌaĐk. ɑƌasstƌaĐk that͛s good. That͛s good. ɑƌasstƌaĐk. That͛s good, that is 
S: You like that? 
L: Yeah 
S: Anything else important to you? 
L: No…that͛s aďout it 
 
Not only is Grasstrack a source of enjoyment for Liam and occupies a position of importance 
for him, but this sport, along with Speedway, also imbues his life with meaning: 
S: Can you think of anything else that gives your life meaning? 
(3 secs) 
L: (vocalisations) Grasstrack Grasstrack Grasstrack Grasstrack Grasstrack. Speedway Speedway 
Speedway 
“: “peedǁaǇ…ah! 
L: Grasstrack Speedway. Grasstrack and Speedway 
S: Have you always enjoyed those? 
L: Yeah 
S: Yeah 
L: Grasstrack and Speedway 
 
IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, he ƌeplaĐes ŵǇ ǁoƌd ͞like͟ ǁith his ǁoƌd ͞loǀe͟, ǁhiĐh iŶdiĐates to ŵe the 
strength of his feelings on this subject: 
L: Yeah. Grasstrack and Speedway. Yeah, Speedway. 
S: What is it about those that you really like, do you think? 
L: I doŶ͛t…I loǀe theŵ  
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Loss of ability to engage in life meaning activities 
Like otheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts, Liaŵ͛s phǇsiĐal diffiĐulties post-stroke deprive him of those meaning-
making activities he has identified. He is no longer able to take part in the sports he loves: 
L: Grasstrack and Speedway 
S: And have you ever done it yourself? 
L: Yeah, I have yeah 
“: Haǀe Ǉou? “o Ǉou͛ǀe…Ǉou͛ǀe…the ďike oƌ… 
L: Yeah 
“: You͛ǀe ďeeŶ oŶ a ďike? 
L: Yeah 
S: Yeah? 
L: Yeah 
S: You raced? 
L: Yeah raced 
S: Ah! 
L: Yeah raced 
S: Yeah? 
L: Yeah raced and that 
“: You͛ǀe doŶe that iŶ the past, haǀe Ǉou? 
L: Yeah raced 
S: Have you won any? 
L: No…Ŷot ďeeŶ Ŷo Ŷo Ŷo 
 
In hospital, Liam is not able to carry out any of his normal activities, such as watching sport or 
caring for his cat. 
 
Physical needs 
Unlike the majority of the participants, Liam is not able to formulate a response when I ask him 
a direct question about his definition of spirituality: 
“: What does…I ǁoŶdeƌ if this ǁoƌd ŵeaŶs aŶǇthiŶg to Ǉou, Liaŵ ;I ǁrite ͞spirituality͟) 
(pause for over 10 seconds – interview terminated) 
 
The ward becomes very busy and noisy at this point, so it may be just an inopportune moment 
to eŵďaƌk oŶ suĐh a ƋuestioŶ, ďut I also feel as if Liaŵ͛s phǇsiĐal situatioŶ aŶd his phǇsiĐal 
needs are so all-consuming, that there is no space or time to ponder the ineffable. This is 
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graphically illustrated when he appears to defecate during one interchange about meaning-
making; the immediacy of physical need takes precedence: 
“: “o, ǁe͛ǀe got Toŵ, Ǉouƌ Đat… 
L: Yeah  
S: and GƌasstƌaĐk… 
L: Yeah 
“: …aƌe the thiŶgs that aƌe ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou 
L: yeah 
S: OK, what about this question – what gives your life meaning? What gives your life meaning? 
(pause – 9 seconds. Vocalisations during which L appears to be defecating in incontinence pad) 
S: You OK, Liam? 
L: (vocalisations) yeah 
It is at this moment that I feel intrusive. I feel acutely the mis-timing of my visit, and the 
inappropriateness of these ƋuestioŶs at this poiŶt iŶ Liaŵ͛s ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ jouƌŶeǇ. 
 
Disability narrative 
Liam appears to be in the midst of a chaos illness narrative (Frank, 2013). All meaning-making 
components of his life are stripped away, and his physical needs are paramount. It would seem 
that controlling survival is his main or, indeed only, priority at this time, and even his grasp on 
this is tenuous, as evidenced by the taking away of autonomous control, in the form of the 
nasogastric tube and incontinence pad. He makes no mention of recovery or restitution, nor 
does he intimate at any point that he is entering a quest state, where he is beginning to accept 
this new post-stroke existence.  
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Rosemary: the coast dweller’s tale 
 
͞The sea, like a ĐƌiŶkled Đhaƌt, spƌead to the hoƌizoŶ, aŶd lapped the shaƌp outliŶe of the 
coast, while the houses were white shells in a rounded grotto, pricked here and there by a 
gƌeat oƌaŶge suŶ.͟ 
(Rebecca, Daphne du Maurier) 
 
I meet Rosemary on only two occasions, once with her husband there, to explain the project to 
theŵ ďoth aŶd to gaiŶ ‘oseŵaƌǇ͛s ĐoŶseŶt, aŶd once to conduct a short, recorded interview. 
When I return a few days after the second visit, I am told by the staff on the stroke unit that 
Rosemary has been referred to a residential home to continue her rehabilitation there. Thus, it 
was that our relationship was short-lived; indeed, it feels listening back to our discussion, that 
it never really had the chance to develop at all. 
Rosemary presents with very severe speech and language difficulties. Her auditory 
comprehension is good, but her expressive skills are characterised by severe expressive 
aphasia, severe apraxia of speech and severe dysarthria. Her non-verbal communication skills 
are limited to sighing, to intimate frustration or sadness: 
 
“: Yeah, OK. AŶd Ǉou͛ǀe ďeeŶ iŶ hospital foƌ hoǁ loŶg? 
R: I suppose three and a half (sighs heavily) two and a half or maybe it was a bit before that 
S: Mm 
‘: Might ďe up…thƌee Ǉeaƌs aŶd eƌ ;unintelligibleͿ…eƌ…I doŶ͛t ;unintelligible) 
 
and laughing, the meaning behind which is not always clear. She has good pragmatic skills, and 
we use eye contact and facial expression to attempt to connect. Her communication Mosaic 
(Clark, 2001), then, is limited to speech attempts (including unintelligible output), non-speech 
linguistic features (such as prosody), and preserved pragmatic skills. 
I ask Rosemary about her stroke story but I am unable to gauge exactly what happened from 
her narrative: 
“: “o ŵaǇďe ǁe Đould staƌt off ďǇ talkiŶg aďout ǁhat happeŶed to Ǉou…hoǁ Đoŵe Ǉou͛ƌe iŶ 
hospital? 
‘: Well, doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…͛spose dƌiǀeƌ. Dƌiǀes the…eƌŵ…eƌ…the Đaƌs…dƌiǀiŶg 
S: uh-huh 
‘: aŶd theǇ take us to… 
“: “o, the Đaƌ ďƌought…a Đaƌ ďƌought Ǉou heƌe? 
R: Mm 
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S: Right. And you had a stroke – is that right? 
R: Mm 
S: Do you remember much about that? 
‘: No…dƌiŶk aŶd dƌiǀe…ďut just doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
S: Right 
‘: You kŶoǁ…so…ǁe…eƌ… 
 
She either has no memory of the time when she had her stroke, or I am unable to hear the 
memories that she attempts to relate in her utterances: 
“: OK, so Ǉou…do Ǉou ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ŵuĐh aďout ǁhat happeŶed to Ǉou? 
R: Well (unintelligible) we can only (unintelligible) 
S: Right 
R: (unintelligible) 
 
Rosemary lives in a coastal town about twenty miles from the urban hospital in which we now 
meet. I wonder if the sea is an important element in her life: 
S: And can you see the sea from where you live in {name of seaside town}? 
R: No  
S: No. Not quite that close 
‘: It͛s ;unintelligible) 
S: Not too far? 
‘: It͛s Ŷot too faƌ 
S: So you could walk? 
R: Yeah 
S: You could walk to the sea? 
R: Yeah 
“: Ah that͛s good. Do Ǉou like the sea? 
R: Yeah 
S: Yeah 
‘: But…eƌŵ…ǁouldŶ͛t go too faƌ aǁaǇ to ;unintelligible) 
S: Mm 
‘: “o, eƌ… 
 
I also try and engage her in conversation about her husband, but again, expression is limited: 
S: So your husband has to travel up from {name of seaside town}? 
R: Yeah 
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S: He comes every day, does he? 
R: Yeah 
 
EǀeŶ ǁith ǀeƌǇ liŵited aŶd ofteŶ uŶiŶtelligiďle output, ‘oseŵaƌǇ͛s ĐhaƌaĐteƌ peeps thƌough at 
times: 
‘: Yeah…;unintelligible utterance – laughs) 
S: (laughs) you have a good sense of humour 
‘: Yeah, it͛s just ŵe 
S: Is that you? 
R: (laughs) well yeah 
S: Is that a part of you? 
R: Yeah yeah (unintelligible) 
 
The illness narrative (Frank, 2013) she adopts seems to be restitutive, with hopes for recovery 
although, not for the first time, I identify a leading quality to my questioning when I listen back 
to the recordings: 
S: And how are you feeling now?  
‘: All ƌight, I suppose…eƌŵ… (unintelligible utterance – laughs) 
S: Be good to get out 
R: Mm 
S: Yeah. Is there any news on how long it might be? 
R: No 
S: Take one day at a time 
R: Yeah 
“: “o, aƌe Ǉou seeiŶg a phǇsio aŶd a speeĐh theƌapist aŶd all the otheƌ… 
R: (unintelligibleͿ…ďut…;unintelligibleͿ…oƌ Ŷot 
S: Mm 
‘: Eƌ… ;unintelligible) 
S: Mm 
R: Mm 
 
Trying to get to the heart of how she is feeling is problematic and, again, my questions are 
leading in nature, and yet I think one gets a sense of her despair through her non-verbal 
communication: 
“: It͛s Ŷot easǇ ďeiŶg iŶ hospital, is it?  
‘: No, so…eƌŵ…Ǉou kŶoǁ…just…;unintelligible)  
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“: Mŵ…stuĐk iŶ heƌe all the tiŵe 
‘: Mŵ… (long unintelligible utterance – sighs) 
S: Tired? 
R: Mm 
 
By the end of our second conversation, I feel that we are only just getting to know each other, 
a pƌoĐess that is hiŶdeƌed ďǇ ‘oseŵaƌǇ͛s eǆpƌessiǀe diffiĐulties aŶd ŵǇ laĐk of skill at fƌaŵiŶg 
my questions and comments more aĐĐessiďlǇ. I feel like ǁe aƌe ͚warming up͛, and that we are 
at a stage of acclimatisation, before issues of a sensitive or spiritual nature can be broached. I 
ask her at the end of what was to be our final conversation what she is missing about being 
away from home: 
S: So what do you miss most about not being at home? 
R: (unintelligible) watching the telly  
S: Watching the sea, did you say? 
R: TV 
S: Oh, the TV 
R: On the telly 
S: On the television, yeah 
R: (unintelligibleͿ aŶd…eƌ…;unintelligibleͿ…TV 
S: uh-huh…so Ǉeah, so Ǉou ŵiss ďeiŶg aďle to ǁatĐh TV 
R: Mm 
S: Yeah yeah 
 
This question was, in my mind, most definitely a prelude to thinking about life meaning and 
purpose, but we unfortunately never had the opportunity to explore these concepts together. 
My brief conversations with Rosemary emphasised for me how crucial relationship is in any 
therapeutic or research-therapy situation; rapport must be forged before real connection 
through communication can begin. 
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The stories of people who have been living with their 
aphasia for some time 
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Lindy: the poet’s story 
 
͞AŶd ǁheŶ he thus had spokeŶ, he Đƌied ǁith a loud ǀoiĐe, ͚Lazaƌus, Đoŵe foƌth. 
AŶd he that ǁas dead Đaŵe foƌth͟ 
(John 11: 43, 44) 
 
Lindy is a woman in her forties who has been living with aphasia since a stroke in 2008. So, 
when I interviewed her, she was five and six years post stroke respectively.  
She is a real wordsmith, a published novelist and now poet. We had corresponded by email 
prior to our first meeting, after Lindy had heard about my research through a mutual friend: 
 
Dear Sophie, 
͞aphasia eǆpƌess spiƌitualitǇ͟ = YE“. 
Best wishes, 
L  
(private email, 2011) 
 
A friendship of sorts had therefore developed, with us corresponding via email and Facebook, 
as well as meeting at her home foƌ tǁo ͚formal͛ interviews.  
LiŶdǇ͛s ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ of spokeŶ laŶguage is eǆĐelleŶt. Heƌ eǆpƌessive language is affected by 
the aphasia; she is able to produce single words and short phrases but presents with significant 
word-finding difficulties. She makes the occasional phonemic paraphasic error, such as /sɪndi/ 
for Sydney. She is, however, a brilliant communicator. Lindy expresses herself using writing 
(her orthographic output lexicon and buffer appear less impaired than her phonological output 
lexicon and buffer – see appendix I), gesture, intonation and facial expression. She has no 
motor speech problems. 
We ŵeet at LiŶdǇ͛s hoŵe – we meet three times in all, once as an introduction, and twice to 
carry out recorded interviews. Whether it is because we are of similar age, or because of our 
mutual love of reading and cats, I do not know, but I feel an instant connection with Lindy. Our 
conversation takes place in her living room, over a steaming cup of strong coffee. Books line 
one wall of her small living room, and it is clear from these that this is a well-read woman who 
loves art and beauty. She is happy for me to record our conversation on a digital voice 
recorder, and then on video. She uses her own notepad to write her thoughts during the 
conversation, and by the end of my visit I somehow feel unable to ask her for the page on 
which she has written all these thoughts. It feels like an intrusion, an imposition. 
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LiŶdǇ͛s aphasia 
Lindy expresses her preferred method of communication early on in our first conversation: 
͞ŵe, ǁƌite it͟ 
LiŶdǇ͛s aĐƋuiƌed laŶguage diffiĐultǇ ǁould ďe Đlassed as ŵodeƌate-seǀeƌe eǆpƌessiǀe oƌ BƌoĐa͛s 
type aphasia. Lesions causing this type of aphasia are typically located in the left frontal lobe of 
the brain, and may or may not be accompanied by a motor speech problem, often apraxia of 
speeĐh. Hoǁeǀeƌ, LiŶdǇ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ diffiĐulties seeŵ ƌestƌiĐted to laŶguage as opposed 
to speech. Using the cognitive neuropsychological model of language processing, Lindy shows 
problems with output as opposed to input, possibly at the level of the phonological and 
orthographic output lexicons, although her graphemic output is often better than her 
phonological, and indeed writing key words can cue her into the spoken word very successfully 
at times. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I felt that it was not within my remit to assess formally the language 
skills of my participants; presenting participants with formal tasks which by their nature are 
often designed for the person to fail at some stage, scoring language assessments and feeding 
back to the participant what they had succeeded on and what they had failed seemed 
counterproductive to a good, open relationship. In chatting to Lindy, I got a feel for her 
language functioning, without the need to assess formally. The point of assessment, after all, is 
to plan intervention to maximise residual skills and to be aware of any deficits. It was clear that 
LiŶdǇ͛s auditoƌǇ ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ ǁas ǀeƌǇ good fƌoŵ eaƌlǇ oŶ iŶ ouƌ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs because of 
the responses she gave to my questions, and she knew much better than me what helped her 
expressive abilities. 
 
LiŶdǇ͛s Mosaic 
Lindy is a competent and successful communicator, despite the limitations imposed by her 
aphasia on her expressive language. She uses all sorts of verbal and non-verbal strategies to 
enhance her output, to create a Mosaic (Clark, 2001) of expression. To supplement her spoken 
output, she writes key words and phrases with her left (non-preferred) hand. Writing will 
either cue her in to the spoken form, or will serve as the primary vehicle for conveying that 
ǁoƌd oƌ ĐoŶĐept. LiŶdǇ͛s Ŷoteďook, ǁith ǁoƌds fƌoŵ eaƌlieƌ iŶ the ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ, ƌeŵaiŶs iŶ 
front of her and acts as a referent during subsequent interlocution; she will point to a word 
previously written if it is needed again. In a similar way, she will point to words used in another 
conversation using another medium, such as emails or word documents she has previously 
sent me. She also uses gesture successfully, again either to cue herself into the spoken form, or 
to convey meaning. Finally, both intonation and facial expression help the listener to 
understand. 
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My communication strategies 
Interestingly, I, as researcher, also mirror some of Lindy͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategies, such as 
gesture: 
 
S: You went like that (copies gesture) 
L: Yes (also does gesture again) 
 
Perhaps this is a subconscious attempt on my part to confirm equality between us and negate 
any perceived power differential. I also try to facilitate a ͞ĐoŶŶeĐtion through conversatioŶ͟ 
(Koch and Kralik, 2006 p 8) by checking back with Lindy that I have understood correctly, for 
example: 
 
“: “o, it͛s pƌaǇiŶg ǁithout ǁoƌds? Would Ǉou desĐƌiďe it as that? 
 
or by recapping: 
 
S: You ǁeƌe saǇiŶg that eƌ…I ǁas saǇiŶg ǁas the church a community and you said no not 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ aŶd Ǉou ǁƌote ͞LoŶdoŶ͟ 
 
or by paraphrasing: 
 
L: Friends 
S: Right, you were with friends 
 
or by overtly seeking clarification: 
 
L: Oh, oh…OK ;surprised intonation) 
S: and then you survived? 
L: yes, yes 
 
Sometimes, I attempt to sum up but get it wrong. Lindy is able to correct my misconception 
with further clarification through speech and writing: 
 
L: Yes…eƌ…ďeautiful ;intonation = what more can I say) 
“: Beautiful ǀisioŶ, oƌ feeliŶg, oƌ… 
L: No…eƌ…ďeautiful (gesture of hand sweepingͿ…uŵ…ďeautiful ;nods) yes 
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“: “o ǁheŶ Ǉou ǁoke up… 
L: (nods) 
S: You had that feeliŶg of ďeautǇ aŶd… 
L: No…uŵ ĐƌǇiŶg 
S: Right  
 
At other times I guess again and seem to get it right: 
 
L: Why? why? 
S: WhǇ hadŶ͛t Ǉou died, oƌ… 
L: Yes 
 
Sometimes, I try and sum up, get it wrong and we are, between us, unable to repair it: 
 
S: Yeah, so you have a quite a positive attitude? 
L: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
S: No 
L: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
 
It can be problematic to get the balance of conversational turns equal with someone with 
expressive language difficulties (Beeke et al, 2014, p 293), particularly, as in the methods used 
in this study, the conversation takes the form of question and answer interviewing. Sometimes 
during the interview, I feel myself eŶteƌiŶg a ŵoŶologue, Ŷot alloǁiŶg spaĐe foƌ LiŶdǇ͛s ǀeƌďal 
or non-verbal contributions. This is perhaps illustrative of the power differential ;O͛MalleǇ, 
2011, p.97) often imposed by an interaction where one party has more expressive language 
than the other. 
 
LiŶdǇ͛s poetiĐ use of laŶguage 
Despite the limitations placed on her language by aphasia Lindy often selects poetic vocabulary 
aŶd liteƌaƌǇ allusioŶ to ĐoŶǀeǇ heƌ ŵessage. Foƌ eǆaŵple, she uses the ǁoƌd ͞ŵute͟ ƌatheƌ 
thaŶ the peƌhaps ŵoƌe pƌosaiĐ ͚without speech͛ or even ͚dumb͛. This poetic vocabulary choice 
even extends to her gestural lexical choice; at one point she gestures a gag over her mouth, to 
illustrate lack of speech.  
In order to convey the message that, because of the seriousness of the stroke and the length 
of time she was in a coma she effectively died and then was revived, she uses the well-known 
example of a biblical character being raised to life in a miraculous encounter with Jesus: 
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͞I aŵ Lazaƌus͟ ;pƌiǀate eŵail, ϮϬϭϯͿ 
 
Thanks to her faith tradition and her flair for the literary, Lindy succeeds in powerfully 
conveying the message of gaining back her life. She also uses literary figures from other faith 
traditions, such as the angel Azreal from Islam. 
 
LiŶdǇ͛s faith 
Lindy identifies herself as Roman Catholic, and is open about her faith. Of course, much of her 
spiritual story involves allusion to Catholic or Christian ideas and doctrine, such as her vision of 
angels. Some aspects of her story, though, belong to a different tradition, suĐh as the ͚black 
angel͛, Azreal. Her faith is important to her: 
 
“: Is that…I seeŵ to ƌeŵeŵďeƌ Ǉou telliŶg ŵe last tiŵe that Ǉou͛ƌe ‘oŵaŶ CatholiĐ? 
L: Yes 
S: So you have a faith? 
L: Yes, yes 
S: Did you kind of draw on your faith at that time? 
L: Yes 
 
Lindy and I have a shared faith in Christianity, which explains some of my direct questions 
during the interviews about her ability to take part in church services and to verbalise liturgy. 
Lindy explains that she is not able to pray aloud in words, but that there is an inner connection 
with God which needs no words: 
 
“: OK…aŶd is that talkiŶg iŶ ǁoƌds? 
L: No (gestures left hand across lipsͿ eƌŵ…the ďƌaiŶ ;gestures left hand at left side of head) 
S: Yeah 
L: The brain 
 
In terms of being able to engage in liturgy with aphasia, Lindy appears to give conflicting 
information, or I misinterpret what she says so that my understanding is of two disparate 
opinions. At one stage, she appears to say that well-known liturgy remains intact, and is 
expressed fluently: 
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S: Yes, OK, so thiŶgs like…uŵ…thiŶgs that Ǉou ǁould haǀe leaƌŶt at aŶ eaƌlǇ age, I pƌesuŵe, 
like the Hail Mary or the Our Father 
L: Oh, yes (emphatic) 
S: Do you remember those? Can you recite those now? 
L: Oh, yes 
“: OK so theǇ͛ƌe Ƌuite…alŵost autoŵatiĐ 
L: Yeah 
S: So they still come out fluently? 
L: Yes 
 
This makes intuitive sense, inasmuch as people with expressive aphasia often have a preserved 
ability to produce over-learnt, automatic phrases, such as social greetings and rote-learnt 
rhymes and sequences (for example, the days of the week, nursery rhymes) (Lum and Ellis, 
1999; Halpern and Goldfarb, 2013, p 46). One could perhaps surmise from the aphasia 
literature that liturgy learnt in youth and repeated many times over a lifetime, such as the 
Loƌd͛s PƌaǇeƌ, might be preserved in someone with even quite significant expressive 
difficulties. 
However, in a separate interview, Lindy says – or I hear – that she is, in fact, not able to 
express even well-known and over-learnt prayer and liturgy: 
 
“: “o…eƌ…ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to saǇiŶg…eƌ…eƌ…lituƌgǇ 
L: (gestures ͞zip͟ aĐross ŵouth) 
S: Is that possible for you? 
L: No no 
S: No, so it doesŶ͛t…is faŵiliaƌ lituƌgǇ…so eƌ like the Loƌd͛s PƌaǇeƌ 
L: Yep 
S: or Hail Mary 
L: Yes 
S: Are you able to say that? 
L: No no (shakes head) 
S: Absolutely not. So do you say it in your head? 
L: Yes, uhuh 
 
Is this in fact a contradiction, or is it a reflection of the sometimes inconsistent nature of 
aphasia errors? Either way, aphasia obviously interferes with some verbal ways of engaging in 
religious sacrament. 
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A further intrinsic part of the Roman Catholic faith which could be compromised by reduced 
ǀeƌďal output is the aĐt of ĐoŶfessioŶ, of opeŶlǇ telliŶg a pƌiest of oŶe͛s siŶs iŶ oƌdeƌ to oďtaiŶ 
absolution. I ask Lindy about this, and she seems to imply that this, too, is not possible in the 
way it was before the stroke: 
 
L: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ. Uŵ… Fatheƌ {name of priest} home 
S: Yeah 
L: uŵ, oŶe to oŶe…uŵ…Ouƌ Fatheƌ aŶd Ǉeah…uŵ…siŶs, Ŷo 
S: U-huh 
L: No 
S: Expressing sins? 
L: No 
“: oƌ…ƌight 
L: uŵ…siŶs Ŷo 
S: Confession, do you mean? 
L: No 
“: ‘ight, Đos that͛s diffiĐult, oƌ Ǉou just… 
L: Yes 
S: Yes, Đos it͛s diffiĐult 
L: Yes 
 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, all this loss does Ŷot seeŵ to haǀe lesseŶed LiŶdǇ͛s faith. “he eǆplaiŶs hoǁ she ǁas a 
practising Catholic prior to the stroke, and that she still is: 
 
“: Mŵ…aŶd so did it…ĐaŶ I ask Ǉou if that eǆpeƌieŶĐe…eƌ…ĐhaŶged Ǉouƌ…eƌ…attitude toǁaƌds 
ƌeligioŶ iŶ geŶeƌal? Weƌe Ǉou… 
L: No 
S: No 
L: No um me um [k] [k࠱ɪdʊ]…Ŷo, CatholiĐ 
S: Mm 
L: uŵ…uŵ…ŵass…eƌ ;shakes head and facial expression = no change) 
S: So you are Catholic and went to mass before your stroke? 
L: Yes 
“: aŶd so ŶothiŶg͛s ĐhaŶged 
L: No no 
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Although the ability to express her beliefs, pray and seek absolution verbally is affected by 
aphasia, it appears that her intrinsic faith in God has not wavered. Indeed, she says in an email 
͞WhǇ? ɑod is good. BeŶeǀoleŶt ɑod͟ ;pƌiǀate eŵail, ϮϬϭϯͿ aŶd she diƌeĐts ŵe to eǀideŶĐe of 
ɑod͛s goodness in the world around me: 
 
L: No…uŵ…uŵ…uŵ…;points to selfͿ uŵ…ɑod eaƌth 
S: Yeah 
L: uŵ…ŵe aŶd Ǉou aŶd ;sweeping gesture) and everybody 
S: Yep 
L: um yes 
S: So He created all these things? 
L: Yes yes 
“: aŶd theƌe͛s eǀideŶĐe of ďeŶeǀoleŶĐe theƌe? 
L: Yes (nods) 
“: Despite ǁhat…Ǉou kŶoǁ…ǁhat Ǉou͛ǀe ďeeŶ thƌough? 
L: uhuh 
S: Hard times 
L: mm (nods)  
 
LiŶdǇ͛s stoƌies of spiƌitualitǇ 
Lindy is open and generous in telling me her spiritual stories, and in this way, she becomes my 
guide, the person with whom I can experiment with wording and concepts, the person with 
whom I can gain confidence in talking about these personal and nebulous concepts with other 
participants. 
LiŶdǇ͛s stƌoke had happeŶed a feǁ Ǉeaƌs pƌeǀiouslǇ, aŶd she ƌelates ǀeƌǇ eloƋueŶtlǇ ǁhat 
happened to her. It feels as if this has been mulled over and talked about often. The enormity 
of the event is palpable in her choice of spoken vocabulary: 
͞ŵassiǀe, ŵassiǀe͟  
aŶd ǁƌitteŶ leǆiĐal ĐhoiĐe; iŶ the fiƌst iŶteƌǀieǁ she ǁƌites ͞despeƌatioŶ͟. Theƌe is alŵost a 
feeling of piecing together what happened, as if in an effort to make sense of it. According to 
FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯͿ, this telliŶg of the illŶess stoƌǇ is ĐƌuĐial; theƌe is the ͞Ŷeed of ill people to tell 
theiƌ stoƌies͟ ;p ϯͿ. It is as if thƌough ƌeheaƌsiŶg aŶd retelling the narrative of her illness and 
subsequent disability, Lindy is attempting to navigate through the chaos and into survivable 
quest (Frank, 2013), although this narrative, of course, contains more than words, or at least 
meaning around the words: 
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L: uŵ…[stərəʊk] uŵ…ŵassiǀe, ŵassiǀe ;writes stroke 2008) 
S: Right, right, a massive stroke in 2008 
L: Yes, uŵ… (writes 25th December) 
S: Ah! Christmas day! 
L: Yes, yes 
S: Yes. Right – so were you alone? 
L: Friends 
S: Right, you were with friends 
L: FƌieŶds…uŵ…LoŶdon 
 
Visions 
Lindy is open and generous in describing spiritual events and experiences in her life. A notable 
theme is that of benevolent visions. Whilst in a post-stroke coma which lasted three days, 
Lindy describes how she is given a sense of peace by what she thinks are angelic beings: 
 
͞…aŶgels? ;questioning intonationͿ I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…uŵ…uŵ…ɑod? ;questioning intonation) I 
doŶ͛t kŶoǁ͟ 
 
In a subsequent email, she seems more certain of the identity of these beings: 
͞I eǆpeƌieŶĐe pƌofouŶd JOY. AŶgels: iŶteŶse Đompassion and androgynous. The most real thing 
I haǀe eǀeƌ felt͟ ;pƌiǀate eŵail, ϮϬϭϯͿ 
 
Whatever the identity of these apparitions, it is clear that their appearance affords Lindy deep 
calm, and is very much a welcome experience: 
 
L: No, Ŷo…uŵ ͚s peaĐeful…uŵ…ǁoƌƌǇ, Ŷo…uŵ…I foƌget it! Foƌget it! 
S: Right, so it gave you a sense of peace 
L: Oh, yes, yes 
 
It seems that the angels appear because Lindy is close to death during those three days of 
coma: 
 
L: uŵ…joǇ…uŵ…ŵe…eƌ…dǇiŶg 
S: uhuh 
L: uŵ…;writesͿ…eƌ thƌee days coma 
S: Yeah 
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L: Yes…eƌ…ďeautiful ;intonation = what more can I say) 
 
Angels have appeared in many faith traditions – and in art – throughout the ages. Along with 
Williams (2006), I find descriptions of encounters with angels, including LiŶdǇ͛s, ͞ŵoǀiŶg, 
iŶtƌiguiŶg aŶd ĐhalleŶgiŶg͟ ;p ϲͿ. AŶgels ;fƌoŵ the ɑƌeek ͞aŶgelos͟, ŵeaŶiŶg ŵesseŶgeƌͿ iŶ the 
ChƌistiaŶ tƌaditioŶ seƌǀe as a liŶk ďetǁeeŶ ɑod aŶd people, ǁho aƌe ͞a little loǁeƌ thaŶ the 
aŶgels͟ ;Psalŵ ϴ: 5). They often appear at times of great crisis (for example, when Abraham is 
about to sacrifice his son in Genesis 22: 11), exciting news (for example, when Mary is told she 
is to give birth to the son of God in Luke 1: 28)
 
or when protection is needed (for example, 
when Daniel faces the lions in Daniel 6: 22). Angels also appear at the empty tomb, to inform 
Jesus͛ fƌieŶds aŶd folloǁeƌs that he has risen from the dead (John 20: 12). 
The aŶgels desĐƌiďed ďǇ LiŶdǇ aƌe ďeŶeǀoleŶt aŶd ͞aŶdƌogǇŶous͟ ;pƌiǀate eŵail, ϮϬϭϯͿ, 
mirroring early Christian artistic representations of angels such as, for example, Andrei 
‘uďleǀ͛s Hospitality of Abraham (this picture was used as an artefact in an interview with Joel 
and a copy can be found in appendix IX). She conveys their appearance through words 
;͞ďeautiful͟ ͞peaĐeful͟ ͞ĐoŵpassioŶ͟ ͞aŶdƌogǇŶous͟Ϳ, as ǁell as iŶtoŶatioŶ. Theiƌ appeaƌaŶĐe 
seems to signify protection, or even saving from death, perhaps akin to the angels who saved 
Daniel in an Old Testament story (Daniel 6: 22) or maybe even a bringing back from death, 
such as the aŶgels at Jesus͛ toŵď oŶ Easteƌ ŵoƌŶiŶg ;JohŶ ϮϬ: 12).     
Williams (2006, p 66) suggests that individuals are more likely to see or hear angels in sleep, 
peƌhaps ďeĐause ͞people aƌe ŵoƌe opeŶ to heaƌiŶg ǁheŶ theiƌ ŵiŶds, ƌatioŶal iŶ the daǇtiŵe, 
aƌe iŶ the dƌeaŵ ǁoƌld͟. Peƌhaps the saŵe is tƌue of the ŵiŶd duƌiŶg Đoŵa: 
 
S: So, ǁhile Ǉou ǁeƌe iŶ a Đoŵa, Ǉou had this…Ǉou had a ǀisioŶ of aŶgels 
L: Yeah, yes 
 
It seems clear that Lindy derives great peace and comfort from the angel vision she sees whilst 
in a coma and it is testament to her alternative and augmentative communicative abilities that 
she is able to convey these complex pictures and ideas through not only speech but also 
intonation and writing.  
She contrasts the peace of the angels with the desperation she feels on waking from the coma, 
when she realises she has not in fact died; she has survived but has lost her language: 
͞Ǉeah…uŵ…ǁake up ĐƌǇiŶg ĐƌǇiŶg ;with emphasisͿ…uŵ…ŵute…aŶguish Ŷo 
ŵaǇďe…uŵ…die…uŵ ǁhǇ? WhǇ?͟ 
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During the coma, Lindy also saw her mother and her father, both of whom had died some 
Ǉeaƌs ďefoƌe. “he desĐƌiďes these appeaƌaŶĐes of heƌ paƌeŶts as a ͞ďaƌƌieƌ͟, pƌeǀeŶtiŶg the 
ǁoƌk of Azƌeal, the AŶgel of Death ǁith his siĐkle, ǁho aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the Quƌ͛aŶ, takes the soul 
of the dying person and returns it to God (private email, 2013). As with the angels, she sees 
benevolent, helping visions, who save her from death: 
 
L: Yes Ǉes…uŵ uŵ uŵ uŵ ;starts to writeͿ “ataŶ…oƌ…uŵ…ɑod…uŵ ;tries to write again) the 
one (gestures with left hand as if using a scytheͿ uŵ…death 
S: Yeah 
L: [s] death…eƌ…uŵ…Oh ɑod 
S: You went like that (copies gesture) 
L: Yes (also does gesture again) 
S: You mean like a scythe? 
L: Yes Ǉes…ŵŵ…uŵ…uŵ…ŵe uŵ Ŷo…uŵ…Muŵ aŶd Dad dǇiŶg all ;gestures with left hand 
over shoulder) um years ago 
S: OK 
L: Yes Ǉes uŵ uŵ. ɑod…uŵ…;attempts to write) um (gestures with left hand sweeping across 
body) 
S: Like a barrier? 
L: Yes yes (nods head) 
 
IŶ aŶ eŵail, iŶ ƌespoŶse to ŵǇ ƋuestioŶiŶg heƌ diƌeĐtlǇ aďout ͞ǀisual halluĐiŶatioŶs oƌ ǀisioŶs͟ 
she had mentioned in previous correspondence, Lindy had given a graphic description of this 
vision experienced during her coma of an image of her dead mother and father protecting her 
from Azreal, the Islamic angel of death: 
 
͞DistƌessiŶg oŶe: ŵaǇďe? ŵaǇďe not? 
ŵuŵ aŶd fatheƌ ďaƌƌieƌ aŶd pƌeǀeŶtioŶ:  AŶgel of Death ;AzƌealͿ siĐkle of death.͟ ;eŵail, ϮϬϭϯͿ 
 
‘ees ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϭϰϵͿ eǆplaiŶs that iŶ IslaŵiĐ tƌaditioŶ, Azƌeal ;oƌ Azƌa͛ilͿ ͞aĐĐoŵplishes the 
separation of body and soul by holding an apple from the tree of life to the nose of the dying 
peƌsoŶ͟. IŶ this ǁaǇ, the peƌsoŶ is luƌed fƌoŵ life to death. It is iŶteƌestiŶg that LiŶdǇ uses aŶ 
allegory from a faith tradition other than her own. Perhaps this is a reflection of her erudition 
and depth of prior reading. The Islamic story also resonates with the Judeo-Christian story of 
the temptation of Eve in the Garden of Eden, which of course would be well-known to Lindy. 
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So, it appears that the angels seen by Lindy during her recovery from the stroke were both 
͞ďeŶeǀoleŶt͟ aŶd pƌoteĐtiǀe, pƌoǀidiŶg heƌ ǁith a seŶse of peaĐe iŶ Đatastƌophe, ďut also 
harbingers of death, thwarted only by the appearance of her other protectors – her parents. 
Both angelic exemplars are rooted in historic literature.  
 
Desperation and Tears 
Lindy is eloquent in her description of the time in coma post-stroke and then just emerging 
from coma, using speech and intonation to great effect; perhaps this is something she has 
thought about often and attempted often to convey because of its huge importance and 
impact on her. During coma, she is in a state of absolute peace: 
 
͞Yes,…uŵ…ďut the aŶgels aŶd ŵe…uŵ…is peaĐeful, peaĐeful ;intonation = aweͿ͟ 
 
but this contrasts sharply with her emotions of utter desperation on waking from the coma, 
again conveyed by speech augmented with powerful and communicative intonation: 
 
 ͞…uŵ…ǁake up ĐƌǇiŶg, ĐƌǇiŶg, oh͟ 
 
The ǀisioŶ of aŶgels eitheƌ ƌepƌeseŶts LiŶdǇ͛s seŶse of peaĐe oƌ peƌhaps the aŶgels Đƌeate the 
sense of peace which is then shattered when she awakes and the realisation of the magnitude 
of her new situation becomes only too apparent: 
 
L: No…eƌ…ďeautiful ;gesture of hand sweeping) …uŵ…ďeautiful ;nods) yes 
“: “o ǁheŶ Ǉou ǁoke up… 
L: (nods) 
S: You had that feeliŶg of ďeautǇ aŶd… 
L: No…uŵ ĐƌǇiŶg 
S: Right 
L: All the time crying (gestureͿ uŵ…uŵ…I…uŵ…uŵ…uŵ…ǁeepiŶg…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
(gesture with left hand and intonation/ facial expression) …uŵ…uŵ…uŵ ;writes) 
S: (after reading what L has written) So that was the 4th day? 
L: Yes 
S: You woke up weeping? 
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Resurrection, suƌǀiǀal aŶd ďeiŶg ͞ďoƌŶ agaiŶ͟ 
Lindy talks about the miracle of surviving this catastrophic cerebrovascular accident, seemingly 
against all odds: 
 
͞I aŵ Lazaƌus.͟ ;2013, private email). 
 
Lazarus was a great friend of Jesus, over whose death Christ famously wept (John 11: 35). 
Having died and been in a tomb for four days – so loŶg that he ͞stiŶketh͟ ;JohŶ ϭϭ: 39) – Jesus 
ǁas ŵoǀed to ask ɑod to ƌaise Lazaƌus fƌoŵ the dead. It seeŵs that LiŶdǇ feels ͞saǀed͟ fƌoŵ 
death much like Lazarus: 
 
L: Aǁake Ŷo aǁake Ŷo aǁake…uŵ…die die 
S: u-huh 
L: Oh, oh…OK ;surprised intonation) 
S: and then you survived? 
L: Yes, yes 
 
and because she uses this biblical analogy, one must presume that this is deemed by her a 
miraculous, God-given experience. Indeed, she goes oŶ to saǇ ͞MiƌaĐle? MaǇďe?͟ ;pƌiǀate 
email, 2013). Interestingly, it has been suggested (Welby, 2016, p 16) that Lazarus may himself 
have had a disability, because at no point in the story does he speak. 
This Đould ďe ǀieǁed usiŶg FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ŷaƌrative illness typologies as the ultimate in a 
restitution story; she died but then was restored to life. 
Similarly, Lindy views her rehabilitation post-stroke as a sort of growth from babyhood through 
adolescence to restored adulthood. She uses speech and gesture to illustrate this in a powerful 
way, firstly her concept of beginning again in terms of function (particularly speech): 
 
L: (facial expression = yikesͿ uŵ…dǇiŶg…uŵ [f] ŵe, LiŶdǇ Usheƌ, dǇiŶg ;gesture – left hand 
gesture of chopping downͿ uŵ…uŵ…stƌoke aphasia…uŵ…ŵe…uŵ ;writes) stroke yeah 
S: (reads) in 2008, yeah 
L: Yes…uŵ…Oh ɑod…uŵ…ŵe…uŵ little…little ;gestures small with left hand close to the 
groundͿ uŵ…uŵ…a ďaďǇ ŵe ;points to herself) a baby 
 
and then the gradual, incremental progression, culminating in death: 
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L: Um grow up little little little little (left hand gesture – going up step by step) yes 
Ǉes…uŵ…dǇiŶg 
 
This restitution narrative is supported by the perceived progress of Lindy in terms of her 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aŶd heƌ Ŷeed to keep ͞stƌiǀiŶg͟: 
 
S: WoƌkiŶg aǁaǇ…aŶd do Ǉou see pƌogƌess all the tiŵe? 
L: Oh, yeah (intonation = absolutely) oh yeah! 
S: Yeah – Ǉou ǁoƌk haƌd at it as ǁell though, doŶ͛t Ǉou? 
L: Yes (intonation = definitely) 
 
Pilgrimage 
In one of her emails, Lindy mentions the concept of ͞pilgƌiŵage͟ as ďeiŶg aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt paƌt of 
her spirituality. When I ask her if she can give me more details of this, she says: 
 
L: Pilgƌiŵage…uŵ…eaƌth…uŵ…the laŶd…uŵ ǁalkiŶg all eƌ uŵ [Ŷɔd] [lɔd] (writes)  
S: (reads) oh yes Lourdes in France? 
L: Yes yes yes 
S: Ah – have you been to Lourdes? 
L: All the (gestures ͞ďaĐk͟) um yes years ago 
 
Lourdes is a place she would like to visit again, but she sees this as an impossibility, because of 
her physical difficulties. I do not fully grasp the importance of pilgrimage to Lindy during our 
iŶteƌǀieǁs, ďut at the eŶd of the thiƌd ŵeetiŶg, she haŶds ŵe a ĐopǇ of heƌ Ŷoǀel ͞The “uddeŶ 
“pooŶ͟ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ. L.E.Usheƌ͛s seĐoŶd Ŷoǀel tells the stoƌǇ of Eliza ǁho goes oŶ a pilgƌiŵage to 
͞the ŵaŶǇ plaĐes ǁheƌe MaƌǇ is ďelieǀed to haǀe appeaƌed aŶd ƌeĐoƌd theŵ ǁith heƌ Đaŵeƌa͟ 
(p 10).  As well as being on an actual pilgrimage of sorts, locating places where the Virgin Mary 
had appeared to believers, the protagonist also pursues a pilgrimage of love and relationship. 
I begin to understand from reading her novel, that Lindy uses the analogy of pilgrimage to 
include searching, striving (a word she uses on a number of occasions during our interviews) 
and connecting. The gifting of the book and my reading it feels like a further expansion of 
LiŶdǇ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Mosaic (Clark, 2001); through this book, I glean more insight into the 
ĐoŶĐept of pilgƌiŵage aŶd iŶto LiŶdǇ͛s spiritual story. 
 
Nature 
Lindy cites nature and walking within nature as a spiritual experience for her: 
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͞Me…uŵ…ǁalkiŶg the fields aŶd ɑod uŵ…aŶgels oƌ ɑod …uŵ, oh, ɑod…it͛s peaĐeful͟ 
 
She describes a non-verbal connection with God which gives her solace: 
 
“: Mŵ…aŶd ǁhat is it aďout Ŷatuƌe that helps that dialogue ǁith ɑod, do Ǉou thiŶk? 
L: uŵ…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ uŵ ;puzzled facial expression) …soothiŶg? ;questioning intonation, as if 
not sure she has produced the word correctly) 
 
Of course, communing with God without words is not an experience reserved for people with 
communication difficulties, but the unspoken prayer of someone with aphasia perhaps has 
added poignancy, believing that God can hear prayer without words. Perhaps this is illustrative 
of the ͞pƌiǀileged aĐĐess to the diǀiŶe͟ (Clark Power et al, 2008, p 375), mentioned in chapter 
one and discussed more fully in chapter six. 
Lindy has channelled her literary skills into poetry since her stroke, and much of this poetry 
relates to aphasia, but also to her experience within nature. So, when asked whether her 
poeŵs aƌe a ǁaǇ of ͞talkiŶg to ɑod͟, she eǆplaiŶs that the spiƌitual esseŶĐe iŶ heƌ poetƌǇ is 
more related to nature than to God per se: 
 
“: uhuh…aŶd Ǉouƌ poeŵs – aƌe theǇ paƌt of Ǉouƌ… 
L: Yes 
S: Sort of spiritual journey? 
L: eƌ…Ŷo ;rocks hand back and forth, as in maybe, maybe not) maybe no (looks puzzled) the 
eaƌth ŵaǇďe…uŵ…ƌiǀeƌ…uŵ…uŵ ;looks at me) 
S: Nature 
L: Yeah, nature yeah 
 
Writing 
Lindy is a published author, and writing was her profession prior to the stroke. It remains at 
the core of her identity, now as a poet: 
 
͞Ǉeah! I well writer (gestures writing) me (points to self) a writer (intonation = that is simply 
who I am)͟ 
 
Writing becomes a part of her therapy, the rehabilitation of her identity and of her language: 
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͞Ǉeah ƌeadiŶg all the tiŵe uŵ…ǁƌitiŶg poeŵs ;gestures little with finger and thumb, then 
increases size between, as if showing increments) um yeah (nodsͿ͟ 
 
I wonder at one point whether Lindy uses poetry as a means to speak or pray to God. She 
answers no, and interestingly asks the same question of me. The smallness and simplicity of 
this question belies its deeply felt (by me) interest in my own faith journey: 
 
S: Do you ever write poems to God? 
L: No (smiles) 
S: (laughs) 
L: (laughs) 
S: OK 
L: You? 
 
This also strikes me as one of those moments of complete equality and balance, with one 
person asking exactly the same question of the other. It also, I think, exemplifies that 
friendship is being formed during this process, of one interlocutor wanting to form more of a 
complete picture of the other by asking relationship-forming questions. 
 
Needing another to hear spiritual stories 
I wanted to find out during my interviews with Lindy whether she was able to reach out to 
anyone else during her stroke recovery, particularly in terms of being able to express spiritual 
angst, or tell her stories of spirituality. I was interested in how someone with aphasia might be 
ministered to – whether indeed ministry was desired and, if so, whether it was accessible. 
Lindy did not see a chaplain whilst in hospital, but on several occasions mentioned visits from 
her local parish priest once she was home from hospital: 
 
S: You didŶ͛t see a ĐhaplaiŶ at all ǁheŶ Ǉou ǁeƌe iŶ hospital? 
L: No 
S: What about your priest? Did he come to visit you? 
L: No, um (writes 2009) 
S: 2009 yeah 
L: Home 
S: Right, to this house? 
L: Yes 
S: OK 
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L: Father {name of priest} 
“: ‘ight, so he͛s ďeeŶ a good suppoƌt foƌ Ǉou? 
L: Yeah 
 
LiŶdǇ͛s spiƌitual stoƌies aƌe ƌelated thƌough speeĐh, ǁƌiting, gesture, intonation and facial 
expression. She conveys personal and beautiful narratives of distress, despair, hope, recovery 
and faith, which successfully guide her listener through the chaos of her stroke to the quest of 
her recovery (Frank, 2013). 
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David: the sculptor’s tale 
 
 ͞I saǁ aŶ aŶgel iŶ the ŵaƌďle aŶd Đaƌǀed uŶtil I set hiŵ fƌee͟ 
(Michelangelo) 
 
David has not been living with his aphasia for very long. When we meet, at a stroke club, he is 
nine months on from the date of his stroke. Although I had recruited him a couple of weeks 
prior to the date of our interview, I had also by chance bumped into him just the day before. 
Checking details of time and address with him, he intimates that he is not sure if he has 
anything useful to say on the subject of spirituality. I reassure him that whatever he 
communicates will be of interest, but he comes back to this theme at the end of the interview 
itself: 
 
D: I soŵehoǁ feel that eƌ…ŵǇ…;unintelligibleͿ ǁasŶ͛t Ŷeeded ;laughs) 
S: Youƌ… 
D: MǇ…ŵǇ…eƌ…ǁasŶ͛t Ŷeeded. I ĐaŶ͛t saǇ that iŶ aŶotheƌ ǁaǇ…hoǁ ǁould Ǉou saǇ that? 
“: I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe ǁhat ǁasŶ͛t Ŷeeded? ɑoiŶg…do Ǉou ŵeaŶ goiŶg to ĐhuƌĐh ǁasŶ͛t Ŷeeded? 
D: No, seeing you, Sophie 
S: OK (laughsͿ I ǁasŶ͛t Ŷeeded. ‘ight 
D: I ĐaŶ iŵagiŶe that Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot…iŵagiŶe it͛s. I tƌied to tell Ǉou ǇesteƌdaǇ. I ƌeallǇ do thiŶk Ǉou 
ǁeƌeŶ͛t eƌ…oh ǁell, Ŷeǀeƌ ŵiŶd 
“: It͛s ďeeŶ useful, if Ǉou ǁeƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that ǁhat Ǉou had to saǇ ǁasŶ͛t goiŶg to ďe useful, is 
that… 
D: It was, was it? 
 
This seems to be an ongoing leitmotif throughout the interview, whether in words or attitude, 
that David is not engaged in the subject matter. He gives consent to the interview and, indeed, 
talks about some very interesting aspects of spirituality, but he never gives the impression that 
this is a useful or enjoyable experience for him. I do not feel that I have created a rapport 
ĐoŶduĐiǀe to opeŶŶess. OŶĐe I haǀe Đoŵpleted tƌaŶsĐƌiďiŶg Daǀid͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ, I seŶd hiŵ a 
synopsis for his comments; he does not respond. 
We meet at his home in a suburb of a big city, where he lives with his wife and two young 
sons. He trained as a fine artist, but has not been able to work since the stroke: 
 
D: I tƌaiŶed as a fiŶe aƌtist aŶd…eƌ…afteƌ doiŶg that…aŶd afteƌ…I ǁeŶt to the…eƌŵ…adǀeƌtisiŶg 
S: Right 
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D: Yep 
S: and are you working at the moment? 
D: No 
S: No, OK 
D: No, I doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ thiŶk Ǉou ĐaŶ I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, I ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhetheƌ Ǉou ĐaŶ ǁoƌk aŶd at the 
ŵoŵeŶt ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ loǀe ƌeallǇ 
 
As our conversation concludes, he tells me that he is starting to create some sculpture for his 
garden, so perhaps his desire to express himself through art is re-emerging after enforced 
post-stroke latency. 
Books – particularly art books – are strewn around the living room, and it is clear that David is 
well-read and continues to enjoy exploring these tomes. As we start our conversation, he has a 
colourful, glossy coffee-table book about mushrooms by his side on the sofa. 
 
Daǀid͛s aphasia 
Daǀid͛s auditoƌǇ ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ is good; theƌe is the oĐĐasioŶal ŵoŵeŶt of appaƌeŶt laĐk of 
full comprehension but this may be due to lack of clarity on my part, a difficulty processing 
more complex sentences, or the fact that his significant expressive difficulties sometimes 
convey a feeling that the utterance has not been understood correctly because of the answer 
given: 
 
S: Do you find yourself questioning why it happened to you at a young age? Those sorts of 
things? 
D: Eƌ…oŶlǇ oŶĐe I get out aŶd people go ͚ɑood ɑod Ǉou͛ƌe ǇouŶg, aƌeŶ͛t Ǉou!͛ ;laughs) I go 
͚ƌeallǇ?͛ aŶd eƌ Ǉeah I aŵ Ƌuite suƌpƌised ďǇ the …Ǉep.  
 
Daǀid͛s eǆpƌessiǀe laŶguage eǆhiďits soŵe good pƌeseƌǀed seŶteŶĐe stƌuĐtuƌe ǁith ŵodeƌate 
word-finding difficulties. His relatively strong sentence structure sometimes belies his inability 
to retrieve a key word: 
 
͞Yes, I did. I ĐaŶ͛t the Ŷaŵe foƌ it…of it…it͛s soŵethiŶg like…I ĐaŶ͛t…it͛s aŶ age ďut I ĐaŶ͛t 
ƌeŵeŵďeƌ the Ŷaŵe of it. MǇ ǁife ǁill ďe heƌe…s…at aďout…Ǉou ŵight haǀe goŶe 
aĐtuallǇ…I͛ŵ…she ŵight ǁell kŶoǁ it͟ 
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He tries to camouflage his word-finding difficulties in various ways, sometimes producing 
unintelligible strings of phonemes in place of the target, sometimes filling in with syntactically 
ĐoƌƌeĐt ďut ͚eŵptǇ͛ utteƌaŶĐes: 
 
͞But…eƌ…I fiŶd it ǀeƌǇ ǀeƌǇ…soƌt of…I ĐaŶ see all the ǁoƌld…eƌŵ…eƌ…;latencyͿ eƌ…just 
ďeĐause I didŶ͛t aĐĐept…that…Ǉou kŶoǁ…the…;latency) eƌŵ…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…ǁhat͛s ;laughs) 
Đos I͟ 
 
He eǆplaiŶs hoǁ his laŶguage has iŵpƌoǀed oǀeƌ the ŵoŶths siŶĐe his stƌoke, fƌoŵ ͚Ǉes͛ aŶd 
͚Ŷo͛ to the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of laŶguage he deŵoŶstƌates todaǇ: 
 
S: Right. Right. And what was your speech and your communication like then? 
D: Well, hopefullǇ it͛s a ďit iŵpƌoǀed, eƌŵ… 
S: Yeah 
D: Yeah, I hope it͛s ďeeŶ iŵpƌoǀed  
S: Yeah, so it feels like it͛s iŵpƌoǀed Ŷoǁ to…? 
D: Yes 
“: …ǁheŶ Ǉou fiƌst had Ǉouƌ stƌoke? 
D: When I was in hospital I was just goiŶg Ǉes aŶd Ŷo, Ǉes aŶd… 
S: OK 
D: …Ŷo ;laughs) 
“: ‘ight, ƌight. “o it͛s defiŶitelǇ iŵpƌoǀed a lot 
D: Yep 
 
Like all the paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁith aphasia, Daǀid͛s laŶguage skills ǁeƌe Ŷot foƌŵallǇ assessed. 
However, if one were trying to plot the level of his linguistic breakdown using the cognitive 
neuropsychological model of language processing (appendix I), one might well identify his 
deficits as being at the level of the phonological output lexicon, or the route from semantic 
system to phonological output lexicon. He does not demonstrate any semantic paraphasias, 
suggestive of an intact semantic system, nor does he display many phonemic paraphasias, 
which, in turn, would suggest that his phonological output buffer and the route to it is not 
affected. It would seem that he has an inability at times to retrieve a word from his 
phonological output lexicon. There is often a marked latency in his responses, which is perhaps 
indicative of his inability to find the target word in his lexicon. 
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Daǀid͛s Mosaic 
His verbal output is supplemented by use of communicative intonation and facial expression, 
but he does not use any other total communication strategies such as writing. I tentatively ask 
him at one point if attempting to write down a word helps in his retrieval of the spoken word, 
but he is dismissive of this idea because the hemiplegia resulting from his stroke has affected 
his dominant hand, and therefore his physical ability to handwrite. Many people (such as 
Lindy) with hemiplegia on their preferred side do learn to write again with their non-preferred 
hand but perhaps David is not yet at this stage in his rehabilitation: 
 
S: Does it help you to write things down? 
D: Well, this haŶd͛s so ďuggeƌed that Ŷo 
S: So actually physically writing is tricky 
D: Yeah 
 
I wonder how this physical disability impacts on him as an artist, but David does not volunteer 
this information and I feel that our relationship is not yet (will never be?) such that I could 
broach this subject. As his therapist, rapport may have developed over time, to an extent 
where sensitive and potentially emotive topics such as this could be tackled, but as a 
researcher just passing through, it does not feel appropriate. This highlights the not always 
comfortable dichotomy of researcher versus therapist. 
He uses gesture occasionally to supplement his speech. His use of laughter, I think, is not 
always helpful in terms of the functionality of his expressive language and sometimes masks 
his errors or difficulties in word retrieval. 
Delivery of speech is slow with many pauses for attempts at word retrieval, some evidence of 
mild dysarthria (imprecise consonants) and occasional neurogenic dysfluency. 
My strategy when conversing with David is to give non-Đoŵŵittal, ͚filler͛ type utterances (such 
as ͞uhuh͟Ϳ iŶ response to some of his, in the hope that these will encourage further 
expression. What I perceive as lack of therapeutic rapport results iŶ less ͚theƌapeutiĐ 
iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg͛ aŶd this is eǆeŵplified iŶ the speeĐh eǆaŵples takeŶ diƌeĐtlǇ fƌoŵ the iŶteƌǀieǁ: 
iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to soŵe of the otheƌ iŶteƌǀieǁs, ŵaŶǇ of the Ƌuotes aƌe Daǀid͛s ǁoƌds oŶlǇ, ƌatheƌ 
than snippets of dialogue between the two of us. 
 
Daǀid͛s stƌoke stoƌǇ 
Daǀid Ŷaƌƌates hoǁ he ǁas ͞staǇiŶg ǁith ŵǇ ďƌotheƌ ǁho used to liǀe just up heƌe͟ ǁheŶ he 
had his stroke nine months prior to our conversation. He describes the pain he experienced: 
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͞AŶd I had a ƌeallǇ hoŶkiŶg headaĐhe…aŶd…eƌŵ I ĐouldŶ͛t sleep ďeĐause of it͟ 
 
but he interestingly uses non-catastrophising vocabulary, as if to play down the seriousness of 
the event: 
 
͞aŶd ǁheŶ I tuƌŶed oǀeƌ I ƌealised that I ǁas…I ƌealised I ŵust haǀe ďeeŶ slightlǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed 
ďeĐause ŵǇ ďodǇ ǁasŶ͛t ŵoǀiŶg͟ 
 
This playing down of the seriousness is also conveyed by laughter: 
 
͞I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ at aďout ϯ o͛ĐloĐk oƌ soŵethiŶg I ǁoŶdeƌ if I͛ŵ goiŶg to get aŶǇthiŶg doŶe todaǇ 
(laughsͿ͟ 
 
He did not recognise what was happening to him as a stroke: 
 
͞I had ŶothiŶg. I did Ŷo idea͟ 
 
and he denies that the experience was a frightening one: 
 
D: aŶd…eƌ…heŶĐe I fell oŶ the flooƌ aŶd heŶĐe ŵǇ ďƌotheƌ aŶd his…ǁife Đaŵe iŶ aŶd 
deĐided…I…to Đall ŵe 
S: Frightening experience 
D: Not really 
S: No? 
 
Unlike some of the other participants in group 2 (such as Lindy and Francesca), David was 
conscious throughout, and the pain and distress of the situation is evident in his wish that he 
had not been: 
 
D: No, eƌŵ…I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ it all. I ǁish it ǁasŶ͛t 
“: Do Ǉou? ‘ight, so Ǉou ǁeƌeŶ͛t uŶĐoŶsĐious at all? 
D: No 
S: Right, so you remember it all 
 
Daǀid ƌeĐouŶts his staǇ iŶ hospital ;͞seǀeŶ ǁeeks theƌe aŶd then five days in {name of another 
hospital}͟Ϳ ďut does Ŷot ƌeŵeŵďeƌ the fiƌst fiǀe daǇs ďeĐause of the stƌoŶg dƌugs he ǁas oŶ: 
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͞Well theǇ put ŵe oŶ these…eƌ…ƌeallǇ…theǇ ŵake Ǉou feel ƌeallǇ kŶoĐked out͟ 
 
His first recollection of that time seems to be the confusion over his diabetes regime; he 
appears to blame his sister-in-law for providing erroneous information which in turn prolongs 
his stay in hospital: 
 
D: aŶd eƌŵ so I ĐaŶŶot ƌeallǇ ƌeŵeŵďeƌ the…oŶe…the fiǀe daǇs of that ďut I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ oŶĐe 
that came off aŶd ŵǇ…ŵǇ…ďƌotheƌ͛s ǁife had this…uŵ…deĐided to tell theŵ eǀeƌǇthiŶg 
so…like I Đhose…haǀeŶ͛t got a sǇƌiŶge heƌe ďut I iŶjeĐt sǇƌiŶge ďeĐause I͛ŵ diaďetiĐ 
S: Right 
D: aŶd she said ͚Oh Ǉou iŶjeĐt fouƌ doses of sǇƌiŶge eǀeƌǇ daǇ͛ aŶd I doŶ͛t I iŶjeĐt tǁelǀe 
S: Right 
D: aŶd so I Đaŵe out of this aŶd theŶ saǇiŶg Ŷo soƌƌǇ ǁe doŶ͛t…so ďasiĐallǇ I ǁas iŶ theƌe foƌ 
too long 
S: Oh OK 
D: Eƌŵ…ďeĐause ƌaisiŶg ŵǇ ďlood sugaƌs 
S: Right – they had the wrong information 
D: Hmm 
S: Right 
D: Eƌŵ…Ǉeah I do ƌeŵeŵďeƌ it Ƌuite ǁell…Ǉeah…eƌ..apaƌt fƌoŵ that I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ it ǁell 
(laughs) 
 
Faith and the church 
Daǀid͛s opeŶiŶg gaŵďit ǁheŶ ǁe ďegiŶ ouƌ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ aŶd I ask hiŵ to tell ŵe a ďit aďout 
hiŵself is that he is ͞ChuƌĐh of EŶglaŶd͟.  Is it that his ƌeligioŶ is aŶ iŶtƌiŶsiĐ aspect of him, at 
the forefront of any introduction to him and his life, or is it that he knows I am interested in 
spirituality in this interview, therefore he gives me first what to him might be the most salient 
piece of information? 
The whole issue of faith and religion is a confusing one throughout the interview. There are 
many - what I perceive to be - conflicting statements, which are possibly a reflection of the 
difficulty of expressing complex, abstract ideas with aphasia, or a reflection of my lack of 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ of Daǀid͛s ideas, or a combination of both. 
At one point in the interview, for example, he claims that, although he was brought up in the 
Church of England, he no longer considers himself to be a member of that denomination, or 
indeed to have a Christian faith: 
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͞Eƌŵ…I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t haǀe a [læ] lost faith…I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t haǀe a faith ƌeallǇ…eƌŵ…ǁheŶ I 
ǁas…ǁheŶ I did haǀe I ǁas ďƌought up ChuƌĐh of EŶglaŶd, so that͛s soƌt of ǁheƌe Ǉou get 
thiŶgs…eƌŵ…so Ǉeah, I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t haǀe a…haǀe a faith͟ 
 
Despite using intonation to imply definitude, this discrepancy of belief versus unbelief 
ĐoŶtiŶues ;͞oŶe͟ iŶ the folloǁiŶg eǆĐeƌpt ƌefeƌs to a faithͿ: 
 
“: You didŶ͛t haǀe oŶe ďefoƌe the stƌoke? 
D: (deliberate intonationͿ I thiŶk…I ŵust saǇ though that oŶe of the aƌeas that͛s totallǇ 
ĐhaŶged…hasŶ͛t ĐhaŶged, it͛s totallǇ 
S: HasŶ͛t ĐhaŶged? 
D: Hm 
S: So, it͛s eǆaĐtlǇ the saŵe as it ǁas ďefoƌe? 
D: Hm 
S: Right 
D: Ǉeah…uŵ…Ǉep 
 
and again later: 
 
͞I͛ŵ Ŷot that ƌeligious. I͛ŵ ǁheŶ I͛d saǇ I͛ŵ…I ŵust adŵit I aŵ ǀeƌǇ ƌeligious͟ 
 
I wonder if the perceived confusion is related to the fact that the aphasia is making it difficult 
for David to explain the complexities and nuance between believing in God – or a god – and 
subscribing to an organised religion. He is clear and categorical about his fundamental belief: 
 
“:…“o, ĐaŶ I ask Ǉou if Ǉou ďelieǀe iŶ ɑod oƌ a god? 
D: Yes, I do ďelieǀe iŶ a god…a siŵple thiŶg 
S: Yes 
D: Yeah. I believe in Jesus Christ 
 
But equally he seems to convey a dislike or a rejection of the faith tradition in which he was 
brought up, and which, in fact, was part of his introductory comment to me: 
 
D: Yeah…ChuƌĐh of EŶglaŶd ;shakes head) 
S: Not Church of England? 
D: No 
121 
 
S: Right 
D: But I would go to any place 
 
It is of interest that he chooses to introduce himself with the very label he is later keen to 
shed, ďut ǁheŶ he asseƌts that ͞eƌŵ…I do ďelieǀe that all ƌeligioŶs aƌe esseŶtiallǇ good͟, it 
seems clear that he is indeed a religious man with respect for religion and a belief in a higher 
being. 
 
Quite late into the interview, he mentions that his wife attends church, but that he does not: 
 
D: AŶd eƌ Ǉeah theǇ aŶd…ŵǇ ǁife͛s deĐidiŶg to go to ĐhuƌĐh aĐtuallǇ 
S: Is she? 
D: Yeah, aŶd she͛s Ƌuite iŶ ĐhuƌĐh aĐtuallǇ she͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶto it aŶd…eƌ…I doŶ͛t go to Đhurch at all. 
 
I am interested in whether his wife has recently started to attend church or whether this has 
been a longstanding practice for her. I wonder whether the occurrence of the stroke might 
have encouraged her to seek solace or support from the local church, but it seems on balance 
that she was attending the church prior to the stroke nine months previously: 
 
“: We͛ǀe Đoǀeƌed eǀeƌǇthiŶg. Oh, Ǉou ǁeƌe just saǇiŶg that Ǉouƌ ǁife staƌted goiŶg to ĐhuƌĐh – 
is that a new thing? 
D: Er, last couple of weeks, years 
S: Yeah – last couple of years 
D: Yeah, she ǁas ďoƌŶ, ǁell, OK…Ŷo…Ǉeah 
 
Although he does not attend church with his wife, David mentions that a person from the 
church comes regularly to visit him, and in fact was due to see David straight after I had 
interviewed him. It is not clear to me if this person is a minister from the church, or an 
interested lay person; David is not satisfied with his label for the visitor: 
 
͞…aĐtuallǇ the peƌsoŶ ǁho͛s last theƌe ǁas a soŵeoŶe ǁho is…eƌ…a spiƌitualist – not a 
spiritualist – a…eƌŵ…Ǉeah he looks after me. He [gʌŶs] ŵe eǀeƌǇthiŶg͟ 
 
I try other labels but they are also not accurate: 
 
S: Like a sort of spiritual adviser? 
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D: No, Ŷo, he͛s…eƌ…he͛s Ŷot a spiƌitualist, I ŵeaŶt…eƌŵ…Ǉeah…he eƌ…he͛s tƌǇiŶg to take ŵe 
[d͡ʒ࠱Ŷ] eƌ ďe a…Oh, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…tƌying to embrace the church like the way he does 
“: Oh, OK, so he͛s soƌt of ŵeŶtoƌiŶg Ǉou? 
D: No, he͛s puƌelǇ just theƌe to help 
“: “o, he͛s fƌoŵ the ĐhuƌĐh? 
D: Yeah 
“: “o he͛s just Đoŵe to… 
D: Yep 
“: to talk to Ǉou aŶd… 
D: Yep. An hour after you! 
S: Oh, right, OK (laughs) 
 
Whateǀeƌ this ǀisitoƌ͛s foƌŵal ƌole oƌ title, he oďǀiouslǇ is a souƌĐe of ĐoŵpaŶioŶship aŶd 
shared interests for David: 
 
D: Yeah, I know I mostly use him but you know I hope he finds right OK 
S: Is that useful for yourself to chat to him? 
D: Not ƌeallǇ. We doŶ͛t talk aďout ƌeligioŶ. 
S: Right 
D: (laughs) 
S: You talk about other stuff 
D: Yeah, mushrooms (indicates book about mushrooms next to him on sofa) 
S: OK! 
 
Daǀid͛s ďeliefs 
The difficulty of expressing the ineffable – with or without aphasia – is appaƌeŶt iŶ Daǀid͛s 
attempts to explain his spirituality to me. At times, it feels like the difficulty in expressing these 
numinous concepts accentuates his expressive abilities per se; for example, when he wryly 
ƌepeats ŵǇ use of the ǁoƌd ͞stƌuggliŶg͟: 
 
D: But…eƌ…I fiŶd it ǀeƌǇ ǀeƌǇ…soƌt of…I ĐaŶ see all the ǁoƌld…eƌŵ…eƌ…;latencyͿ eƌ…just 
ďeĐause I didŶ͛t aĐĐept…that…Ǉou kŶoǁ…the…;latencyͿ eƌŵ…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…ǁhat͛s ;laughs) 
cos I  
“: You͛ƌe stƌuggliŶg to… 
D: Yeah 
S: put it into words 
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D: Struggling, that͛s ƌight 
 
He ĐoŵplaiŶs of ͞foƌgettiŶg͟ ǁhat he ǁaŶts to saǇ ďut peƌhaps the ǁoƌds aŶd phƌases aƌe so 
abstract, so nebulous, that they are more difficult to locate or activate in his output lexicon 
than more concrete lexical items (Papathanasiou, Coppens and Potagas, 2013 p 142). 
In this extract, I attempt to cue him in by mirroring his output, allowing time and giving what I 
hope is reassurance, but we are between us unable to quite explore what he is trying to 
convey: 
 
D: Eƌŵ…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ƌeallǇ, ǁhat does it mean? (laughsͿ Ǉou kŶoǁ, it͛s eƌ…ǁheŶ I͛ŵ thiŶkiŶg 
ďasiĐallǇ of spiƌitualitǇ oƌ heaǀeŶ aďoǀe I͛ŵ thiŶkiŶg this ŵust haǀe happeŶed soŵetiŵe to 
someone 
S: To someone else? 
D: Hm 
“: ‘ight, OK. “o it͛s just paƌt of a… 
D: it͛s…it͛s the idea is that the idea as an earth (gestureͿ ƌotatiŶg…eƌŵ…ǁheƌe I do ďelieǀe iŶ 
thiŶgs I Đoŵe…eƌŵ…;latencyͿ I keep foƌgettiŶg ǁhat I͛ŵ ŵeaŶt to saǇ ;laughs) 
S: It͛s a ĐoŵpliĐated thought, isŶ͛t it? 
D: Yeah 
 
IŶ the eŶd, Daǀid settles foƌ the ĐoŶĐept of ͞holisŵ͟ to eǆplaiŶ his spirituality and beliefs: 
 
D: But I ǁould defiŶitelǇ… ǁould…ǀieǁ the ǁoƌld as ǁhole  
“: ‘ight, OK. “o Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot suďsĐƌiďiŶg to the ChuƌĐh of EŶglaŶd ďut Ǉou ďelieǀe iŶ… 
D: IŶ…ǁell I ďelieǀe I͛ŵ tƌǇiŶg to fiŶd the ǁoƌd ͚ǁhole͛ 
 
but he is dismissive of what, to me, is an interesting and valid description: 
 
͞so, it͛s ŶoŶseŶse I kŶoǁ ďut it͛s ŶoŶseŶse͟ 
 
I think I detect a level of embarrassment, perhaps to be expected when discussing these 
concepts with a relative stranger, and perhaps also a further reflection of the lack of rapport 
between us. He does, however, give a very candid and beautiful definition of what spirituality 
means for him: 
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͞eƌŵ…;latencyͿ it ŵeaŶs…eƌ…Đoŵfoƌt…it ŵeaŶs…eƌ…ďlessiŶg…it ŵeaŶs…eƌ…it ŵeaŶs good 
thiŶgs, Ǉeah͟ 
 
Life purpose and meaning 
When I ask David what gives his life meaning, he gives a cursory answer about his children, 
then moves on to a discussion about his wife attending church: 
 
S: (pauseͿ What aƌe the thiŶgs iŶ Ǉouƌ life…eƌŵ…that giǀe…paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ giǀe Ǉouƌ life ŵeaŶiŶg 
and purpose, for you do you think? 
D: Having kids, yeah 
S: How many kids do you have? 
D: I…[gƌ࠱] two 
S: Two 
D: Tǁo…theǇ͛ƌe ďoth ďƌotheƌs aŶd eƌ… 
S: How old are they? 
D: TheǇ͛ƌe eight aŶd seǀeŶ…eƌ…siǆ 
 
I wonder if he is giving responses that he thinks are relevant to my topic. That is to say, does he 
equate spirituality with religion, and therefore when I try and broaden the topic to include 
what may give meaning and purpose to his life, he closes this line of questioning down and 
reverts to a discussion involving religion. Of note, perhaps, is that he does not mention art as a 
meaning-giver in his life. 
 
Vision  
Soon after I ask David directly whether he believes in God or a god, he candidly describes a 
vision he had when a very small boy: 
 
D: Yeah. I believe in Jesus Christ 
S: Right 
D: Eƌŵ…Ǉep…I had a…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if Ǉou Ŷeed to kŶoǁ…I had a very strange event happen to 
ŵe aďout ǁheŶ I ǁas aďout fouƌ ǁhiĐh ǁas…I͛ǀe had it…Ǉou kŶoǁ…kŶoǁ that it tells people 
aŶd theǇ go ͚ŵǇ ɑod just ƌiŶg the Đhild [æfjʊs] (abuse?) or something (laughs) but er this 
peƌsoŶ…all ƌight…soŵeoŶe Đaŵe to see ŵe…I ƌeŵeŵber it being of the [drࠧit] fƌaŵe of ŵiŶd 
aŶd I just thought ͚I ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhǇ Ǉou͛ƌe heƌe͛ aŶd he this ŵaŶ took ŵǇ haŶd aŶd…eƌ..aŶd said 
͚doŶ͛t ǁoƌƌǇ, it͛s all ƌight, Ǉou͛ƌe goŶŶa ďe all ƌight͛. 
S: Really? 
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D: Yeah 
S: And who do you believe that was? 
D: Well…the guǇ had a ďeaƌd, so I ǁasŶ͛t ;laughs) certain it was him 
 
True to form, his language is deprecating ([æfjʊs] ŵaǇ ďe a phoŶeŵiĐ paƌaphasia of ͞aďuse͟, 
aŶd he ŵaǇ ďe ĐoŶflatiŶg ͚ChildliŶe͛ aŶd Đhild aďuse iŶ the utteƌaŶĐe ͞ŵǇ ɑod just ƌiŶg the 
child [æfjʊs]͟), as if trying to nullify or play down the occurrence. This may be a reflection of 
embarrassment at divulging something so personal to a comparative stranger. My reaction is 
oŶe of ͞uŶfetteƌed staŶĐe͟ ;Moustakas, ϭϵϵϰ, p 85), and the final interchange of this episode I 
hope reflects my acceptance and belief in what he has just described: 
 
S: But ǁas that…ǁas that a good, positiǀe, ĐoŵfoƌtiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐe? 
D: It was positive, yeah 
 
Illness narrative 
CoŶsideƌiŶg Daǀid͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ usiŶg FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ illŶess/ disability narratives, it is difficult to 
pinpoint whether his story is one of restitution, chaos or quest. On the one hand, he does 
appear to still be in a state of post-stroke chaos: he will not countenance the possibility of 
return to work, for example, and he is quick to blame his sister-in-law for the protracted stay in 
hospital. At times he refers to his recovery in restitutive terms, such as when he states that his 
communication has improved. He is perhaps at the very early stages of embracing a narrative 
of quest, as evidenced by his beginning to express himself artistically by sculpting. Frank (2013) 
explains that the quest naƌƌatiǀe ͞holds Đhaos at ďaǇ͟ ;p 115), however I feel that during my 
interview with David, chaos is a nearby presence, a presence that David attempts to mask with 
laughter and light-hearted deprecation. Knowing that David is only 9 months into his recovery 
from a major, life-changing event, which has stripped him of his language, his job and his art, 
perhaps this is unsurprising. 
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Francesca: the opera lover’s story 
 
͚͞NothiŶg Ƌuite like it iŶ the ǁhole histoƌǇ of ŵusiĐ,͛ aŶŶouŶĐed Moƌse ŵagisteƌiallǇ, afteƌ 
Brünnhilde had ridden into the flames and the waves of the Rhine had finally rippled into 
sileŶĐe.͟ 
(The Way through the Woods, Colin Dexter) 
 
Francesca and I meet at a stroke group for people with communication difficulties run by a 
charity. She is kind enough to approach me after I give a talk at the group about my research 
and my quest for interested participants. She gives me her email address and we agree to 
ŵeet iŶ a Ƌuiet ƌooŵ at the gƌoup͛s ǀeŶue a feǁ ǁeeks lateƌ. 
Francesca is a woman in her mid-sixties. My immediate impression of her is of an independent, 
forthright individual. She is mobile, although she has a hemiplegia of the right arm and leg, 
which means her movement is effortful and somewhat slow. 
 
FƌaŶĐesĐa͛s aphasia aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ŵosaiĐ 
Francesca had her stroke fifteen years prior to our interview, when she was in her early fifties. 
As well as the physical deficits, she has been left with moderate to severe expressive aphasia, 
in the context of very good auditory comprehension skills and no obvious motor speech 
deficits. 
Francesca͛s aphasia is characterised by marked word retrieval difficulties, some phonemic 
paraphasias (such as [twɪp] for top), ŵaŶǇ ƌepetitiǀe phƌases ;e.g. ͞eǆaĐtlǇ͟Ϳ aŶd use of filleƌs 
;suĐh as ͞eƌŵ͟Ϳ. Heƌ seŶteŶĐe stƌuĐtuƌe is Ŷotaďle iŶ that she uses feǁ fuŶĐtioŶ ǁoƌds 
(prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns); instead she tends to use content words, predominantly 
ŶouŶs. This leŶds heƌ output ǁhat is soŵetiŵes ƌefeƌƌed to iŶ the liteƌatuƌe as a ͚telegƌaphiĐ͛ 
quality (Halpern and Goldfarb, 2013 p 46). Her output comprises very short utterances on the 
whole, and our interchange assumes the structure of a question and answer session, an 
interview perhaps rather than a conversation. 
Throughout our conversation, I employ a number of strategies in order to facilitate her 
expressive abilities. I check to ensure I have understood correctly: 
F: (laughsͿ eƌŵ…accountant 
“: ‘ight, Ǉou͛ƌe aŶ aĐĐouŶtaŶt, so Ǉou studied aĐĐouŶtaŶĐǇ 
F: Yep 
S: At Bath 
F: Yep 
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or sometimes I explicitly seek clarification: 
“: Oh, I see…aƌe ǁe talkiŶg aďout ŵoŶeǇ? 
F: Yes, exactly 
 
At times, I try and cue Francesca in, by starting off the sentence and enabling her to complete 
it: 
 
S: and then you had a break and then you went into the  
F: Civil service yep yep 
 
I provide pauses in an effort to allow time for further comment: 
 
F: Yep yep 
S: (pause) and photography you mentioned theƌe… 
F: Yeah 
 
and I find I am mirroring her sentence structure in my own: 
 
S: But Ǉou Ŷot so ŵuĐh…ďallet? 
 
Is this in an attempt to normalise her expressive language abilities, to make her feel more 
comfortable during the interaction? Whatever the reason, or the result, it is a strategy I 
employ unconsciously. 
Although Francesca presents with significant expressive language difficulties, she does not 
employ many total communication strategies to augment her speech. I offer her a pen and 
paper at one point during the interview, when she is struggling to convey the difference in pay 
between being an accountant and working as a civil servant. As this involves sums of money – 
and numbers can often be particularly problematic for people with aphasia (Ablinger, Weniger 
and Willmes, 2006) – she writes the numerical figures. However, she does not seem to 
routinely rely on writing as a form of expression; she did not carry around a pen and paper like 
some participants in this study. She uses very specific gestures twice during our conversation, 
and this proves a successful strategy; she gestures lying back undergoing a brain scan when the 
ǁoƌd ͚sĐaŶ͛ eludes heƌ, aŶd she also gestuƌes holdiŶg haŶds ǁheŶ desĐƌiďiŶg hoǁ heƌ fatheƌ 
supported her during the scan process: 
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F: eƌ…eƌŵ…Ǉes…eƌŵ…eƌŵ...eƌŵ…eƌŵ…the eƌŵ the eƌŵ ɑod…eƌŵ…the ;gestures lying down 
with head back) 
S: Scan? 
F: Yes 
S: The scan – you remember being in the scanner? 
F: Yes, yes 
S: Right 
F: Yep aŶd ŵǇ fatheƌ eƌ…eƌŵ ŵǇ fatheƌ aŶd ouƌ…ŵe…aŶd ŵǇ fatheƌ ;gestures holding hands) 
S: Was next to you while you were going into the scanner? 
F: Yep yep 
 
Francesca oǀeƌuses the ǁoƌd ͞eǆaĐtlǇ͟, ǁhiĐh peƌhaps has ďeĐoŵe a faǀouƌed, filliŶg-in word, 
signifying agreement with the interlocutor, but arguably little else. This palilalic utterance 
interferes somewhat with the normal ebb-and-flow turntaking of conversation, as Francesca 
will sometimes insert this into the conversation too often, impinging oŶ the otheƌ͛s 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ͚turn͛. 
Laughter, too, is prevalent and the meaning behind this is unclear; could it be embarrassment 
at her word-finding difficulties, nervousness at talking to someone new, or a way of masking 
her expressive deficits? 
Francesca uses some intonation in order to convey meaning, such as emphatic intonation 
ǁheŶ she tells ŵe ͞life͟ is heƌ defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ, ďut she uses less ŵeaŶiŶg-bearing 
intonation in general than other participants in the study. 
She uses the successful strategy of cueing herself into a target word, particularly in the case of 
numbers: 
 
“: ‘ight. AŶd ǁhat…just ďeiŶg ŶoseǇ Ŷoǁ really because I went to Bath UŶiǀeƌsitǇ…ǁhiĐh Ǉeaƌ 
were you there? 
F: eƌŵ…ŶiŶeteeŶ…siǆtǇ…eƌŵ…ϯ,ϰ,ϱ,ϲ,ϳ 
“: ϭϵϲϳ til…? 
F: and erm 2, 3 years 
S: 3 year course 
F: Yep 
S: So, 1967 til 1970? 
F: Yeah, yep 
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Francesca uses the ǁoƌd ͞ɑod͟ as a teƌŵ of eǆaspeƌatioŶ ǁheŶ she is uŶaďle to ƌetƌieǀe a 
word: 
 
͞eƌ…eƌŵ…Ǉes…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…the eƌŵ the eƌŵ ɑod…eƌŵ͟ 
 
This appears to have little if anything to do with deity or religion and is more a reflection of the 
plight of some people with aphasia, for whom expletives (albeit very mild in this instance - if, 
indeed, it can be termed an expletive at all) are more readily preserved and accessed than they 
were prior to the stroke (van Lancker and Cummings, 1999; Halpern and Goldfarb, 2013, p 46).  
 
Francesca͛s stroke story 
In common with all the participants in group 2, Francesca͛s stroke story is a traumatic one. She 
was living alone, and was unconscious on the bathroom floor for 36 hours before help was 
summoned by some colleagues, after she had failed to arrive for work: 
 
F: Yeah…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…iŶ the…eƌ…eƌ house…eƌ…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…falliŶg oǀeƌ…eƌŵ…iŶ the ďathƌooŵ 
S: Right 
F: Yep 
S: Right 
F: aŶd…eƌ…aŶd…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…uŶĐoŶsĐious 
S: Right 
F: eƌŵ…tǁo, Ŷo oŶe aŶd a half daǇs uŶĐoŶsĐious…Ǉep 
S: In the bathroom? 
F: Yep, yep 
S: Before you were found? 
F: Yep 
 
I am shocked by this, but Francesca shows very little emotion in relating this story; perhaps it 
has been told so often that it has lost its power for her. She links the stroke to the period just 
after she had finished an important piece of work; perhaps she blames stress or overwork for 
eliciting the stroke. Maybe it helps her recovery narrative to have something to blame, to have 
a reason for the stroke to have occurred. 
   
Francesca͛s definition of spirituality 
Francesca views spirituality as an intrinsic part of life, and defines it thus: 
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“: Would…hoǁ ǁould Ǉou defiŶe spiƌitualitǇ foƌ Ǉou? What does…if I saǇ the ǁoƌd spiƌitualitǇ 
what does it mean for you? 
F: Life (with definite intonation) yep 
S: Right, so is it part and parcel of life? 
F: Yes, yeah 
 
For her, spirituality is separate from religion: 
 
S: AŶd is it to do ǁith…foƌ Ǉou does it haǀe aŶǇthiŶg to do ǁith ƌeligioŶ oƌ faith? 
F: No no no 
S: Nothing at all 
F: No 
 
Although she explains that she was baptised (presumably as a child) into the Christian faith, 
she does not subscribe to any organised religion: 
 
F: My father mother no religion, and my grandfather and grandmother no religion 
S: Right 
F: Yep yep 
“: “o Ǉou ǁeƌeŶ͛t ďƌought up iŶ that ǁaǇ? 
F: ChƌistiaŶ…eƌŵ…I ǁas…eƌŵ…ĐhƌisteŶiŶg…Ǉep 
S: Yes 
F: But… 
S: You were christened but have no particular faith? 
F: EǆaĐtlǇ…aŶd eƌŵ…aŶd eƌŵ…ŵǇ fatheƌ ŵotheƌ Ŷo…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…ChuƌĐh of EŶglaŶd aŶd 
Jesus maybe, maybe not 
 
She describes herself as a spiritual person but one without a religious affiliation: 
 
“: OK…so ǁould Ǉou ĐoŶsideƌ Ǉouƌself to ďe a spiƌitual peƌsoŶ? 
F: Yes (with definite intonation) 
S: You would, yeah 
F: Yes, yep yep 
S: Interesting 
F: Yep ďut…eƌŵ…ChƌistiaŶ, Musliŵ, Jeǁish, Ŷo 
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Francesca displays a certain stoicism in relation to her lot in life: 
 
“: ‘ight, so that͛s a huge thiŶg to go thƌough at Ƌuite a ǇouŶg age 
F: Yes, thiƌtǇ…foƌtǇ…fiftǇ-one 
“: ϱϭ? “o Ǉou ǁeƌe ǇouŶg… 
F: Yes, yep, yeah 
S: and did that sort of throw up any kind of questions for you about, you know, life the 
universe and everything? 
F: (audible sigh and 6 seconds latency before replying) No 
S: No 
F: No no no 
S: OK 
F: Yeah yeah 
S: OK 
F: No I [fɔwɪd]…foƌǁaƌd ŵaƌĐh 
S: Right OK so you look forward? 
F: Exactly exactly 
S: Right OK 
F: Yep yep 
 
I wonder if I have overstepped the mark by asking the question about possible (probable?) 
existential crisis. Is Francesca unable to articulate her opinion about this because of the 
aphasia or is she unwilling to engage in a discussion about this? Is it too personal to divulge to 
a relative stranger?   
 
Communicating with professionals post-stroke 
When I ask more questions about her experience in hospital soon after the stroke, she is 
reluctant – or unable – to articulate much about this time: 
 
S: Right. Was that a frightening experience? In the scanner? 
F: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ;laughsͿ eǆaĐtlǇ I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
S: Yep 
F: Yep yep yep 
S: So you remember being in the scanner? 
F: Exactly yeah 
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Again, it is difficult to gauge whether Francesca is unwilling to discuss such emotive issues with 
a comparative stranger, or whether her language impairment is hindering her ability to 
articulate these thoughts. 
 
She describes a period of rehabilitation, but this part of the conversation assumes the form of 
a question and answer session, almost an interrogation, and I am not able to promote enough 
trust or encouragement to enable Francesca to elucidate: 
 
S: And do you remember sort of seeing the professionals like the speech therapist and other 
people? 
F: Yes. Yep afteƌǁaƌds…eƌ…eƌŵ…Ϯ ǁeeks 
S: Yeah 
F: Yeah me out and in of [kənʃənəs] (consciousness) but afterwards yep yep 
S: So you saw lots of different professionals coming and going 
F: Yep…eƌŵ…{name of hospital} fiƌst aŶd ƌehaďilitatioŶ ǁaƌd eƌ…eƌŵ…{name of hospital} yeah 
S: Oh OK so they have a rehab ward at {name of hospital}? 
F: Yes yep yep 
S: And you spent quite a lot of time there? 
F: Oh, two, three, four, five, six and a half months 
S: Gosh, wow – that͛s a loŶg tiŵe 
F: Yes 
 
Conversation feels shut down between us; I am hoping that this line of questioning is leading 
on to enquire about professionals with whom Francesca felt able to talk through her stroke 
experience, but the skills of encouraging her to open up elude me. 
 
Identity 
Our conversation starts with some general information, as this is only our second meeting, and 
so I suggest ͞it ǁould ďe ƌeallǇ ŶiĐe just to kŶoǁ a ďit aďout Ǉou͟. “he ďegiŶs Ŷot ǁith ǁheƌe 
she lives, or her family, or where she was born, but by telling me where she studied and what 
her profession was. This speaks to me of the importance of her education and discipline in 
terms of creating and sustaining her identity. For a person with limited ability to express their 
identity through their speech, or through the evolving content of their conversation because of 
their aphasia, it seems it is vital to somehow convey that identity overtly. So, perhaps 
ordinarily our identity would naturally unfold during the ebb and flow of conversation, but in 
the case of someone with aphasia issues of identity need to be declared and obvious. 
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So, right from the start of our conversation, I know Francesca is a graduate of a good 
university, a professional woman, who once held down an important job: 
 
F: (laughsͿ eƌŵ…accountant 
“: ‘ight, Ǉou͛ƌe aŶ aĐĐouŶtaŶt, so Ǉou studied aĐĐouŶtaŶĐǇ 
F: Yep 
S: At Bath 
F: Yep 
 
It is almost as if from the beginning of our relationship, she is declaring that this is who she is, 
this is her identity, and that the stroke and aphasia may have deprived her of her job but they 
cannot deprive her of the essence of who she is. 
 
Her erudition is conveyed by her profession, but also by her choice of vocabulary, 
notwithstanding her significant word-finding difficulties. When I rather unimaginatively 
describe the city of Bƌistol as ͞ŶiĐe͟, Francesca retrieves considerably more interesting and 
evocative lexical items: 
 
F: Beautiful, yeah, yep, Clifton suspension bridge 
S: Yes, absolutely 
F: Yep, yep, camera obscura 
 
Work was and is an important part of Francesca͛s identity pre- and post-stroke, so that she 
ƌefeƌs to heƌ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ the loĐal stƌoke gƌoup as ͞ǁoƌk͟.  
 
Life purpose and meaning 
BusǇŶess aŶd ͚work͛ are some aspects of life which give meaning and purpose for Francesca: 
 
F: Eƌŵ…ǁoƌk ;laughs) 
S: Yeah 
F: Still 
“: ‘ight, Ǉou do ǁoƌk Ŷoǁ? “o ǁhat…? 
F: No no no {name of stroke club}! 
S: Ah 
F: Exactly 
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She is very engaged and involved in several groups which take place at the stroke club, and 
when I visit the club to recruit participants, I notice that she seems to have a particular role, 
above and beyond being solely a group member; she assists the coordinator to evaluate the 
involvement and interaction of the various group members at the end of the session. Although 
this is a long way from her original work as an accountant in the civil service, it still serves to 
give purpose to her life. 
 
Arts and opera 
Central to Francesca͛s life meaning, however, are the arts, and in particular opera: 
 
͞I loǀe opeƌa…I like eƌŵ…the eƌŵ…pƌoduĐiŶg ǁoƌds aŶd ŵeaŶiŶgs aŶd…it͛s ǁoŶdeƌful eƌŵ 
ŵusiĐ͟ 
 
When proper nouns are often particularly problematic for people with expressive aphasia 
(Robson et al, 2004), it is perhaps surprising and testament to her passion for opera, that 
Francesca is able to name four of her favourite composers without demur: 
 
F: Yep Ǉep Ǉep…aŶd aƌts aŶd photogƌaphǇ aŶd ŵusiĐ eƌŵ…I loǀe opeƌa 
S: Do you? 
F: Yes yep yep yep 
S: Tell me a bit about that 
F: Wagner 
S: Wagner? 
F: Yes 
S: Wow, serious stuff! 
F: Yes Ǉep…eƌŵ  eƌŵ eƌŵ aŶd eƌŵ PuĐĐiŶi 
S: Yeah 
F: Yeah and Donizetti 
S: Yes 
F: And er and er oh ɑod…Veƌdi…Ǉes Ǉep 
 
Francesca is ǀeƌǇ easilǇ Đued iŶto the ǁoƌd ͞eŵotioŶal͟ ǁheŶ talkiŶg aďout opeƌa: 
 
S: AŶd ŵusiĐ is so… 
F: Emotional yeah yeah 
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and when I ask her if listening to opera can, in her eyes, be classed as a spiritual experience, 
Francesca is quite unequivocal in her affirmative response: 
 
“: That͛s gƌeat…so I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ Ǉou ǁould saǇ eƌŵ…something like opera, listening to 
music, is a spiritual experience? 
F: Yes, yes yep yep yep 
 
Opera appears to be Francesca͛s first love in terms of art, but she also professes a love of 
photography. Poignantly, her love of taking photographs – mostly of nature – has been 
restricted by the physical limitations imposed on her by her stroke: 
 
F: Eƌŵ, ďefoƌe the stƌoke I like…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…piĐ…piĐtuƌes Ŷo photogƌaphǇ eƌ Ŷo 
photos…Ŷo I like photogƌaphǇ, Ǉep. Befoƌe the stƌoke, tǁo haŶds 
S: Yep, so you were taking photographs 
F: Exactly 
S: OK 
F: Afteƌǁaƌds…eƌŵ…oŶe hand and a little bit of erm erm I like photography but one-haŶded… 
S: It͛s ŵoƌe diffiĐult 
F: Yes, exactly yep 
 
This is perhaps an example of the stroke and its after-effects actually impacting on an 
iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to eŶgage iŶ spiƌitual, ŵeaŶiŶg-making occupations. 
 
Relationships 
As much as Francesca adores opera, her mother was a great lover of ballet. She talks rather 
proudly of a working-class woman who nevertheless watched and loved the ballet. She 
volunteers this fact, once I have summarised what she has said about loving the arts herself: 
 
“: …“o Ǉou like the aƌts aŶd opeƌa… 
F: Yes, Ǉeah aŶd eƌŵ ŵǇ ŵotheƌ loǀes…eƌ…loǀed eƌ ďallet…Ǉep Ǉep 
S: OK 
 
Perhaps telling me about the centrality of opera and the arts in her life, reminds her of her 
mother and of heƌ ŵotheƌ͛s positiǀe iŶflueŶĐe iŶ this ƌegaƌd. I ŶotiĐe the ĐoƌƌeĐted teŶse iŶ the 
reference to her mother and wonder if her death was recent; a lack of real relationship over 
time between us precludes me from asking this question. 
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Francesca͛s father is also mentioned in this relatively short interview of thirty minutes. He is 
portrayed as the strong figure, who stayed with her during the brain scan directly after her 
stroke and held her hand. 
It is clear she is a single woman: 
 
S: So is there something about interacting with other people? 
F: Yeah 
S: Yeah. Do you live by yourself? 
F: Yes Ǉep Ǉep…eƌ…ŵǇ Đaƌeƌ aŶd I go to the eƌŵ…eƌŵ…shoppiŶg…eƌŵ food shoppiŶg aŶd 
iƌoŶiŶg aŶd doŵestiĐ ǁoƌk aŶd Ǉes eƌ…Ϯ,ϯ,ϰ,ϱ,ϲ,ϳ tiŵes 
 
She makes no mention of a partner or children of her own, so I understand the importance of 
referring to parents in a discussion around meaning and purpose. 
 
We develop a relationship of sorts, although I am very conscious of this being an organised 
interview, a contrived chat around a subject of my choosing. There are moments of 
connection, for example when we discover we both went to the same university: 
 
F: Eƌŵ…uŶiǀeƌsitǇ…eƌŵ…Bath…Bath University 
S: Me too! 
F: Really? 
S: Yes 
 
but thirty minutes has not felt long enough to cultivate rapport, therapeutic or otherwise. 
When I receive the summary of the interview back from Francesca with her comments 
included, there is little discernible warmth or connection. During the interview, I try and give a 
little information about myself in order to foster a more equal interchange, but this does not 
elicit questions by Francesca to me, which might have served to balance the power differential 
and foster rapport-building. 
 
Illness narrative 
Francesca had her stroke many years ago, and one would therefore perhaps have expected her 
to have entered a quest narrative (Frank, 2013). Her stoical attitude and involvement in a 
stroke club – not just as a member but also as a coordinator – suggest this to be so. However, 
limited rapport meant that possible chaos and restitution narratives, either current or past, 
were not fully explored. 
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Joel: the evangelist’s story 
 
͞Take, eat; this is ŵǇ ďodǇ ǁhiĐh is giǀeŶ foƌ Ǉou: Do this iŶ ƌeŵeŵďƌaŶĐe of ŵe…DƌiŶk Ǉe 
all of this; for this is my Blood of the New Testament, which is shed for you and for many for 
the ƌeŵissioŶ of siŶs͟ 
(The Book of Common Prayer) 
 
Joel is a man in his forties with a young family. He is originally from Nigeria, and is a committed 
Christian. We meet twice at his home in order to talk about his faith and for me to hear his 
stories of spirituality. 
When I first arrive in his street, I inadvertently knock on the wrong door; the neighbour has not 
heard of my participant or his family. This strikes me as sad, that people living in a 
neighbouring house have not met each other, and I wonder if this is part and parcel of the 
soĐial isolatioŶ that ĐaŶ aƌise ǁith disaďilitǇ iŶ geŶeƌal aŶd ǁith the ͞iŶǀisiďle iŵpaiƌŵeŶt͟ 
(Hewitt and Pound, 2014, p 181; Moss et al, 2004 p 755) of aphasia in particular. 
Joel is cheerful and friendly and proffers me his left hand in greeting. His wife is there, but 
does not stay in the room for our conversations. Two little daughters occasionally float in and 
out, singing songs quietly and offering me drinks. On my second visit, he greets me from the 
top of the stairs with a wide grin of recognition before he descends. 
 
Joel͛s aphasia 
Joel had his stroke 3 and 4 years respectively prior to my interviews with him. He has a right 
sided hemiplegia but is mobile. It is evident from having a conversation with Joel that his 
auditory comprehension is excellent. His expressive abilities are characterised by significant 
word finding difficulties, neologisms (non-words created in place of the target word, such as 
[məʊ məʊ]) and limited syntactic structure. It is augmented, however, by facial expression, 
intonation, some gesture and use of other referents. As with all participants, no formal 
assessment of language and speech was carried out but, on observation, Joel presents with a 
BƌoĐa͛s-type, expressive aphasia, with no motor speech deficits. Using the cognitive 
neuropsychological model of language processing (appendix IͿ, Joel͛s diffiĐulties aƌe at the 
output end of the framework (phonemic and orthographic), below the level of the semantic 
system (phonological and orthographic output lexicon and/or buffers). In essence, he 
understands what is said to him, but has difficulty in finding the vocabulary and syntax he 
needs for expressing his thoughts. 
Understanding within our conversations about spirituality is helped by the fact that we share a 
faith. Foƌ eǆaŵple, at oŶe poiŶt ǁheŶ he is tƌǇiŶg to talk aďout Jesus͛ disĐiples, he saǇs: 
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J: Yes, eƌ…fouƌ, fiǀe, siǆ, seǀeŶ, eight, ŶiŶe, teŶ, eleǀeŶ, tǁelǀe ;with emphasis on last number) 
S: Tǁelǀe…? Ah! Aƌe you talking about the twelve apostles? 
 
His own strategy to cue himself into the target word also actually cues in the listener, or at 
least the listener with a shared knowledge. 
 
“oŵetiŵes, his default utteƌaŶĐe is ͞foƌ Ŷoǁ͟, ǁhiĐh seeŵs to ŵeaŶ ͞that͛s enough for now, 
let͛s leaǀe it theƌe͟; he uses this if he is stƌuggliŶg to fiŶd the ǁoƌd he ǁaŶts aŶd his 
interlocutor is not helping. 
 
Joel͛s Mosaic 
Joel͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Mosaic (Clark, 2001) comprises speech, some writing (see appendix VIII), 
gesture, intonation, facial expression and use of objects of reference. During our first 
interview, he often reaches for his Bible, in order to explain something, or illustrate a point. 
For the second interview, I arrive with some objects (see appendix IX for examples), with a 
view to seeing whether these might facilitate expressions of spirituality, specifically Christian 
faith. 
IŶteƌǀieǁ tiŵes aŶd dates ǁeƌe aƌƌaŶged ǀia eŵails ǁith Joel͛s ǁife. Ouƌ fiŶal ĐoƌƌespoŶdeŶĐe 
perhaps reflects some level of friendship and connection, however brief: 
 
Hi Sarah and Joel – thank you both so much again for welcoming me into your home – I really 
appreciate it and know the interview will enhance my research 
With very best wishes 
Sophie 
 
Dear Sophie – it͛s our pleasure. AŶd thaŶk you so much more for taking the time to come. 
Sarah and Joel 
 
The neologism [࠱ h࠱] is used consistently throughout both interviews and seems to convey 
͞Ǉes, Ǉou got it͟. “oŵe Ŷeologisŵs aƌe ŵoƌe diffiĐult foƌ ŵe to iŶteƌpƌet ;foƌ eǆaŵple, 
[məʊməʊ səʊn࠱ ɪ]), and indeed these are often accompanied by embarrassed laughter, as if 
Joel is aware they are not conveying the intended meaning.  
 
Joel͛s stƌoke stoƌǇ 
LiŶdǇ had taught ŵe the ǀalue of listeŶiŶg to ŵǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stƌoke stoƌǇ. Joel eǆplaiŶs hoǁ 
the stroke occurred several years previously, very suddenly as he was driving a friend in his car. 
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The suddenness is successfully conveyed by choice of vocabulary but also by intonation and 
gesture: 
 
J: And (sighsͿ…suddeŶ…suddeŶ 
S: You, you were driving? 
J: (very animated – points to himself) me was driving 
S: Right 
S: So the car 
J: I kŶoǁ…eƌ…{local area} 
S: Yeah 
J: GoiŶg iŶ eƌŵ…to {local town}…to {loĐal toǁŶ} 
S: Right, OK, so you were driving to {local town} 
J: Yeah, aŶd suddeŶlǇ…suddeŶlǇ ;with emphasisͿ…eƌ so 
 
The devastating physical and cognitive effects of the stroke are also made apparent: 
 
J: No, Ŷo, Ǉes…the oŶe is aŶd ǁe got out 
S: Yes 
J: But gone (makes sweeping gesture with left hand) gone 
S: Did you know what had happened? 
J: [n࠱] but (touches left side of head then right) 
S: In your head? Could you feel something in your head? Did you feel pain? 
J: Yes 
 
However, Joel is quick to correct me during one interview, when I offer sympathy in the form 
of acknowledging the perceived frustration of people who have aphasia: 
 
J: No, [࠱ ࠱ ࠱] (readsͿ iŶ the daǇ that the…oh ɑod…oh ɑod 
“: I kŶoǁ, it͛s theƌe. It͛s fƌustƌatiŶg 
J: No Ŷo Ŷo Ŷo…Ŷo Ŷo Ŷo 
S: You͛ƌe Ŷot fƌustƌated? 
J: Not at all 
S: You͛ƌe aŵaziŶg 
This appears to relate to his acceptance of stroke and aphasia as his lot whilst on earth, and his 
ďelief iŶ the ͞ƌesuƌƌeĐtioŶ ďodǇ͟ of the Biďle. IŶ ϭ CoƌiŶthiaŶs ϭϱ: 52, Christians read that in 
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the afterlife they will receive a new body, a body free from the pain or trauma experienced in 
life: 
 
͞Foƌ the tƌuŵpet ǁill souŶd, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be 
ĐhaŶged.͟ 
 
Joel explains how he does not blame God for the stroke or complain at his subsequent 
language (and physical) disability because the situation is temporary; when he dies, he will 
ƌeĐeiǀe his ͞Ŷeǁ ďodǇ͟: 
 
S: Hmm, do you ever question God? Do you ever say why did this happen to me? 
J: (lots of phonemes – difficult to transcribeͿ Foƌ ŵe Ŷoǁ is…so Ǉeah ;touches left hand to 
chest) 
S: This is your lot? 
J: (emphatic) no no no no (points with left hand) rise again (laughs) 
 
Restitution or resurrection body 
Joel͛s ďelief iŶ life afteƌ death, aŶd life ǁith a Ŷeǁ, peƌfeĐt ďodǇ afteƌ death is peƌhaps the 
ultimate in restitution narrative (Frank, 2013). He conveys a stoical attitude of accepting life as 
it is, in the sure knowledge of something better to come, something that will last an eternity. 
At our first meeting, he is keen to show me the biblical verse which illustrates this; he finds it 
difficult to locate the exact verse he wants and enlists the help of his wife: 
 
“: Yeah, aŶd Ǉou said…ǁheŶ I fiƌst Đame in you said something about…eƌŵ…this body will rise 
again? 
J: Yes, yeah 
S: Can you tell me a bit more about that? 
J: ‘ise agaiŶ, ǁill ƌise agaiŶ…Oh, ɑod ;reaches for Bible housed in the ottoman in front of us – 
becomes animated. He brings out a very battered, well-thumbed Bible with no cover. He leafs 
through it with his left hand. His wife enters and he gestures to her) iŶ the…ƌise agaiŶ…Ŷo Ŷo 
no 
“: J said that this ďodǇ ǁill ƌise agaiŶ aŶd I thiŶk he͛s trying to find the reference. 
J͛s ǁife: OK, that͛s JohŶ…Is it the oŶe ͞Ǉouƌ ďƌotheƌ ǁill ƌise agaiŶ?͟ 
J: ‘ise agaiŶ…eƌ…eƌ ;taps Bible) 
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Although he appears to accept the stroke and aphasia as his lot in life, he also acknowledges 
the possibility of some improvement in function in this life, as well as in an afterlife. He 
sometimes speaks the laŶguage of FƌaŶk͛s ƌestitutioŶ narrative (Frank, 2013): 
 
S: OK and did you see a speech therapist? 
J: Well, Ǉes…Ǉeah, Ǉeah, Ǉeah…so ďetteƌ Ŷoǁ…[ǀࠧtli] ďetteƌ 
S: Vastly better than it was. Good – so Ǉou͛ǀe ŵade pƌogƌess? 
 
Joel͛s defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ 
As oŶe ŵight eǆpeĐt foƌ soŵeoŶe ǁith suĐh a stƌoŶg aŶd ǀiďƌaŶt faith, Joel͛s defiŶitioŶ of 
spirituality is characterised by impassioned intonation and reference to God, the church and 
the Bible. He uses the Bible to sum up his definition of spirituality by locating the passage 
about the fruits of the spirit and enabling me to read them out. By my reading them out, he is 
Đued iŶto the ǁoƌd ͞spiƌit͟, aŶd iŶ this ǁaǇ, it is as if we have both found, read and shared the 
appropriate passage: 
 J: (sighs) is all in all. All in all (emphaticallyͿ so…;taps the Bible with left hand). The Bible and 
so… 
S: Any other words come to you? 
J: [tʃ࠱gɹ࠱ti] 
S: Integrity? 
J: Yes 
S: Nice! 
J: Hm…eƌ…eƌŵ…eƌ…iŶtegƌitǇ…eƌ..[dʒ࠲tʃ stændɪn] 
“: Hŵ…ĐhuƌĐh staŶdiŶg? 
J: No, all the time (laughs) ɑod…Oh, ɑod…iŶtegƌitǇ aŶd Ŷ…Ŷ…;sighsͿ st… ;takes pen and paper 
spontaneously for the first time, but does not writeͿ eƌŵ… (long pause – reaches for Bible 
again) OK (finds Ephesians) aha! (points to verse) 
S: (reads) but the fruits of the spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, 
faith 
J: Yes, yes 
S: OK, so the fruits of the 
J: Spirit! Yeah 
 
Loss 
Despite his positive attitude and belief in a better life to come, Joel does express the extent 
and depth of loss following his stroke. When I ask him if he remembers his time in hospital 
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directly after the stroke, he graphically conveys the enormity of this loss using both gesture 
and apt vocabulary: 
 
S: OK. So do you remember being in hospital? 
J: No, no because you have gone (sweeping gesture with left hand) 
 
I ask him specifically if he is still able to engage in prayer as a way of communicating with God: 
 
“: AŶd eƌ…ĐaŶ Ǉou tell ŵe aďout pƌaǇiŶg? Are you able to pray? 
J: Well (sighs) yes (emphatically) but not aloud eh yeah 
S: OK so not aloud? But inside?  
J: [࠱ h࠱] 
 
The sigh perhaps demonstrates a wistfulness, but the following emphatic intonation assures 
me that prayer still happens but in a different way.  
 
Liturgy 
Interestingly, snippets of liturgy are remembered and accessed, sometimes through the 
prompt of an object of reference. So, for example, when I show Joel a communion wafer, the 
following exchange takes place: 
 
J: (struggle behaviour) testament 
S: Testament 
J: Yes 
S: Fantastic 
J: Yes 
S: Yeah, so the cup goes with this (shows wafer)? 
J: Yeah, yeah (struggleͿ ďlood…the ďlood 
S: Yeah 
J: Hmm 
S: So, this is the body, the cup is the blood 
J: Blood, yeah 
S: Yeah 
J: Drink 
S: Yep 
J: In remembrance of me 
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His choice of vocabulary is reminiscent of liturgy used in the Book of Common Prayer, a text 
with which he may well have been familiar growing up in Nigeria: 
 
͞foƌ this is ŵǇ ďlood of the Ŷeǁ testaŵeŶt, 
which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins: 
do this, as oft as Ǉe shall dƌiŶk it, iŶ ƌeŵeŵďƌaŶĐe of ŵe.͟ ;Church of England, p 256) 
 
This traditional type of liturgy (from 1662) was and is widely used in the church in Nigeria 
(Hefling and Shattuck, 2008, p 298). 
 
Priests 
I am interested in how someone who has gone through a catastrophic event such as stroke, 
which has deprived them of language, and who has a strong faith, expresses their spiritual 
needs. Are chaplains and pastors equipped to minister to people for whom words have 
become problematic? Joel admits that, although he was visited by the chaplain in the hospital, 
communication between them was difficult: 
 
“: OK, so did the pastoƌ fƌoŵ Ǉouƌ ĐhuƌĐh…. 
J: No Ŷo Ŷo…hospital 
S: The hospital one, OK. And did you find you were able to communicate with them? 
J: Yeah 
S: About what you wanted to say? 
J: Yeah, but slightly, cos [mɪəsɔl] 
S: Yeah, so it was difficult? 
J: Yeah but [mɔmɔ] so… 
 
Perhaps the healthcare professional more equipped to facilitate his expressive abilities would 
be the speech and language therapist but, although she might have had the clinical skills, it 
seems she did not have the ministry skills necessary: 
 
S: OK. Did you find, so was there anyone else that you saw in hospital, so like the speech 
theƌapist foƌ eǆaŵple, ǁould Ǉou haǀe liked to ďe aďle to talk aďout…eƌ…talk aďout ǁhat͛s 
important to you? Your religion? Your spiritual issues? 
J: Well eƌ…eƌ…Ŷot ďeĐause… 
S: Not with her? 
J: No 
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Connection 
In terms of understanding one another and facilitating that understanding and expression of 
spiritual issues, we are helped by having a shared faith in Christianity. This shared knowledge 
enables me to make guesses when the target word eludes Joel: 
 
S: And were you baptised then? 
J: Eƌŵ…eƌŵ ďeĐause ;gestures and phonemes which are difficult to interpretͿ Ǉes…Ŷo…Ŷo 
baptism but there was important 
S: Yes, so you sort of committed yourself 
J: Yourself yes 
 
or cue him in to a desired word or concept: 
S: OK, so the fruits of the 
J: Spirit! Yeah 
 
Life Meaning 
When I ask Joel what is important to him, what gives his life meaning he is unequivocal: 
͞IŵpoƌtaŶt is ɑod ;lots of left hand gesturing and animated intonationͿ otheƌ thiŶgs, Ŷo…Ŷo 
God God God God (emphaticͿ, so…͟ 
 
He uses speech, intonation and writing to convey the prominent position occupied by God and 
Jesus in his life: 
 
S: So, what does Jesus mean to you? 
J: (sighs – takes pen and paper) Lord (writes Lord Jesus) 
S: (reads) Lord Jesus. So he is your Lord? 
 
The Biďle is also ĐeŶtƌal to Joel͛s faith stoƌǇ. WheŶ I eŶteƌ the liǀiŶg ƌooŵ foƌ the seĐoŶd 
interview, there is a flipchart displayed with a Bible verse written up, along with the words 
͞listeŶiŶg to ɑod͟. I assuŵe that a Biďle studǇ gƌoup has ƌeĐeŶtlǇ takeŶ plaĐe iŶ the ƌooŵ, ďut 
Joel explains that he and his wife were using this for their own private study. He is quick to 
locate and use his Bible to explain important concepts to me: 
 
“: ‘ight, ƌight, OK…eƌ…Ǉes, ďeĐause ǁe talked last tiŵe aďout hoǁ iŵpoƌtaŶt the Biďle is foƌ 
you 
J: Yeah, yeah (gestures to the ottoman in front of us, in which his Bible is housed) 
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S: Yeah, it͛s iŶ theƌe! I remember you reaching in and getting it. 
 
The centrality and importance of the Bible to Joel is conveyed passionately and unequivocally, 
despite the neologisms: 
 
S: Erm, so the Bible is very important to you? 
J: Oh yes [kࠨnæsɪə] is erm (animated) [d࠱fəʊ] oh, God 
“: It͛s OK, take Ǉouƌ tiŵe. 
J: But the Biďle…is iŵpoƌtaŶt 
“: It͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou. Aƌe Ǉou still aďle to ƌead the Biďle? 
J: Yeah yeah yeah 
 
From this extract we can also glean that Joel is still able to read the Bible and to understand 
what is written. Similarly, he is adamant that he is still able to take an active part in church 
services, despite his aphasia: 
 
S: And you go to a church nearby? 
J: Yeah yeah 
S: And do you find being in church that you can still take part? 
J: Yeah yeah yeah (shrugs shoulders, as if to say ͞ǁhy Ŷot?͟) 
 
Artefacts as prompts 
Knowing the importance of his faith to him from our first meeting, I take a number of artefacts 
with me when I go back to visit Joel for a second time (see appendix IX for examples). I 
wondered whether having an object of reference might enable Joel to extend his expressive 
abilities and thereby convey more complex or nebulous concepts. For example, through 
looking at a small sculpture representing the Trinity together, Joel is able to express what the 
Trinity comprises:  
 
J: (laughs) God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
S: Yes, all as iŵpoƌtaŶt as eaĐh otheƌ, oƌ…? 
J: Yes, no no all important 
S: All important, yeah 
J: Hm 
 
and its particular relevance to him: 
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S: And which one, which one do you identify most with or feel closest to? 
J: All the tiŵe…Ŷo Ŷo…all the tiŵe 
S: So, theǇ͛ƌe all eƋual? 
J: Yes 
 
Thus, this notoriously difficult concept of one being but in three parts is successfully expressed 
in few words but expansive communicative ability. 
 
“iŵilaƌlǇ, lookiŶg at a piĐtuƌe of HolŵaŶ HuŶt͛s ͞Light of the Woƌld͟ ;appeŶdiǆ IX) together, I 
ďegiŶ to uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ Joel ǀieǁs Jesus, that he is iŶ heaǀeŶ, alƌeadǇ seated at ɑod͛s side, 
and that therefore this image is not very meaningful or important for Joel: 
 
J: Erm, yeah (intonation suggests reservation – laughs) but well now is in heaven 
S: Yeah 
J: Yeah, so (laughs) 
S: Yeah, so it doesŶ͛t ŵeaŶ so ŵuĐh to Ǉou ďeĐause… 
J: Well (points) 
“: Ah, ďeĐause he͛s kŶoĐkiŶg oŶ the dooƌ 
J: [࠱h࠱] 
S: I see 
J: No, Ŷot, Ŷo Ŷo …is seated iŶ the ƌight side of ɑod 
 
Showing Joel a communion wafer leads to a discussion about his church, and the fact that he 
takes part in the Eucharist at his local church. At the beginning of this interchange, I am unsure 
as to whether his church tradition would use wafers (as opposed to real bread), but he is able 
to disabuse me of my presupposition. He uses speech, intonation and writing to get the 
message across to me: 
 
S: Great. Not sure whether this one will mean anything to you? Might do (shows communion 
wafer) 
J: Yeah (laughs) [kɔtə]  
S: Does it? 
J: Yes (emphatic) (laughsͿ All the tiŵe, ǁe…iŶ the [ࠧɪdəŶtࠧɪŵ]…Oh ɑod…OK ;writes St. Ad) 
eƌŵ… 
S: (reading what he has writtenͿ “t AŶŶe͛s? 
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J: Yeah 
S: St. Andrew? 
J: No Ŷo Ŷo Ŷo Ŷo it͛s…hŵ…OK, foƌ Ŷoǁ…Ŷo Ŷo Ŷo eƌ 
“: “t……. 
J: [࠱ɪdən] 
S: Aidan 
 
Looking at the wafer together prompts one of our longest interchanges, and results in Joel 
being able to explain the symbolism of the bread and wine, as well as recall snippets of 
relevant liturgy: 
 
J: (laughsͿ hŵ …eat 
S: Eat, uhuh 
J: And [ɨ]…ŵǇ ďodǇ 
S: Brilliant 
J: Is the…ŵŵ…ƌeŵeŵďeƌ this…iŶ [kəʊ] OK (laughs) 
S: You͛ƌe doiŶg gƌeat 
J: (sounds of struggleͿ Oh ɑod…OK…foƌ Ŷoǁ 
S: OK 
J: Cup 
S: Corp? Cup – sorry, I misheard you. Yep 
J: (struggle behaviour) testament 
S: Testament 
J: Yes 
S: Fantastic 
J: Yes 
S: Yeah, so the cup goes with this (shows wafer)? 
J: Yeah, yeah (struggleͿ ďlood…the ďlood 
S: Yeah 
J: Hmm 
S: So, this is the body, the cup is the blood 
J: Blood, yeah 
S: Yeah 
J: Drink 
S: Yep 
J: In remembrance of me 
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S: Brilliant! Well done – Ǉou got theƌe! That͛s faŶtastiĐ 
J: Yeah 
S: So, theƌe͛s the ďodǇ of Chƌist aŶd the ďlood of Chƌist 
J: blood (said simultaneously with S) 
 
Other artefacts are less successful in facilitating conversation. In some Christian traditions, the 
sound of a bell may signify the presence of the Holy Spirit, so I show and play a small bell for 
Joel and ask him what this means to him: 
 
“: I ǁas thiŶkiŶg aďout…Ǉou kŶoǁ soŵe ĐhuƌĐhes haǀe ǁhat aƌe Đalled ͞ďells aŶd sŵells͟. 
Have you heard that expression? 
J: Oh, OK 
S: They have bells and incense 
J: No 
S: To… 
J: No no no no (laughs) 
S: Not in your church? 
J: No no no 
S: Not in your tradition? 
J: No 
S: It͛s fuŶŶǇ hoǁ diffeƌeŶt ĐhuƌĐhes… 
J: No Ŷo Ŷo, ǁell, ďut Ŷot…;intonation = live and let live!) 
S: But not for you 
 
Even with limited words, Joel does not appear to be dismissive of the significance the sound of 
a bell may have for someone else. Even with limited output, his intonation portrays respect for 
otheƌs͛ ǀieǁs. 
 
Giving Glory to God 
A recurring leitmotif in the interviews with Joel is that of giving glory to God. He is quick to 
divert my praise for his knowledge of the Bible to God: 
 
S: Brilliantly found, well done! Your knowledge of the Bible is amazing 
J: Well, God be to the glory. Yes, God be to the glory 
S: Yeah, to God be the glory 
J: Yeah, yeah 
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and at the end of our second meeting, he is anxious to attribute all improvement after the 
stroke to God:  
 
S: Well, I thiŶk that͛s all I ǁaŶted to talk aďout todaǇ. Is theƌe aŶǇthiŶg else Ǉou wanted to talk 
about? 
J: No no no no..not at all. Not at all (laugh together) erm (struggle behaviour) bit by bit 
S: Yeah 
J: Bit by bit 
S: Yes 
J: But…ɑod ǁill ďe gloƌified 
S: Fantastic 
J: Yeah 
S: So ďit ďǇ ďit…aƌe Ǉou talkiŶg aďout…Ǉou? 
J: Yes, eƌ… 
S: And do you mean your communication? 
J: Yeah, ďut… 
S: Bit by bit 
J: Yes 
S: And to God be the glory 
J: Yes 
S: Yeah 
J: Yeah 
 
Joel͛s faith 
I estimate Joel to have been born in the late sixties or early seventies. As part of his spiritual 
story, he explains that he became a born-again Christian in 1988, as a young man. At least, this 
is what I interpret from the following exchange, my interpretation being aided by speech and 
writing: 
 
S: Have you always been brought up as a Christian? 
J: No, ďeĐause…ǁell, Ǉes, ďut Ŷot eƌ…ďut eƌŵ…eƌŵ…;sighs) 
S: Do you want to write it? 
J: OK (takes pen and paperͿ eƌŵ…ŶiŶeteeŶ ;writes 198 ) 
“: NiŶeteeŶ eightǇ…. 
J: Aha (writes 8) 
S: Nineteen eighty eight? 
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J: Aha 
S: Aha  
J: Hmm 
S: What happened in 1988? 
J: Was but (laughs) 1988 
S: It was an important date? 
J: Yes, yes 
S: Was that when you became a Christian? 
J: Yes, ǁell… 
“: BoƌŶ agaiŶ, oƌ…? 
J: Yes (nods) [࠱h࠱] 
 
Joel͛s faith is ǀeƌǇ eǀideŶt fƌoŵ the ŵoŵeŶt Ǉou ŵeet hiŵ – one of the first things he says to 
ŵe at ouƌ fiƌst ŵeetiŶg is ͞ƌise agaiŶ͟, theƌe is a plaƋue ƋuotiŶg a Biďle ǀeƌse oŶ the ǁall of his 
lounge and the well-thumbed, battered state of his Bible is testament to his constant 
reference to it. One might imagine that suffering a stroke at a young age which has left him 
with significant language and physical deficits, would have challenged his belief in a 
benevolent God but again he relies on intonation and gesture to express clearly how his faith 
has seemingly not wavered: 
 
J: Important is God (lots of left hand gesturing and animated intonationͿ otheƌ thiŶgs, Ŷo…Ŷo 
“: Hŵŵ…aŶd has that ĐhaŶged siŶĐe the stƌoke? 
J: (Shakes head) Not at all. (More emphatically) Ŷot at all. Yes, so, Ǉeah, hŵ… 
S: So, your faith is as strong now as it was before? 
J: Yeah, yep…yep. 
 
Christianity is at the Đoƌe of Joel͛s ďeiŶg, aŶd his stoƌǇ of spiƌitualitǇ is thus full of ƌefeƌeŶĐes to 
Bible verses, church and to God. Despite significant aphasia, he is able to express deeply held 
religious beliefs, such as the belief that he will have a new, unblemished body on the day of 
resurrection, as well as complex theological concepts, such as the Holy Trinity. His is a 
restitution narrative (Frank, 2013), where he has made discernible progress in function during 
this lifetime, but is also assured of a religious restitution in the form of an afterlife with a 
Đoŵplete ďodǇ. This ƌeligious ƌestitutioŶ Đould also ďe allied to FƌaŶk͛s ;2013) quest narrative, 
in that the assurance of eternal life with a non-aphasic body allows Joel to embrace and accept 
his current situation, and live life to the full.  
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Peter: the gardener’s tale 
 
͞AŶd the seĐƌet gaƌdeŶ ďlooŵed aŶd ďlooŵed aŶd eǀeƌǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg ƌeǀealed Ŷeǁ ŵiƌaĐles͟ 
 
(The Secret Garden, Francesca Hodgson Burnett) 
 
I had met Peter a few months previously at a Stroke Association group. He had seemed 
interested in being interviewed and I had duly given him my card and waited eagerly for him to 
contact. He is a man of late middle age, who had his stroke nearly two years prior to our 
meeting. I suppose I assumed because of his interest and willingness to be interviewed that he 
was a man of faith, or a man who might describe himself as spiritual; sitting down, I notice 
what looks like an order of service for a church event, but I could not be sure. Again, this made 
me think Peter might be a religious man, a churchgoer. 
As he welcomes me into his home, before being offered either a seat or a drink, he ushers me 
towards the conservatory and points out his eǆteŶsiǀe gaƌdeŶ: ͞ϭϬϬ foot͟ is one of the first 
things he utters. 
I feel an affinity with Peter. His cat is a mutual source of amusement, and I notice he has a 
lamp and a mirror which are exactly the same as ones I have at home. Small things, but they 
help in relating to someone new and in forging immediate rapport. 
It soon becomes apparent when speaking to Peter that he has excellent auditory 
comprehension skills. He follows my conversation with ease, even picking up on quick-fire 
comments and interjections. His pragmatic skills are also excellent, including normal eye 
contact, facial expression and ability to take turns in the conversation. His expressive language, 
however, is characterised by significant word-finding difficulties, which lend his output a very 
slow and deliberate feel. Spoken words are often produced in a literal paraphasic manner, so 
that, foƌ eǆaŵple, ͞sittiŶg͟ is pƌoduĐed as [stɨtɨn] and worried as [wࠨdɨd]. Mapping his 
language skills onto the cognitive neuropsychological model of language processing, his 
problems seem to be mostly at the level of the phonological output lexicon and buffer 
(appendix 1).      
 
Peteƌ͛s Mosaic            
Peter does not appear to have many non-verbal strategies to aid his word-retrieval difficulties. 
At one point in the interview, I ask him if he would like to try and write the word he is 
struggling to find. He intimates, however, than he has similar linguistic difficulties in the 
written modality, so that attempting to write does not help his expressive success: 
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S: Does it help to write? 
P: No, ďeĐause the fiƌst ǁoƌd that I…ǁill ďe usiŶg..I eƌŵ…if I…eƌ…I….eƌ…I (pauseͿ…the…saǇ ǁe 
did focus oŶ it ďut Ŷot ǀeƌǇ faƌ…eƌ…eƌ…ǁhat happeŶed…eƌŵ ;pause) 
 
He does use some gesture (although this is often quite undifferentiated and vague) or tapping 
his leg as a way of cueing himself in to the target word or phrase, but this is not always 
successful: 
 
͞ǁhat I ǁas I ǁas eƌŵ ;slaps right thigh, looks away and smilesͿ͟ 
 
However, just as his fluency and ability to retrieve a target word seem to increase when he 
talks about his garden, the place and activity which, as we shall see, gives his life meaning and 
provides happiness, so his gestures also become more specific and communicative: 
 
͞theŶ that͛s all good ;gestures hoeing) erm hoe round the plants, hoe off the weeds and 
theǇ͛ƌe ďetteƌ as ǁell͟ 
 
He also uses some non-speech sounds to convey meaning. For example, when he is relating 
the events of the day he had his stroke and he was alone, collapsed in his front garden, he 
expresses the emotion thus: 
 
S: Could you ask him for help? 
P: Erm (sharp exhalationͿ I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ eƌŵ I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ eƌŵ… 
 
Peter is aware of his errors, which lends his output a veneer of frustration but also enables him 
to self-correct successfully on many occasions: 
 
͞Eƌ…and the and the erm people that I was in charge…er (pause) er no, (looks away, searching 
for the words, moves left hand and shakes head slightly) the people, the people that (under his 
breath) not in charge (shakes headͿ͟ 
 
As the listener, I try and employ a number of strategies to aid his word-retrieval, as well as to 
foster a relationship of trust and patience. I give him time and space for the elusive words to 
come. I try and cue him in by paraphrasing what he has just said. I provide encouraging fillers, 
suĐh as ͞aha, ŵŵ͟ aŶd ŵǇ ŶoŶ-verbal communication is open and encouraging (head-nodding, 
leaning forward, eye contact, smiling). 
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Trauma of the stroke 
Lindy had suggested I begin ďǇ askiŶg people aďout theiƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of stƌoke. Peteƌ͛s stoƌǇ is 
a traumatic one and also one that feels as if it has been told often; events are remembered in 
detail, and added to the narration to create a rich and enduring image of the catastrophe: 
 
S: Then you went to hospital? 
P: Yes, I…it took eƌŵ ďeĐause theƌe͛s aŶ aĐĐideŶt iŶ the eƌŵ oŶ the [koŶtʃəfl࠲ʊ] (contraflow) on 
the bridge 
S: Uhuh 
P: It took…took…thƌee Ƌuaƌteƌs of aŶ houƌ to get aŶ aŵďulaŶĐe eƌŵ theǇ had the oŶe 
ďaŶd…oŶe ďaŶd…one man [ambəsens] (ambulance) but obviouslǇ I…theǇ had to…eƌŵ…theǇ 
ĐouldŶ͛t do aŶǇthiŶg ǁith ŵe so I had aŶ aŵbulance and then I went off to {paraphasia – name 
of hospital} 
 
He explains how, eighteen months or so prior to our meeting, he had suffered a stroke in his 
front garden. Living alone, no one missed him (he is separated from his wife and his two 
daughters had left home a few years previously) and he lay in the garden in the cold of a 
November day for many hours. 
In talking about this traumatic experience, Peter uses understatement, as if the full horror of it 
cannot be fully acknowledged. So, he explains how, if his temperature had gone down by one 
ŵoƌe degƌee, if ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ ͞aǁkǁaƌd͟, ǁheŶ ǁhat he pƌesuŵaďlǇ ŵeaŶs is ͚serious͛ or 
even ͚fatal͛. Whilst ǁaitiŶg foƌ the aŵďulaŶĐe, he ǁas ͞out of it͟, as opposed to ŵaǇďe 
͚unconscious͛ or ͚very seriously ill͛. It strikes me that this, as I perceive it, understated lexical 
choice may be less a feature of his aphasia and more a reaction to the chaos narrative (Frank, 
2013) of this part of the stroke story; in order to contain the chaos, he chooses milder 
vocabulary. 
Peteƌ͛s ǁoƌd-finding difficulties are particularly marked when he describes the events of that 
day: 
 
͞Eƌ…eƌŵ…I d..d..spoke aďout ǁhat had happeŶed eƌŵ ďut theŶ I didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ feel erm what 
ǁe ǁeƌeŶ͛t I thiŶk ǁe ǁeƌeŶ͛t eƌ ;looks away, frowning, taps thigh) I think (long pause, taps 
thigh)͟ 
 
This contrasts markedly with his word-retrieval and expressive abilities when he is talking 
about his garden: 
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P: All in the (gesture) erm (gestureͿ eƌŵ…ǁhat happeŶed ǁas I Đaŵe fƌoŵ a gaƌdeŶ that ǁas a 
huŶdƌed aŶd foƌtǇ foot…the gaƌdeŶ iŶ {name of local town} 
S: Right, so you downsized! (laughs) 
P: (laughs and smiles broadly) yes, {name of street} and er what I did then, I [dʌk] out some of 
the plants anyway, others I erm cut them in two. I bought one half so I had six hundred plants 
erm erm erm but then I bought them with me so 
S: That must have been quite a lot of work, to have gathered all that 
P: (smiles broadlyͿ Ǉes, it ǁas I ŵeaŶ…eƌŵ...I was at hoŵe…I͛ǀe ďeeŶ at hoŵe foƌ eleǀeŶ, 
twelve years erm so I er (gesture) I had plenty (conduite d͛approĐhe7Ϳ of tiŵe to do that…eƌŵ..I 
thiŶk ŵǇ ǁife…I thiŶk ŵǇ ǁife ǁould haǀe…eƌŵ…would have er I think she thought that I 
would stay there. 
 
I ask if he was able to articulate this trauma whilst recovering in hospital, in an effort perhaps 
to make sense of what had happened to him, but he explains how his aphasia was so severe 
that he ͞ƌeallǇ ĐouldŶ͛t use the ǁoƌds͟. FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϭϭϱͿ talks aďout ͞the suffeƌing [being] 
too gƌeat foƌ the self to ďe told͟ aŶd Peteƌ had to ĐoŶteŶd ǁith the douďle paiŶ of also Ŷot 
having the language to express his angst. He also intimates that perhaps medical and hospital 
staff did not attempt to facilitate or encourage him to talk about what had happened to him: 
 
P: Eƌ the people iŶ Đhaƌge…ǁaǇ aďoǀe theŵ ;gestured ͞aďoǀe͟) theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t talk ŵe like 
a…eƌ…theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t talk to ŵe aďout ;hand gestures) what happened because they were…er… 
(pause) erm no because then as I say I reallǇ ĐouldŶ͛t talk to theŵ aŶǇǁaǇ, so. 
S: Are these like doctors and consultants and that sort of person? 
P: Yes, that͛s ǁhat I thiŶk, Ǉes 
 
When I suggest the possibility or usefulness of being able to communicate his illness/ disability 
narrative to another person such as a hospital chaplain, he is candid about his lack of religious 
belief. However, it appears he would have been open to discussing events with a minister, but 
his aphasia precluded this anyway: 
 
S: What about someone like a chaplain? 
P: Er, no because..er...I…er because I er because I was an atheist 
S: Oh, OK 
P: “o… 
                                                          
7
 Several attempts at the target word 
155 
 
“: That ǁouldŶ͛t haǀe ďeeŶ the ƌight peƌsoŶ? 
P: No…I ǁould talk to ͚eŵ…eƌ…ďut Ŷot kŶoǁiŶg ǁhat I had eƌŵ I ĐouldŶ͛t talk to theŵ aŶǇǁaǇ 
(nods) 
 
Relationship 
Two years after his stroke, he now finds relationship and communion with people in a similar 
position to him, people who attend his local stroke group, about whom he says: 
 
͞ǁe teŶd to just talk aďout aŶǇthiŶg͟ 
 
In fact, he seeks out relationship with stroke group members, neighbours, friends and family, 
and indeed views socialising as the next step in his therapy: 
 
P: Yeah erm but it erm when I got the car erm I... I…eƌŵ this ǁas oŶlǇ MaƌĐh…Apƌil…fiƌst of 
April when I got the car, I told I said to her {his speech and language therapist} I didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ 
think I needed erm anything I thought I would do better le...getting on with talking with people 
(gesture with both hands) 
S: Yes, I can understand that, going to the group and stuff 
P: Yes, yeah going off to do the shopping and goiŶg ƌouŶd people͛s houses ;nods) that sort of 
thing 
S: Yes, good for you 
 
Peƌhaps this is aŶ illustƌatioŶ of Peteƌ͛s disaďilitǇ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ŵoǀiŶg iŶto ǁhat FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯͿ 
ǁould teƌŵ ͞Ƌuest͟, liǀiŶg ǁith and coping with the illness/disability as it presents now. He is 
perhaps sharing his stroke story – his life story – ǁith ǁhat “Đhǁeitzeƌ Đalled ͞the ďƌotheƌhood 
of those ǁho ďeaƌ the ŵaƌk of paiŶ͟ ;“Đhǁeitzeƌ, ϭϵϵϴͿ. 
 
Despite living alone, Peter derives pleasure and meaning from relationships with his daughters 
and, indeed, his ex-wife: 
 
͞“o ďut eƌŵ that͛s ǁhat it is ǁith ŵe. I go out aŶd ǀisit people er my daughter, she live in 
{name of local town} er and and my wife she [lɨd] in {name of another local town}͟ 
 
I perceive a relationship between participant and researcher also developing over the course 
of the interview. Despite the fact that this is only our second meeting (our first being at the 
stroke group, where I introduced my project), there are various moments of connection during 
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the interview. For example, ǁheŶ the Đat desĐeŶds fƌoŵ the ďaĐk of Peteƌ͛s Đhaiƌ to take 
centre stage, we both laugh, and he picks up on my irony when suggesting he has downsized, 
when he explains that he has gone from a garden of one hundred and forty feet, to a still very 
lengthy one of one hundred feet. 
By the end of our hour together, he is also sharing quite intimate information with me, such as 
disclosure of mental illness, and his recent diagnosis of cancer. It is interesting to consider the 
overlap in qualitative interviewing between researcher and therapist; is it possible (or 
desirable) to separate the therapist from the interviewer? I wonder, too, if the subject matter 
of spiƌitualitǇ aĐtuallǇ leŶds itself to disĐlosuƌe oƌ ĐaŶdidŶess; does aŶ opeŶ ͞uŶfetteƌed͟ 
researcher stance (Moustakas, 1994, p 85) regarding issues of a slightly unusual or 
unconventional nature and a non-judgmental mien and attitude foster in turn a readiness to 
disclose and to confide, on the part of the participant? I hope I have become what Moustakas 
(1994, p 39) identifies as the ͞eŶhaŶĐeƌ͟, ǁho ͞Đƌeates aŶ atŵospheƌe of fƌeedoŵ, opeŶŶess, 
aŶd tƌust, aŶd is ǁilliŶg to ƌespoŶd aŶd disĐlose his oƌ heƌ oǁŶ thoughts aŶd feeliŶgs.͟   
 
Garden 
It is clear that Peter derives life meaning and purpose from his love of the garden and 
gardening. I am invited to view his garden before I am invited to sit down or to have a drink. 
Although he talks during the interview of a close bond with his children and with his ex-wife, 
and a good support network of friends and other stroke group members, when I specifically 
ask him what gives his life meaning, his answer is unequivocal: 
 
“: What͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou? 
P: (with energyͿ ǁhat͛s [ɨmpɔtət] to me is getting on with the garden (smiles) 
 
He conveys the pivotal role the garden plays in his life through animated delivery of speech, 
facial expression, choice of vocabulary and gesture. He smiles broadly when discussing his 
garden as if his spirits are lifted: 
 
S: So, what do you get, working in the garden? What does it do for you? 
P: Ah (shakes head, shrugs shoulders – as if to say ͞so ŵuĐh! – smilesͿ eƌ…pause…I do [lʌb]...I 
loǀe ŵǇ gaƌdeŶ…I like the floǁeƌs ďut I also like the ďirds and the bees and everything else 
eƌŵ…eƌŵ…;gesture – animated) 
 
His enthusiasm is also conveyed by the complexity and detail of information he gives: 
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͞ǁhat I did theŶ, I [dʌk] out some of the plants anyway, others I erm cut them in two. I bought 
one half so I had siǆ huŶdƌed plaŶts eƌŵ eƌŵ eƌŵ ďut theŶ I ďought theŵ ǁith ŵe so͟ 
 
His expressive abilities (both verbal and non-verbal) are markedly better when he is discussing 
the garden as opposed to the story of what happened on the day of his stroke. For example, he 
is able to convey quite complex information about what appears to refer to grafting of one 
plant onto another through use of accurate gesture and good choice of vocabulary: 
 
͞I did eƌŵ this ǁas thƌee diffeƌeŶt plaŶts aŶd I ;gesture with both hands, finger of left hand 
crossing fingers of right) then er er created plants er er and then erm oh they would just small 
bits of erm they were just small bits of garden and I joined all of the things together and made 
it what I did was er if I can hoe (gestures hoeing)͟. 
 
Passion, enthusiasm and importance seem to lend the utterance clarity and eloquence. 
IŶdeed, so iŵpoƌtaŶt is the gaƌdeŶ to Peteƌ͛s life that his ŵeŶtal health is affeĐted if he is 
unable to get into the garden either because of the weather or because of his physical health: 
 
͞Oh, Ǉes, Ǉeah…eƌŵ…this…this…the ďest tiŵe of Ǉeaƌ ǁheŶ it͛s it [ďɔŵ] aŶd ǁheŶ it͛s ǁaƌŵ…I 
doŶ͛t…I eƌŵ...liǀe…I liǀe a ďit…I get…;pause) (shakes head, sighs) (pauseͿ ǁheŶ it͛s Ŷot ŶiĐe out 
theƌe, I get a ďit loǁ͟ 
 
Having endured both a stroke and cancer, he craves life in the garden, away from illness: 
 
P: “o Ŷoǁ I ƌeallǇ thiŶk that I doŶ͛t...I ĐaŶ͛t I ĐaŶ͛t do do it aŶǇŵoƌe…I thiŶk I͛ll get oŶ ǁith ŵe 
gaƌdeŶ aŶd eƌ that͛s…aŶd that͛s ;gestureͿ that͛s ďeĐause I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to eƌ…I 
doŶ͛t ǁaŶt aŶǇthiŶg I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt aŶǇthiŶg eƌ…;pause – shakes head) 
S: You͛ǀe had Ǉouƌ fill of ďeiŶg ill 
P: Yes, I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt aŶǇŵoƌe 
S: You, you just want to get on with the garden? 
P: Yes 
 
Peteƌ͛s defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ 
Despite the church order of service on the coffee table, Peter describes himself early on in the 
interview as an atheist. I am interested in what his definition of spirituality might be – after all, 
he expressed an interest in taking part in the study and I am intrigued as to his interest in and 
opinion about the subject matter. Of all the participants living long-term with their aphasia in 
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the study, Peter struggles the most in putting his understanding of spirituality into words, or 
into expression of any kind, verbal or non-verbal: 
 
“: Mŵŵ, Ǉeah…so if I saǇ the ǁoƌd spiƌitualitǇ to Ǉou, ǁhat does it…ĐaŶ Ǉou thiŶk of otheƌ 
ǁoƌds that it ďƌiŶgs to ŵiŶd, oƌ otheƌ feeliŶgs, oƌ… 
P: Eƌ… (long pauseͿ I ĐaŶ͛t thiŶk of aŶǇthiŶg ;takes hand to mouth) 
S: DiffiĐult ĐoŶĐept, isŶ͛t it? 
P: Yes, eƌ… (shakes head), Ŷo, I ĐaŶ͛t thiŶk of aŶǇthiŶg 
 
Is this a problem associated with his aphasia, or is this the universal problem of verbalising the 
numinous? Peter knows what spirituality is to him because he is able to claim that adjective in 
relation to himself, but he finds it difficult to express via any modality, not just speech. It 
seeŵs to ďe his aphasia ǁhiĐh ƌeŶdeƌs the ǁoƌd ͞spiƌitual͟ diffiĐult to pƌoduĐe, aŶd Peteƌ 
makes many unsuccessful attempts at producing the word and self-corrects many times before 
it is articulated correctly. His assertion that he definitely would consider himself a spiritual 
peƌsoŶ, aŶd that he ďelieǀes ͞iŶ soŵethiŶg ďut ǁhat it is I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ͟, feels ŵoƌe aŶ 
inadequacy of language per se rather than of his language system in particular:  
 
S: Would you describe yourself as a spiritual person? 
P: Yes, Ǉes, I….I Đould ;pauseͿ ǁheŶ I thought aďout that ďut I ĐouldŶ͛t ;many attempts at word 
͚spiritual͛) (shakes head) spiƌitual peƌsoŶ like that eƌŵ…I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe that…I do ďelieǀe iŶ 
something but what it is I, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
 
When Peter is relaying the story of the day he had his stroke, I ask him twice what was going 
through his mind during his time alone in the garden, getting colder and colder as the day 
pƌogƌessed ;͞theǇ did saǇ that if ŵǇ temperature had fallen one degree (gestureͿ I…eƌ…it 
ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ aǁkǁaƌd͟Ϳ, aŶd I thiŶk I haǀe iŶ ŵǇ ŵiŶd the ŶotioŶ of pƌaǇeƌ. Ill aŶd aloŶe 
in the cold, I would have prayed, but Peter did not do so, and this is a lesson for me in listening 
to the otheƌ͛s stoƌǇ, Ŷot oǀeƌlaǇiŶg ŵǇ oǁŶ. 
 
Disability narrative 
FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ thƌee illŶess ;oƌ disaďilitǇͿ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes aƌe all ƌeǀealed at ǀaƌious diffeƌeŶt poiŶts 
iŶ ouƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ. Peteƌ͛s ƌetelliŶg of his stƌoke stoƌǇ is ĐouĐhed iŶ Đhaos teƌŵs – he is outside 
alone, in freezing temperatures, unseen by neighbours and the ambulance is delayed in both 
getting to him and conveying him to hospital. However, a restitution narrative is evident in his 
relaying of improvement in his speech, thanks to the input from a healthcare professional: 
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S: So, while you were in hospital, what was your talking like? 
P: I ĐouldŶ͛t ;shakes head) 
S: At all? 
P: No 
“: “o, it͛s ƌeallǇ iŵpƌoǀed? 
P: Oh, Ǉes. I ĐouldŶ͛t, Ŷo, I ĐouldŶ͛t talk at all and er then {name} at the…eƌ..;cat descends from 
ďaĐk of Đhair ďehiŶd P͛s head aŶd ǁe ďoth sŵile aŶd laugh) 
S: Is she your speech therapist? 
P: Yes erm she was and she was very good because erm erm she taught me how to speak erm 
(pause) erm 
 
IŶ the ƌestitutioŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe, ͞foƌ eǀeƌǇ ailŵeŶt, there is a ƌeŵedǇ͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p 86), and at 
this poiŶt Peteƌ ǀieǁs his “LT as the ͚healeƌ͛ of his laŶguage.  
After his cancer diagnosis, Peter also looks to the medics to cure his disease, so that he is able 
to return to what is important to him – his garden: 
 
P: “o, I just, I just I had it doŶe…I had...er theǇ…I had ĐaŶĐeƌ of the stoŵaĐh aŶd theǇ…theǇ 
took it all off 
S: Uhuh 
P: aŶd Ŷoǁ I͛ŵ eƌ I͛ŵ...the Ŷoǁ I oŶlǇ haǀe to go eǀeƌǇ…eǀeƌǇ ;looks away, slaps thigh as if to 
cue word) every six months, so 
S: Right, oh that͛s good 
P: TheǇ had tǁo lots of thƌee ŵoŶths aŶd ǁheŶ theǇ got that theǇ said siǆ ŵoŶths…that͛s oŶlǇ 
last week. Obviously my girls were very concerned erm but (shrugsͿ just thought ͞ah ǁell͟ get 
rid [əbɨt] aŶd I͛ll get oŶ ǁith ŵe gaƌdeŶ ;smiles and laughs) 
 
FiŶallǇ, a Ƌuest Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is also estaďlished iŶ Peteƌ͛s stoƌǇ, as he shoǁs aĐĐeptaŶĐe of his 
disability, even indicating that he feels lucky to have preserved physical abilities after his 
stƌoke, ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that this is laĐkiŶg iŶ soŵe of his stƌoke ͞ďƌotheƌs͟, to use “Đhǁeitzeƌ͛s 
(1998) language: 
͞ďut, ďeĐause of that eƌŵ I didŶ͛t feel all I got iŶ ;touching right hand with left) in my hand is 
those…those fiŶgeƌs aŶd the thuŵď that͛s all I got aŶd goiŶg to the “tƌoke AssoĐiatioŶ ŵeetiŶg 
I ƌealised that I luĐkǇ ďeĐause a lot of people theƌe ĐaŶ͛t use aŶ aƌŵ oƌ leg oƌ…͟ 
Quest is epitoŵised foƌ Peteƌ ďǇ ďeiŶg aďle to ͞get oŶ ǁith ŵe gaƌdeŶ.͟ 
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Interweaving the aphasia stories 
 
͞“toƌies aƌe aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ŵeaŶs of eǆpƌessiŶg aŶd affiƌŵiŶg ǁho ǁe aƌe, iŶeǀitaďlǇ 
influencing how others interact with us. Telling, constructing, revisiting, and developing 
stoƌies aƌe also aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ǁaǇ of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ĐhaŶges to life͛s ďiography and 
incorporating disability into evolving identities. But how does one shape and share stories of 
ideŶtitǇ ǁithout laŶguage?͟ 
 
(Pound, in Swain et al (eds), 2014, p 164)  
 
The stroke stories  
Lindy gave me good advice early on in my research, before I had interviewed any of my 
participants. She suggested I just encourage each person to tell me what happened to them, in 
order to hear their stroke experience. It is a striking fact that all eight people with aphasia with 
whom I spoke told very different stroke stories. Their experiences were all unique and their 
memory of that day also differed. Some gave no, or very little information, suggesting a lack of 
memory of what happened or perhaps a difficulty in formulating the language to express it, or 
perhaps an unwillingness to give such personal information to a stranger, particularly a 
stranger with an audio recorder. Others gave factual accounts of what happened when and for 
how long: these narratives are peppered with times, places and people – the bare facts. Others 
ascribed a spiritual essence to their experience, relating events of a supernatural nature. 
The participants who were still in hospital related more limited stroke stories than their 
counterparts who had been living with their aphasia for months or years. Amy was the only 
person who was unable to relate virtually any detail; she seemed more concerned with the 
here and now, particularly the pain and discomfort she is in: 
 
S: Yeah? So what happened to you? Why are you in hospital? 
A: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…oǀeƌ that ǁaǇ 
S: Over that way? So you were at home? 
A: Yeah 
S: Do you remember what happened? 
A: No 
S: No. So you just woke up and you were in hospital? Right 
A: Yeah…I got paiŶ…ŶeĐk 
S: Pain in your neck? 
A: Yeah 
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S: Right 
A: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ;said in a despairing fashion) 
S: Been hard? 
A: It hurts 
 
Rosemary related a story which included reference to driving (possibly drink driving, although 
this might just be a type of word association, cueing her into a common, learnt phrase 
(Papathanasiou, Coppens and Potagas, 2013, p 146)). Liam described being at home by himself 
at the tiŵe the stƌoke happeŶed aŶd ͞stƌoke people͟ ďaŶgiŶg oŶ the dooƌ iŶ aŶ effoƌt to 
rescue him. 
 
By contrast, participants in group 2 who had been living with their aphasia and disability for 
longer, by and large produced more elaborate stroke stories. There were a greater number of 
details, and the participants seemed to have started making meaning of the experience, 
perhaps through multiple narrations over time of what happened. 
 
Peter gave a very factual account of the day he had his stroke. Although it is a narrative full of 
trauma, he chose non-catastrophising vocabulary to tell it. For example, he described how he 
fell in his front garden, and was lying there, unnoticed, for eight hours on a cold, November 
day; he explained hoǁ it ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ ͞aǁkǁaƌd͟ if his teŵpeƌatuƌe had falleŶ aŶǇ 
further, even by one degree. David used vocabulary in a similar way, as if containing the 
catastrophe by diluting the language; he, for example, descriďed hoǁ he ǁas ͞slightlǇ 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed͟ ǁheŶ he fouŶd he ǁas uŶaďle to ŵoǀe. 
 
Peteƌ͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ĐoŶtaiŶed faĐts aŶd tiŵiŶgs, ǁhiĐh leŶt it a ĐiŶeŵatiĐ ƋualitǇ; he desĐƌiďed 
the ambulance taking 45 minutes to reach him because of an accident and a resultant 
contraflow system. He talked about living alone, not having the front door key on him, trying 
to alert his neighbours, about a delivery boy who did not attempt to help him. 
 
Peteƌ͛s stƌoke stoƌǇ ǁas ǀiǀid, aŶd felt as if it had ďeeŶ told ofteŶ, eitheƌ aloud or to himself. 
LiŶdǇ͛s stoƌǇ, too, felt as if it had ďeeŶ ŵulled oǀeƌ ofteŶ, ďut heƌ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ǁas ŵuĐh less 
concerned with facts. Although she told me the day her stroke occurred (Christmas Day), and 
the fact that she was at the time walking in London with a friend, the rest of the story is about 
ǁhat she eǆpeƌieŶĐed aŶd felt. LiŶdǇ͛s stƌoke ǁas ͞ŵassiǀe͟ aŶd she ǁas iŶ a Đoŵa foƌ thƌee 
days. Of all the participants, it is Lindy who ascribed a supernatural element to her physical 
situation. Rather than the faĐts aŶd figuƌes of Peteƌ͛s Ŷaƌƌatiǀe, she desĐƌiďed the eŵotioŶs 
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she felt – the calm and peace - experienced whilst in coma. She unselfconsciously described 
the benevolent visions she saw whilst in coma, of angels promoting peace, and of her (long 
dead) parents acting as a barrier between her and death. She gave herself a new post-stroke 
identity of survivor – ͞I aŵ Lazaƌus͟. 
 
Joel͛s stƌoke stoƌǇ ǁas siŵilaƌ to Peteƌ͛s, LiŶdǇ͛s aŶd Daǀid͛s iŶ as ŵuĐh as he detailed ǁheƌe 
he was and with whom. The emphasis of his story, however, was that everything happened 
suddeŶlǇ aŶd that theƌe ǁas a seŶse of loss ;he said the ǁoƌd ͞goŶe͟ aŶd ŵade a sǁeepiŶg 
gestuƌe oǀeƌ his ďodǇ aŶd headͿ. LiŶdǇ desĐƌiďed the ͞despeƌatioŶ͟ of ǁakiŶg fƌoŵ the Đoŵa 
and finding that she was still alive, whereas Joel corrected me when I suggested he was 
fƌustƌated ďǇ his lost laŶguage skills; Joel͛s ďelief iŶ a ƌesuƌƌeĐtioŶ ďodǇ appeaƌed to offeƌ hiŵ 
hope. 
 
Francesca͛s stroke story was told with little emotion but, again, felt like it had been told often. 
Like, Peter, Francesca was alone when she had her stroke, and lay on the bathroom floor 
unconscious for thirty-six hours before being discovered by concerned work colleagues. Her 
stroke story was linked to her work and her identity, in that she situated the event around the 
completion of an important governmental initiative; perhaps the stroke occurrence was put 
into the work context and diary to normalise it, or to contextualise it. 
 
Definitions of spirituality 
A perennial discussion in studies of spirituality is the relationship between religion and 
spirituality (for example, Tacey (2012, p 473)). Does one have to be religious to be spiritual? 
What does spirituality look like if it does not equate to religiosity? This question was mirrored 
iŶ the ƌespoŶses of the paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁheŶ theǇ ǁeƌe asked the ƋuestioŶ ͞ǁhat does spirituality 
ŵeaŶ to Ǉou?͟.  
For some, notably Joel, Lindy and Amy, spirituality and religion seemed to be inextricably 
linked. It became obvious as I got to know each of them better during our conversations that 
their faith was iŶtƌiŶsiĐ aŶd ĐeŶtƌal to theiƌ ideŶtitǇ; foƌ Joel it ǁas ͞all iŶ all͟. Foƌ AŵǇ, heƌ 
spirituality was expressed through prayer; she not only said this but also gestured, as if to give 
the word – and the concept – emphasis. For Lindy, God was at the centre of her spirituality, 
but she saw and felt his presence not only during formal prayer and liturgy, but also within 
Ŷatuƌe. Joel͛s spiƌitualitǇ was epitomised in his battered and much-used Bible, which he used 
as a constant referent. He found the verse in Ephesians which lists the fruits of the spirit (love, 
joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith) in order to illustrate what his definition 
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of spirituality comprised. He located the verse in his Bible, I then read, and in this way he was 
Đued iŶto the ǁoƌd ͞spiƌit͟; so, although I ǀeƌďalised the fƌuits of the spiƌit, he iŶ faĐt iŶstigated 
the idea non-verbally through finding and showing me the Bible verse, and indeed he 
completed it verbally. 
For others, there is an emphatic lack of overlap between spirituality and organised religion, 
although they still profess to a faith. Both David and Francesca were adamant that their 
spirituality is completely divorced from the Church of England or any other religion. For 
example, Francesca says: 
 
“: OK…so ǁould Ǉou ĐoŶsideƌ Ǉouƌself to ďe a spiƌitual peƌsoŶ? 
F: Yes (with definite intonation) 
S: You would, yeah 
F: Yes, yep yep 
S: Interesting 
F: Yep ďut…eƌŵ…ChƌistiaŶ, Musliŵ, Jeǁish, Ŷo 
 
David is of a similar mindset: 
 
D: Yeah…ChuƌĐh of EŶglaŶd ;shakes head) 
S: Not Church of England? 
D: No  
S: Right 
D: But I would go to any place 
However, they do both claim a belief in a higher being. David believes in Jesus Christ, and 
Francesca saǇs ͞Jesus ŵaǇďe, ŵaǇďe Ŷot͟ although it is uŶĐleaƌ ǁhetheƌ she is ƌefeƌƌiŶg to heƌ 
own beliefs or those of her parents.  
For all participants who were able to formulate a definition of spirituality (Liam did not 
respond to this direct question, and my conversation with Rosemary did not progress to it), the 
concept of spirituality seems to evoke overwhelmingly positive feelings. For example, Lindy 
equates spirituality not only with God but also with nature and peace: 
͞Me…uŵ…ǁalkiŶg the fields aŶd ɑod uŵ…aŶgels oƌ ɑod…uŵ, oh, ɑod…it͛s peaĐeful͟ 
David, too, employs positive synonyms to define spirituality: 
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͞eƌŵ…;latencyͿ it ŵeaŶs…eƌ…Đoŵfoƌt…it ŵeaŶs…eƌ…ďlessiŶg…it ŵeaŶs…eƌ…it ŵeaŶs good 
thiŶgs, Ǉeah͟ 
For Francesca, the concept of spirituality appears to be all-encompassing and perhaps 
inextricable from other facets of life: 
͞Life ;with definite intonationͿ Ǉep͟ 
 
Peter, like Francesca, considers himself to be a spiritual being, but is unsure how to put that 
into words, or of what he believes in: 
 
S: Would you describe yourself as a spiritual person? 
P: Yes, Ǉes, I…I Đould ;pauseͿ ǁheŶ I thought aďout that ďut I ĐouldŶ͛t ;many attempts at word 
͞spiritual͟) (shakes headͿ spiƌitual peƌsoŶ like that eƌŵ…I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe that…I do believe in 
soŵethiŶg ďut ǁhat it is I…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
 
Just as David ͞stƌuggles͟ to eǆpƌess his spiƌitualitǇ, so Peteƌ is also at a loss aŶd ͞ĐaŶ͛t thiŶk of 
aŶǇthiŶg͟ ǁheŶ I ask hiŵ foƌ his defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ. 
 
Meaning-making 
Despite the evident difficulties of explaining what the term spirituality may mean to them, 
participants do express the spiritual aspects of their lives in a number of ways. When I ask 
ǁhat giǀes theiƌ life ŵeaŶiŶg, theǇ aƌe all aďle to giǀe a ƌespoŶse. ͞MeaŶiŶg͟ is oŶe of the 
teƌŵs used iŶ MuƌƌaǇ aŶd )eŶtŶeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ defiŶitioŶ of spiƌituality: 
͞A ƋualitǇ that goes beyond religious affiliation, that strives for inspirations, reverence, awe, 
meaning and purpose, even in those who do not believe in any good.͟  
IŶ ŵǇ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs, I teŶded to ask the ƋuestioŶ ͞ǁhat giǀes Ǉouƌ life ŵeaŶiŶg͟, as a prelude 
theŶ to askiŶg the ŵoƌe ŶuŵiŶous ͞ǁhat does the teƌŵ spiƌitualitǇ ŵeaŶ to Ǉou?͟. These aƌe 
difficult concepts to define with intact language – many have tried and some believe that it is a 
reductive and meaningless task to do so (Bash, 2004) – and it is made even more difficult by 
the addition of aphasia, as well as the emotion of serious and life-changing illness. 
Telling me about their meaning-making activities animated a number of the participants. Peter 
told me definitively that it was his garden which gave his life meaning. In his case, his speech 
output became more fluent, with an increase in vocabulary and complex sentence structure, 
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when compared to his attempt to define spirituality, a concept with perhaps less resonance for 
him. Compare, for example, this description of working in his garden: 
͞I did eƌŵ this ǁas thƌee diffeƌeŶt plaŶts aŶd I ;gesture with both hands, finger of left hand 
crossing fingers of right) then er er created plants er er and then erm oh they would just small 
bits of erm they were just small bits of garden and I joined all of the things together and made 
it what I did was er if I can hoe (gestures hoeingͿ͟. 
with his definition of spirituality: 
eƌ… (long pauseͿ I ĐaŶ͛t thiŶk of aŶǇthiŶg ;takes hand to mouth) 
In his description of working in the garden, the utterance is considerably longer, and includes 
accurate and intricate gesture to convey meaning. As listener, I was captivated by his verbal 
and gestural description, and sensed his enthusiasm and delight. In contrast, vocabulary 
desserts him when trying to define spirituality, and the gesture he uses serves to reinforce the 
paucity of his output; by his gesture, he is almost gagging his mouth, or perhaps it is an 
attempt to coax the words from his mouth. Similarly, Francesca is able to retrieve the names of 
many opera composers (Donizetti, Wagner, Puccini, Verdi) – opera being her main meaning-
maker - in the context of her expressive language being characterised by severe word-finding 
difficulties. 
Nature also gives meaŶiŶg to LiŶdǇ͛s life, although foƌ heƌ it ǁould seeŵ that Ŷatuƌe aŶd ɑod 
are inextricably linked; God is revealed to her in nature, and by engaging in nature, she is able 
to commune with God: 
 
L: Eƌŵ…eƌŵ…Ŷatuƌe uŵ uŵ uŵ uŵ ɑod…ŵe aŶd ɑod ;laughs) 
S: Mm (laughs) 
L: Talking (gestures talking with left hand and smiles wryly) 
S: Yeah? 
L: WhǇ…eƌ ;gestures talking again) yeah (smiles) 
S: Yeah, so Ǉou ĐaŶ talk to ɑod ǁheŶ Ǉou͛ƌe ǁalkiŶg 
For Francesca, it is the arts – and specifically music and opera – which give her life meaning. 
“he desĐƌiďes the ǁoŶdeƌ of the ǁoƌds aŶd ŵusiĐ, aŶd is also Đued iŶto the ǁoƌd ͞eŵotioŶal͟; 
it is clear that opera taps into a facet of her being which is not necessarily body or mind, but 
may be construed as spirit. 
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Although David is a fine artist, he eschews art as his meaning-maker and instead mentions his 
children. However, he does not elaborate, and I am left to ask questions to find out more: 
 
D: Having kids, yeah 
S: How many kids do you have? 
D: I…[gƌ࠱] two 
S: Two 
D: Tǁo…theǇ͛ƌe ďoth ďƌotheƌs aŶd eƌ… 
S: How old are they? 
D: TheǇ͛ƌe eight aŶd seǀeŶ…eƌ…siǆ 
Why the limited response? Is the concept of children so emotive that he is unable to express 
his feelings, or is it that I am a relative stranger and that rapport has never really become 
established between us? Perhaps it is just a truism that children give our lives meaning, and 
the statement therefore needs no further explanation or exegesis.  
Both Lindy and Francesca mention their parents in our conversations. For both, parents 
represent protection and comfort. Francesca͛s father held her hand (she uses speech and 
gesture to express this) as she went into the CT scanner, just after her stroke. She also 
Đoŵpaƌes heƌ ŵotheƌ͛s loǀe of ďallet to her own love of opera; it is not without a hint of pride 
that she tells me her mother was not of the social class one might associate with ballet-lovers, 
ďut ǁas ͞ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass ďut Ǉep Ǉep Ǉep.͟ “he also self-ĐoƌƌeĐts the teŶse ;͞loves͟ ballet 
becomes ͞loved͟ ballet, with intonational emphasis on the morphological ending), perhaps 
suggestiŶg that the death of heƌ ŵotheƌ ǁas ƌeĐeŶt, oƌ feels ƌeĐeŶt. LiŶdǇ͛s paƌeŶts featuƌe iŶ 
a vision she had whilst in a coma directly after the stroke; she saw them form a protective 
barrier, preventing the Angel of Death from taking her soul to God, that is, saving her from 
death. 
The meaning-makers in the lives of Amy, Liam and Rosemary may seem on the surface to be 
more prosaic: Liam loves his motor sport and his cat, Amy derives purpose and meaning from 
household chores and her pets, and the thing Rosemary misses most about home is her 
television. These three participants have all very recently had their strokes, and perhaps it is 
what gives them the most physical and emotional comfort that also provides the most 
meaning in their lives, whilst they are in the midst of the chaos of new illness (Frank, 2013). 
 
Faith after stroke 
Of those participants who professed a faith, some indicated that their faith had not been 
altered by the advent of the stroke and their subsequent disability. Joel and Lindy both appear 
167 
 
steadfast in their faith and in their beliefs. Joel uses facial expression, intonation and definite 
head shaking to emphasise the fact that God is the most important aspect of his life, and that 
his faith has not changed from before the stroke: 
 
J: Important is God (lots of left hand gesturing and animated intonationͿ otheƌ thiŶgs, Ŷo…Ŷo 
“: Hŵŵ…aŶd has that ĐhaŶged siŶĐe the stƌoke? 
J: (Shakes head) Not at all. (More emphaticallyͿ Ŷot at all. Yes, so, Ǉeah, hŵ… 
S: So, your faith is as strong now as it was before? 
J: Yeah, yep…yep 
 
He ďelieǀes that ͞ɑod ǁill ďe gloƌified͟, so peƌhaps he sees his disaďilitǇ as a testiŵoŶǇ of 
faith. Lindy, too, uses intonation and head nodding very effectively to convey that, despite her 
illness and subsequent disability, she still believes in God, and in his goodness: 
 
S: AŶd theŶ Ǉou said ͞ɑod is good, ďeŶeǀoleŶt ɑod͟ 
L: Yeah yes 
S: So eǀeŶ afteƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg Ǉou͛ǀe ďeeŶ thƌough? 
L: Yes (nods) 
S: That͛s still ǁhat Ǉou ďelieǀe that… 
L: Oh yes (intonation = definitely) yes 
S: That hasŶ͛t ĐhaŶged Ǉouƌ attitude? 
L: Oh no! No 
 
Joel aŶd LiŶdǇ͛s uŶǁaǀeƌiŶg faith ŵaǇ ďe liŶked to theiƌ ďelief iŶ a ͞ƌesuƌƌeĐtioŶ ďodǇ͟, that is, 
that they will receive the gift of eternal life and inhabit a new body in heaven. 
 
Religion and liturgy 
Lindy, Joel and Amy all profess a faith and indicate that they take part in organised religious 
activities. Amy uses gesture and speech to talk about prayer and blessing. Joel uses artefacts to 
cue himself into half-remembered liturgy; for example, looking at and touching a communion 
ǁafeƌ eŶaďles hiŵ to eǆpƌess the ǁoƌds ͞ďodǇ͟, ͞ďlood͟ aŶd ͞testaŵeŶt͟, aŶd the peƌtiŶeŶt 
sŶippet of lituƌgǇ ͞iŶ ƌeŵeŵďƌaŶĐe of ŵe͟. 
Both Lindy and Joel still take part in services at their respective local churches. They both admit 
that speakiŶg pƌaǇeƌs aloud is Ŷo loŶgeƌ possiďle, ďut that theǇ aƌe aďle to pƌaǇ ͞ǁithout 
ǁoƌds͟. Joel has aŶ eleŵeŶt of suƌpƌise iŶ his ǀoiĐe, as he tells ŵe that he still participates fully 
iŶ lituƌgǇ aŶd ǁoƌship, as if to saǇ ͚of Đouƌse – ǁhǇ eǀeƌ Ŷot?͛. LiŶdǇ saǇs at one point that she 
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is able to recite well-known prayers such as the Hail Mary, but is unable to engage fully in, for 
example, confession. When I ask Lindy if she is able to recite liturgy, she graphically gestures 
her lips being zipped shut. 
 
Visions 
Both Lindy and David report seeing visions as integral parts of their spiritual stories. David 
reports seeing a vision of someone whom he intimates is Jesus when he was a young child: 
 
D: Eƌŵ…Ǉep…I had a…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if Ǉou Ŷeed to kŶoǁ…I had a ǀeƌǇ stƌaŶge eǀeŶt happeŶ to 
me about when I was about four which ǁas…I͛ǀe had it…Ǉou kŶoǁ…kŶoǁ that it tells people 
aŶd theǇ go ͚ŵǇ ɑod just ƌiŶg the Đhild [æfjʊs] or something (laughsͿ ďut eƌ this peƌsoŶ…all 
ƌight…soŵeoŶe Đaŵe to see ŵe…I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ it ďeiŶg of the [dƌࠧit] fƌaŵe of ŵiŶd aŶd I just 
thought ͚I ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhǇ Ǉou͛ƌe heƌe͛ aŶd he this ŵaŶ took ŵǇ haŶd aŶd…eƌ..aŶd said ͚doŶ͛t 
ǁoƌƌǇ, it͛s all ƌight, Ǉou͛ƌe goŶŶa ďe all ƌight͛. 
S: Really 
D: Yeah 
S: And who do you believe that was? 
D: Well…the guǇ had a ďeaƌd, so I ǁasŶ͛t ;laughs) certain it was him 
 
This is a ͞positiǀe͟ eǆpeƌieŶĐe foƌ Daǀid, aŶd ĐoŶǀeǇs Đoŵfoƌt aŶd pƌoteĐtioŶ. “iŵilaƌlǇ, LiŶdǇ 
relates two stories involving visions. One, when she sees her parents forming a barrier 
between herself and the angel of death, and another when she experiences angels 
surrounding her whilst in a coma after her stroke. Her parents shield her from the frightening 
vision of Azreal, and the angels bring a sense of peace and beauty. 
 
Meaning-making being taken away post stroke 
Although all the participants report diverse meaning-makers in their lives, from pets to opera, 
God to gardening, many of them also report a common loss of or change to that meaning-
maker post-stroke. They report no longer being able to engage in the activity as they might 
have done prior to the onset of their disability. What effect does being deprived of meaning-
ŵakeƌs haǀe oŶ oŶe͛s psǇĐhe? Is paƌt of the ƌehaďilitatioŶ pƌoĐess – part of the move into 
FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Ƌuest Ŷaƌƌatiǀe – the ability to accept the loss of meaning-makers and to 
discover new ones? For example, Lindy is perhaps the participant who has progressed the 
most into a quest narrative. Formerly a published novelist but now no longer able to construct 
art of that length and complexity, the new post-stroke Lindy is now a poet, often drawing on 
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her stroke and aphasia experience as subject matter. For Lindy, although one meaning-maker 
was taken from her through aphasia, another has taken its place.   
Neither Lindy nor Joel are able fully to engage in church services. As a Roman Catholic, Lindy is 
not able to participate in confession, for example, and Joel is no longer able to pray aloud. 
Both, though, claim still to be able to communicate with God via silent, unspoken prayer, or 
through nature. The loss of the ability to engage fully in church and liturgical life was not 
explored with either of them during our conversations. I catch a glimpse of the frustration in 
Joel, as he tries to tell me about a particular verse in the Bible which he is unable to find; he 
instructs his wife to find it, too, and when she flicks further back in the Bible, he physically 
stops heƌ aŶd saǇs ͞Ŷo, Ŷo͟, ǁith aŶ aiƌ of eǆaspeƌatioŶ. I ǁƌite iŶ ŵǇ Ŷotes that his ǁife ͞dƌifts 
aǁaǇ as he ĐoŶtiŶues to seaƌĐh͟; this feels like a ĐoŵŵoŶ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐe, ǁith Joel kŶoǁiŶg the 
verse from scripture he wants but not being able to find it. 
As well as finding life meaning in opera, Francesca talks about her love of photography, but her 
physical disability now precludes her actively taking photographs: 
͞eƌŵ, ďefoƌe the stƌoke I like…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…eƌŵ…piĐ…piĐtuƌes Ŷo photogƌaphǇ eƌ Ŷo photos…Ŷo 
I like photogƌaphǇ, Ǉep. Befoƌe the stƌoke, tǁo haŶds͟. 
Peter admits to the fact that his not being able to work in the garden in the winter negatively 
impacts on his mental health; being deprived of his meaning-maker has an obvious effect on 
his wellbeing and health. 
 
Chaplains and churchmen 
What seems to be clear from all the interviews is that most participants were either not visited 
by a chaplain whilst in hospital, or they do not remember being visited. Despite Lindy and Amy 
being professed Christians, neither of them relates visits from a chaplain whilst an in-patient; 
Joel explains that although he was visited by the hospital chaplain, he was only able to express 
his spiƌitual Ŷeeds ͞slightlǇ͟ ďeĐause of his language difficulties.  
David talks about being visited at home by someone from the church – I wonder if this was 
instigated and encouraged by his church-going wife. Lindy and Amy also receive pastoral visits 
from their priest, and Joel attends church. 
This is perhaps an indication of the inherent difficulty of ministering to people with very 
significant communication problems, and chimes with some comments made by the chaplain 
iŶ gƌoup ϯ, ǁho ĐoŶfesses to ͞ŵoǀiŶg oŶ͟, ǁheŶ a patieŶt is uŶaďle to eŶgage in conversation 
(see next section – The LaǇ ChaplaiŶ͛s “toƌǇͿ. 
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Stoicism 
A number of participants demonstrate a type of stoicism post-stroke, despite function (and 
sometimes meaning-makers) being compromised. Lindy explains how she tries to counteract 
the prevailing sadness at a drop-in centre she visits for people with aphasia: 
 
L: Yes, uŵ…sad…ŵe jollǇ ;facial expression of happiness) come on come on! 
S: You try and chivvy them up? 
L: Yes 
S: Does that work? 
L: Slowly slowly 
 
What is it in Lindy that enables to her act in such a positive fashion and provide 
encouragement to others in a similar situation? Francesca, too, is an encourager and enabler 
at heƌ loĐal stƌoke suppoƌt gƌoup, aŶd heƌ ŵaŶtƌa is that oŶe ŵust ͞foƌǁaƌd ŵaƌĐh͟. 
 
Post stroke identity 
Identity and subsequent perceived loss of identity has been discussed and explored in the 
aphasiology literature (Shadden, 2005; Bronken et al, 2012). My narratives also have a story to 
tell about the importance of identity for people whose language and communication skills 
have been affected by stroke. To each of the stories I have given not only a name to the person 
whose interview I was relating but also the identity that was conveyed to me whilst speaking 
to them. Thus, Joel became the evangelist, because he conveyed so eloquently and so 
fervently his love of God and the Bible. Peter became the gardener, because his garden and 
the joy it brought him seemed so manifestly intrinsic to who he was. Ethical considerations 
meant that I gave pseudonyms to all my participants (bar Lindy, who had given permission for 
me to use her real name); perhaps I, too, was guilty of stripping away their true identities 
because of research convention. 
Issues of identity were most starkly thrown into relief for me in my discussions with Lindy and 
Francesca. They seemed to convey the essence of their identity not only in what they said but 
also in their choice of vocabulary, their environments and the labels they gave themselves. 
IŶ aŶsǁeƌ to ŵǇ fiƌst ƋuestioŶ ;͞it ǁould ďe ƌeallǇ ŶiĐe just to kŶoǁ a ďit aďout Ǉou͟Ϳ, 
Francesca immediately tells me she studied accountancy at Bath University. There is no 
preamble about where she was born, where she lived, her family – the first pieces of 
information she wants me to know about her are that she is a graduate and what she did for a 
living. It almost feels as if she is saǇiŶg to ŵe ͚doŶ͛t ǁƌite ŵe off as soŵeoŶe ǁho is uŶaďle to 
use language – I am an intelligent human being, for whom language ǁas ĐƌuĐial iŶ ŵǇ Đaƌeeƌ.͛ 
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She emphasises her erudition by alluding to perhaps more unusual associations of Bristol 
;͞Đaŵeƌa oďsĐuƌa͟Ϳ, iŶ ƌespoŶse to ŵǇ ƌatheƌ pƌosaiĐ oďseƌǀatioŶ ͞ŶiĐe ĐitǇ͟.  Heƌ aďilitǇ to 
retrieve the names of several of her favourite opera composers is also a reflection of this 
erudition and her desire to convey it. 
LiŶdǇ͛s ideŶtitǇ, too, is ǁoǀeŶ iŶto the ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ she Đhooses. As a poet, she eŵploǇs poetiĐ 
language and imagery to convey meaning, such as Azreal and Lazarus. One wall of her small 
flat is comprised entirely of book-laden shelves, and open books are lying on the sofa, mid-
read. 
Whilst Francesca has seeŵiŶglǇ lost a faĐet of heƌ ideŶtitǇ iŶ teƌŵs of heƌ joď, LiŶdǇ͛s Đaƌeeƌ 
has shifted to accommodate her aphasia; although still a writer, she now writes poetry rather 
thaŶ Ŷoǀels, aŶd still ideŶtifies heƌself as a ǁoƌdsŵith ;͞ŵe, ǁƌiteƌ͟Ϳ. Francesca͛s involvement 
in support groups for people with aphasia may be a reflection of her desire to assume a new 
role. 
 
Physical needs  
Groups one and two – people with a newly-diagnosed aphasia and people who have been 
living with their aphasia for a while (from nine months to fifteen years) – presented quite 
differently and narrated very different stories of spirituality. Although of course all the stories 
were distinct and unique, there was a commonality in the group 1 stories of physical needs 
taking precedence over discussions of the numinous. It is perhaps intuitive, and reminiscent of 
Masloǁ͛s ;ϭϵϱϰͿ hieƌaƌĐhǇ of Ŷeed, that people iŶ the aĐute stages of illŶess aŶd Ŷeǁ disability 
have to have their basic needs met, before they can concentrate on self-actualisation. 
This is illustrated in the group 1 stories by Amy not always being available for a conversation, 
because she is seeing a therapist as part of her rehabilitation programme. She is also often 
preoccupied with mealtimes and drinking, satisfying her physical needs before the numinous 
can be tackled. Liam, too, has many physical issues with which to contend, including a 
nasogastric tube, swallowing issues and a productive cough. Small wonder, then, that his need 
to defecate into his incontinence pad is overwhelming, and far outranks social etiquette or 
participation in any conversation, let alone a conversation about issues other than the 
physical. Rosemary is not available for us to get to know each other better in subsequent 
meetings, and perhaps have the opportunity for deepening the discussion to include 
spirituality, as she is transferred to another unit to continue her (physical) rehabilitation. 
 
Communication difficulties of the participants 
Although all the participants present with aphasia following a stroke and all have good 
receptive skills in the context of poor expressive abilities, nevertheless they all present very 
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differently both in the effect of the aphasia on their communication skills and in their use of 
augmentative communication (total communication) strategies. 
All participants presented with word-finding difficulties to a greater or lesser extent. Some 
paƌtiĐipaŶts deŵoŶstƌated the tǇpiĐal ͞telegƌaphiĐ͟ ;HalpeƌŶ aŶd ɑoldfaƌď, ϮϬϭϯ p 46) or 
͞agƌaŵŵatiĐ͟ ;Maƌshall, ϮϬϭϯ, p 198) quality of expressive aphasia, most notably Joel, Lindy 
and Francesca. Others showed more complex sentence structure in their expressive language, 
such as David, Peter and Amy. 
Lindy, Joel and Francesca all showed a reduction in complexity of syntactic structure, most 
notably a dearth of function words. They typically produced short utterances, containing some 
content words (nouns, verbs, adjectives) but few function words (for example, pronouns, 
conjunctions). Morphology
8
 was also limited. Several of them use favoured fillers, for example 
Francesca ofteŶ said ͞eǆaĐtlǇ͟ aŶd ͞Ǉep͟. BǇ ĐoŶtƌast, AŵǇ, Daǀid aŶd Peteƌ eŵploǇed more 
complex sentence structures, which included morphology and function words.  
Liam and Amy (and to a lesser extent, Francesca) all use expletives, which may or may not be 
of pathological origin, aŶd Liaŵ͛s output is also ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ lateŶĐǇ of ƌespoŶse ;peƌhaps 
indicative of a processing problem), palilalia and echolalia. Echolalia is often a sign of a lack of 
comprehension (Christman, Boutsen and Buckingham, 2004Ϳ, so it ŵaǇ ďe that Liaŵ͛s 
receptive abilities were more compromised than first thought by the SLT. 
 
Participants͛ Mosaics 
To a greater or lesser extent, though, all participants were reliant on a mode of communication 
other than speech to convey their stories of spirituality. Some interviewees, such as Lindy, had 
a very rich Mosaic (Clark, 2001) of expression, comprising the written word, gesture, 
intonation, facial expression, email, Facebook and poetry. The mosaics of other participants 
were more limited in scope; for example, David used predominantly speech, with some use of 
intonation but otherwise no other total communication strategies. It is possible that, as he was 
closer to his stroke event, he was not yet ready to embrace non-verbal strategies, preferring to 
rely on his (improving) speech. 
Joel was the only participant to whom I introduced artefacts in an effort to expand his Mosaic 
and therefore his range of expression. Because we had met before and he had been open 
about his faith (a faith I share), I was able to bring objects with me on the second meeting that 
I felt might prompt him in his story-telling. This strategy may perhaps have therapeutic 
importance which I will discuss later in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                          
8
 In grammar, morphology refers to affixes to the root of a word to, for example, create tense 
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‘eseaƌĐheƌ͛s stƌategies  
I used a number of facilitation techniques in listening to these stories of spirituality. All 
interviewees needed time and space in order to frame their stories. I hope I gave them this 
time and space to formulate their ideas and to convey those ideas via whichever modality they 
chose. I tried to be non-judgemental but at the same time always congruent, laying my 
prejudices aside before the conversation began. 
Undoubtedly rapport, even friendship, occurred with some interviewees (Lindy, Amy, Joel, 
Peter), whereas with others I would say there was little connection (Liam, Rosemary, 
Francesca, David). 
Lindy, Joel, Amy and I all shared a Christian faith. Given that the interviewees were talking 
about their spirituality, this seemed to lend a natural connection to our relationship. These 
relationships seemed to go deep quickly, perhaps again because of having something 
important in common. With Peter, the sense of connection is a little harder to define or 
explain. He was introduced to me at a stroke group by a mutual friend, which perhaps was a 
good basis for our relationship. He also confided in me details relating to health issues, 
possibly because he saw me as a therapist more than a researcher. 
Liam recognised me when we met for the second and subsequent times, even remembering 
my name, but I never felt that we connected. Perhaps this was due in part to the clinical 
environment, lack of privacy on a hospital ward, and also his understandable preoccupation 
with physical over relational needs. Rapport-building with Rosemary was also probably 
affected by the clinical environment, as well as by our meetings being cut short by her move to 
another rehabilitation facility. Meeting these patients with acute aphasia only on a few short 
occasions also did not enable me to ascertain the most effective forms of facilitation, which 
again may have impacted on the quality of our interaction and therefore the depth of the 
relationship. 
Of the three participants with acute aphasia, it was only Amy with whom I felt I had 
established a relationship. We met on five occasions in total (four interviews were recorded), 
which gave us more opportunity to get to know one another. By the end of our last meeting, 
she had invited me to visit her at home, and she referred to me as her friend when she 
introduced me to her neighbour on the ward. 
With Francesca and David I felt there was very little rapport. They had both been recruited by 
my visiting and giving a presentation to a stroke group. Although they enthusiastically 
volunteered to be a part of the project, I wonder if they felt almost duty-bound to 
accommodate researchers in aphasia. As two professionals themselves, I wonder if they were 
altruistically helping me out, rather than keen to have a discussion about spirituality per se. 
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My behaviour and reactions also helped to foster or stunt rapport during the interviews. With 
David, for example, I found myself making assumptions (such as about the stroke experience 
being a frightening one), which he was quick to correct. I also asked leading questions 
sometimes, a fact I only recognised once I had listened back to the recording and transcribed 
what was said and how I had said it. For example, when I am talking to Liam, about his cat, I 
saǇ ͞ ďet Ǉou ŵiss hiŵ, do Ǉou?͟, to ǁhiĐh Liaŵ pƌediĐtaďlǇ aŶsǁeƌs ͞Ǉeah͟. The suďseƋueŶt 
oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐe of possiďle eĐholalia ͞ŵiss…ŵiss hiŵ͟ deŵoŶstƌates the daŶgeƌ of usiŶg a leadiŶg 
question, particularly with someone with aphasia. 
Immersing myself in the interviews also reveals other faults in my interviewing technique. For 
example, I sometimes give feedback which is totally out of tune with what the participant is 
attempting to convey: 
 
S: What a fascinating experience 
L: (laughsͿ Ǉes, ǁell…sĐaƌed 
 
It is at times like this that I become acutely aware of the sensitive nature of some of these 
spiritual stories, and I recognise that a high level of interviewing skill is warranted. 
With all participants, I often give a non-coŵŵittal souŶd, suĐh as ͞uhuh͟, iŶ aŶ effoƌt to 
convey that I am listening, I have had my conversational turn, and they are free to continue or 
to expand that point. I also employ active listening strategies, such as leaning forward, 
maintaining eye contact, nodding and showing positive, encouraging facial expression. 
Shared knowledge allows me to understand references that might be impenetrable to 
someone without that knowledge. So, for example, Joel cues himself – and me – into a 
discussion about the twelve apostles by counting: 
J: Yes, eƌ…fouƌ, fiǀe, siǆ, seǀeŶ, eight, ŶiŶe, teŶ, eleǀeŶ, tǁelǀe ;with emphasis on last number) 
S: Tǁelǀe…? Ah! Aƌe Ǉou talkiŶg aďout the tǁelǀe apostles? 
 
Illness narratives 
When looking at the aphasia stories, one can start to see how each participant at different 
times uses slightly different narrative typologies. For example, Liam and Rosemary narrate 
stories of chaos; they are both still in the midst of changed circumstances where coherent 
narratives are impossible, and physical needs seem to outweigh the spiritual. Lindy, Joel and 
Amy all demonstrate aspects of a restitution narrative at times. Lindy, for example, at one 
point describes how she is like a child, gradually developing back into an adult. She relates how 
her language skills have improved hugely over the years since her stroke, and how she has a 
dƌeaŵ that she ǁill ďe flueŶt ďǇ ϮϬϭϵ. Joel also ƌepoƌts that his laŶguage skills aƌe ͞ďetteƌ 
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Ŷoǁ…[ǀࠧtli] ďetteƌ͟, aŶd he pƌopouŶds a spiƌitual ƌestitutioŶ, ǁheƌeďǇ he ǁill live again with a 
new body. Amy, too, is seeking restitution, and this is illustrated in her asking to go home on 
many occasions. 
Lindy, Francesca and Peter all show evidence of attaining or getting close to a quest narrative. 
Lindy has embraced a different style of writing to accommodate her aphasia, and Francesca 
has shifted her work from accountancy to helping to run a support group for people with 
aphasia. Peter is content in his garden, and tells me he is one of the lucky ones, because he has 
not been affected physically by the stroke, and is thus still able to participate in his passion. 
Of all the participants, perhaps David is the person whose narrative is less clear to me. Like 
Lindy he, too, is adapting his art to accommodate his changed circumstances, by moving from 
fine art drawing to sculpture. Yet his humour and toned down language perhaps belie a still 
chaotic state.  
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Sacred work: The speech and language therapist’s tale 
 
I meet the speech and language therapist (SLT) in a quiet room at the University. I had already 
sent her the topic guide for the group 3 interviews (appendix IV), at her request. The guide 
follows a structure of talking in general terms about the work the multidisciplinary team (MDT) 
member does and then specific challenges of working with people with aphasia. It goes on to 
explore whether the team member ever discusses issues of a sensitive, spiritual or existential 
nature with clients, and if they see it as part of their role. Team members are also asked if they 
could give their definition of spirituality. The topic guide is just that – a guide – and, as 
interviewer, I am not rigid in sticking to these questions. Indeed, at the end of every interview, 
including this one with the SLT, I make a point of asking whether the interviewee has anything 
more they would like to say. In almost every instance, they did. 
The SLT is a very experienced, highly specialist SLT (band 7), who has extensive experience of 
working with people with stroke and, in particular, those with aphasia following their stroke. 
She works on a 24-bed acute care and rehabilitation unit, where people are admitted 2 days or 
fewer after their stroke. She treats a spectrum of patients in terms of the severity of their 
stroke, from those who have good mobility post-stroke but have aphasia, to those for whom 
the stƌoke has ďeeŶ pƌofouŶd aŶd ͞death is peŶdiŶg͟. “eǀeƌitǇ of aphasia ĐaŶ also diffeƌ 
significantly, from those with mild word retrieval difficulties to those with profound global 
(expressive and receptive) aphasia. 
The “LT͛s ƌole is to assess aŶd ŵaŶage the sǁalloǁiŶg aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ issues of patieŶts 
on the stroke unit: 
 
͞sǁalloǁiŶg aŶd dǇsphagia assessŵeŶts aƌe aŶ iŵpoƌtant part of my work, but then with 
people ǁho haǀe aphasia oƌ ĐogŶitiǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ iŵpaiƌŵeŶt…I tƌǇ to asĐeƌtaiŶ the ďest 
ǁaǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate.͟ 
 
She sees herself as an integral member of the MDT, and considers communication with the 
other team members of vital importance when it comes to holistic and client-centred care for 
the patieŶts oŶ the uŶit. Details of patieŶts͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe aŶd sǁalloǁiŶg aďilities aƌe 
conveyed to the team via MDT meetings: 
 
͞aŶd I ǁill ŵake a Ŷote of these thiŶgs aŶd ǁƌite iŶ the medical notes and share with my 
Đolleagues duƌiŶg haŶdoǀeƌ͟ 
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Part of this role of MDT member involves both signposting patients to other members of the 
team, as necessary, or indeed acting as the communication advocate in interactions between 
patients and other staff members. So, in terms of addressing the spiritual needs of patients, 
she gives the example of using her skills in facilitating communicative competence in people 
with aphasia in interactions between the patient and their spiritual advisor (vicar or chaplain): 
 
͞aŶd soŵetiŵes…ǀiĐaƌs ǁill Đoŵe oŶ the ǁaƌd aŶd I ǁill ask theŵ if theǇ ǁaŶt ŵe to faĐilitate 
oƌ I ǁill shoǁ theŵ ǁhat ǁoƌks͟ 
 
But she is also very open to discussing issues of a spiritual nature herself with clients, if that 
seems appropriate: 
 
͞I do thiŶk it͛s paƌt of ouƌ ƌole ďeĐause soŵetiŵes Ǉou ǁill stuŵďle upoŶ it, Ǉou kŶoǁ, aŶd I 
would have to say that in my experience people with aphasia, I would have to say about a 
quarter of the time to about half the time, they will bring it up͟. 
 
Specific skills of the SLT 
So what is it about the specific skills of the SLT which might enable patients to communicate 
freely about spiritual issues?  She discusses the fact that often her role necessitates close 
physical proximity and that it is perhaps this physical closeness which engenders trust and 
openness: 
 
͞the ǁoƌk ǁe do, it͛s peƌsoŶal. I ŵeaŶ it ŵight ďe oƌal Đaƌe, it ŵight ďe eǆaŵiŶiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s 
mouth for a swallowing assessment and in the course of that, you know, are you comfortable, 
you kŶoǁ, Ǉou ŵaǇ Ŷeed to ďe tƌaŶsfeƌƌed…heƌe, I͛ŵ just goiŶg to giǀe Ǉou a ďit of a Đuddle 
ǁhile ǁe get Ǉou upƌight iŶ ďed͟  
 
IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, she talks aďout ǁhat the “LT does ͞ďetǁeeŶ the teĐhŶiĐal ďits͟, that is, ǁhilst 
she is carrying out one SLT assessment or procedure, conversations of a deep or important 
nature can take place: 
 
͞Ǉou aƌe doiŶg the teĐhŶiĐal ďits, Ǉou kŶoǁ, lookiŶg iŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s ŵouth, askiŶg theŵ 
biographical questions and so on but then in between that having a meaningful conversation, 
Ǉes, Ǉes.͟ 
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The “LT oďǀiouslǇ has ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe kŶoǁledge of aphasia iŶ geŶeƌal, aŶd of aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
communication skills in particular following in-depth assessment, and she also has skills in 
therapeutic and facilitative techniques: 
 
͞Ǉes, OK, ǁith tƌeatment I try and make it meaningful to the person, and assessing the 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ƌaŵps that ǁill ǁoƌk, is it Ǉes/ Ŷo ƋuestioŶs…ǁƌitteŶ ĐhoiĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ…͟ 
 
“he is also adept at ƌeĐogŶisiŶg aŶd haƌŶessiŶg patieŶts͛ ŶoŶ-verbal communication skills: 
͞I ŵeaŶ, as sooŶ as Ǉou see a peƌsoŶ, it speaks ǀoluŵes͟ 
 
“he speaks ǀeƌǇ ŵoǀiŶglǇ of oŶe paƌtiĐulaƌ patieŶt ǁho pƌeseŶted to heƌ ǁith a ͞gƌieǀiŶg ďodǇ 
postuƌe͟. He ǁas a ŵaŶ iŶ his fifties, ǁith pƌofouŶd aphasia, to the eǆteŶt that he fouŶd all 
language extremely difficult to understand. He was effectively cut off from the rest of the 
human race in terms of verbal communication. The SLT posits that this loss, not just of 
language but all the associated losses such as of identity, role and so on, was so great that he 
was grieving and this grief manifested itself non-verbally but graphically: 
 
͞he Đlosed hiŵself off iŶ his ƌooŵ, he had a pƌiǀate ƌooŵ, he dƌeǁ the ĐuƌtaiŶs, Ǉou kŶoǁ, if 
you open his door, his curtains were drawn, he drew the curtains from the outside, the lights 
ǁeƌe off, he had his hoodie oŶ aŶd his legs ǁeƌe Đƌossed…͟ 
 
The SLT is also adept at creating a therapeutic environment and engendering trust: 
͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg ǁith theŵ so that…iŶ a ǁaǇ ǁheƌe theǇ feel safe, ďut Ŷot deŵaŶdiŶg 
anything of theŵ, Ǉes͟. 
 
Dignity 
Promotion and maintenance of dignity also seems to be a recurring motif in the work of the 
“LT. “he stƌiǀes alǁaǇs ͞to Đƌeate aŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt that saǇs Ǉou ŵatteƌ͟, ďǇ giǀiŶg the ĐlieŶt 
enough time to process information and to express themselves. She will ensure privacy and 
take patieŶts to a daǇ ƌooŵ foƌ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs, to ŵake it ͞feel Ŷoƌŵal͟. 
 
Reinstating identity 
The SLT made several references to specific patients during our interview, in order to illustrate 
points or to clarify something. In doing so, it struck me how she actively tried to reinstate or 
emphasise their identity, something that often is compromised post-stroke (Ellis-Hill and Horn 
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2000; Shadden, 2005), with profound changes in functioning. She would, for example, tell me 
their profession: 
 
͞I aŵ thiŶkiŶg of a ƌetiƌed pƌofessoƌ – all ǁalks of life͟ 
 
͞I͛ŵ thiŶkiŶg of oŶe aphasiĐ ŵaŶ, he ǁas a phaƌŵaĐist, he tƌied to take his oǁŶ life͟ 
 
It is as if she is saying – I am not just dealing with a person with aphasia; I am dealing with this 
professional person, who now also has aphasia. 
She talks about the threat to identity post-stroke and the profound effect this can have on 
personhood: 
 
͞ǁheŶ ideŶtitǇ is thƌeateŶed, a peƌsoŶ͛s ͚iŶtaĐtŶess͛ is thƌeateŶed. AŶd that ĐaŶ ƌesult iŶ 
suffeƌiŶg͟ ;pƌiǀate teǆtͿ 
 
Conversely, the SLT also recognises that stroke can strip away all vestiges of previous power or 
status (she gives the example of President Nixon, who became aphasic after a stroke), and 
therapists are left with the person beneath: 
 
͞a peƌsoŶ ǁho is iŶ Đƌisis aŶd iŶdeed theǇ aƌe, it ƌeallǇ is a life aŶd death eǀeŶt heƌe, those 
eǆteƌŶal thiŶgs fall ďǇ the ǁaǇside͟ 
 
͞it͛s life, it͛s life Ǉou͛ƌe ĐliŶgiŶg to, aŶd those ŵasks aŶd those thiŶgs that ǁe ǁeaƌ, theǇ ƌeallǇ 
do fall to the waǇside, Ǉeah͟ 
 
So, on the one hand, part of creating a therapeutic environment and alliance is acknowledging 
the identity of the client, but on the other there is the understanding that at times of crisis, 
masks that go to create our identities may fall to one side. As the SLT says in relation to 
President Nixon: 
 
͞aŶd ǁheŶ I heaƌd oŶ the ƌadio at the tiŵe I thought oh, I ĐaŶ tell Ǉou that he ǁaŶted to ďe 
treated as a man who was in crisis and not the former president of the United States, I am 
suƌe͟. 
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Time 
Time was a recurring leitmotif during the interview with the SLT. She places supreme 
importance on allowing the patient time and space to communicate. Indeed, she goes so far as 
to maintain that this is a motto she lives by: 
͞it͛s a ƌule of ŵiŶe, I do Ŷot ƌush, I take tiŵe. It͛s Ǉeah…aŶd I thiŶk to ŵǇself ͚OK, this is ǁhat I 
aŵ doiŶg Ŷoǁ,͛ aŶd I put eǀeƌǇthiŶg else oŶ hold.͟ 
So in being given time and space, the patient gets the message that they are important, that 
they matter. 
 
“piƌitualitǇ aŶd ͞spiƌitual͟ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs 
IŶ ƌespoŶse to ŵǇ ĐoŵŵeŶt ͞ǁhat aďout this teƌŵ, spiƌitualitǇ͟, the “LT saǇs the folloǁiŶg: 
͞I thiŶk of the ǁoƌd ͚iŶspiƌatioŶ͛, ͚iŶspiƌe͛, ͚to ďƌeathe͛, ͚to Đoŵe aliǀe͛͟. 
 
Although she recognises religion as one manifest example of spirituality, she implies that 
spirituality is broader than that and is an intrinsic aspect of being human: 
 
͞I thiŶk that ďǇ default of ďeiŶg a liǀiŶg/ ďƌeathiŶg huŵaŶ ďeiŶg, theƌe͛s aŶ eleŵeŶt of 
spiƌitualitǇ, Ǉes. It͛s ǁhat ŵakes Ǉou Đoŵe aliǀe aŶd ǁhat͛s ŵeaŶiŶgful.͟ 
 
She gives several examples of times when she, as an SLT, has entered into what could be 
termed spiritual discussions with patients. Sometimes issues about death need to be 
discussed, for example with a patient who has to make the decision about whether they want 
aŶ eŶteƌal feediŶg tuďe oƌ Ŷot. “he saǇs she keeps heƌ ƋuestioŶs ͞ǀeƌǇ stƌaightfoƌǁaƌd͟, so as 
to avoid ambiguity. She also uses non-verbal communication strategies, in order to facilitate 
comprehension, expression or both: 
 
͞so theŶ, if you give me the go ahead, I may present pictures of say a headstone and rest in 
peaĐe, oƌ ďƌiŶg aŶ aĐtual feediŶg tuďe…͟ 
 
“eǀeƌal tiŵes, the “LT states that she is ͞a paiƌ of eaƌs͟ ǁheŶ listeŶiŶg to patieŶts͛ spiƌitual 
concerns. She listens in a non-judgemental and accepting way, as patients with a faith in God 
question what has happened to them, with reference to God: 
 
͞if a peƌsoŶ does…theǇ giǀe soŵe iŶdiĐatioŶ that theǇ ǁish to speak aďout theiƌ faith, Ǉou 
kŶoǁ, like ͚ǁhǇ didŶ͛t ɑod take ŵe?͛ oƌ ǁhat have you, I am a pair of ears and they may tell 
ŵe hoǁ theǇ feel aďout theiƌ stƌoke aŶd theiƌ ƌeligioŶ/ faith, aŶd soŵetiŵes people doŶ͛t ǁish 
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to speak about it, they do have a particular religion but they feel abandoned by God and, you 
kŶoǁ, ͚ǁheƌe is ɑod iŶ all this?͛͟ 
 
EƋuallǇ, she listeŶs atteŶtiǀelǇ to ͞ŶoŶ-ƌeligious͟ patieŶts, as theǇ stƌuggle ǁith eǆisteŶtial aŶd 
painful issues post-crisis: 
͞AŶd theŶ theƌe aƌe people ǁho…theǇ aƌe ŶoŶ-ƌeligious…theǇ ǁill ask ƋuestioŶs, theǇ ŵight 
be asking questions such as, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ͚ǁhat did I do to deseƌǀe this?͛…I aŵ a paiƌ of eaƌs.͟ 
 
Sacred work 
The iŶteƌǀieǁ ĐoŶĐludes ǁith the “LT desĐƌiďiŶg heƌ ǁoƌk as ͞saĐƌed͟: 
 
͞I feel like the ǁoƌk I do is…is saĐƌed ǁoƌk ďeĐause I thiŶk if Ǉou Ŷeed to see ŵe Ǉou aƌe 
obviously haǀiŶg a ďad daǇ…I tƌǇ to ŵake ŵǇ ǁoƌk aŶ aĐt of kiŶdŶess.͟ 
 
This is a fascinating term to use in relation to secular therapy. If one looks at a definition of 
sacred in the dictionary, it is very much concerned with God and divinity: 
 
͞eǆĐlusiǀelǇ dediĐated oƌ appƌopƌiated ;to a god oƌ to soŵe ƌeligious puƌposeͿ͟ (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2011) 
 
WheŶ I asked if she Đould eǆpaŶd oŶ this ĐoŶĐept of ͞saĐƌed ǁoƌk͟, she gaǀe ŵe the folloǁiŶg 
explanation: 
 
͞ oŶe of the ƌeasoŶs I ďelieǀe it is saĐƌed oƌ holǇ is ďeĐause when people are admitted to 
hospital with stroke they may be confronted with a major disability where important decisions 
need to be made and their established values can be challenged. People may or may not be 
religious, but everyone I have met has a code of values, ethics, or core beliefs that guide their 
ďehaǀiouƌs…AŶd aŶotheƌ thiŶg, people aƌe Ŷot "just a ďodǇ".  CT sĐaŶs, takiŶg ďlood, kŶoǁiŶg 
your cranial nerves, meeting our targets are necessary, BUT there is more to healing than just 
that.  That is Ŷot ǁhat is goiŶg to saǀe the daǇ.͟ ;peƌsoŶal teǆtͿ 
 
This seems to chime with the idea of sacredness or spirituality being a facet of the holistic 
work of the therapist; there is more to healing than the biomedical. 
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The human being it’s not just the physical: the physiotherapist’s tale 
 
I ŵeet the phǇsiotheƌapist ;PTͿ iŶ the ƌelatiǀes͛ ƌooŵ, just off the ďusǇ, ďustliŶg stƌoke uŶit. He 
has just come from seeing patients on the ward, but appears happy to sit and answer some 
questions. He is quietly spoken and gentle in his manner.  
The PT has worked with people who have had strokes for a total of 14 years. He relates how 
seven of those were abroad, and seven in the UK. He is a clinical specialist, band 7. 
We begin by talking about what his job on the stroke unit involves and there is immediately a 
predictable emphasis on the physical dimension of his patients: 
 
͞so, ǁe geŶeƌallǇ look at…it ĐaŶ ďe ďalaŶĐe fƌoŵ sittiŶg, aƌe theǇ oƌieŶted iŶ lǇiŶg aŶd sittiŶg, 
and in standing? Then how is their dynamic balance? TheŶ lookiŶg at theiƌ ǁalkiŶg.͟ 
 
It is interesting that, as the interview progresses, he appears to become more and more open 
to ideas related to the numinous: 
 
͞so I thiŶk Ǉeah, Ŷoǁ it͛s tiŵe to ŵoǀe foƌǁaƌd aŶd add the otheƌ diŵeŶsioŶ as ǁell ďeĐause 
yeah, the huŵaŶ ďeiŶg it͛s Ŷot just the phǇsiĐal͟ 
 
From what the PT says, patients seemingly do sometimes bring up issues of a spiritual nature 
iŶ theiƌ phǇsiotheƌapǇ sessioŶs, aŶd he is ǁilliŶg to disĐuss suĐh thiŶgs ͞if theǇ iŶitiate it͟. He 
suggests that the trust and therapeutic alliance between PT and patient make for a situation 
conducive to addressing meaningful issues: 
 
͞so as theǇ get ĐoŶfideŶt that yeah, I thiŶk…I haǀe got soŵeoŶe ǁho uŶderstaŶds ŵe, I think 
theǇ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ďetteƌ theiƌ feaƌs͟ 
 
Eaƌlieƌ iŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁ he eǆplaiŶs hoǁ he ǁould aŶsǁeƌ eǆisteŶtial ƋuestioŶs ;suĐh as ͞ǁhǇ 
did this happeŶ to ŵe?͟Ϳ ďǇ giǀiŶg ŵediĐal aŶsǁeƌs ƌelated to the ďodǇ aŶd ƌeasoŶs foƌ 
impairment: 
 
͞as a phǇsio, I aŵ goiŶg to eǆplaiŶ it fƌoŵ the ŵediĐal, Ǉeah…͟ 
 
However, as the interview progresses, he concedes that when a patient asks such a question, it 
may not be a medical answer that they are looking for; it may be that they are searching for 
deeper truths: 
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͞aƌe theǇ askiŶg ŵe aďout the oƌgaŶiĐ Đauses of stƌoke, or is it something else? They are 
thinking if I have done everything right, I have lived right, why is this happening to me? So 
theƌe ŵight ďe agaiŶ a spiƌitual ƋuestioŶ theƌe͟ 
 
WheŶ asked hoǁ he ǁould defiŶe the teƌŵ ͞spiƌitualitǇ͟, the PT iŶitiallǇ eƋuates it to religion, 
but also recognises that it is a concept that maybe can encompass more than just religion: 
 
͞The fiƌst thiŶg that Đoŵes to ŵiŶd is ƌeligioŶ ďeĐause oďǀiouslǇ spiƌitualitǇ has alǁaǇs ďeeŶ 
associated with religion and then it encompasses…ďut I thiŶk it…theƌe is a lot ŵoƌe thaŶ just 
ƌeligioŶ͟ 
 
and that perhaps every human being has a facet of self which could be termed spiritual: 
 
͞“oŵe people thiŶk theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot spiƌitual ďut ǁheŶ Ǉou speak ǁith theŵ Ǉou ƌealise that theǇ 
are spiritual but theǇ doŶ͛t see it as ďeiŶg spiƌitual…͟ 
 
He identifies how aphasia can be a barrier in therapy in general, and that communication 
difficulties in the therapy session can lead to changes in mood and motivation: 
 
͞ĐaŶ lead to fƌustƌatioŶ aŶd Ǉeah, if Ŷot haŶdled properly then make the person feel like they 
aƌe Ŷot doiŶg ǁell so theǇ staƌt to feel that theǇ aƌe ǁoƌthless͟ 
 
He acknowledges, too, that for a person with aphasia as a result of their stroke, tackling the 
abstract nature of the concept of spirituality could be problematic: 
 
͞soŵeoŶe ǁith ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ soƌt of diffiĐulties ǁill fiŶd it a ďit diffiĐult to ĐoŶǀeǇ that 
aďstƌaĐt Ŷatuƌe of spiƌitualisŵ [siĐ]͟ 
 
Interestingly he does not proffer any mitigation to these communication barriers; he does not 
discuss liaison with the speech and language therapist for advice, for example, or the use of 
non-verbal communication facilitation techniques. I, as interviewer, also do not prompt him to 
think about facilitation of communication with patients with aphasia; this is an oversight on my 
part, I think. 
The PT identifies a number of interesting objections or at least caveats to discussing issues of a 
spiƌitual Ŷatuƌe ǁith patieŶts. Although he saǇs he ǁill disĐuss suĐh issues at the patieŶt͛s 
request: 
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͞if soŵeoŶe ǁilliŶglǇ soƌt of ďƌiŶgs up the topiĐ I disĐuss it ǁith theŵ͟ 
 
he is wary of overstepping the mark, of venturing beyond his remit: 
 
͞it͛s Ŷot kŶoǁiŶg ǁheƌe aƌe the liŵits aŶd hoǁ faƌ should Ǉou disĐuss͟ 
 
He seems very aware of the importance of spirituality to people and is anxious not to minimise 
its importance by perhaps handling the subject matter in the wrong way, or in an 
inappropriate way: 
 
͞I thiŶk theƌe is a daŶgeƌ of tƌiǀialisiŶg otheƌ people͛s soƌt of jouƌŶeǇ as ǁell, aŶd theiƌ spiƌitual 
views which they may hold very dearly and are part of their identity and I always feel like yeah, 
I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to soƌt of tƌiǀialise soŵeoŶe͛s ďeliefs aŶd spiƌitual ǁellďeiŶg, espeĐiallǇ if theǇ aƌe 
having to struggle with a stroke as well, so yeah, I am always cautious of not making things 
ǁoƌse͟ 
 
He is also wary of the danger of healthcare professionals proselytising or forcing their own 
opinions about spirituality and religion onto patients: 
 
͞ŵaǇďe theǇ Đould ďe seeŶ as tƌǇiŶg to iŶflueŶĐe people iŶto theiƌ oǁŶ ƌeligioŶ͟ 
 
The PT seems to imply that the spiritual domain is not accepted within the healthcare 
paƌadigŵ, that it ǁould ďe ͞politiĐallǇ iŶĐoƌƌeĐt͟ to talk aďout spiƌitual issues ǁith patieŶts: 
 
͞I thought hmm, in the health sector religion is not talked so much about aŶd I thiŶk agaiŶ it͛s 
that…people aƌe tƌǇiŶg Ŷot…aǀoidiŶg Ŷot ďeiŶg politiĐallǇ ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ 
 
On the other hand, he is obviously an holistic practitioner, seeing and managing all facets the 
patient: 
 
͞“o I fiŶd it͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt otheƌǁise theŶ Ǉou ŵaǇ…I ŵaǇ tƌǇ just the phǇsiĐal aŶd fiŶd I aŵ 
losiŶg ŵǇ patieŶt, theǇ aƌe Ŷot paƌtiĐipatiŶg/ eŶgagiŶg aŶd if I doŶ͛t go ďaĐk iŶto ǁhǇ aŶd tƌǇ 
aŶd soƌt of uŶtaŶgle all the little ďits…͟ 
 
He also acknowledges that perhaps the landscape of healthcare has changed over the last few 
years and continues to do so. He talks about how healthcare used at one time to be very 
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concerned with body and impairment, then progressed to encompass the mind and 
psychosocial aspects of patients; perhaps now it is ready to embrace the spiritual: 
 
͞it took a ǁhile to soƌt of get psǇĐhologǇ iŶ, iŶǀolǀed iŶ…ďeĐause it used to ďe Ƌuite a ŵediĐal 
ĐoŶĐept, isŶ͛t it? ...Noǁ ǁe aƌe theƌe, so I thiŶk Ǉeah, it͛s Ŷoǁ tiŵe to ŵoǀe foƌǁaƌd aŶd add 
the otheƌ diŵeŶsioŶs as ǁell͟ 
 
He is the only healthcare professional interviewed who considers NHS Trust policies and 
procedures, and whether addressing spirituality in his sessions is permitted: 
 
͞I aŵ happǇ to disĐuss it, ďut iŶ teƌŵs of poliĐies aŶd pƌoĐeduƌes I thiŶk Ǉeah, it͛s the feaƌ of 
treading that thiŶ liŶe.͟ 
 
However, he also ends the interview with the fact that perhaps we as professionals should be 
starting to consider more the spiritual in our clients, even possibly including it in our Trust 
procedures, such as an agenda item in multidisciplinary meetings: 
 
͞I thiŶk it͛s ǁoƌth…it͛s ǁoƌth puttiŶg oŶ ouƌ MDM ageŶda.͟ 
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It’s part and parcel of someone’s life: the occupational therapist’s tale 
 
The occupational therapist (OT) greets me enthusiastically on the stroke unit and we go into 
the ƌelatiǀes͛ ƌooŵ, ǁheƌe it is ƌelatiǀelǇ Ƌuiet. The OT is ĐhattǇ aŶd iŶfoƌŵatiǀe; heƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ 
is comprehensive and detailed, covering the many facets of her work, a reflection of the all-
encompassing work of an OT. Her conversation is peppered with concepts such as holism, 
function and meaning. 
The OT is a clinical specialist on the stroke unit – a band 7 – whose role is to support the OT 
team, providing second opinions on complex clients when needed. As with all the 
multidisciplinary participants, a topic guide has been provided; the loquacious OT, however, 
teŶds to ǀeeƌ off the topiĐ guide, ĐƌeatiŶg ŵuĐh ŵoƌe of a ͞ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶal iŶteƌǀieǁ͟ ;Kiŵ, 
2015, p 262).  
 
Role of OT and rapport-building 
The OT ŵaiŶtaiŶs that she deals ǁith ͞the ďasiĐs͟, suĐh as ͞ǁashiŶg, dƌessiŶg, toiletiŶg, eatiŶg, 
drinking, getting in and out, on and off furniture, making decisions, problem-solǀiŶg, safetǇ͟. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, she also poiŶts out that OTs ͞look at all aƌeas͟, iŶĐludiŶg hoǁ patieŶts ͞see the 
ǁoƌld͟. Heƌs is a tƌuly holistic role, and this holism includes attending to all aspects of the 
individual. She posits that because of the intimate nature of some of their work, OTs are 
ideally placed to create a relationship with clients: 
 
͞I thiŶk ďeĐause ǁe eŶd up doiŶg things like personal care, you do really get to know 
soŵeďodǇ iŶ that ǁaǇ ďeĐause Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t Ŷot͟ 
 
This ƌappoƌt aŶd ͞seŶsitiǀe ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs͟ theŶ ŵeaŶ that the OT is open to exploring 
spirituality with her patients: 
 
͞it ƌeallǇ is aďout gettiŶg to kŶoǁ that person and understanding them and what they think 
aŶd ǁhat theǇ ďelieǀe aŶd hoǁ theǇ see the ǁoƌld ƌeallǇ aŶd I thiŶk that͛s ǁhat spiƌitualitǇ is 
foƌ ŵe, is ǁhat it͛s aďout, it's hoǁ Ǉou see thiŶgs, Ǉeah, defiŶitelǇ.͟ 
 
She is clear that discussing spirituality is not necessarily a core role for the OT, but that 
because of this holistic and all-encompassing approach to client care, she finds that the subject 
can be intrinsic to that care: 
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͞“o Ƌuite ofteŶ ǁe ĐaŶ get ǀeƌǇ iŶǀolǀed iŶ that, so Ǉeah, aŶd Ŷot ŶeĐessarily wanting to, it's 
just that ǁe get dƌaǁŶ iŶto that… the disĐussioŶs aŶd the lookiŶg at life͟. 
 
Stroke as disruptor 
The OT eŵploǇs ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ ǁhiĐh eǀokes the destƌuĐtioŶ stƌoke ĐaŶ ǁƌeak oŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s life. 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, she talks aďout ͞that kŶoĐk fƌoŵ the stƌoke͟, aŶd the faĐt that ŶoƌŵalitǇ ĐaŶ ďe 
͞all ǁhooshed fƌoŵ uŶdeƌ theiƌ feet͟. “he sees heƌ ƌole as aŶ OT to iŵďue the situatioŶ ǁith 
positivity, and to encourage function, even if this is different to pre-morbid function: 
 
͞But eǀeŶ people like that, they then get knocked down and we have to bring them back up 
agaiŶ aŶd look at … Ŷot hoǁ Ŷegatiǀe it is, hoǁ ĐaŶ ǁe ǁoƌk aŶd iŵpƌoǀe oŶ ǁhat theǇ aƌe 
doiŶg͟. 
 
Time 
The OT identifies that in her role she has the privilege of being able to spend time with her 
patients, which in turn makes for more opportunity for discussion and possibly for enriched 
relationships: 
 
͞ǁe get lots of tiŵe ǁith the patieŶts aŶd lots of iŶ-depth stuff, quite personal stuff sometimes 
as ǁell͟ 
 
With patients with aphasia, she recognises that perhaps even more time is needed, in order to 
ensure messages are understood and conveyed: 
 
͞I thiŶk ǁe do alloǁ ŵoƌe tiŵe.  I thiŶk ǁe… ďeĐause oďǀiouslǇ ǁe speŶd Ƌuite a lot of tiŵe 
with our patients anyway but with aphasic patients we do Ŷeed to giǀe theŵ ŵoƌe tiŵe͟ 
 
She intimates that more time is needed with patients with aphasia, because rapport-building is 
not quite so straight-forward when language is affected: 
 
͞soŵetiŵes it ŵeaŶs ǁe haǀe to speŶd ŵoƌe tiŵe ǁith people ďeĐause ǁe have to get to 
kŶoǁ theŵ ďetteƌ ďeĐause theǇ ĐaŶ͛t just ǀeƌďalise aŶd saǇ ͚Well I doŶ͛t like this, I doŶ͛t like 
that, I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to do it this ǁaǇ.͛͟ 
 
Time is viewed by the OT as a precious commodity, which can be eroded by busyness, to the 
detriment of relationships with patients: 
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͞AŶd theŶ oďǀiouslǇ ǁheŶ ǁe aƌe ƌeallǇ ďusǇ, that iŵpaĐts ŶegatiǀelǇ ďeĐause ǁe haǀeŶ͛t got 
the tiŵe to speŶd ǁhiĐh is a shaŵe͟. 
 
Personhood and identity 
In line with person-centred care, it is important for the OT to recognise the person behind the 
stroke, the person the patient once was: 
 
͞ǁe go ͚OK, so ǁhat did Ǉou do ďefoƌe Ǉou had a stƌoke, ǁho aƌe Ǉou?͛ Ǉou kŶoǁ, so it's aďout 
theŵ as a peƌsoŶ, Ŷot just ǁell Ǉou͛ƌe that patieŶt that͛s had a stƌoke, so Ǉou haǀe got all this 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ.͟ 
 
This gathering of information to formulate a picture of the patient pre-stroke is made more 
complex by the presence of aphasia: 
 
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk Ǉou haǀe the saŵe iŶ-depth conversations as we do with people because we 
ĐaŶ͛t… I thiŶk peƌsoŶal issues… it͛s so peƌsoŶal, people Ŷeed to… it Ŷeeds to ďe a tǁo ǁaǇ 
ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ, aŶd Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t do that ǁith soŵeďodǇ ǁith aphasia… ͞ 
 
Getting to know the patient  
Getting to know the patient well, their past, their interests, their goals, is obviously important 
for the OT but is problematic when the patient is unable to verbalise these things directly: 
͞I ǁould saǇ it alŵost ƌestƌiĐts a little ďit hoǁ, hoǁ Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat theǇ do aŶd ǁhat theǇ 
like͟. 
She reports that the process of getting to know a client with aphasia is ͞slightlǇ skeǁed͟ 
because of the restrictions on normal conversation. She acknowledges that the person does 
not intrinsically alter in character post-stroke, but that it can be difficult to gain access to that 
prior identity if language is missing or compromised: 
 
͞theǇ aƌe still theƌe, theǇ aƌe still that peƌsoŶ, theǇ still ǁaŶt to do these thiŶgs theǇ eŶjoǇ aŶd 
theǇ still ǁaŶt to ďe paƌt of the ǁoƌld aŶd eŶjoǇ ǁhat theǇ do, ďut theǇ just… it͛s liŵited aŶd 
theǇ ĐaŶ͛t ǀeƌďalise that to theŵ.  It's very difficult I think to get that true feel of a person, it 
ƌeallǇ is, ǁheŶ Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t get that fƌoŵ theŵselǀes, Ǉeah.͟ 
 
Therapists are then reliant on family members to provide the information required, which the 
OT sees as information somehow diluted, that may not tell the complete or accurate story: 
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͞AgaiŶ ǁe Ƌuite ofteŶ haǀe to ƌelǇ oŶ the ƌelatiǀes iŶ oƌdeƌ to tell us ͚Oh, theǇ loǀe goiŶg iŶ 
theiƌ gaƌdeŶ͛ oƌ ͚theǇ like seǁiŶg͛ oƌ ͚theǇ go to ĐhuƌĐh eǀeƌǇ ǁeek͛ oƌ theǇ ͚ďelieǀe iŶ this, oƌ 
they belieǀe iŶ that͛ aŶd Ǉou soƌt of thiŶk ǁe doŶ͛t get that diƌeĐt fƌoŵ the patieŶt aŶd I thiŶk 
uŶless Ǉou do, Ǉou doŶ͛t get a full piĐtuƌe of that peƌsoŶ͟. 
 
Aphasia 
The OT has a good understanding of aphasia and the effects of aphasia on her assessment and 
management of patients. Problems with comprehension pose a particular risk of danger for 
heƌ, ǁheŶ a patieŶt͛s safetǇ Đould ďe Đoŵpƌoŵised aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the pƌoteĐtiǀe ƌehaďilitatioŶ 
environment: 
 
͞Ƌuite ofteŶ if it's the ƌeĐeptiǀe pƌoďleŵs, folloǁiŶg ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe asking them to do, so if we are 
asking them to show us can you move your limbs, can you get up from your chair, can you 
come to the kitchen? – all these sort of things - it's theŶ theiƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe 
askiŶg theŵ to do, aŶd so if ǁe ĐaŶ͛t get them to understand that in a therapy session in a very 
safe protective environment, how do we then expect that to translate into going home and 
hoǁ aƌe theǇ goiŶg to ŵaŶage theƌe?͟ 
 
She identifies that direct information-gathering can be difficult and that time is needed to 
enable messages to be conveyed and understood in conversations with people with aphasia:  
͞so ǁheŶ Ǉou aƌe askiŶg a peƌsoŶ aŶd Ǉeah, theǇ͛ƌe aphasiĐ aŶd Ǉou go up to theŵ aŶd Ǉou 
saǇ ͚Hoǁ aƌe Ǉou?͛ aŶd Ǉou iŶtƌoduĐe Ǉouƌself aŶd ǁe ĐaŶ͛t get that information from them, 
soŵetiŵes it's ŶiĐe to speŶd soŵe tiŵe to see ǁhat theǇ ĐaŶ giǀe us aŶd…͟ 
 
“he ƌefeƌs to the pƌoĐess of ͞deciphering͟, as if because the client is not able to give the 
information needed themselves, it is conveyed in a coded way by a third party, never quite 
giving the information as accurately as if it had come directly from the patient themselves: 
͞“o the fiƌst ĐhalleŶge is, Ǉou ǁalk up to theŵ aŶd Ǉou thiŶk Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t tell ŵe this iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
so it's then deciphering that from a different source or a next of kin, a relative or wife/partner 
ǁhateǀeƌ, so that͛s defiŶitelǇ ouƌ fiƌst ĐhalleŶge͟. 
 
Heƌ laŶguage at this poiŶt is Ƌuite Ŷegatiǀe aŶd defiŶitiǀe ;foƌ eǆaŵple, ͞theǇ ĐaŶ͛t tell us͟Ϳ, 
and the resultant information is seen by the OT as perhaps not as valuable or accurate: 
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͞that iŶfoƌŵatioŶ doesŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ alǁaǇs Đoŵe fƌoŵ the patieŶt so I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe alǁaǇs 
get a clear idea of actually what makes that patient tick, what do they enjoy, what do they 
believe in, what do they get a lot out of, Ǉou kŶoǁ, that soƌt of thiŶg? ͞ 
 
The OT recognises that she and the other members of the stroke rehabilitation team have to 
have special skills of noticing when working with people with aphasia. They need to be alert to 
body language and other non-verbal methods of communication: 
 
͞ǁe haǀe to ďe ŵoƌe peƌĐeptiǀe I thiŶk ǁith people ǁith aphasia, Ǉeah, if theǇ ĐaŶ͛t 
communicate to talk to you, and when they are trying desperately to tell you something...I 
think there is a real skill in actually reading that person.͟ 
 
She illustrates how a misunderstanding by members of the team of someone who is having 
difficulties communicating can result in loss of dignity, by telling me about a real episode which 
had recently occurred on the ward: 
 
͞the eǆaŵple that I gaǀe is that the geŶtleŵaŶ ǁho Ŷeeded the toilet despeƌatelǇ aŶd all he 
kept saǇiŶg ǁas ͚Coŵe oŶ, Đoŵe oŶ, Đoŵe oŶ.͛  Not kŶoǁiŶg hiŵ at all, I just thought he 
wanted us to get him up, because he wanted to get up, and then we found out that ǁasŶ͛t 
ǁhat it ǁas aďout…aŶd eǀeŶ if ǁe get theƌe oŶ tiŵe he ĐaŶ͛t tell us ͚Do Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat?  I 
ƌeallǇ Ŷeed a ǁee͛ aŶd ǁe ĐaŶ͛t theŶ get theƌe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ƋuiĐklǇ eŶough to do it pƌopeƌlǇ 
ǁith hiŵ.͟ 
 
She accepts that patients with aphasia can therefore become very frustrated: 
 
 ͞aŶd Ǉet ǁe aƌe eǆpeĐtiŶg this peƌsoŶ ǁho ĐaŶ͛t ǀeƌďalise to us, to go aŶd sit iŶ fƌoŶt of a siŶk 
aŶd theǇ aƌe pƌoďaďlǇ goiŶg ͚I doŶ͛t do this at hoŵe, I go iŶ theƌe, that shoǁeƌ oǀeƌ theƌe,͛ aŶd 
soŵetiŵes that͛s ǁheŶ theiƌ fƌustƌatioŶs ĐaŶ Đoŵe iŶ ďeĐause theǇ ĐaŶ͛t saǇ to us… theǇ ĐaŶ 
iŶdiĐate to us͟  
 
The OT concedes that conversation – particularly about more sensitive issues – is 
compromised with a person with severe aphasia: 
 
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk Ǉou haǀe the saŵe iŶ-depth conversations as we do with people because we 
ĐaŶ͛t… I thiŶk peƌsoŶal issues… it͛s so peƌsoŶal, people Ŷeed to… it Ŷeeds to ďe a two-way 
ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ, aŶd Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t do that ǁith soŵeďodǇ ǁith aphasia.͟ 
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She alludes to conversations – which are quite common on a stroke ward – about death and 
dying, and how much more difficult these can be if the patient has lost their ability to 
formulate language in the way they used to: 
͞theǇ haǀe had a stƌoke aŶd theǇ ĐaŶ see this is the eŶd, this is … Ǉou kŶoǁ, that͛s it, eŶd of 
ŵǇ life, ĐaŶ͛t do aŶǇ ŵoƌe, aŶd Ƌuite ofteŶ a lot of ouƌ sessioŶs ǁill ďe ǀeƌǇ eŵotioŶal aŶd 
ǁe͛ƌe talkiŶg thƌough, Ǉou kŶoǁ… aŶd oďǀiouslǇ if theǇ͛ƌe aphasiĐ it ĐaŶ ďe ŵoƌe diffiĐult ďut 
talking through the impact of the stroke, what that then means for them in terms of what they 
haǀe doŶe iŶ theiƌ life͟. 
 
Non-verbal Communication 
Despite this, the OT seems, of all the healthcare professionals other than the speech and 
language therapist (SLT), the most familiar with non-verbal, total communication strategies. 
This is no doubt a feature of her holistic stance and eagerness to facilitate function. Although 
she does not explicitly discuss liaising or working with the SLT, possible joint-working is 
suggested by her knowledge and use of photos, communication boards and pictures to 
facilitate conversation with people with aphasia. 
She also stresses several times during the interview the need to know a patient well and 
become familiar with their non-verbal skills, in order to understand them more fully: 
 
͞You have to sort of figure out what their gestures are, like John, the gentleman we were 
saǇiŶg aďout, I aŵ ǀeƌǇ aǁaƌe of ǁheŶ I fiƌst ŵet hiŵ, I didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ ǁhat his ǁoƌds 
meant when he was trying to tell us something, but it was a desperate plea to tell us 
soŵethiŶg, aŶd oŶĐe he had doŶe the thiŶg that he did I ǁeŶt ͚Oh that͛s ǁhat Ǉou ǁeƌe 
telliŶg…͛ ďut I had Ŷeǀeƌ ŵet hiŵ, ďut Ŷoǁ I kŶoǁ, if he ǁould saǇ that to ŵe, that is his ǁaǇ of 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg, that͛s his ǁaǇ.͟ 
 
Skill of the therapist 
The OT sees the whole person and thinks about all areas of their life, and this is reflected in the 
specific skills the OT brings to dealing with spirituality in her patients with aphasia: 
 
͞I thiŶk it is just ǀeƌǇ iŶdiǀidual, spiƌitualitǇ, aŶd I thiŶk a lot of … ǁe as a profession, I think, 
thiŶk ŵoƌe aďout it thaŶ otheƌs ďeĐause I thiŶk it͛s paƌt aŶd paƌĐel of soŵeďodǇ͛s life aŶd 
that͛s ǁhat ǁe ask aďout.͟ 
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She explains that OTs discuss the whole gamut of human activity and occupation from family 
and work to sex and relationships in the course of their management of a client, and that a 
peƌsoŶ͛s spiƌitualitǇ ǁould ďe Ŷo diffeƌeŶt iŶ teƌŵs of its iŶĐlusioŶ iŶ these disĐussioŶs: 
 
͞I ŵeaŶ ďeĐause ǁe talk to people aďout all soƌts of thiŶgs, ǁe ĐaŶ talk to theŵ aďout sex, we 
ĐaŶ talk to theŵ aďout … that͛s ofteŶ a ƋuestioŶ theǇ ǁill ask us ďeĐause ǁe haǀe asked theŵ 
very personal things about toileting and things, so we are the obvious person to talk to.  I think 
we do ask them about their hobbies and a lot of people will say they enjoy going to church or 
they enjoy meditation or they enjoy any sort of activities that they consider really important to 
theŵ aŶd that͛s paƌt of theiƌ life, that ĐaŶ ďe gaƌdeŶiŶg, that ĐaŶ ďe aŶǇthiŶg that soƌt of fulfils 
them and makes them happǇ.͟ 
 
For stroke patients with aphasia in particular, she sees the OT as having honed skills in 
understanding non-verbal responses: 
 
 ͞aŶd that͛s I thiŶk ǁheƌe ǁe piĐk up oŶ aŶd thiŶgs, Ǉou thiŶk ͚Well ǁhǇ aƌe Ǉou ƌeaĐtiŶg like 
that?͛ aŶd peƌhaps a Ŷuƌse ǁouldŶ͛t piĐk up oŶ that͟ 
 
She contrasts the OT approach – where the professional would allow the patient to have a go 
at a particular activity, and the approach of a nurse – who, because of the busyness of the day 
and the need to make sure things are completed – may carry out the procedure for the 
patieŶt. IŶ this ǁaǇ, the OT has the tiŵe aŶd is aďle to oďseƌǀe aŶd leaƌŶ fƌoŵ the ĐlieŶt͛s 
response. 
The OT acknowledges, however, that all members of the stroke team possess skills of 
understanding and facilitating communication skills of people on the ward with aphasia: 
 ͞AŶd I thiŶk as a stƌoke teaŵ geŶeƌallǇ, Ŷot just as a theƌapist ŵǇself, ďut I thiŶk ǁe aƌe ŵoƌe 
aǁaƌe of that.  It͛s that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg isŶ͛t it, it͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that that peƌsoŶ ĐaŶ͛t 
coŵŵuŶiĐate, so hoǁ ĐaŶ theǇ get theiƌ poiŶt aĐƌoss aŶd hoǁ ĐaŶ ǁe ŵeet theiƌ Ŷeeds fullǇ.͟ 
Team members – and specifically OTs – can act as the bridge between a person with aphasia 
and their family members, because of this acquired skill of interpretation and facilitation: 
 
͞Ƌuite ofteŶ ǁe haǀe to ďe a ďit of aŶ adǀoĐate foƌ theŵ iŶ that seŶse ďeĐause theǇ ĐaŶ͛t 
verbalise that or not in the way they would perhaps want to if they can verbalise, but it's not, 
Ŷot Đleaƌ to the faŵilǇ soŵetiŵes͟. 
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Loss 
As well as the ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ of destƌuĐtioŶ Ŷoted aďoǀe ;͞ǁhooshed aǁaǇ͟, ͞kŶoĐk ďǇ͟, ͞the 
stƌoke soƌt of thƌoǁs that͟Ϳ, the OT also desĐƌiďes the loss eǆpeƌieŶĐed ďǇ heƌ stƌoke patieŶts, 
and those patients with aphasia in particular. She describes the catastrophe of loss of 
laŶguage, aŶd its iŵpaĐt oŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s aďilitǇ to fuŶĐtioŶ: 
͞We use ouƌ ǀoiĐe foƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg, ǁe do, Ǉou kŶoǁ…we would be lost without it, so when 
soŵeďodǇ has lost it, that iŶ teƌŵs of fuŶĐtioŶ is ŵassiǀe so Ǉeah, it iŵpaĐts gƌeatlǇ.͟ 
 
Dignity can be lost if a person is unable to communicate their basic needs (as exemplified in 
the example of John, cited above, and his inability to articulate the need for the toilet). The OT 
saw her role in this instance as instigating management strategies that would mitigate the 
need to communicate verbally: 
 
͞aŶd so ǁe ǁeƌe aǁaƌe that aĐtuallǇ that͛s soŵethiŶg that theŶ ƌeallǇ fƌustƌates hiŵ, is that 
he͛s theŶ Ŷot gettiŶg to the toilet oŶ tiŵe, so ǁe put iŶ a Ϯ houƌlǇ toiletiŶg ƌegiŵe so that ǁe 
know that his needs are met, because otherwise if he is left uncomfortable he then gets very 
distƌessed aŶd upset, aŶd eǀeŶ if ǁe get theƌe oŶ tiŵe he ĐaŶ͛t tell us ͚Do Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat?  I 
ƌeallǇ Ŷeed a ǁee͛ aŶd ǁe ĐaŶ͛t theŶ get theƌe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ƋuiĐklǇ eŶough to do it pƌoperly 
ǁith hiŵ.͟ 
 
The OT views the loss of function post-stroke as a type of bereavement; the patient is grieving 
for what they used to be able to do, whilst facing a future with changed abilities: 
 
͞so I thiŶk it ďeĐoŵes ǀeƌǇ spiƌitual ďeĐause eǀeƌǇthiŶg that theǇ thiŶk theǇ ĐaŶ͛t do aŶǇ ŵoƌe, 
theǇ haǀe just lost that so it͛s like a ďeƌeaǀeŵeŶt pƌoĐess ƌeallǇ͟. 
 
Definition of spirituality 
The OT ǀieǁs this loss aŶd ďeƌeaǀeŵeŶt pƌoĐess as ͞spiƌitual͟; iŶ faĐt, heƌ defiŶitioŶ of ǁhat 
constitutes the spiritual is ďƌoad. “he defiŶes spiƌitualitǇ as ͞aŶǇthiŶg that guides theŵ͟, ǁhiĐh 
may include God or Buddha, but also includes sewing and gardening, pets, exercise or the 
suŶƌise. “piƌitualitǇ is aďout hoǁ people ͞see the ǁoƌld͟ aŶd heƌ ƌole ǀis à vis spirituality as an 
OT, is in knowing all facets of her patients: 
 
͞it ƌeallǇ is aďout gettiŶg to kŶoǁ that peƌsoŶ aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg theŵ aŶd ǁhat theǇ thiŶk 
aŶd ǁhat theǇ ďelieǀe aŶd hoǁ theǇ see the ǁoƌld ƌeallǇ͟ 
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Interestingly, even with this broad definition of spirituality, the OT does not consider herself to 
be a spiritual person, or at least not a religious one: 
 
͞I ǁould saǇ… I aŵ Ŷot paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ƌeligious, I aŵ Ŷot… Ǉou kŶoǁ, I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe iŶ aŶǇthiŶg 
ƌeallǇ ŵǇself, ďut I thiŶk … it͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶdiǀidual aŶd I thiŶk it͛s aďout ǁhat guides people͛s liǀes͟ 
 
She begins to conflate religion with spirituality in this excerpt, so it is unclear whether she is 
claiming a lack of religiosity or a lack of spirituality. 
 
Referral on to other professionals 
It is clear from the OT͛s fƌeƋueŶt ƌefeƌeŶĐes to otheƌ pƌofessioŶals that she ǁoƌks ĐloselǇ ǁith 
other multidisciplinary team members. In the area of spiritual needs of patients, she cites the 
chaplain, neuropsychologist and stroke liaison nurse as the key professionals to whom to refer, 
as ǁell as the patieŶt͛s loĐal ŵiŶisteƌ. Like the “LT, she sees heƌself as the ŵediatoƌ ďetǁeeŶ 
the chaplaincy team and patients requiring spiritual support: 
 
͞ǁe Ƌuite ofteŶ haǀe the ĐhaplaiŶs doǁŶ heƌe.  We haǀe a ŶiĐe ƌelatioŶship ǁith them, then 
Ƌuite ofteŶ if people iŶdiĐate that theǇ ǁould like to see theŵ oƌ that ǁe… if soŵeoŶe has got 
aphasia ǁe ǁill ask theŵ aŶd ǁe iŶdiĐate soŵehoǁ…͟ 
 
Foƌ the OT, spiƌitualitǇ is ͞paƌt aŶd paƌĐel͟ of the ǁhole peƌsoŶ, aŶd theƌefoƌe Đoŵes ǁithiŶ 
the OT͛s holistiĐ remit.  
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Warmth and comfort: the nurse’s tale 
 
Of all the healthcare professionals working with people with aphasia post-stroke in the acute 
setting, the nurse was the most problematic to recruit. I initially approached the nursing team 
of the stroke unit where the other members of the multidisciplinary team worked, but their 
workload was such that none of the nurses was able to commit time to be interviewed. This, 
sadly, is a reflection of current healthcare working, where professionals often feel overworked 
and too stressed and stretched to contemplate anything extraneous to their normal working 
day.  Of course, the opinion of the nursing manager on this unit was respected and 
understood, and I sought instead to recruit the nurse for my study from a neighbouring 
hospital, belonging to the same Trust but in a different town. 
Although the manager of this second stroke unit was willing to take part in the project and a 
mutually convenient time and place was agreed, it was still a short, rushed interview, during 
ǁhiĐh I ǁas alǁaǇs aǁaƌe of the Ŷuƌse͛s Ŷeed to get ďaĐk to heƌ patieŶts aŶd the ƌuŶŶiŶg of 
the ward. 
Our meeting takes place half way through the morning on the stroke unit; the time and place 
has been agreed as the most convenient and least likely to cause disruption. When I arrive, the 
nurse is busy in a six-bedded bay, conversing with other members of the team about patients. 
Already I feel like I am imposing, taking her away from the important business of direct patient 
care. 
The nurse, however, is insistent that she can spare some time to chat with me, and we go to 
her small office just off the ward. I never quite shake off the feeling that my being there is a 
slight inconvenience, and the resultant interview is short, with questions and answers left 
unexplored or not expanded upon. The nurse herself has difficulty articulating issues relating 
to spirituality; this is certainly not a difficulty exclusive to the participants with aphasia: 
 
͞“oƌƌǇ, I aŵ tƌǇiŶg to thiŶk ǁheƌe I aŵ… What was I goiŶg to saǇ?͟ 
 
The Ŷuƌse͛s title is ͞stƌoke liaisoŶ sisteƌ͟, aŶd she tells ŵe she has ǁoƌked iŶ the aƌea of stƌoke 
care for six years. She sums up her role as liaising with the rest of the stroke rehabilitation 
team, meeting patients and relatives, providing information on stroke and being involved in 
discharge planning. 
 
Nuƌse͛s defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ 
The nurse defines spirituality thus: 
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͞I ǁould saǇ it's ďelieǀiŶg iŶ soŵethiŶg else that͛s Ŷot phǇsiĐallǇ heƌe aŶd kiŶd of ... it͛s giǀiŶg 
you that waƌŵth aŶd Đoŵfoƌt to help Ǉou get thƌough thiŶgs iŶ life͟ 
 
Although she says towards the end of our discussion that she does not consider herself to be a 
spiƌitual peƌsoŶ, she Ŷeǀeƌtheless saǇs she ďelieǀes iŶ soŵethiŶg that ͞giǀes Đoŵfoƌt͟. “he is 
also opeŶ to otheƌ people͛s spiƌitual Ŷeeds. Hoǁeǀeƌ, she iŶtiŵates that ofteŶ patieŶts Đoŵe 
into her care who do not require any spiritual help or special consideration: 
 
͞But ǁe haǀeŶ't ƌeallǇ had that ŵaŶǇ to ďe hoŶest of patieŶts that haǀe ƌeƋuiƌed aŶǇthiŶg 
eǆtƌa iŶ that seŶse ƌeallǇ.͟ 
 
She also suggests that spiritual concerns are not necessarily included when a patient is clerked 
into the ward by the nursing staff, apart from explicit information about belonging to a 
particular religion: 
 
͞….ďut very often it͛s Ŷot eǆpƌessed iŶ the foƌŵ, ǁhetheƌ theƌe ǁas aŶǇ ƌeligioŶ, ƌeligious 
ďeliefs, uŶless theƌe ǁas aŶ aĐtual ƌeligious ďelief.͟ 
 
The nurse gives an example of a patient who had been on the ward. She was not necessarily a 
religious person, but the nurse identifies her as someone with spiritual needs: 
 
͞ǁe haǀe had a patieŶt iŶ the past that ǁas ǀeƌǇ spiƌitual… so she ǁould eǆpƌess hoǁ she ǁas 
feeling or what she ǁas seeiŶg aŶd saǇiŶg… desĐƌiďiŶg thiŶgs iŶ Đolouƌs as ǁell, so ͚I aŵ feeliŶg 
ƌed todaǇ,͛ ͚I aŵ feeliŶg….͛  Yeah, that ǁas Ƌuite a ǁhile ago though that patieŶt.͟ 
 
I ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhǇ this patieŶt ;ǁho ǁas oŶ the ǁaƌd ͞Ƌuite a ǁhile ago͟Ϳ has staǇed iŶ the Ŷuƌse͛s 
mind as an example of a patient with spiritual needs? Is it that hers was an unusual 
manifestation of spirituality, or is it that the nurse comes across patients with overt spiritual 
needs infrequently? 
 
Nuƌse͛s ƌole iŶ teƌŵs of spiƌitualitǇ 
The Ŷuƌse͛s ƌole is oŶe ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh of suppoƌtiŶg the patieŶt aŶd it is Đleaƌ that this also applies 
to supporting their spiritual needs: 
 
͞Yeah, if it is soŵeoŶe͛s ĐhoiĐe to talk aďout those thiŶgs aŶd oďǀiouslǇ ǁe aƌe theƌe to 
suppoƌt patieŶts͟ 
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However, time constraints often make supporting spiritual needs problematic: 
 
͞the diffiĐultǇ oďǀiouslǇ is ǁith the tiŵes in the NHS and having less staff and having more of a 
ǁoƌkload to do as ǁell, it does ŵake thiŶgs like that ŵoƌe diffiĐult.͟ 
 
She recognises the benefit of working within a team in order to address the emotional and 
spiritual issues of a patient: 
 
͞aŶd ǁe fiŶd that haƌd as Ŷuƌses to ďe aďle to suppoƌt soŵeoŶe goiŶg thƌough that aŶd that͛s 
ǁheŶ ǁe ǁould Đall oŶ otheƌ people to … Ǉou kŶoǁ, it͛s a ŵultidisĐipliŶaƌǇ teaŵ, to tƌǇ aŶd 
help and support them even if it's just sitting with them or if their family Đoŵe iŶ at aŶǇ tiŵe͟ 
 
The nurse seems tentative in her understanding of her role in addressing spiritual needs, and 
would value more explicit guidance: 
 
͞It͛s soŵethiŶg that I thiŶk ǁe aƌe alǁaǇs goiŶg to ďe leaƌŶiŶg ǁith ďeĐause theƌe͛s ŶothiŶg 
really out theƌe to help … theƌe͛s Ŷo guideliŶes, it's kiŶd of hoǁ Ǉou iŶteƌpƌet it isŶ't it?͟ 
 
Team working 
As heƌ title suggests, the stƌoke liaisoŶ Ŷuƌse͛s ƌole iŶǀolǀes ďƌiŶgiŶg iŶ otheƌ pƌofessioŶals at 
different points in the patient journey, relaying pertinent information between professionals 
and patients and their carers. She mentions the speech and language therapist (SLT) as being 
the key team member on whom to call when she and other team members need to know the 
best method of communicating with a patient: 
 
͞We ŶoƌŵallǇ ask the speeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapists foƌ suppoƌt ǁithiŶ that aƌea so theǇ 
ǁould let us kŶoǁ ǁhat is ƌeliaďle ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟ 
 
and the SLT also offers support to nursing staff and other team members when the patient is 
showing frustration because of communication difficulties: 
 
͞Ǉou ĐaŶ see theiƌ fƌustƌatioŶ so that͛s ǁheŶ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, speeĐh aŶd laŶguage [sic] comes in 
ǀeƌǇ ǁell, if theǇ aƌe aďle to help suppoƌt us ǁith that theŶ it's ǀeƌǇ ďeŶefiĐial͟ 
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She also mentions the neuropsychologist as being another key team member for supporting 
teaŵ ŵeŵďeƌs aŶd patieŶts, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to patieŶts͛ eǆpƌessiŶg eǆisteŶtial aŶgst 
post stroke: 
 
͞Yeah, Ǉeah, so Ǉou ǁould haǀe soŵe patieŶts that aƌe eǆpƌessiŶg, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ͚WhǇ has this 
happened to ŵe, haǀe I doŶe soŵethiŶg ǁƌoŶg, is it ďeĐause of this?͛ Ǉou kŶoǁ, aŶd thiŶkiŶg 
aďout thiŶgs iŶ theiƌ past life that ͚I haǀe ďeeŶ a ďad peƌsoŶ, aŶd this is ǁhǇ this has happeŶed͛ 
– that͛s ǁhǇ it's Ƌuite helpful that ǁe haǀe ŶeuƌopsǇĐh goiŶg as ǁell ďeĐause it may be 
something more underlying going on than what we know.͟ 
 
The nurse also views her role as one of supporting the medical team in breaking diagnostic 
news to patients; the doctors would talk to the patient about their medical diagnosis, and then 
the nurse, with other team members, would be there to help the patient understand and 
come to terms with the news: 
 
͞“o geŶeƌallǇ thiŶgs like that aƌe ŶoƌŵallǇ ďƌoaĐhed ďǇ the doĐtoƌs ďeĐause theǇ aƌe disĐussiŶg 
the medical side of things more often when they do their daily rounds, and then obviously 
after that, then obviously we are kind of the fallback from that, so if they had any questions or 
if theǇ aƌe gettiŶg ŵoƌe fƌustƌated ǁe ǁould… if ǁe ǁeƌe stƌuggliŶg ǁe ǁould speak to the 
language therapists [sic] for support or say neuropysch if they are able to come into play as 
ǁell.͟ 
 
Referring on to other members of the team 
The nurse sees her role vis à vis spirituality as one of referring on when appropriate to the 
chaplaincy team. She mentions referral of a dying patient to chaplaincy for administration of 
the last rites: 
 
͞ǁhetheƌ it's gettiŶg a ĐhaplaiŶ iŶ, oƌ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, if theǇ ǁeƌe a patieŶt that ǁas dǇiŶg aŶd theǇ 
Ŷeeded theiƌ last ƌites aŶd aŶǇthiŶg like that ƌeallǇ͟ 
 
She acknowledges that the role of the chaplain is perhaps made more difficult with the person 
whose communication skills are compromised: 
 
͞soŵetiŵes ǁe haǀe had ĐhaplaiŶs Đoŵe iŶ ďut oďǀiouslǇ that ŵakes it diffiĐult ďeĐause if 
theǇ aƌe Ŷot aďle to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate…͟ 
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However, she is also able to see the value of chaplains using facilitative communication 
strategies, as well as of the possible comfort of familiarity: 
 
͞ďut theǇ ǁould use the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aids as ǁell aŶd see if theǇ aƌe aďle to help aŶd 
establish what it is that they are wanting to know, they read prayers as well with patients even 
if they are not fully understanding, they still do that because it's a process that they are used 
to doiŶg.͟ 
 
Interestingly, the nurse discusses referral to palliative care for patients requiring spiritual 
support at the end of life. It of course makes intuitive sense that those professionals who are 
very used to spending time with the dying and their families would also be able to support 
other team members with issues of spirituality, and yet she is the only member of the team to 
mention them: 
 
͞It͛s ŵoƌe diffiĐult if the patieŶt is ĐoŵiŶg to the eŶd of theiƌ life iŶ a ǁaǇ ďeĐause it͛s ǁhat aƌe 
theǇ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of that… Palliatiǀe Đaƌe as ǁell, ǁe ofteŶ speak to palliatiǀe Đaƌe aŶd theǇ͛ll 
help us ǁith that.͟ 
 
Challenges of working with people with aphasia 
Not unsurprisingly, the nurse has a good understanding of aphasia, and the different ways it 
ŵaǇ affeĐt a peƌsoŶ͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate: 
 
͞ǁhetheƌ theǇ aƌe uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ;ďeĐause soŵe patieŶts may be understanding but are not 
aďle to eǆpƌess that theǇ uŶdeƌstaŶdͿ so it just depeŶds oŶ ǁhat tǇpe of … ǁhetheƌ it͛s 
ƌeĐeptiǀe oƌ eǆpƌessiǀe as ǁell͟ 
 
“he ƌeĐogŶises the ĐhalleŶge of disĐeƌŶiŶg the patieŶt͛s Ŷeeds if theǇ aƌe uŶaďle to 
communicate, and the benefit of spending time with patients in order to get to know their 
likes and dislikes: 
 
͞uŶtil Ǉou kŶoǁ soŵeoŶe it's diffiĐult to kŶoǁ ǁhat theǇ ǁould pƌefeƌ aŶd that͛s ǁhat ŵakes 
things a lot more interesting.͟ 
 
She also understands the limits of the Ŷuƌse͛s ƌeŵit iŶ teƌŵs of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, 
iŶ assessiŶg a peƌsoŶ ǁith aphasia͛s aďilitǇ to giǀe iŶfoƌŵed ĐoŶseŶt, the Ŷuƌse ǁould Đall oŶ a 
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speeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapist to deteƌŵiŶe the patieŶt͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to uŶdeƌstaŶd aŶd to 
express consent: 
 
͞“oŵetiŵes theǇ [the speeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapists] suppoƌt ǁith the ĐapaĐitǇ assessŵeŶts 
as well just to help us really to establish whether what we are understanding is reliable.͟ 
 
Emotions encountered 
The nurse recognises a number of emotions encountered by people with aphasia following 
stƌoke, suĐh as fƌustƌatioŶ, aŶgeƌ aŶd ďeiŶg ͞uptight͟. “he eǆplaiŶs hoǁ soŵe people folloǁiŶg 
stroke may experience periods of existential angst, when they are asking questions about why 
they have become ill: 
 
͞Ǉeah, so Ǉou ǁould haǀe soŵe patieŶts that aƌe eǆpƌessiŶg, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ͚WhǇ has this 
happeŶed to ŵe, haǀe I doŶe soŵethiŶg ǁƌoŶg, is it ďeĐause of this?͛ Ǉou kŶoǁ, aŶd thiŶkiŶg 
aďout thiŶgs iŶ theiƌ past life that ͚I haǀe ďeeŶ a ďad peƌsoŶ, aŶd this is ǁhǇ this has 
happeŶed͛͟ 
 
She talks about the particular fear people may experience at the end of life: 
 
͞It͛s ŵoƌe diffiĐult if the patieŶt is ĐoŵiŶg to the eŶd of theiƌ life iŶ a ǁaǇ ďeĐause it͛s ǁhat aƌe 
they understanding of that, and I think it can be quite frightening for them because it's 
frightening for anyone to be facing that.͟ 
 
One can only surmise that this fear may be even more marked in those patients who are 
unable to voice this. 
 
Non-verbal communication 
The nurse has some understanding of total communication strategies: 
 
͞We haǀe a ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďooklet that ǁe use; also if theƌe͛s ĐeƌtaiŶ thiŶgs that patieŶts 
understand that the family have, then they can bring them in – photos, anything that helps 
tƌiggeƌ thiŶgs ƌeallǇ, that͛s the ŵaiŶ… the ŶoŶ-verbal commands, sometimes people are able 
to gestuƌe ďut Ŷot aďle to speak͟ 
 
However, there are some practical barriers in the way of communication aids being used 
routinely: 
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͞Yes ǁe haǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aids.  We did haǀe soŵe up oŶ the ǁall ďut theǇ haǀe taken 
theŵ doǁŶ ǁheŶ theǇ ǁeƌe paiŶtiŶg, so…  We aƌe just ǁaitiŶg foƌ theŵ to ďe put ďaĐk up 
agaiŶ.͟ 
 
Like many of the participants in this study, when the interview is coming to an end (and in this 
case, the recorder has been switched off), the nurse reveals a nugget of information about 
spirituality which she subsequently gives me permission to share. She tells me that she does 
Ŷot ĐoŶsideƌ heƌself to ďe a spiƌitual peƌsoŶ, ďut that she ďelieǀes iŶ soŵethiŶg that ͞giǀes 
Đoŵfoƌt͟. “he desĐƌiďes a ďeautiful picture that her grandmother relayed to her as she lay 
dying in a hospice; her grandmother saw daffodils and knew she was going to a good place. 
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To listen and love: The lay chaplain’s tale 
 
The lay chaplain and I meet for our interview in the hospital chapel, a quiet area but one 
ǁheƌe people ǁould Đoŵe aŶd go fƌeelǇ. The laǇ ĐhaplaiŶ is a ChƌistiaŶ aŶd has ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs͛ 
experience in this capacity of working with people who have had strokes: 
 
͞at the {named hospital} goiŶg ďaĐk ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs͟ 
 
He is not ordained but is a volunteer with the chaplaincy team. In line with the other qualified 
members of the multidisciplinary team (MDT) interviewees, I had intended to interview the 
chaplain herself, an ordained minister. However, in consultation with her, it was decided that 
the lay chaplain had much more experience of ministering to people post stroke and that he 
would therefore be the most appropriate member of the chaplaincy team to be interviewed. 
Again, the interview loosely followed the MDT topic guide and finished ǁith the ƋuestioŶ ͞is 
theƌe aŶǇthiŶg else Ǉou ǁaŶt to saǇ aďout this topiĐ that I haǀeŶ͛t Đoǀeƌed?͟ 
 
Listening 
The lay chaplain begins by outlining what his job generally entails. He explains that his is a 
listening role, one that provides support and help through talking and listening: 
 
͞I saǇs ͚I aŵ heƌe to talk to Ǉou aŶd listeŶ to Ǉou, to help Ǉou iŶ ǁhat is happeŶiŶg to Ǉou͛.͟ 
 
He values this listening role as perhaps the most important part of the interaction: 
 
͞also at the eŶd theǇ haǀe thaŶked ŵe foƌ listeŶiŶg to theŵ͟. 
 
Relationship 
His role is also one of relationship. He laments the fact that, in the hospital in which he 
currently works, throughput of patients is much faster than it was in his previous hospital, and 
thus he is not able to see patients as often, and forge such strong relationships: 
 
͟foƌŵ a ǀeƌǇ ďig ƌelatioŶship ǁith theŵ, aŶd seeiŶg theŵ eǀeƌǇ daǇ, it did help͟ 
 
͞It͛s aǁkǁaƌd iŶ this hospital Ŷoǁ ďeĐause I oŶlǇ see a patieŶt oŶĐe͟ 
 
The relationship he does forge with patients, however, appears to be mutually beneficial: 
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͞so, I͛ŵ gettiŶg soŵethiŶg out of it as ǁell ďeĐause I listeŶ to people͛s liǀes͟. 
 
Being comfortable in his presence 
He stresses the fact that he wants patients to feel comfortable in his presence and wants to 
avoid obstructions to interaction appearing ďeĐause he has the title of ͚ĐhaplaiŶ͛, aŶd 
therefore perhaps the reputation of someone who is going to proselytise: 
 
͞aŶd I thiŶk ǁheŶ Ǉou saǇ Ǉou͛ƌe a laǇ ĐhaplaiŶ people soŵetiŵes put up a ďaƌƌieƌ aŶd I saǇ ͚I 
am Ŷot heƌe foƌ ĐhaplaiŶĐǇ, I aŵ Ŷot heƌe to pƌeaĐh to Ǉou.͛͟ 
 
He wants to provide ministry to patients who desire it, regardless of their faith or lack of faith: 
 
͞theƌe has ďeeŶ a Đouple of tiŵes ǁheŶ I haǀe ŵet patieŶts aŶd theǇ haǀe said ͚I aŵ soƌƌǇ, I 
am Ŷot a ChƌistiaŶ, I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe.͛ I saǇ ͚ I͛ŵ Ŷot heƌe foƌ that,͛ ͞ 
 
On the other hand, he will pray with people who explicitly request that ministry: 
 
͞a feǁ of theŵ haǀe tuƌŶed ƌouŶd aŶd said ͚ǁould Ǉou pƌaǇ foƌ ŵe?͛͟ 
 
Love 
At the heart of what he does is love and compassion: 
 
͞I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, eŶĐoŵpassiŶg theŵ iŶ that loǀe that ǁe haǀe all got aŶd if theǇ ĐaŶ feel that, I 
thiŶk it ŵust help a hell of a lot͟. 
 
Holism 
The lay chaplain views his input as holistic, not just benefitting the patient from a spiritual 
perspective but also contributing to body/mind restitution: 
 
͞ aŶd also ďǇ doiŶg that [patieŶt talkiŶg aďout faŵilǇ, hoďďies etĐ] I thiŶk it helps theiƌ ŵiŶds 
to ǁoƌk, so it͛s helpiŶg all the ǁaǇ thƌough the ďodǇ͟ 
 
Just as the other professionals involved want to include the spiritual in their rehabilitation of 
mind and body, so the lay chaplain is cognisant of the need to include the mind and body in his 
spiritual ministry. 
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Evasion 
It seeŵs that the ŵajoƌitǇ of the laǇ ĐhaplaiŶ͛s ƌole is ďased aƌound the verbal; being able to 
talk to and listen to the patient, to pray with them. When asked about ministering to people 
ǁith little oƌ ͞Ŷo talk͟ ;MĐViĐkeƌ, ϮϬϬϳͿ, the laǇ ĐhaplaiŶ appeaƌs less ĐoŶfideŶt iŶ his 
response. Indeed, he does not actually answeƌ the ƋuestioŶ ͞do Ǉou fiŶd people ǁho haǀe had 
a stroke and have communication problems, are they sometimes still wanting to talk to you 
aďout … spiƌitual issues?͟. He iŶstead, peƌhaps, staǇs iŶ his Đoŵfoƌt zoŶe, of ƌeassuƌiŶg people 
that they do not have to be church-goers to be loved by God. Or perhaps he misunderstood 
the question. 
At times, he candidly admits to shutting down the conversation because verbal communication 
is so limited: 
 
͞But soŵe I…Ǉou get that ďlaŶk look aŶd so Ǉou saǇ ͚ǁell thaŶk Ǉou very much, I am happy to 
ďe heƌe ǁith Ǉou ďut as ǁe ĐaŶŶot ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate I ǁill saǇ a pƌaǇeƌ aŶd I ǁill ŵoǀe oŶ͛͟ 
 
This is at odds, hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁith his asseƌtioŶ that ͞ I tƌǇ aŶd ŵake theŵ feel at ease just ďǇ 
sittiŶg theƌe͟. 
 
He alludes to the ͞aǁkǁaƌdŶess͟ of interacting with someone with little or no verbal 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, aŶd to the faĐt the he does Ŷot ǁaŶt to put ͞too ŵuĐh stƌaiŶ͟ oŶ the patieŶt. 
Is it that he is wary of causing stress to the patieŶt, oƌ is this ͞aǁkǁaƌdŶess͟ felt as keeŶlǇ ďǇ 
him? 
I broaĐh the ĐoŶĐept of ͞ŵiŶisteƌiŶg ǁithout ǁoƌds͟ aŶd, although he is iŶitiallǇ puzzled ďǇ this 
idea, he does then take on board what it could mean: 
 
͞…just ďǇ ouƌ faĐes aŶd the ǁaǇ ǁe look at people aŶd just aĐtioŶs͟. 
 
Non-verbal communication 
When it comes to ministering specifically to people with aphasia post-stroke, the lay chaplain 
has a rudimentary understanding of the fact that non-verbal communication strategies may be 
helpful. He uses written cues, gesture and facial expression to try and facilitate expression and 
understanding of language: 
 
͞I ask theŵ if theǇ ǁaŶt to ǁƌite it doǁŶ. I alǁaǇs ĐaƌƌǇ a peŶ aŶd papeƌ…if theǇ ĐaŶ͛t talk to 
ŵe theŶ I ǁill do laŶguage [siĐ], aŶd Ǉou kŶoǁ, I ǁill saǇ ͚aƌe Ǉou happǇ?͛ ;gesturing) and 
smile, and do different thiŶgs like that to tƌǇ aŶd see ǁhetheƌ I ĐaŶ get ƌeĐolleĐtioŶ fƌoŵ theŵ͟ 
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When I ask him what would help when having conversations with people with aphasia, he 
says: 
 
͞diffeƌeŶt Đaƌds, oŶes that haǀe got photos oŶ theŵ…ǀisual aids, I thiŶk that ǁould help Ƌuite 
a ďit͟. 
 
Definition of spirituality 
When asked for his definition of spirituality, the lay chaplain first laments that this is a difficult 
concept to define. He then goes on to say: 
 
͞I ǁould saǇ to tƌǇ aŶd aĐtuallǇ do ǁhat the Loƌd asks us to do, as he asked his disciples, to go 
out to teaĐh, to heal, to listeŶ aŶd loǀe͟ 
 
So, his initial definition, not unsurprisingly, is based on Christian, biblical teaching. However, he 
later goes on to broaden out his definition of spirituality, veering away from the overtly 
Christian, or even religious: 
 
͞I thiŶk it͛s eǀeƌǇthiŶg, Ǉou kŶoǁ, iŶ all ǁe do͟. 
 
Personal experience 
At the end of the interview, as I have done in all the interviews, I ask the lay chaplain whether 
there is anything else about the topic that he wants to say, anything I have missed. He takes 
this opportunity to tell me his personal, and immediate, experience of stroke; his aunt had just 
suffered a stroke and had subsequent aphasia. He gives his take on what aphasia is: 
 
͞ďeĐause ǁith a stƌoke I thiŶk people, theiƌ ďƌaiŶs soŵetiŵes…theǇ ĐaŶ heaƌ the ǁoƌds ǁe aƌe 
saǇiŶg ďut theǇ͛ƌe juŵďled aŶd soŵetiŵes ǁe Ŷeed to let theŵ haǀe that soƌt of…to uŶ-
juŵďle it͟ 
 
and how best to communicate with someone with aphasia: 
 
͞It has affeĐted heƌ talkiŶg side ŵore and I was just allowing her to talk slowly and I think this 
is the ŵaiŶ thiŶg ǁe haǀe got to look at, if a patieŶt ĐaŶ͛t talk to Ǉou pƌopeƌlǇ, alloǁ theŵ to 
take theiƌ tiŵe͟ 
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I wonder why he has alluded to this personal experience? Is it that he just wants to use a 
specific patient as an example of someone with aphasia, albeit a relative? Perhaps he sees me 
as an interested party, as someone with inherent interest in a situation currently very close to 
his heart. Maybe he is looking for my professional SLT opinion. Can the qualitative interview 
process become a therapeutic one? 
What strikes me about the lay chaplain is his very definite desire to help and to offer love to 
the patients with whom he engages. However, it is also clear that he has limited understanding 
of aphasia aŶd the ŵultifaƌious effeĐts of aphasia oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate. 
Peƌhaps the ͞aǁkǁaƌdŶess͟ he ideŶtifies iŶ his iŶteƌaĐtioŶs ǁith people ǁith aphasia Đould ďe 
mitigated by being better informed about the different types of aphasia, and the different 
facilitation strategies which may enrich his interactions with stroke patients. 
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Chapter 5: Making sense of the stories 
 
͞Theƌe aƌe ŵoƌe thiŶgs iŶ heaǀeŶ aŶd oŶ eaƌth, Hoƌatio, thaŶ aƌe dƌeaŵt of iŶ Ǉour 
philosophǇ͟ 
(Hamlet William Shakespeare) 
 
If pheŶoŵeŶologǇ is ͞the aƌt of ďƌiŶgiŶg tƌuth iŶto ďeiŶg͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p xxii), then 
this ƌeseaƌĐh has atteŵpted to ďƌiŶg the tƌuth aďout the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ spiƌitualitǇ to the foƌe. 
Spirituality for them, as for me, encompassed myriad facets of life - including but not 
exclusively - religious belief. The stories of the participants in groups 1 and 2 have been an 
attempt to discover what it is like to eǆpƌess oŶe͛s spiƌitualitǇ, when one has aphasia. 
Their myriad comments, gestures, intonation and facial expressions all create a rich Mosaic 
(Clark, 2001) of spiritual matters communicated. People with a professed faith were able to 
convey complex religious concepts; Joel and I, for example, were able to have a conversation 
about the Christian concepts of the Holy Trinity and the fruits of the spirit. Other participants 
were able to express the complexity of supernatural occurrences; David shared a vision of 
Jesus he had experienced as a young child, and Lindy eloquently and beautifully described the 
appearance of angels at her bedside during her stroke coma. Others equated spirituality with 
meaning-making, and were able to convey what gave their life meaning and purpose. 
In order to help build a framework from which to view these stories, I have used some 
concepts propounded by Merleau-Ponty (2002), namely ambiguity, language and thought, 
lived body, the body as expression and wonder. These concepts enabled me to make sense of 
the stories. Aligning each story to FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ illŶess Ŷaƌƌatiǀes added a fuƌtheƌ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, 
which has particular pertinence when I come to discuss clinical relevance of the study (chapter 
6). 
The second research question asked what is the lived experience of the multidisciplinary stroke 
team when discussing spirituality with their clients with aphasia? I found it helpful to look at 
the MDT interviews through the lens of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s (2002) ideas of ambiguity and 
wonder, in order to dig deeper into this experience. 
In order to make sense of the stoƌies, I had to agaiŶ ĐoŶsideƌ ɑadaŵeƌ͛s fusioŶ of hoƌizoŶs 
;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯϭϲͿ, as I had ǁheŶ ĐaƌƌǇiŶg out the iŶteƌǀieǁs. MǇ pƌejudiĐes ;oƌ ͞foƌe-ŵeaŶiŶgs͟ – 
see chapter 2) formed part of my horizon, as this horizon met those of my participants. So it 
ǁas that I felt aďle to ďeĐoŵe aŶ ͞eŶhaŶĐeƌ͟, ĐƌeatiŶg ͞aŶ atŵospheƌe of fƌeedoŵ, opeŶŶess, 
aŶd tƌust͟, eŶaďliŶg paƌtiĐipaŶts to ͞ƌespoŶd aŶd disĐlose [theiƌ] oǁŶ thoughts aŶd feeliŶgs͟ 
(Moustakas, 1994, p 39).  
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5.1 Frank’s illness (disability) narratives 
 
As I listened to the spiritual stories of people with aphasia, I also contemplated the three 
illness narratives propounded by Frank, namely restitution, chaos and quest (Frank, 2013, p 
52).  Some participants with aphasia expressed a restitution narrative, claiming experienced or 
hoped-for improvement in their language impairment, or their body function (World Health 
Organisation, 2001). Some participants were still deep in the wreckage of the chaos narrative, 
unable to navigate a way through. Some, however, seemed to have attained a state of quest, 
and were embracing a new life with new, changed communication skills. Some stories of 
spirituality revealed more than one illness/disability narrative. Participants expressing a 
predominantly quest narrative seemed to be the most able or willing also to engage in a 
spiritual narrative. 
5.1.1 Chaos 
 
The ͞aŶti-Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϵϴͿ of the Đhaos stoƌǇ is epitoŵised iŶ the effoƌts of soŵe 
participants to convey the utter devastation and distress of the stroke event. Peter talks about 
the faĐt that he ͞ƌeallǇ ĐouldŶ͛t use the ǁoƌds͟ iŵŵediatelǇ afteƌ the stƌoke, ĐhiŵiŶg ǁith 
FƌaŶk͛s ŶotioŶ that ͞the suffeƌiŶg is too gƌeat foƌ the self to ďe told͟ ;p ϭϭϱͿ. Of Đouƌse, these 
participants were not only in a state where narrative may fail, but were also deprived of their 
linguistic abilities per se; most participants explained how their aphasia was far more 
pronounced immediately post-onset than at the point of interview. Peter intimates that 
hospital staff in the acute setting were not able to hear or listen to his illness narrative soon 
after the stroke: 
 
͞I ƌeallǇ ĐouldŶ͛t talk to theŵ aŶǇǁaǇ͟ 
 
and for some participants, like Lindy, the aphasia was so severe that telling any kind of 
narrative was impossible; ͞ŵe, ŵute͟, she saǇs aŶd I ǁƌite iŶ ŵǇ Ŷotes afteƌ the seĐoŶd 
interview that she draws fingers of left hand across mouth – like a gag?  Language and 
narration is literally stalled, by both the aphasia and perhaps also because these individuals are 
in this state of chaos. 
Other participants demonstrate this annihilation by their choice of vocabulary. Joel says 
͞ďeĐause Ǉou haǀe goŶe͟, aŶd he, too, ŵakes a sǁeepiŶg gestuƌe ǁith his left haŶd as if to 
emphasise this. David talks about his preferred hand beiŶg ͞ďuggeƌed͟, so that ǁƌitiŶg ;aŶd, 
for him, art) have become difficult. 
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Both Peter and David use peculiarly mild vocabulary to convey the events surrounding their 
stƌoke. Peteƌ͛s seǀeƌe dip iŶ teŵpeƌatuƌe afteƌ speŶdiŶg seǀeƌal houƌs Đollapsed iŶ the gaƌden 
is desĐƌiďed ďǇ hiŵ as ͞aǁkǁaƌd͟, aŶd Daǀid ƌelates hoǁ he ǁas ͞slightlǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed͟ at 
waking up in the night and not being able to move the right side of his body.  Perhaps they are 
trying to contain the chaos by tempering their lexical choice. 
The related stroke stories themselves all inevitably carry a chaotic theme, none more so than 
Peteƌ͛s, ǁheƌe the aŵďulaŶĐe is delaǇed ďǇ a ĐoŶtƌafloǁ sǇsteŵ, ǁith Đaƌs dƌiǀiŶg oŶ the 
opposite side of the road – perhaps the epitome of chaos. Aspects of these narratives are very 
frightening; Joel was driving with a passenger in the car when he experienced his stroke, and 
Francesca was alone in her flat and not found for 36 hours. Lindy experienced her stroke on 
Christmas day whilst out for a walk with a friend; here the catastrophe of the stroke 
experience seems to be heightened by the contrast with festivities going on around her. 
Of all the participants with aphasia, it is those in group 1 who have recently had their strokes 
who display the most evidence of still living a chaos narrative. Although David in group 2 still 
appears to blame his sister-in-law for giving medical and nursing staff erroneous information 
relating to his insulin, thereby prolonging his hospital stay, he nevertheless does also 
demonstrate other narratives now that he is nine months on. Liam and Amy, however, both 
seem lost in a ͞Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ǁƌeĐkage͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϱϯͿ, ǁheƌe phǇsiĐal Ŷeeds take pƌeĐedeŶĐe 
over everything. For Liam, all identified meaning-makers have been stripped away – he has 
few visitors, he is not able to care for his cat, he is physically unable to engage in the sports he 
loves, and he has a real lack of control over his physical functioning (for example, his 
swallowing difficulties necessitate a nasogastric tube, and his lack of bladder and bowel 
control means he is reliant on incontinence pads). For Amy, too, physical discomfort and pain 
are at the forefront of our discussions, and satisfaction of physical needs is paramount. 
The participants in group 1 were less inclined to talk about spiritual or existential issues than 
their group 2 colleagues; perhaps this is due in part to their being deep within the chaos 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀe, ǁheƌe all theiƌ eŶeƌgǇ is ĐoŶsuŵed ďǇ tƌǇiŶg to satisfǇ the ďase of Masloǁ͛s 
hierarchy of need pyramid (Maslow, 1954); the pinnacle of self-actualisation can perhaps only 
be voiced as individuals approach and enter a quest narrative. All participants in group 1 were 
ƌelatiǀelǇ passiǀe iŶ theiƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, peƌhaps aŶotheƌ iŶdiĐatioŶ of the ͞Ŷaƌƌatiǀe 
wreckage͟ ǁhiĐh fiŶds eǆpƌessioŶ diffiĐult: 
 
͞Liǀed Đhaos ŵakes ƌefleĐtioŶ, aŶd ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ stoƌǇtelliŶg, iŵpossiďle.͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϵϴͿ. 
 
Interestingly, neither of the two participants with a strong Christian faith – Lindy and Joel – 
blame God for their situation or lose their faith. God is not lost in the chaos. 
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5.1.2 Restitution 
 
The aphasia stories of spirituality from group 2 are peppered with restitution narratives. All the 
participants bar Francesca report that their expressive language is better now than it was 
immediately post-stƌoke. Daǀid saǇs ͞ǁell, hopefullǇ it͛s [his speeĐh] a ďit iŵpƌoǀed͟ aŶd Joel 
eǆĐlaiŵs hoǁ his laŶguage is ͞[ǀࠧtli] ;ǀastlǇ?Ϳ ďetteƌ͟. “oŵe attƌiďute this to the speeĐh aŶd 
language therapy input they have received. The SLT is seeŶ ďǇ soŵe as the ͚Đuƌeƌ͛, the ŵediĐal 
eǆpeƌt ǁho takes ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ iŵpƌoǀiŶg the iŵpaiƌŵeŶt; ͞she taught ŵe hoǁ to speak͟, 
says Peter. SLT is seen as the restitution remedy. 
LiŶdǇ ƌepoƌts that she is alǁaǇs ƌeadiŶg aŶd ǁƌitiŶg aŶd ͞stƌiǀiŶg͟ to make improvements in 
her language abilities. Joel and Francesca also both show this stoicism, perhaps illustrated best 
in Francesca͛s eǆĐlaŵatioŶ of ͞foƌǁaƌd ŵaƌĐh͟. 
For two of the ChƌistiaŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts, ƌestitutioŶ has a ƌeligious oǀeƌlaǇ. LiŶdǇ͛s ĐoŵŵeŶt in a 
pƌiǀate eŵail of ͞I aŵ Lazaƌus͟ suggests that she feels saǀed fƌoŵ death, iŶ faĐt that she ǁas 
dead ďut ǁas ďƌought ďaĐk thƌough ŵiƌaĐulous aŶd diǀiŶe iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ. Joel͛s stoiĐ attitude of 
accepting what life has dealt him seems rooted in his belief that this phase is transient, and 
that he will receive a new, healed body when he rises again after death. This religious 
restitution does not rely on the medical model of intervention but rather on divine healing. 
5.1.3 Quest 
 
All the participants in group 1 seem a long way from finding a quest narrative. Although Amy 
voices often during our conversations that she wants to go home, thereby perhaps intimating 
that she is searching for normality, she nevertheless remains dependent on nursing and 
medical care which necessitates her staying in hospital. Liam and Rosemary also appear far 
from being able to express a quest narrative, notwithstanding their expressive language 
difficulties.  
By contrast, all the participants in group 2 display some evidence of a quest narrative at certain 
stages of their stories. The artists – David and Lindy – are both starting to embrace artistic 
expressions close to but different from their original forms; published novelist Lindy now 
writes poetry, and fine artist David is now experimenting with sculpture. Francesca, who from 
the beginning of our conversation makes it clear that employment is of huge importance to 
her, is no longer able to work as an accountant but has a role within her stroke group which 
she ƌefeƌs to as ͞ǁoƌk͟. Joel is ĐoŶteŶt ǁith his lot, alŵost ĐhidiŶg ŵe foƌ assuŵiŶg that his 
word-finding difficulties are a source of frustration. Peter is thankful that his stroke did not 
ƌesult iŶ phǇsiĐal disaďilitǇ: ͞aŶd goiŶg to the “tƌoke AssoĐiatioŶ ŵeetiŶg I ƌealised that I lucky 
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ďeĐause a lot of people theƌe ĐaŶ͛t use aŶ aƌŵ oƌ leg oƌ…͟, as this ŵeaŶs he still has the 
phǇsiĐal aďilitǇ to ͞get oŶ ǁith ŵe gaƌdeŶ͟, a peƌfeĐt ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of Ƌuest. 
 
All the participants with aphasia in groups 1 and 2 express one or more of these illness 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀes thƌoughout theiƌ stoƌies, testaŵeŶt to the faĐt that telliŶg the stoƌǇ of oŶe͛s illŶess 
is possible, even when language is severely impaired. 
5.2 The influence of Merleau-Ponty  
 
Relating the stories to the phenomenology of perception propounded by Merleau-Ponty 
(2002) helped to root them in a framework, which in turn enhanced my understanding. Much 
of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ǁoƌk is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith the so-Đalled ͞thiƌd diŵeŶsioŶ͟ ǁhiĐh, he Đlaiŵs, 
exists between empiricism and intellectualisŵ, ďetǁeeŶ ͞phǇsiĐal ƌealitǇ͟ aŶd a ͞spiƌitual oƌ 
ŵeŶtal ƌealŵ͟ ;Leǁis aŶd “taehleƌ, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϲϰͿ.   
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ demands that we go back to the Husserlian things themselves, to 
look at things pre-reflexively, before we have objective knowledge of them: 
͟To ƌetuƌŶ to thiŶgs theŵselǀes is to ƌetuƌŶ to that ǁoƌld ǁhiĐh pƌeĐedes kŶoǁledge, of ǁhiĐh 
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an 
abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which 
ǁe haǀe leaƌŶt ďefoƌehaŶd ǁhat a foƌest, a pƌaiƌie oƌ a ƌiǀeƌ is͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2010, p x). 
In the thinking of Carel (2008), a philosopher herself undergoing serious, life-limiting illness, 
phenomenology in the health sĐieŶĐes ĐaŶ ďe used to Đƌeate a fƌaŵeǁoƌk that ͞giǀes 
pƌeĐedeŶĐe to the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of illŶess aŶd to the eŵďodied Ŷatuƌe of huŵaŶ eǆisteŶĐe͟ ;p 
103). So it is that phenomenology aŶd the ĐoŶĐept of ͞liǀed ďodǇ͞ (Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 
161) fits the study of a particular facet of what it is to be human – namely spirituality – with a 
client group for whom the body has altered and a normal function of the body is changed – 
namely the ability to communicate in people with aphasia. In fact, for Merleau-Ponty (2002, p 
229), the act of expressing – whether via speech or another modality – is a transcendental, 
spiritual act: 
͞speeĐh oƌ gestuƌe tƌaŶsfiguƌe the ďodǇ͟ 
which further lends congruence to the use of phenomenology – and specifically the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty - to investigate spirituality with those who are challenged in 
their communication. 
The success of intersubjectivity in this study varied from participant to participant and from 
story to story, success or otherwise being largely governed ďǇ ŵǇ aďilitǇ tƌulǇ to ͚ďe ǁith͛ ŵǇ 
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participants. This, in turn, was influenced by multifarious factors, including time pressures and 
lack of shared cultural reference, but also, undeniably, communication breakdown.   
HiŶĐkleǇ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ states that the ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal͟ eŵphasizes the ͞seŶsoƌǇ aŶd peƌĐeptual 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes͟ ;p ϵϯͿ of iŶdiǀiduals, ǁhiĐh tallies ǁith Meƌleau-PoŶtǇ͛s eŵphasis oŶ peƌĐeptioŶ, 
which he divides into, amongst other concepts, bodily sensation, association, attention and, 
importantly for this study, speech (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Much of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ 
is concerned with ambiguity – or the so-Đalled ͞thiƌd ǁaǇ͟ ďetǁeeŶ eŵpiƌiĐisŵ aŶd 
intellectualism – language and thought, the lived body, the body as expression and wonder. 
Each of these elements of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ has been used in order to look at the 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies, aŶd to ŵake sense of the emergent themes. 
5.2.1 Merleau-Ponty and Ambiguity 
 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ deals ǁith the spaĐe ďetǁeeŶ. To ͚do͛ phenomenology, one must 
always begin with the lived experience, but that experience may be hazy, ambivalent or 
undefined. Within this study, a light was shone on the ambiguous concept of spirituality, 
expressed in the ambiguous language of people both with and without aphasia. Ambiguity 
revealed itself in language used and roles adopted, but it was also at times mitigated by careful 
listening and skilful non-verbal communication. 
To enter into an exploration of the spiritual stories of people with aphasia is to enter into a 
world of ambiguity. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p 30) recognises that between the worlds of 
intellectualism and empiricism, or idealism and realism (Dorfman, 2005, p 25), or perhaps even 
mind and body, lies the morass of ambiguity. Spirituality is itself a topic fraught with ambiguity, 
often seen as a nebulous concept, unwilling or unable to be confined in human-made verbal 
definition. Attempts have been made to define spirituality; indeed, examples were quoted in 
chapter 1, and all the participants in this study have given their own, disparate ideas as to what 
spirituality means to them.  Yet it remains a concept which defies reductive definitive 
definition, being perceived differently by each person. 
People with aphasia produce expressive language that may be pregnant with neologisms and 
paraphasias, latency and fillers, palilalia and automatic speech; in short, the expression of 
people with aphasia can reside in an ambiguous land, where it is incumbent upon the listener 
to attempt to create certainty through facilitative techniques and listening skills. The person 
with aphasia may themselves try to navigate this land of linguistic ambiguity, by creating their 
own landmarks in gesture, writing or drawing. 
As the majority of people have their language areas in the left cerebral cortex (Schoenberg and 
“Đott, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϭϱϵͿ, aŶ iŶfaƌĐt affeĐtiŶg the left Đoƌteǆ ŵaǇ ƌesult iŶ aphasia. IŶ his ďook, ͞The 
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Masteƌ aŶd his EŵissaƌǇ͟ MĐɑilĐhƌist ;ϮϬ10) posits that there are marked differences in the 
͚ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ of the ƌight heŵispheƌe ;the ͚ŵasteƌ͛Ϳ aŶd the left heŵispheƌe ;its ͚eŵissaƌǇ͛Ϳ, 
which may be pertinent not only to the ambiguity of aphasic language, but also to the 
ambiguity inherent in the study of a subject such as spirituality. 
The right hemisphere, saǇs MĐɑilĐhƌist ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϱϮͿ, is ͞ŵoƌe gloďal aŶd holistiĐ͟ thaŶ its left 
brother. The larger left hemisphere is concerned with the concrete, with categorisation, with 
foĐussed atteŶtioŶ, aŶd has tƌaditioŶallǇ ďeeŶ ƌefeƌƌed to as the doŵiŶaŶt heŵispheƌe ͞since 
it did all the talkiŶg͟ ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϮϯͿ. He aƌgues that the ƌight heŵispheƌe is ďetteƌ at 
ŵediatiŶg eŵotioŶs, seeiŶg the ǁhole ƌatheƌ thaŶ the paƌts, aŶd that ͞iŶteŶse eŵotioŶal 
responses are related to the right hemisphere and inhibited by the left͟ ;p ϮϳͿ. Little ǁoŶdeƌ 
then, perhaps, that the preserved right hemisphere in people with aphasia might actually 
thrive in an atmosphere of ambiguity, whereas their left hemisphere might baulk at a lack of 
cohesion and certitude: 
͞the ƌight heŵispheƌe͛s iŶteƌest iŶ laŶguage lies iŶ all thiŶgs that help to take it ďeǇoŶd the 
liŵitiŶg effeĐts of deŶotatioŶ to ĐoŶŶotatioŶ; it aĐkŶoǁledges the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of aŵďiguitǇ.͟  
(p 80). 
Does the enforced dominance of the right hemisphere in patients with aphasia and damage to 
their left hemisphere mean that they are better able to cope with ambiguity? Be that as it may, 
the language of aphasia is nevertheless a potentially ambiguous one.  In this study, I asked 
people with the ambiguous language of aphasia, to voice their understanding of the 
ambiguous concept of spirituality. 
Congruent with this ambiguity of both concept and its transportation to the listener is a 
phenomenological methodology. Positivism has in the past always striven for certainty and 
sureness, where there are right and wrong answers, and no room for grey areas of ambiguity: 
͞positiǀisŵ offeƌs assuƌaŶĐe of uŶaŵďiguous aŶd aĐĐuƌate kŶoǁledge of the ǁoƌld͟ ;CƌottǇ, 
1998 p 18). 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ ;ϭϵϲϰ, p ϭϲϬͿ, hoǁeǀeƌ, uƌges us to esĐheǁ suĐh ͞ǀagaďoŶd eŶdeaǀouƌs͟ aŶd 
instead try to perceive the meaning of a phenomenon as it is given to us, in all its uncertainty 
and ambiguity, even if, as Heidegger (Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 71) believed, in some 
iŶstaŶĐes, ͞the ultiŵate ŵeaŶiŶg of pheŶoŵeŶa ŵaǇ never be fully revealed to 
ĐoŶsĐiousŶess͟. Leǁis aŶd “taehleƌ ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϵϬͿ aĐkŶoǁledge that ͞a pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal 
iŶǀestigatioŶ disĐloses aŶ esseŶtial aŵďiguitǇ at the Đoƌe of ouƌ eǆisteŶĐe͟, aŶd this is peƌhaps 
particularly apposite when one is endeavouring to disclose a facet of a person such as their 
spirituality, which is necessarily individual, unique and nebulous. 
There exists in this ambiguity a liminal space. Just as Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ oĐĐupies aŶ 
area between the two extremes of empiricism and intellectualism, so this study occupies a 
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space between normality and pathology, between body and spirit, between speaker and 
listener. It speaks into ambiguity and a liminal space, where lines and definitions are blurred.  
Within this study, ambiguity exists in the methodology, the subject matter, the methods 
whereby the stories were collected, and in the way the stories were told.  
5.2.2 Ambiguity in language 
 
Predictable aphasic errors abound in the samples of language of participants in groups 1 and 2, 
such as word retrieval difficulties, paraphasias, neologisms, palilalia, overuse of fillers (such as 
͚ah͛ aŶd ͚uŵ͛Ϳ, ƌeduĐed sǇŶtaĐtiĐ ĐoŵpleǆitǇ, lateŶĐǇ of ƌespoŶse aŶd faǀouƌed autoŵatiĐ 
ǁoƌds/phƌases ;suĐh as ͞eǆaĐtlǇ͟ ;Francesca)). Daǀid͛s output is Đhaƌacterised at times by lack 
of content words, or erroneous word choice, so that responses are unclear in relation to the 
suďjeĐt at haŶd: ͞ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ loǀe ƌeallǇ͟, he saǇs, iŶ ƌespoŶse to ǁhetheƌ he is ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ 
able to work. He also sometimes produces uŶiŶtelligiďle stƌiŶgs of phoŶeŵes, aŶd ͚eŵptǇ͛ 
speech, with good preserved syntactic structure which belies his inability to retrieve the target 
word at times. Daǀid ǁƌǇlǇ ƌepeats ŵǇ ǁoƌd ͚struggling͛ as he attempts to offer his definition 
of spirituality, a reflection perhaps both of the complexity of the concept, but also of his word 
finding difficulties. Joel confuses gender and pronouns in his word selection, which lends part 
of our conversation a confused and ambiguous tenor: 
 
S: You were driving? 
J: Yes 
S: Wow, OK, OK. And were you alone in the car? 
J: No, Ŷo…ďoǇ, ǁell giƌl 
S: Your girl? 
J: No, boy 
S: Your boy? 
J: No, Ŷo, Ŷo…man 
S: Do you mean your wife? 
J: No no no because it was a female, no no, male 
S: Male – right. A male relative? 
J: No no no 
S: A male friend? 
J: Theƌe…eƌ Ǉes aŶd 
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Joel is also the only participant in group 1 or 2 who habitually uses neologisms, particularly the 
phrase [məʊ məʊ]. He seems aware of this neologism, aware that it is incomprehensible and 
not the word or phrase that he wants, and so it is often accompanied by an embarrassed 
laugh. In all the ambiguity of language and non-language, there is the added confusion of 
embarrassment.  Francesca and David also use laughter which seems to serve the role of 
camouflaging word finding difficulties. Similarly, Joel uses the phƌase ͞foƌ Ŷoǁ͟ ǁheŶ he has 
attempted to convey something but the words elude him and his listener is not able to 
faĐilitate. It seeŵs to sigŶifǇ ͚let͛s leaǀe it, as I ĐaŶ͛t fiŶd the ƌight ǁoƌds, aŶd Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t help 
ŵe͛; peƌhaps aŶotheƌ iŶdiĐatioŶ of ambiguity in the world of aphasia. 
Ambiguity present in aphasic output during the interviews seems to be exacerbated by 
emotive content, and mitigated by meaning-making content. When Peter describes the 
traumatic day of his stroke, his language is lacking in content words (nouns, verbs, adjectives) 
and his gestures are indistinct: 
 
S: No. So what were you thinking during that time? 
P: (hand movement, pauseͿ I ǁas thiŶkiŶg aďout tƌǇiŶg to get ďaĐk iŶ ďut oďǀiouslǇ I ǁouldŶ͛t 
ďe aďle to…eƌŵ…I doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ kŶow (shakes head) erm no 
 
Contrast this with the clarity of conveying information, both verbally and in gesture, about 
plants and grafting of plants in his garden: 
 
͞I did eƌŵ this ǁas thƌee diffeƌeŶt plaŶts aŶd I ;gesture with both hands, finger of left hand 
crossing fingers of right) then er er created plants er er and then erm oh they would just small 
bits of erm they were just small bits of garden and I joined all of the things together and made 
it what I did was er if I can hoe (gestures hoeing)͟. 
 
Gesture in this excerpt is specific and aids understanding by the listener, as does his increased 
use of nouns and verbs. 
Similarly, Francesca has significant word finding difficulties in general conversation, and her 
responses often comprise only one or two words, but when I ask her about opera, she is able 
to name several favourite composers. Proper nouns are often problematic for people with 
aphasia (Beeson, Holland and Murray, 1997), so this is perhaps testament to the importance 
opera and composers hold in her life; the target words – or names – are triggered in the 
phonological output lexicon, despite the reduced semantic information inherent in proper 
nouns. 
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Ambiguity in aphasic language lies not only with the speaker, however. Seemingly conflicting 
stateŵeŶts, suĐh as Daǀid͛s Đlaiŵs aďout ďeiŶg ƌeligious oƌ Ŷot, aŶd LiŶdǇ͛s ĐoŵŵeŶts aďout 
her ability to remember and express learnt liturgy, may also be in part due to my inability as 
facilitator: 
͞CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ diffiĐultǇ ďeloŶgs eƋuallǇ to those ǁith the impairment and those who 
stƌuggle to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ǁith theŵ.͟ ;Heǁitt aŶd PouŶd, ϮϬϭϰ, p ϭϴϭͿ. 
 
When David tries to explain who the person visiting the house after me is, I make several 
attempts to clarify but to no avail; by the end of the interchange I am still not quite sure of this 
peƌsoŶ͛s ƌole: 
 
D: Yeah, aŶd she͛s Ƌuite iŶ ĐhuƌĐh aĐtuallǇ she͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶto it aŶd…eƌ…I doŶ͛t go to ĐhuƌĐh at all. 
I…aĐtuallǇ the peƌsoŶ ǁho͛s last theƌe ǁas a soŵeoŶe ǁho is…eƌ…a spiƌitualist – not a 
spiritualist – a…eƌŵ…Ǉeah he looks after me. He [gʌns] me everything 
S: Like a sort of spiritual adviser? 
D: No, Ŷo, he͛s…eƌ…he͛s Ŷot a spiƌitualist, I ŵeaŶt…eƌŵ…Ǉeah…he eƌ…he͛s tƌǇiŶg to take ŵe 
[d͡ʒ࠱Ŷ] ;?geŶtlǇͿ eƌ ďe a…Oh, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…tƌǇiŶg to eŵďƌaĐe the ĐhuƌĐh like the ǁaǇ he does 
“: Oh, OK, so he͛s soƌt of ŵeŶtoƌiŶg Ǉou? 
D: No, he͛s puƌelǇ just theƌe to help 
“: “o, he͛s fƌoŵ the ĐhuƌĐh? 
D: Yeah 
“: “o he͛s just Đoŵe to… 
D: Yep 
“: to talk to Ǉou aŶd… 
D: Yep. An hour after you! 
S: Oh, right, OK (laughs) 
 
Amy in group 1 also gives what appears to be conflicting information about whether or not her 
grandchildren have visited recently. This discrepancy may again be a reflection of my inability 
to grasp fully what she is conveying, or perhaps it reflects her wanting to see them more, a 
feeling that often is just not often enough. 
This iŶaďilitǇ of the listeŶeƌ soŵetiŵes to uŶdeƌstaŶd the ŵessage is Ŷot ĐoŶfiŶed to ŵe. Joel͛s 
wife at one point is summoned by Joel in order to help him find a specific Bible verse. She is 
unable to understand which verse he is alluding to, and I later note in my reflective log: 
J͛s ǁife tries to help, fliĐkiŶg further ďaĐk iŶ the Biďle. J physiĐally stops her aŶd says ͞Ŷo, Ŷo͟. 
She drifts away as he continues to search. 
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A glimpse is offered into their day-to-day existence, where ambiguity of meaning abounds. 
The ambiguity of aphasic output is compounded by overlaid motor speech difficulties of some 
of the participants; Amy presents with unilateral upper motor neuron dysarthria, and 
Rosemary with possible apraxia of speech and dysarthria. 
There is no clear cut distinction in clarity, however, between the aphasic output of the people 
in groups 1 and 2 and the non-aphasic participants of the multidisciplinary team in group 3. 
The MDT members are also hesitant in their speech and use many fillers. They, too, can be 
non-fluent and lacking in clarity at times, using ambiguous non-specific vocabulary and 
needing facilitation from the listener: 
 
͞“oƌƌǇ, I aŵ tƌǇiŶg to thiŶk ǁheƌe I aŵ… What ǁas I goiŶg to saǇ?͟ ;Nuƌse͛s iŶteƌǀieǁͿ 
 
The participants with aphasia attempt to mitigate the ambiguity in their aphasic output in a 
number of ways, many of which are successful.  Francesca͛s speech output is limited and 
telegraphic; she tends to use single words or short phrases. To augment this, she uses gesture 
on a number of occasions; for example, the word for a CT scanner eludes her, so she is able to 
gesture leaning back. She also gestures her father holding her hand, a gesture which is 
arguably more evocative than the spoken message would have been.  She is able to cue herself 
in using sequences, particularly with numbers, for example, when she tells me how old she 
ǁas ǁheŶ she had a heƌ stƌoke:  ͞Ǉes, thiƌtǇ…foƌtǇ…fiftǇ-oŶe͟.  
Lindy also uses gesture to good effect, such as ǁheŶ she ͚zips heƌ ŵouth shut͛ ǁheŶ I ask heƌ if 
she is still able to recite liturgy in church. She also uses facial expression and intonation to 
great effect; perhaps her being a poet means she has a natural affinity for prosody. Writing, 
though, is her most used and most efficacious augmentative communication method; she 
writes key words when the spoken form eludes her, which sometimes cues her into uttering 
the spoken form, or sometimes simply enables her interlocutor/reader to understand. 
Ambiguity is averted by this written record, which also acts as a referent to come back to 
during the conversation. 
Joel uses a form of circumlocution in order to cue his listener into elusive words. For example, 
ǁheŶ he is uŶaďle to fiŶd the ǁoƌd ͚apostle͛ oƌ ͚disĐiple͛ iŶ his leǆiĐoŶ, he iŶgeŶiouslǇ ĐouŶts to 
twelve, which, along with context, is enough to alert me to the intended word. At various 
times he uses intonation to convey the message; at different times in the interview he 
expresses lack of equivocation (when I suggest his word-finding problems must be frustrating), 
emphasis (such as when he asserts that he is still able to pray) and enthusiasm (for reading the 
Bible, for example). Although he occasionally reaches for pencil and paper, writing is less 
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successful for Joel than for Lindy; starting the word in written form enables me to guess at, and 
for him to eventually achieve, the name of his church (appendix VIII). 
Peter uses physical prompts to try and cue himself in to words he is unable to retrieve; he 
often taps his thigh as if coaxing out the target word. He also pauses, giving himself time to 
find the word. The written modality does not help Peter; it may be that he has a similar word-
retrieval deficit in the written modality to the spoken. 
David, too, eschews the idea of writing to help convey the message, but for him writing is not 
possible because of hemiplegia of his right side and, therefore, his dominant hand.  
Interestingly, David is the person in group 2 closest to the stroke event, and he is the 
participant who uses augmentative, total communication strategies the least. This may be 
because he is not yet at the rehabilitation stage needed in order to contemplate methods 
other than speech. 
Amy, Liam and Rosemary in group 1, who are even closer to their stroke event than David is to 
his, also use little total communication, oƌ, to use Claƌk͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ teƌŵiŶologǇ, liŵited 
communication Mosaics. AŵǇ͛s use of the oĐĐasioŶal gestuƌe ;suĐh as haŶds togetheƌ foƌ 
͚pƌaǇeƌ͛, oƌ haŶd oŶ head foƌ ͚ďlessiŶg͛Ϳ is effective but infrequent. Rosemary uses excellent 
eye contact and facial expression in the context of severely reduced verbal output which, 
although they help in forging relationship and connection, do not facilitate language 
comprehension and expression per se. Of all the participants, Liam is the least able to mitigate 
the ambiguity of his aphasic output with any attempts at total communication. Our interview is 
peppered with pauses, as he struggles to process what was said to him and/or to formulate a 
response. 
Perhaps the participants who are able to utilise non-verbal clarification methods do so because 
they have enforced dominance of their right hemisphere, and therefore, as McGilchrist (2010) 
iŶtiŵates, ͞alloǁ the ͚sileŶt͛ ƌight heŵispheƌe to speak͟ ;p ϭϱϱͿ ďǇ usiŶg ŵoƌe ͚ƌight 
heŵispheƌe͛ fuŶĐtioŶs, suĐh as the ŵusiĐalitǇ of iŶtoŶatioŶ. If the eŵissaƌǇ ;left heŵispheƌeͿ is 
the ͞paiŶt ďoǆ͟ of laŶguage ;p ϵϵͿ, pƌoǀidiŶg the uteŶsils of leǆiĐal iteŵs aŶd sǇŶtaǆ, the 
master (right hemisphere) paints the ǁhole piĐtuƌe.  “o, MĐɑilĐhƌist suƌŵises, ͞folloǁiŶg a left 
heŵispheƌe stƌoke, the ƌight heŵispheƌe paiŶteƌ has lost his ŵateƌials.͟ ;p ϭϬϬͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
using total communication strategies, the person with aphasia can learn to paint (or, perhaps, 
create Mosaics (Clark, 2001)), with other materials.  
As a researcher and as a speech and language therapist, I attempt to use learnt skills to 
ŵitigate the aŵďiguitǇ iŶ the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ output. I ĐheĐk ďaĐk to ŵake suƌe I haǀe uŶdeƌstood 
correctly, sometimes paraphrasing, sometimes mirroring. I try cueing in participants by starting 
off a sentence for them, hoping they will be able to complete it. I allow time and give non-
Đoŵŵittal ƌespoŶses ;suĐh as ͚uhuh͛Ϳ, to shoǁ that I aŵ still listeŶiŶg. I also use Ƌuestioning 
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intonation to encourage further output or elaboration of what has been said. Throughout the 
interviews, I try and keep an interested demeanour, and employ active listening strategies, 
such as leaning forward, maintaining eye contact and nodding. Using a ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal 
attitude͟ ;van Manen, 2016, p 32), I listen attentively and non-judgementally to equivocal 
episodes (for example, visions), to allow them to be voiced, noted and accepted. 
For my second interview with Joel, I bring artefacts which I hope may stimulate some more 
discussion about spirituality and, in his case, Christianity. Nebulous and difficult concepts could 
be tackled when Joel and I had objects in front of us to refer to and to prompt conversation. 
Some objects even seemed to stimulate remembered liturgy (such as the communion wafer).  
Occasionally, ambiguity within interaction between participants with aphasia and me as 
researcher remains; between us, we are unable to repair it: 
 
S: Yeah, so you have a quite a positive attitude? 
L: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
S: No 
L: I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
 
Most, but not all, of the MDT members were also well used to incorporating strategies into 
their conversations with clients with aphasia which helped mitigate the ambiguity of their 
communication. The occupatioŶal theƌapist ƌefeƌs to ͞deĐipheƌiŶg͟ aphasiĐ speeĐh, aŶd 
explains how she and the other members of the team are perceptive to non-verbal attempts at 
communication. She also, however, uses some reductive phrases regarding people with 
aphasia, suĐh as ͞theǇ ĐaŶ͛t tell us͟ ǁhiĐh suggest she is uŶdeƌ-confident in the 
communication capacities of people with aphasia. The lay chaplain is similarly dismissive of the 
non-verbal communication skills of patients he sees with aphasia, a stance that is doubtless 
due to a laĐk of kŶoǁledge oƌ tƌaiŶiŶg: ͞ďut soŵe I…Ǉou get that ďlaŶk look…͟. The 
phǇsiotheƌapist speaks of the ĐlieŶt͛s ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ hiŵ ĐƌeatiŶg a ĐoŶduĐiǀe ƌelatioŶship foƌ 
expression and for comprehension of that expression.  
Aphasic language, then, is an ambiguous language, where errors and misunderstandings 
aďouŶd. If the laŶguage of the doŵiŶaŶt ;leftͿ heŵispheƌe ͞ďƌiŶgs pƌeĐisioŶ aŶd fiǆitǇ͟ 
(McGilchrist, 2010, p 114), the communication of the right affords a certain lack of clarity, 
where both communication partners have to work at interpretation. 
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5.2.3 Ambiguity of identity 
 
It is a well-documented fact (Ellis-Hill and Horn, 2000; Shadden, 2005; Simmons-Mackie and 
Damico, 2008; Corsten et al, 2015) that people who have aphasia following a stroke may 
experience a feeling of lost or changed identity. In this study, participants exhibited some 
ambiguity in their role but were successfully finding new ones. So, for example, Lindy the 
novelist becomes Lindy the poet. The first thing that Francesca tells me about herself is that 
she is an accountant; her identity is formed through her profession. The SLT in particular tries 
hard to preserve the identities of the patients she mentions, usually by telling me their age or 
occupation. Throughout the stories, I have given the participants titles reflecting the identities 
they conveyed to me during our conversations, in an effort to solidify changing roles and 
identities. 
I find that my role, too, is at times ambiguous throughout the project. Am I researcher or 
therapist, professional or friend? As a researcher, I needed to be concerned with correct 
process; I needed to set up the recording equipment, read through the information sheet and 
ask the participant to sign the consent form. As a therapist, however, I wanted to create a 
therapeutic space, to nurture and to encourage, to facilitate and to empathise.  I felt a certain 
ambiguity of role; was I there to collect information, or to provide therapy? Was I intending to 
ďe a ͞miner͟ digging for nuggets of research iŶteƌest, oƌ a ͞tƌaǀelleƌ͟, accompanying the co-
researchers as they navigated my prompts and questions, their opinions and feelings (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009, p 49). My role as I perceived it changed in relation to how I recruited or 
met the participants. Lindy and Joel were both introduced to me by mutual acquaintances, and 
our relationship therefore started out on more of a friendship footing. This was enhanced by 
continued interactions via email and social media. Francesca and David were very much 
͚ƌeĐƌuited͛ ǀia a stƌoke gƌoup, folloǁiŶg a pƌeseŶtatioŶ of the pƌojeĐt, aŶd so ouƌ ƌelatioŶship 
felt like more one of professional researcher and research participant. For the participants in 
group 1, I was entering the ward with a Trust research passport which gave me free rein as an 
eŵploǇee to Đoŵe aŶd go as I Ŷeeded to. This, ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith ŵǇ siǆ Ǉeaƌs͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of 
working on acute wards as an SLT, made my role feel more like one of professional therapist. 
All these variables meant that my role could feel different from participant to participant, from 
interview to interview, and even within one interview. I wonder if my own perception of role 
also impacted on my behaviour, which in turn influenced how each participant viewed me, and 
therefore how they reacted to me. 
DuƌiŶg iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁheƌe I felt ŵoƌe like ͚ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛, I ǁas Ŷot aďle to ƌeaĐt iŶ as ŵuĐh of a 
therapeutic way as was perhaps natural for me. When David explained that his dominant hand 
ǁas ͞ďuggeƌed͟ ǁhiĐh had effectively put paid to his art for the moment, the therapist inside 
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me wanted to pursue this, yet I was there in my capacity as researcher, and the necessary 
therapeutic rapport had not been forged. Therapeutic interviewing is, however, possible in the 
research context; the lay chaplain divulged to me the fact that his aunt had recently had a 
stroke with resultant aphasia. However, therapeutic rapport within the research setting is 
needed in order for therapy to happen. I felt powerless when Amy asked me if she could go 
home, as if I were not a researcher but a member of hospital staff with influence to bear on 
her discharge date. Just being in a hospital setting made me feel I should be helping more. 
Friendship began to form between me and some participants. Amy introduced me to a fellow 
patient as her friend; at the end of our time together, I gave her a parting gift of a holding 
cross, thinking that, following our conversations about prayer, this might be a helpful adjunct 
to her prayer life. She invited me to visit her, once she was home from the hospital. Visiting 
Lindy again, it felt right to take her some flowers, as a friend would. Shared experience, 
history, faith or culture created relationship bonds; even something as simple as laughing 
about the antics of a cat with Peter allowed us to connect, as did looking at a symbol of the 
Trinity with Joel. Peter seemed at times to view me as therapist and divulged some intimate 
mental and physical health issues. Often participants responded to the final question (which 
always took the forŵ of ͚is theƌe aŶǇthiŶg else Ǉou ǁould like to talk aďout?͛Ϳ ǁith a 
confidence; the lay chaplain shared his experiences of an aunt who had recently had a stroke, 
and the nurse spoke about the death of her grandmother.  A lack of connection, or even 
therapeutic alliance, such as in the interview with Francesca, resulted in a less successful 
interaction, an interaction that became more like an interrogation – the antithesis of 
therapeutic. What difference did the ambiguity of relationship make to the research process? 
Weƌe paƌtiĐipaŶts ŵoƌe oƌ less likelǇ to ͚opeŶ up͛ to a ƌeseaƌĐheƌ theǇ ƌegaƌded as a fƌieŶd? 
Was friendship more likely to be forged because of the nature of the research subject? Was 
there something in my demeanour as interlocutor which spoke of therapy, or was it the 
subject matter of spirituality which had created in that space the permission to talk freely and 
candidly? 
Moustakas ;ϭϵϵϰ, p ϯϵͿ speaks of the ͞eŶhaŶĐeƌ͟ ǁithiŶ the ƌeseaƌĐh eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, 
encouraging participants, in a quasi-therapeutic way, to communicate their thoughts and 
feelings. Perhaps this enhancer is a hybrid of researcher and therapist. 
The members of the MDT seemed on the whole to be clear about their roles and identities 
within the team, both in terms of their normal duties, but also in terms of their remit vis à vis 
spiƌitualitǇ. The Ŷuƌse is Đleaƌ ǁheŶ a patieŶt͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ diffiĐulties ŶeĐessitate 
discussion with the SLT, and also when emotional issues might best be addressed by the 
neuropsychologist. The OT, SLT, nurse and physiotherapist are all clear that the lay chaplain is 
the expert in spiritual matters, and the team member to whom they should refer: 
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͞ǁe Ƌuite ofteŶ haǀe the ĐhaplaiŶs doǁŶ heƌe.  We haǀe a ŶiĐe ƌelatioŶship ǁith theŵ, theŶ 
quite often if people iŶdiĐate that theǇ ǁould like to see theŵ oƌ that ǁe… if soŵeoŶe has got 
aphasia ǁe ǁill ask theŵ aŶd ǁe iŶdiĐate soŵehoǁ… theƌe͛s a ŶiĐe teaŵ heƌe.͟ ;OT interview) 
 
The chaplain is keen to explain his role to me, that it is not one of proselytising but that he is 
there to listen, not to preach or to pray – he will visit Christians and non-Christians alike. 
Perhaps he often has to clarify this ambiguity for both staff and patients. 
The majority of participants with aphasia did not see (or did not remember that they had seen) 
a chaplain whilst in hospital. Neither Lindy, a committed Catholic, nor Amy, a woman of faith, 
saw a chaplain after their stroke. I am struck after interviewing both a chaplain and an SLT that 
perhaps the one has the ministry skills, whilst the other has the facilitative skills; a sharing of 
expertise between team members may result in an increased confidence in lay chaplains to 
facilitate conversation with people with aphasia.  
5.2.4 Ambiguity and altered states of consciousness 
 
Confusion around the stroke event also seems to have created an atmosphere of ambiguity for 
some participants. Liam, for example, does not remember (or at least is not able to convey) 
ǁhat happeŶed oŶ the daǇ of his stƌoke, otheƌ thaŶ ͞stƌoke people͟ ďaŶgiŶg on the door. 
David admits that he did not know what was happening to him as he had his stƌoke: ͞I had 
ŶothiŶg. I did Ŷo idea͟. 
Altered states of consciousness that often surround the stroke event lent their own ambiguity 
to the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stƌoke stoƌies. David recounts that he was conscious during the trauma of 
the stroke happening:  
 
D: No, eƌŵ…I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ it all. I ǁish it ǁasŶ͛t 
“: Do Ǉou? ‘ight, so Ǉou ǁeƌeŶ͛t uŶĐoŶsĐious at all? 
D: No 
S: Right, so you remember it all 
 
but then his memory becomes hazy ďeĐause the dƌugs he ǁas oŶ ͞ŵake Ǉou feel ƌeallǇ 
kŶoĐked out͟. LiŶdǇ ǁas ĐoŶǀeƌselǇ unconscious for three days, and during this time she saw 
graphic visions of angels and of her dead parents.  
If, as MĐɑilĐhƌist ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϭϱͿ posits, ͞ǁhateǀeƌ ĐaŶ͛t ďe ďƌought into focus and fixed, ceases 
to eǆist as faƌ as the speakiŶg heŵispheƌe is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed͟, peƌhaps if the speakiŶg heŵispheƌe is 
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damaged and the so-called non-dominant hemisphere comes more into play, more nebulous, 
less ͞fiǆed͟ ĐoŶĐepts aƌe alloǁed to ďe entertained by the brain. During the interview, even 
Lindy herself appreciates the unlikeliness of the reality of these visions, or the identity of the 
beings depicted: 
 
͞….aŶgels? ;questioning intonationͿ I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…uŵ…uŵ…ɑod? ;questioning intonation) I 
doŶ͛t kŶoǁ͟ 
 
However, in a subsequent email, she is sure of their existence and identity: 
 
͞AŶgels: iŶteŶse ĐoŵpassioŶ aŶd aŶdƌogǇŶous. The ŵost ƌeal thiŶg I haǀe eǀeƌ felt͟. 
 
Possible ambiguity of the existence of these visions is, for Lindy, clarified. 
5.2.5 Windows of clarity 
 
Although ambiguity is a recurrent leitmotif in the stories, windows of absolute clarity also 
exist, and these are thrown into sharp relief by their contrast with the ambiguity. For example, 
most participants are able to give their definition of spirituality, and are often clear what it is 
and what it is not for them. David and Francesca, for example, are clear that spirituality for 
them is not about organised religion. It is the opposite for the two Christians, Lindy and Joel, 
who equate their spirituality with their faith tradition. Joel demonstrates a complete absence 
of ambiguity when I ask him what is important in his life, and he conveys this very successfully 
through emphatic intonation, gesture and repetition: 
 
͞IŵpoƌtaŶt is God (lots of left hand gesturing and animated intonationͿ otheƌ thiŶgs, Ŷo…Ŷo 
God God God God (emphaticͿ, so…͟ 
 
There also exists a distinct clarity in the telling or retelling of the stroke story; the impression 
gained from asking the group 2 participants to tell me what happened to them is one of 
ƌeheaƌsed oƌ pƌaĐtised telliŶg.  IŶ liŶe ǁith FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϱϯͿ ǀieǁ that ͞stoƌies aƌe a ǁaǇ of 
ƌedƌaǁiŶg ŵaps aŶd fiŶdiŶg Ŷeǁ destiŶatioŶs͟ foƌ people ǁho haǀe suffeƌed oƌ aƌe suffeƌiŶg 
from illness, it is as if through the telling and retelling of the catastrophe, these participants 
aƌe soŵehoǁ aďle to staƌt to ŵake seŶse of ǁhat happeŶed to theŵ. DeǀelopiŶg FƌaŶk͛s 
(2013, p 53) wreckage analogy, it is as if telling the story of the illness anchors the storyteller as 
she navigates the chaos. 
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5.2.6 Ambiguity and liminality 
 
The participants with aphasia have a pathology; an illness event has resulted in aphasia. Yet 
they continue to be thinking, feeling human beings, with all the desire and need to 
communicate that they possessed prior to the stroke. Therefore the normal/abnormal 
dichotomy is made null and void; people with pathology may have lost a route to 
communication but they have not lost the desire and need to communicate per se. With or 
without aphasia, participants struggle to convey the meaning of an abstract and personal 
concept such as spirituality; the ability to access language skills easily and barely with a second 
thought does not automatically allow for easy and fluent definitions of nebulous concepts. 
Areas of liminality existed, then, for all participants, yet these liminal places may prove to be 
areas of development: 
͞UŶdoiŶg, dissolutioŶ, deĐoŵpositioŶ aƌe aĐĐoŵpaŶied ďǇ pƌoĐesses of gƌoǁth, 
transformation, and the reformulation of old elemeŶts iŶ Ŷeǁ patteƌŶs͟ ;TuƌŶeƌ, ϭϵϲϰ, p ϰϵͿ. 
Some participants occupied a liminal position between the shoreline of intelligibility and 
fluency, and the waters of not being understood. Within the conversations, that liminal space 
was filled by non-verbal attempts at communication, as well as listener intervention (prompt 
questions, use of artefacts, accepting demeanour).  It seems in these interchanges that the 
liminal space is often occupied by both speaker and listener, both engaged in the pursuit of 
understanding and being understood: 
͞iŶ a shaƌed ǁoƌld, aŶotheƌ huŵaŶ ďeiŶg ĐaŶ still see the iŶteŶded diƌeĐtioŶ aŶd the goal of 
the entire movement, the meaning of the movement.͟ ;HjelŵďliŶk et al, ϮϬϬϳ p 95). 
Participants in the study occupied various liminal spaces. Firstly, there were the physical 
͚shoƌeliŶes͛, ǁheƌe paƌtiĐipaŶts fouŶd theŵselǀes stƌaŶded; Peteƌ ǁas seŵiĐoŶsĐious iŶ his 
front garden for many hours before being discovered, and Francesca was unconscious in her 
bathroom for a day and a half before work colleagues raised the alarm. Lindy also reports 
occupying the physical liminal space of coma, in which she is visited by benevolent beings who 
ďƌiŶg heƌ a seŶse of peaĐe. Little ǁoŶdeƌ that iŶ this hazǇ, ďluƌƌed ǁoƌld, ͞ŵeaŶiŶgs eŵeƌgiŶg 
from reflecting on lived experience are always ambiguous, enigmatic, and ultimately 
unfathomable.͟ ;van Manen, 2016, p 42). 
The word retrieval difficulties of all the participants with aphasia lend a liminal essence to our 
interactions; it is as if meaning is at the edge of the interchange, sometimes not fathomable. 
Consider this interaction with Rosemary: 
 
S: You could walk to the sea? 
R: Yeah 
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“: Ah that͛s good. Do Ǉou like the sea? 
R: Yeah 
S: Yeah 
‘: But…eƌŵ…ǁouldŶ͛t go too faƌ aǁaǇ to ;unintelligible) 
S: Mm 
R: So, eƌ… 
 
Her limited output, and my inability to facilitate, result in a hint of understanding of the 
essence of her meaning but no more. In contrast, being a wordsmith, and perhaps because she 
is further down the line of recovery, Lindy uses her gift gloriously to evoke her feelings in 
poetry, and to enable the reader/listener to catch a glimpse of her lifeworld:  
 
͞ďǇ eaĐh ŵeŵoƌǇ 
elusive brain, 
so much still 
 
frustrating, 
me here 
limbo-land-aphasia͟ ;Usheƌ, ϮϬϭϭͿ 
 
Here she conveys so eloquently and beautifully the intangibility of words and expression in the 
lifeworld of someone with aphasia; expression eludes her, and leaves her in a liminal space. 
 
Just as loss of language creates a liminal space of misunderstanding, so, too, may grief and loss 
which can accompany stroke create a liminal space for some of the participants, partially cut 
off fƌoŵ the ƌest of the huŵaŶ ƌaĐe. This is peƌhaps illustƌated ďest ďǇ the “LT͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of 
the ŵaŶ ǁith a ͞gƌieǀiŶg postuƌe͟, distaŶĐed fƌoŵ those aƌouŶd hiŵ ďǇ the severity of 
language difficulty and reflected in his physically distancing himself from others; he is 
described as being in a side room with the curtains drawn, the hood of his sweatshirt pulled up 
around his face. His is a liminal existence, where interaction with others is so difficult and the 
grief of loss of function so intense that he physically creates separation from the world. 
 
Social liminality is also hinted at in some of the stories. The OT recognises the difficulty of 
͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ǁith a person with aphasia, where traditional turn-taking and information 
shaƌiŶg is Ŷot alǁaǇs possiďle: ͞it Ŷeeds to ďe a tǁo-ǁaǇ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ aŶd Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t do that 
ǁith soŵeoŶe ǁith aphasia͟. I aŵ stƌuĐk, ǁheŶ goiŶg to ǀisit Joel foƌ the fiƌst tiŵe, ďǇ the faĐt 
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that he is unknown to his immediate neighbours, when I inadvertently knock on their door 
instead of his. This may of course be a reflection of post-modern lack of community and 
contact with neighbours, but it might also indicate the social isolation that can accompany 
language impairment. 
 
Spirituality as a concept in the therapies may occupy a liminal space in the professional remit. 
Amongst the members of the MDT, opinions varied as to how much spirituality did or should 
be addressed with patients within clinical sessions. All the professionals interviewed agreed 
they would be willing and able to discuss some issues related to spirituality with their clients. 
The “LT felt aďle to addƌess spiƌitual oƌ eǆisteŶtial issues ͞ďetǁeeŶ the teĐhŶiĐal ďits͟; these 
sensitive discussions were able to take place around other (more traditional?) SLT procedures 
such as an oral examination, helped in part, she says, by having time and being in close 
physical proximity. 
The physiotherapist was the most vocal about not wanting to overstep the mark. He was also 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout ďeiŶg seŶsitiǀe to iŶdiǀiduals͛ ƌeligioŶ aŶd ŵoƌes, espeĐially if he knew little 
about them, and he was cognisant of Trust policy and procedure and was anxious not to 
infringe these. However, like his OT, SLT and nurse colleagues, he is holistic in his approach and 
ƌeĐogŶises that iŵpaiƌŵeŶt aŶd disaďilitǇ ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe just iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the ďodǇ, that ͞theƌe is 
ŵoƌe to healiŶg thaŶ the ďioŵediĐal͟ ;“LT iŶteƌǀieǁͿ. Just as otheƌ MDT ŵeŵďeƌs see 
spirituality as part of their input (albeit on the periphery at times), the lay chaplain sees his 
spiƌitual iŶput as also ďeŶefittiŶg ŵiŶd aŶd ďodǇ. Foƌ hiŵ, a ĐlieŶt͛s phǇsiĐal aŶd psǇĐhologiĐal 
health is on the liminal edge of his mainly spiritual intervention. 
 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ĐoŶĐept of aŵďiguitǇ iŶ the liǀed ǁoƌld, theŶ, is ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ ƌefleĐted iŶ ďoth the 
stories of the people with aphasia and of the multidisciplinary team, and is also present in the 
liminal spaces identified. 
5.3 Thought and language 
 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of aphasia ŵaǇ ďe disputed soŵeǁhat ďǇ ŵodeƌŶ 
aphasiologists and speech and language therapists. He posits that the person with aphasia has 
lost ͞the ŵaŶŶeƌ of usiŶg ǁoƌds͟ ;LaŶdes, ϮϬϭϯͿ, ǁhiĐh iŶ the ĐogŶitiǀe ŶeuƌopsǇĐhologiĐal eƌa 
of the post-1980s may seem a simplistic stance. However, his particular theory of aphasia also 
perhaps helps us to appreciate his understanding of thought and language, why thought might 
͞teŶd[s] toǁaƌds laŶguage as to its ĐoŵpletioŶ͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p 206). For Merleau-
PoŶtǇ, laŶguage ͞is Ŷot the ͚sigŶ͛ of thought, if ďǇ this ǁe uŶdeƌstaŶd a pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ǁhiĐh 
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heƌalds aŶotheƌ as sŵoke ďetƌaǇs fiƌe͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p 211); my understanding of this 
is that language is not just a physiological represeŶtatioŶ of a peƌsoŶ͛s thought. ‘atheƌ, that 
language – and perhaps communication in general – is an imperfect representation of our 
thoughts, open to interpretation, temporality and nuance, perhaps even more so in the 
individual with disrupted language skills: 
͞theƌe aƌe Ŷo ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal sigŶs, staŶdiŶg as the siŵple ŶotatioŶ of a thought: puƌe aŶd Đleaƌ 
in itself, there are only words into which the history of the whole language is compressed, and 
which effect communication with no absolute guarantee, dogged as they are by incredible 
liŶguistiĐ hazaƌds.͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p 218). 
So it would appear for Merleau-Ponty that there is no one perfect language, comprising words 
which convey perfectly the meaning for every object or every experience of the human 
condition. Rather, language is imperfect, as we stutter to convey our thoughts and feelings; 
whether one has aphasia or not, expression of concepts is not always precise. 
However, Merleau-Ponty (2002, p 206) also posits that thought is somehow incomplete or 
unrealised if not put into language: 
͞A thought liŵited to eǆistiŶg foƌ itself iŶdepeŶdeŶtlǇ of the ĐoŶstƌaiŶts of speeĐh aŶd 
communication, would no sooner appear than it would sink into the unconscious, which 
means that it would not exist even for itself.͟ 
It is as if the act of speaking or formulating language solidifies the notion and realises it. For 
people with aphasia, this concept is problematic. People with aphasia continue to function as 
cognate, intelligent individuals. As can be seen from the stories, they convey complex ideas, 
thoughts and feelings. Fedorenko and Varley (2016) showed through complex experiments and 
neuroimaging that cognitive function such as arithmetic processing, logical reasoning, theory 
of mind, music processing and spatial navigation can all take place separately from linguistic 
processing. They cite examples of people with severe global aphasia post-stroke still being able 
to play chess or compose music. It is clear, then, that other cognitive processes can and do 
take plaĐe sepaƌatelǇ fƌoŵ laŶguage. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it seeŵs possiďle that ͞laŶguage ƌesouƌĐes ŵaǇ 
often be deployed to scaffold performance on a range of problems without being a mandatory 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of that ƌeasoŶiŶg͟ ;VaƌleǇ, ϮϬϭϰ, p ϮϰϮͿ, so that ĐogŶitiǀe tasks may somehow be 
completed or realised through language. In philosophical terms, Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s poiŶt seeŵs 
to be that our thoughts are not properly formed or complete until conveyed via language to 
another.  
Is it possible that Merleau-Ponty means communicatioŶ, ǁheŶ he uses the ǁoƌd ͚laŶguage͛ oƌ 
͚speeĐh͛? Is he iŶ faĐt suƌŵisiŶg that iŶ oƌdeƌ to giǀe life to ouƌ thoughts, theǇ Ŷeed soŵehoǁ 
to ďe ŵoulded iŶto soŵe foƌŵ of eǆpƌessioŶ, ƌeadǇ to ďe ƌeĐeiǀed ďǇ aŶotheƌ? ͞The ǁoƌd 
ďeaƌs the ŵeaŶiŶg͟ foƌ Meƌleau-Ponty (2002, p 206), but, as the stories show us, words are 
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not only confined to spoken language. Lindy uses the written word, Peter uses gesture, and so 
on. It is incumbent upon the listener to facilitate this conversion of thought into expression. 
This is the imperative of the communication partner, to coax clarity of expression from the 
ambiguity of thought. 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ, theƌefoƌe, eǆploƌes the idea that laŶguage aŶd thought, though 
ƌelated ;͞as sŵoke ďetƌaǇs fiƌe͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p 211)), are different. The word 
conveys the meaning of the thought but has no intrinsic meaning of its own. Words in and of 
themselves do not have the power of expression; rather, they are the system of transport from 
mind/thought to the other: 
͞The ǁoƌd is still bereft of any effectiveness of its own, this time because it is only the external 
sigŶ of aŶ iŶteƌŶal ƌeĐogŶitioŶ͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002 p 205). 
Words become redolent with meaning, as they are habitually used, but the sequence of 
phonemes in the word do not of themselves convey ŵeaŶiŶg. Theƌe is Ŷo iŶheƌeŶt ͚ĐatŶess͛ in 
the seƋueŶĐe of phoŶeŵes /kæt/.  MĐɑilĐhƌist ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϭϵͿ disagƌees, ĐitiŶg the ͞kiki/ ďouďa 
effeĐt ;͚kiki͛ suggestiŶg a spikǇ-shaped oďjeĐt, ǁheƌe ͚ďouďa͛ suggests a softlǇ ƌouŶded 
oďjeĐtͿ͟. He posits that ǁoƌds aƌe ͞Ŷot aƌďitƌaƌǇ ďut eǀoĐatiǀe, iŶ a sǇŶaesthetiĐ ǁaǇ, of the 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the thiŶgs theǇ ƌefeƌ to.͟ I ǁould suggest a ŵiddle gƌouŶd, ǁheƌe depeŶdiŶg oŶ 
their etymology, some words will have no intrinsic evocation of their meaning, whereas others 
possess a sort of onomatopoeia. 
It seems to me that Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ ƌegaƌdiŶg thought aŶd laŶguage has gƌeat 
iŵpoƌt foƌ people ǁith aphasia, foƌ ǁhoŵ ǁoƌds ĐaŶ ďeĐoŵe elusiǀe. If ͞the ǁoƌd is Ŷot the 
bearer of its own meaŶiŶg, has Ŷo iŶŶeƌ poǁeƌ͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p 205), then the person 
with aphasia can be acknowledged as a still thinking being, and the onus is on the listener to 
hear their thoughts, however they may be conveyed, whether verbally or non-verbally. 
Listening to the stories of people with aphasia – told through some spoken words but also 
gesture, intonation, writing and artefacts – can be seen as one way of enabling them to bring 
their thoughts into existence. Merleau-PoŶtǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ϮϬϲͿ saǇs, ͞laŶguage is but an external 
aĐĐoŵpaŶiŵeŶt of thought͟, just as gestuƌe ŵaǇ ďe. ͞“peeĐh aĐĐoŵplishes thought͟ ;p ϭϳϰͿ 
he also posits, implying that in order for the thought to be properly defined it must be 
expressed in some way. 
This journey of thought through expression is a treacherous one, where words may be 
misconstrued and messages therefore misunderstood. This is true of the language skills of 
someone with no pathology, but has particular resonance in terms of understanding the 
thoughts of those with aphasia. 
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In unimpaired language then, thought is only imperfectly reflected or conveyed. Likewise, in 
aphasic language, thought is potentially conveyed imperfectly, with the listener needing to 
employ facilitation and interpretation. 
Many participants, such as Francesca, for example, show latency of response. This may of 
course be a facet of her impaired language skills; she is struggling to find the correct words, 
and to construct the correct syntax. It might also, however, be a reflection of reduced clarity of 
thought, which because of its haziness cannot be brought to realisation via expression. 
Some participants intimate that automatic speech is relatively preserved; Lindy gives 
conflicting information (or I have heard it as such) about her ability to say familiar, over-learnt 
liturgy, but she does say at one point that she is still able to recite the Hail MaƌǇ aŶd the Loƌd͛s 
Prayer, prayers that she would doubtlessly have learnt as a young child and have continued to 
recite throughout her life before the stroke: 
 
S: Yes, OK, so thiŶgs like…uŵ…thiŶgs that Ǉou ǁould haǀe leaƌŶt at aŶ eaƌlǇ age, I pƌesuŵe, 
like the Hail Mary or the Our Father 
L: Oh, yes (emphatic intonation) 
S: Do you remember those? Can you recite those now? 
L: Oh, yes 
“: OK so theǇ͛ƌe Ƌuite…alŵost automatic 
L: Yeah 
S: So they still come out fluently? 
L: Yes 
“: ‘ight. That͛s ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg 
L: Yes 
S: And what about hymns and songs? 
L: [sɪm] no. Hymn no, no 
S: Peƌhaps Ŷot as faŵiliaƌ as… 
L: No 
S: Oƌ ŵaǇďe theƌe͛s soŵethiŶg aďout those ƌeallǇ faŵiliaƌ pƌaǇeƌs like the Hail MaƌǇ that 
Ǉou͛ǀe said so ŵaŶǇ tiŵes iŶ the past ďeĐoŵe iŶgƌaiŶed alŵost 
L: Yes, yes 
 
An ability to recite the Lord͛s PƌaǇeƌ oƌ the Hail MaƌǇ, foƌ eǆaŵple, ǁould Đhiŵe ǁith the ƌight 
heŵispheƌe͛s appaƌeŶt aďilitǇ to pƌoduĐe autoŵatiĐ speeĐh ;FeƌŶǇhough, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϭϳϯͿ. This 
ability arguably bypasses the thought process; one does not necessarily need to think about 
what oŶe is saǇiŶg. This ĐoŶtƌasts ǁith LiŶdǇ͛s aďilitǇ to pƌaǇ ǁithout ǁoƌds ǁheŶ she is ǁith 
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God in nature; she has a direct link to God which does not involve speech but does involve 
thought, in the form of prayer: 
 
S: So, were you able to pray? 
L: No (with intonation of puzzlement) no, um...the…ɑod…heƌe ;points to head) 
S: Yeah 
L: Faith yes, yes 
S: So theƌe ǁeƌe Ŷo ǁoƌds Ŷeeded ďut… 
L: Yes 
S: Was there a connection to God? 
L: Yes 
S: But without prayer necessarily 
L: Yes 
“: OK, Ǉes, that͛s iŶteƌestiŶg. AŶd ǁhat aďout…uŵ…pƌaǇiŶg Ŷoǁ? Is that soŵethiŶg – I doŶ͛t 
know whether you can answer this or whether I should be asking it but is that something you 
do iŶ ǁoƌds…pƌaǇiŶg? 
L: No 
S: Right 
L: Me…uŵ…ǁalkiŶg the fields aŶd ɑod uŵ…aŶgels oƌ ɑod …uŵ, oh, ɑod…it͛s peaĐeful 
S: Yeah 
L: Peaceful 
S: PeaĐeful, Ǉes. “o, it͛s pƌaǇiŶg ǁithout ǁoƌds. Would Ǉou desĐƌiďe it as that? 
L: Yes 
 
Similarly, she is not able to take part in confession, as this would necessitate complex and 
lengthy novel expression, rather than automatic speech. Presumably she is able to think about 
her sins but is not able to voice them. 
Joel, too, is cued in to very familiar liturgy, so that showing him a communion wafer prompts 
not only the contextually-ƌelated ǁoƌd ͚ďlood͛, ďut also the assoĐiated lituƌgical reference: 
 
J: Blood, yeah 
S: Yeah 
J: Drink 
S: Yep 
J: In remembrance of me 
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However, the automatic speech and the thought or concept are surely linked in this example.  
 
Thought is defiŶitelǇ ͞ƌealised͟ oƌ ͞Đoŵpleted͟ ďǇ ĐoŶǀeǇaŶĐe, iŶasŵuĐh as it is heard or 
perceived by another and it therefore has existence outside of the thinker. Despite Merleau-
PoŶtǇ͛s ŶotioŶ that it is speech that ͞aĐĐoŵplishes thought͟ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ϭϳϰͿ, hoǁeǀeƌ, ŵǇ 
contention is that expression of thought via any modality realises it in the same way. Take, for 
eǆaŵple, LiŶdǇ͛s desĐƌiptioŶ of heƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁhilst iŶ Đoŵa. UsiŶg speeĐh augŵeŶted ďǇ 
gesture, nodding, intonation, facial expression and writing, she is able to convey a complex 
array of ideas about emotion, death, beauty, Satan, God and visions: 
 
L: Yes…uŵ…aŶgels 
S: Uhuh 
L: Uŵ…joǇ…uŵ…ŵe…eƌ…dǇiŶg 
S: Uhuh 
L: Uŵ…;writesͿ…eƌ thƌee daǇs Đoŵa 
S: Yeah 
L: Yes…eƌ…ďeautiful ;intonation – simply beautiful – what more can I say) 
“: Beautiful ǀisioŶ, oƌ feeliŶg, oƌ… 
L: No…eƌ…ďeautiful (gesture of hand sweepingͿ…uŵ…ďeautiful ;nods) yes 
“: “o ǁheŶ Ǉou ǁoke up… 
L: (nods) 
S: You had that feeliŶg of ďeautǇ aŶd… 
L: No…uŵ ĐƌǇiŶg 
S: Right 
L: All the time crying (gestureͿ uŵ…uŵ…I…uŵ…uŵ…uŵ…ǁeepiŶg…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ…I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
(gesture with left hand and intonation/ facial expressionͿ…uŵ…uŵ…uŵ ;writes) 
S: (after reading what L has written) So that was the 4th day? 
L: Yes 
S: You woke up weeping? 
L: Yes Ǉes…uŵ uŵ uŵ uŵ ;starts to writeͿ “ataŶ…oƌ…uŵ...ɑod…uŵ ;tries to write again) the 
one (gestures with left hand as if using a scytheͿ uŵ…death 
S: Yeah 
L: [s] death…eƌ…uŵ…Oh ɑod 
 
Members of the multidisciplinary team instinctively understand how to nurture this 
conveyance of ideas. The nurse talks about getting to know her patients, so that she can 
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understand their preferences better. The OT says that she and other members of the MDT are 
particularly attuned to listening to people with aphasia:  
 
͞ǁe haǀe to ďe ŵoƌe peƌĐeptiǀe I thiŶk ǁith people ǁith aphasia, Ǉeah, if theǇ ĐaŶ͛t 
communicate to talk to you, and when they are trying desperately to tell you something...I 
thiŶk theƌe is a ƌeal skill iŶ aĐtuallǇ ƌeadiŶg that peƌsoŶ͟ ;OT iŶteƌǀieǁͿ 
 
 The OT, lay chaplain and the SLT identify time as one of the key elements in enabling people 
with aphasia to express their ideas and thoughts. 
There are several examples throughout the interviews with the MDT which suggest that team 
members assume their clients with aphasia are still thinking, possibly in language, but are 
struggling to convey this via speech. This is exemplified by the OT, who says: 
 
͞aŶd Ǉet ǁe aƌe eǆpeĐtiŶg this peƌsoŶ ǁho ĐaŶ͛t ǀeƌďalise to us, to go aŶd sit iŶ fƌoŶt of a sink 
and they are probably going ͚I doŶ͛t do this at hoŵe, I go iŶ theƌe, that shoǁeƌ oǀeƌ theƌe,͛ aŶd 
soŵetiŵes that͛s ǁheŶ theiƌ fƌustƌatioŶs ĐaŶ Đoŵe iŶ ďeĐause theǇ ĐaŶ͛t saǇ to us… theǇ ĐaŶ 
iŶdiĐate to us͟ ;OT iŶteƌǀieǁͿ. 
 
The nurse identifies the frustration which so often accompanies expressive aphasia; the client 
knows what they want to say but is unable to find the words: 
 
͞You ĐaŶ see it ŵoƌe iŶ the fƌustƌatioŶ, aŶd ǁe haǀe had a feǁ patieŶts ǁheƌe theǇ ĐaŶ͛t 
express things and they just get more angry and uptight and you ĐaŶ see theiƌ fƌustƌatioŶ͟ 
(Nurse interview) 
 
The physiotherapist interestingly alludes to patients with whom he has worked who have had 
transient ischaemic attacks resulting in aphasia: 
 
͞BeĐause that͛s also iŵpoƌtaŶt ďeĐause if I heaƌd it is a ŵiŶi-stƌoke, I ĐaŶ͛t ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate, oƌ I 
aŵ haǀiŶg diffiĐulties aŶd I aŵ ǁoƌƌied duƌiŶg that tiŵe ͚Aŵ I goiŶg to survive this?  And if I am 
going to give an effort, how long is it going to take me, and will it be worthwhile? And all those 
thiŶgs aƌe goiŶg thƌough theiƌ ŵiŶds ďut Ŷo esseŶtiallǇ, it͛s oŶlǇ ǁheŶ theǇ ƌeĐoǀeƌ that theǇ 
start telling you backwards how it was and I find that quite interesting͟ (Physiotherapist 
interview). 
He implies that these patients, who temporarily lost their language, report their thought 
processes once their language skills return. This stance is supported by the report of a 
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nineteenth century professor of physiology cited by McGilchrist (2010, p 109) who suffered an 
aphasiĐ episode fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh he ƌeĐoǀeƌed: ͞the thought was all ready, but the sounds that had 
to eǆpƌess it as iŶteƌŵediaƌǇ ǁeƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ at ŵǇ dispositioŶ…I ǁas uŶaďle to aĐĐept…the 
theoƌǇ that ǀeƌďal sigŶs aƌe ŶeĐessaƌǇ, eǀeŶ iŶdispeŶsaďle foƌ thought.͟ 
 
The SLT is adept at starting to read the non-verbal conveyance of thought: 
 
͞DefiŶitelǇ, eǀeŶ fƌoŵ the tiŵe….  It's fuŶŶǇ Ǉou should saǇ that, I ŵeaŶ as sooŶ as Ǉou see a 
peƌsoŶ it speaks ǀoluŵes, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ͚Aƌe theǇ out iŶ a Đhaiƌ aŶd eŶgaged aŶd lookiŶg aƌouŶd?͛  
͚Aƌe theǇ … do theǇ haǀe a gƌieǀiŶg ďodǇ postuƌe?͛  ͚What is theiƌ faĐial eǆpƌessioŶ like?͛  You 
kŶoǁ, that staƌts… I ǁould haǀe to saǇ that staƌts the ŵoŵeŶt Ǉou see a peƌsoŶ.͟ ;“LT 
interview) 
 
This ĐoŶtƌasts shaƌplǇ ǁith the laǇ ĐhaplaiŶ͛s ƌatheƌ disŵissiǀe attitude to patieŶts ǁho aƌe 
unable to communicate with him via speech: 
 
͞But soŵe I…Ǉou get that ďlaŶk look aŶd so Ǉou saǇ ͚ǁell thaŶk Ǉou ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh, I aŵ happy to 
ďe heƌe ǁith Ǉou ďut as ǁe ĐaŶŶot ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate I ǁill saǇ a pƌaǇeƌ aŶd I ǁill ŵoǀe oŶ͛͟ ;LaǇ 
chaplain interview). 
 
It is clear, then, that humans do not need lexical items or intact syntax in order to think and 
perform other cognitive functions. Whether people with aphasia are still able to produce the 
͞iŶŶeƌ speeĐh͟ of thought ǁith ǁhiĐh ŵost of us aƌe faŵiliaƌ ƌeŵaiŶs a ŵoot poiŶt 
(Fernyhough, 2016), but the fact that their powers of thought survive is indisputable: 
͞laŶguage is ŶeĐessaƌǇ Ŷeitheƌ for categorisation, nor for reasoning, nor for concept formation, 
Ŷoƌ peƌĐeptioŶ͟ ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϭϬͿ. 
How much more important that listeners to the stories of people with aphasia – stories about 
spirituality or of other issues – use every facilitation and support technique at their disposal? 
Merleau-Ponty had much to say about the nature of thought and language, and I have 
attempted to see the stories of the people with aphasia in relation to this. Do we think in 
language? How do people with impaired language skills think? Does aphasia affect the 
peƌsoŶ͛s aďilitǇ to thiŶk, oƌ does the ŶoŶ-dominant hemisphere (and its language areas) take 
over from the left, allowing the person with aphasia to think, but maybe think differently, with 
the ͞speakiŶg heŵispheƌe͟ sileŶĐed aŶd the ͞ŵasteƌ͟ heŵispheƌe iŶ Đhaƌge ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, 
2010). 
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As previously discussed, Merleau-Ponty intimated that thought was realised by its expression. 
He talks aďout ͞speeĐh͟ aĐĐoŵplishiŶg thought, ďut I ǁould like to ĐoŶteŶd that he is using the 
teƌŵ ͚speeĐh͛ to suggest eǆpƌessioŶ, ďe that spokeŶ laŶguage, ǁƌitiŶg, gestuƌe, sigŶ laŶguage 
or any other non-verbal method. 
5.4 Wonder  
 
A phenomenological approach to shedding light on the subject of spirituality with people with 
aphasia demands a researcher stance of wonder, curiosity, awe and openness (Finlay, 2011, p 
230; van Manen, 2016, p 36). To enter into phenomenological dialogue is to expose oneself as 
researcher to the essence of that lived experience, as told by the participant. In the ͞ďouŶtiful 
ǁoƌld of pheŶoŵeŶologǇ͟ ;CƌottǇ, ϭϵϵϴ p ϴϱͿ theƌe is aŵple sĐope foƌ ǁoŶdeƌ; ǁithiŶ the 
accepting space of the research interview, fascinating insights were gained.  
Through phenomenology, says van Manen ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϭͿ, ͞aŶ oƌdiŶaƌǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ŵay suddenly 
appear quite extraordinary: we become aware of the phenomenal phenomenality of a 
pheŶoŵeŶoŶ!͟. It is thƌough adoptiŶg a ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;van Manen, 2016, p 32), 
of openness, curiosity and acceptance that we discover the wonder of what is being shown to 
us. Van Manen ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϴͿ suggests that ͞aŶǇ oƌdiŶaƌǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe teŶds to ďeĐoŵe Ƌuite 
extraordinary when we lift it up from our daily existence and hold it with our 
pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal gaze.͟ IŶ oƌdeƌ to ďe fullǇ pƌeseŶt ǁith the otheƌ, we need to listen and 
look and perceive them in an attitude of curiosity and wonder. In order to be fully present with 
the participants, I had to listen attentively with this phenomenological attitude. This tallies 
ǁith ɑadaŵeƌ͛s  ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯϭϲͿ idea of horizons fusing; as I listened to the other, I attempted to 
acknowledge my own horizons, full of my fore-meanings, whilst meeting the horizon of my 
interlocutor with interest and awe. This is the naïve wonder of the phenomenological attitude, 
as opposed to the natural attitude (Finlay, 2011, p 47; van Manen, 2016, p 34), where opinions 
and stances have already been created. In phenomenological inquiry, we are open to novelty 
and new ways of seeing (Dorfman, 2005). 
Merleau-Ponty likens phenomenology to art in its inquisitiveness and attention to detail: 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologǇ…is as paiŶstakiŶg as the ǁoƌks of BalzaĐ, Pƌoust, ValĠƌǇ oƌ CĠzaŶŶe – by 
ƌeasoŶ of the saŵe kiŶd of atteŶtiǀeŶess aŶd ǁoŶdeƌ͟ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ǆǆiǀͿ. 
He discusses Cézanne wanting to paint the white, snow-like table cloth described poetically, 
using simile, by Balzac. Cézanne knows he must not paint using the poetic images evoked by 
BalzaĐ, ďut ƌatheƌ ǁhat is aĐtuallǇ theƌe; Ŷot the fƌeshlǇ falleŶ sŶoǁ ďut the ͞ŶapkiŶs aŶd ƌolls 
as theǇ ƌeallǇ aƌe͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2005, p 230). 
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The task in listening to the spiritual stories was to be open to what was being communicated, 
not hearing them through a filter of what I might have expected or what I thought might be 
conveyed. It was not difficult to be awestruck as researcher when listening to the stories. Both 
what the participants told me and the manner in which they did so often left me humbled. 
“uĐh is the poǁeƌ of pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd ͞ƌefleĐtiǀe ǁoŶdeƌ͟ ;HiŶĐkleǇ, ϮϬϭϯ, p 
93) of new horizons being explored. 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ŵethod of aĐhieǀiŶg opeŶŶess Đoŵes ďaĐk to a ĐeƌtaiŶ eǆteŶt to the 
reduction, and his and our ability to see phenomenon afresh, without the encumbrance of 
prior experience, belief or culture: 
͞iŶ oƌdeƌ to see the ǁoƌld aŶd gƌasp it as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar 
aĐĐeptaŶĐe of it͟ ;Meƌleau-Ponty, 2002, p xv). 
Meŵďeƌs of the ŵultidisĐipliŶaƌǇ teaŵ adopted a theƌapeutiĐ ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ 
within their work which is evident in how they described their encounters with patients with 
aphasia. The OT, for example, is curious about her clients and anxious to get to know them as 
ŵuĐh as she ĐaŶ iŶ oƌdeƌ to tailoƌ heƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt. “he iŶǁaƌdlǇ asks ͞ǁho aƌe Ǉou?͟ ǁheŶ 
she meets a patient and strives to understand who they are, above and beyond a patient who 
has just had a stroke: 
 
͞ǁe Ŷot oŶlǇ go iŶ aŶd go ͚Oh look, Ǉou͛ǀe haǀe had a stƌoke͛ ǁe go ͚OK, so ǁhat did Ǉou do 
ďefoƌe Ǉou had a stƌoke, ǁho aƌe Ǉou?͛ Ǉou kŶoǁ, so it's aďout theŵ as a peƌsoŶ, Ŷot just ǁell 
Ǉou͛ƌe that patieŶt that͛s had a stƌoke, so Ǉou haǀe got all this iŶfoƌŵatioŶ.͟ ;OT iŶteƌǀieǁͿ 
 
Her eagerness to communicate with people with aphasia is also reflected in her curiosity 
regarding total communication strategies and her willingness to employ them: 
 
͞quite often would use picture cards to try and communicate or communication boards to try 
aŶd help ǁith that͟ ;OT iŶteƌǀieǁͿ 
 
The “LT also ǀieǁs heƌ ĐlieŶts ǁith a ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal gaze͟ ;van Manen, 2016, p 38), 
perhaps exemplified in her explaining to heƌ ĐlieŶts that ͞Ǉou ŵatteƌ͟ aŶd ͞I aŵ a paiƌ of eaƌs͟. 
Foƌ heƌ, theƌapǇ is ͞saĐƌed ǁoƌk͟, aŶ ͞aĐt of kiŶdŶess͟. 
A sense of wonder is evident in many of the aphasia stories, too, and is expressed in various 
ǁaǇs ďǇ the paƌtiĐipaŶts. LiŶdǇ͛s poetƌǇ illustƌates this wonder beautifully and succinctly: 
 
͚͞HappiŶess͛, 
I, sampling the word, 
237 
 
happy-in-Ŷess.͟ ;Usheƌ, ϮϬϭϭͿ 
 
This speaks of being open to newness, to the novelty that old, well-used words have now 
become in her new world of aphasia. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p 174) understands the use of 
poetry as a means of expressing wonder: 
͞the poeŵ uses laŶguage, aŶd eǀeŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ laŶguage, iŶ suĐh a ǁaǇ that the eǆisteŶtial 
modulation, instead of being dissipated at the very instant of its expression, finds in poetic art 
a meaŶs of ŵakiŶg itself eteƌŶal.͟ 
He contrasts the use of poetry with non-verbal communicative methods such as intonation. 
IŶtoŶatioŶ, he posits, ͞Ŷo loŶgeƌ ƌeǀeal[s] the speakeƌ͛s thoughts ďut the souƌĐe of his 
thoughts͟. PoetƌǇ, it seeŵs, is ďetǁeen this and day-to-day speech or narrative, in that it 
expresses deep emotion but is more lasting than a non-verbal cry or sigh. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to MĐɑilĐhƌist ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϳϳͿ, the ƌight heŵispheƌe of the ďƌaiŶ͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of 
the ǁoƌld iŶĐludes ͞eŵpathǇ aŶd iŶteƌsuďjeĐtiǀitǇ…the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of aŶ opeŶ, patieŶt 
attention to the world, as opposed to a wilful, grasping attention; the implicit or hidden nature 
of tƌuth…the pƌiŵaĐǇ of peƌĐeptioŶ…ĐƌeatiǀitǇ as aŶ uŶǀeiliŶg ;Ŷo-saǇiŶgͿ pƌoĐess͟. People 
with a damaged left hemisphere, in which their language skills resided pre-stroke, perhaps 
make more use of this right hemisphere understanding of the world. 
As well as poetry, Lindy uses non-verbal communication during our discussions in order to 
convey a sense of wonder. In particular, she conveys the wonder of the beings which revealed 
themselves to her in visions during coma, using facial expression and intonation to augment 
her speech: 
 
L: Uŵ…joǇ…uŵ…ŵe…eƌ…dǇiŶg 
S: Uhuh 
L: Uŵ…;writesͿ…eƌ thƌee daǇs Đoŵa 
S: Yeah 
L: Yes…eƌ…ďeautiful ;intonation = what more can I say) 
 
She also expresses a religious awe of her God, using speech and intonation: 
 
͞Me…uŵ…ǁalkiŶg the fields aŶd ɑod uŵ…aŶgels oƌ ɑod …uŵ, oh, ɑod…it͛s peaĐeful͟ 
 
Joel͛s seŶse of ǁoŶdeƌ is also ƌooted iŶ his ƌeligious belief, and it is his intonation above all that 
ĐoŶǀeǇs this seŶse of aǁe. Peteƌ͛s seŶse of ǁoŶdeƌ is eǀiŶĐed ďǇ his gaƌdeŶ; his laŶguage 
becomes more fluent as he talks about (and gestures about) hoeing and weeding and grafting. 
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5.5 Lived body and the body as expression 
 
Heidegger (1962, p 27) propouŶded the ĐoŶĐept of ͞DaseiŶ͟, and believed that we are bodies 
iŶ the ǁoƌld ;just as foƌ Husseƌl, ǁe aƌe ͚ďeiŶg-in-the-ǁoƌld͛Ϳ, eǆpeƌieŶĐiŶg aŶd peƌĐeiǀiŶg 
phenomena. Husserl urged us to go straight to the thiŶgs theŵselǀes ;͞zu den Sachen selbst͟) 
(Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 5; Finlay, 2011, p 3) in order to understand them. In order to go 
directly to the things themselves, we have to experience them, to perceive them. For Merleau-
Ponty (1964, p 160), we haǀe a ͚liǀed ďodǇ͛ that iŶteƌaĐts ǁith the ǁoƌld iŶ oƌdeƌ to peƌĐeiǀe 
and be perceived: 
͞that aĐtual ďodǇ I Đall ŵiŶe, this seŶtiŶel staŶdiŶg ƋuietlǇ at the ĐoŵŵaŶd of ŵǇ ǁoƌds aŶd 
my acts.͟  
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϭϵϲϰ, p ϭϲϯͿ defiŶitioŶ of this ďodǇ is oŶe ǁhiĐh chimes with the concept of 
tripartite being, or a person comprising body, mind and spirit: 
͞The ďodǇ͛s aŶiŵatioŶ is Ŷot the asseŵďlage oƌ juǆtapositioŶ of its paƌts. Noƌ is it a ƋuestioŶ of 
a mind or spirit coming down from somewhere else into an automaton; this would still 
suppose that the ďodǇ itself is ǁithout aŶ iŶside aŶd ǁithout a ͞self͟. Theƌe is a huŵaŶ ďodǇ 
when, between the seeing and the seen, between touching and the touched, between one eye 
and the other, between hand and hand, a blending of some sort takes place.͟ 
The body is more than just a physical body; there exists a perfect amalgam of perceived and 
perceiving body, which Merleau-Ponty (1964, p 163) astutely recognises may be disturbed by 
illness or disability: 
͞ǁheŶ the spaƌk is lit ďetween sensing and sensible, lighting the fire that will not stop burning 
uŶtil soŵe aĐĐideŶt of the ďodǇ ǁill uŶdo ǁhat Ŷo aĐĐideŶt ǁould haǀe suffiĐed to do…͟ 
For the people in this study with aphasia, this (cerebrovascular) ͞aĐĐideŶt͟ has oĐĐuƌƌed, aŶd 
they are striving to join together again the constituent parts of this lived body by using their 
total communication or Mosaic (Clark, 2001) strategies. 
For Merleau-Ponty, to understand the environment we need to interact with the environment. 
In order to interact we need to both perceive and be perceived; he gives the famous example 
of a hand touching whilst simultaneously being touched. This could be seen as analogous to 
speaking and being heard, to being both storyteller and story-listener. In order truly to listen to 
a story, we must be perceptive, willing to see and hear communication in all its forms. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that we are able to perceive and communicate by using our whole 
lived body as expression. This philosophical premise also finds credence in the established 
speeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapǇ stƌategǇ of total ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, FƌaŶk͛s idea of the 
͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ďodǇ͟ ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯ, p ϮϵͿ, aŶd the MosaiĐ appƌoaĐh ;Claƌk, ϮϬϬϭͿ. People ǁith 
aphasia use all forms of verbal and non-verbal communication in order to convey their 
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message, whilst the listener perceives and acknowledges those attempts. Both Merleau-Ponty 
and Frank, then, appreciate that communication is not only verbal in form, but can, or indeed 
should, employ the body, too. Similarly, Claƌk͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ MosaiĐ appƌoaĐh pƌopouŶds the use of 
any and all forms of communication to get a message across.  
Participants in group 1 were less able to make use of these non-verbal communication 
techniques (such as gesture and writing) than those in group 2. One may surmise that they had 
had less chance to develop and practise non-verbal strategies, and there may have also been a 
reluctance on their part to relinquish attempts at the verbal so early on in the rehabilitation 
process. The hospital setting, too, was less conducive to these communication methods; it is 
physically difficult to use pen and paper when you are either in bed or poorly-positioned in a 
hospital chair. Strategies that were less reliant on props were used more with these 
participants; Rosemary, for example, made good use of intonation and laughter. 
Participants in group 2, however, who were that much further down the rehabilitation path, 
were in the main adept at using their body as expression (such as gesture, intonation and facial 
expression) and other non-speech communication methods (such as writing key words, 
referring to objects). 
Lindy used writing throughout her conversations with me, and supplemented these with 
emails, poems and Facebook messages. Joel often reached for his well-used Bible and used this 
to communicate specific religious ideas through selecting relevant verses. Peter used gesture 
to supplement his speech, and Francesca was adept at creating meaning by using words 
augmented by intonation, and gesture. David was the least likely of group 2 to employ total 
communication strategies; his Mosaic mostly comprised spoken words only. This may be a 
reflection of the relative recency of his stroke compared to others in group 2. 
For Merleau-PoŶtǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ϮϭϬͿ, speeĐh is ͞oŶe of the possiďle uses of ŵǇ ďodǇ͟; he uses 
speeĐh as oŶe ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh his ďodǇ ĐaŶ iŶteƌaĐt ǁith Husseƌl͛s LeďeŶsǁelt ;͚lifeǁoƌld͛Ϳ ;Leǁis 
and Staehler, 2010, p 34). However, it is not the only one.  For him, there is authenticity in the 
expression derived via non-verbal means: 
͞OŶe ĐaŶ see ǁhat theƌe is iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ ďetǁeeŶ the gestuƌe aŶd its ŵeaŶiŶg, foƌ eǆaŵple iŶ 
the case of emotional expression and the emotions themselves: the smile, the relaxed face, 
gaiety of gesture really have in them the rhythm of action, the mode of being in the world 
which are joy itself.͟ ;Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p 217). 
He contrasts the inherent meaning contained within non-verbal communication (facial 
expression, gesture), with the apparent arbitrariness of word labels: 
͞is Ŷot the liŶk ďetǁeeŶ the ǀeƌďal sigŶ aŶd its ŵeaŶiŶg Ƌuite aĐĐideŶtal?͟ ;Merleau-Ponty, 
2002, p 217) 
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PiĐtuƌe LiŶdǇ iŶ Ǉouƌ ŵiŶd͛s eǇe deŵoŶstƌatiŶg ǁith heƌ haŶd at ǀaƌious leǀels to the gƌouŶd 
how, after her stroke she felt like a small child again: or hear the sigh ǁhiĐh aĐĐoŵpaŶies Joel͛s 
explanation that the stroke happened suddenly whilst he was driving: 
 
J: and (sighsͿ…suddeŶ…suddeŶ  
 
and one begins to appreciate Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s poiŶt, that gestuƌe aŶd iŶtoŶatioŶ ĐaŶ ĐaƌƌǇ 
meaning as much as words can, in fact possibly more effectively. 
Perhaps this vindicates and validates the use of non-verbal communication as the primary 
method of communication for people with aphasia; there is an innate authenticity to their 
expression. 
Just as for Merleau-Ponty, the body can be the bearer of meaning, so Frank (2013) also 
eŵphasises the ďodǇ͛s ƌole iŶ eǆpƌessiŶg ŵeaŶiŶg. He talks aďout a ͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ďodǇ͟ 
that ͞tƌaŶsĐeŶds the ǀeƌďal.͟ ;p ϰϵͿ. 
An extension of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ďodǇ as eǆpƌessioŶ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ϮϭϬͿ aŶd FƌaŶk͛s Đoŵmunicative 
body (2013, p 49) may be the therapeutic method of total communication. People with 
aphasia – including the participants in this study – are encouraged to use all communicative 
methods at their disposal, be it gesture, drawing, writing key words, intonation, facial 
expression. All of these communication methods are used to a greater or lesser extent by the 
participants with aphasia, often very successfully to convey complex, abstract and numinous 
concepts. Total communication embraces Merleau-PontǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ϮϯϬͿ ĐoŶĐept of ͞the 
ŵiƌaĐle of eǆpƌessioŶ͟, aŶd ďeĐoŵes aŶ eǆteŶsioŶ to the liǀed ďodǇ. Just as the ǁhite stiĐk of a 
blind person or a car to improve mobility may be regarded as an extension of self and body, so 
LiŶdǇ͛s peŶ aŶd papeƌ, oƌ Joel͛s Biďle ŵaǇ ďe ƌegaƌded as eǆteŶsioŶs to theiƌ selfhood aŶd 
expressive abilities: 
͞the autoŵoďile aŶd the ĐaŶe aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ eǆteƌŶal oďjeĐts foƌ theiƌ possessoƌs, ďut 
extensions of their bodies that have been incorporated into their bodily space. In driving or in 
walking with the cane, the wings of the car and the end of the cane have come to mark the 
boundaries between the embodied self and its world.͟ ;Leǁis aŶd “taehleƌ, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϲϱͿ. 
In her article looking at the lived experiences of people closely related to someone with 
aphasia, Nyström (2011, p 7Ϳ disĐusses hoǁ ƌelatiǀes aŶd Đaƌeƌs ďeĐoŵe ͞aŶ eǆteŶsioŶ of the 
aphasiĐ peƌsoŶ͛s ďodǇ aŶd ŵiŶd͟, thereby inadvertently contributing to the person with 
aphasia͛s feeliŶgs of loss of ideŶtitǇ. The ƌelatiǀe assumes new roles which may have at one 
time been the remit of the person with aphasia, or they may, with the best of intentions, speak 
for their relative, or supply missing words. Thus, people as well as objects may become 
extensions to our lived bodies, whether desired or not. 
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For Merleau-PoŶtǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p ϮϯϬͿ theŶ, theƌe is aŶ ͞iŵŵaŶeŶt oƌ iŶĐipieŶt sigŶifiĐaŶĐe iŶ the 
liǀiŶg ďodǇ͟, a sigŶifiĐaŶĐe ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ augŵeŶt the eǆpƌessioŶ of speeĐh aŶd ƌesult iŶ 
conveyance of information, feelings and concepts that goes beyond the verbal. For him, there 
eǆist ͞seǀeƌal ǁaǇs foƌ the huŵaŶ ďodǇ to siŶg the ǁoƌld͛s pƌaises aŶd iŶ the last ƌesoƌt to liǀe 
in it.͟ ;Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p 218). 
Using the principles of the lived body being able to communicate in ways other than speech, 
participants were treated as expert voices, as competent, valued members of the research 
process, contributing to knowledge created. In terms of expressing spirituality, it is clear from 
the stories and from the methods used to tell these stories, that people with aphasia are able 
to express their spiritual needs, distress and well-being through multifarious and effective 
means.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 
FƌaŶk͛s illŶess Ŷaƌƌatiǀes aŶd Meƌleau-PoŶtǇ͛s philosophǇ ƌegaƌdiŶg aŵďiguitǇ, thought aŶd 
language, wonder and lived body, have provided a framework on which to view the stories of 
spirituality. FƌaŶk͛s Đhaos Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ŵaǇ ďe seeŶ as illustrative of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s aŵďiguitǇ; 
participants living a chaos narrative demonstrated ambiguity of role, identity and language. As 
they approached or attained a quest narrative, participants were more able to realise their 
thoughts through myriad mosaics of communication, including use of what Merleau-Ponty 
teƌŵed ͞liǀed ďodǇ͟ (2002, p 210), and what Frank (2013, p 49) Đalled ͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ďodǇ͟. 
Healthcare professionals demonstrated in their stories how a sense of wonder (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002, p xxiv; Finlay, 2011, p 230; van Manen, 2016, p 13) allowed them to be open and 
Đuƌious aďout theiƌ patieŶts͛ spiƌitual stoƌies.  Being able to analyse some of the issues related 
to talking to people with aphasia about spirituality in this way has helped me to understand 
the stories, and also to consider possible ways of addressing spirituality with people with 
aphasia. 
What follows is a final discussion, where I summarise the findings of this study and 
contemplate possible implications for clinical practice in speech and language therapy. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
͞ PheŶoŵeŶologǇ…eŶthƌals us ǁith iŶsights iŶto the eŶigŵas of life as we experience it – the 
world as it gives and reveals itself to the wondering gaze͟ 
 (van Manen, 2017, p 779) 
 
In this final chapter, I will look again at the original questions asked and consider how these 
have been answered through the research. I will also summarise new knowledge gained about 
spirituality and people with aphasia, including ideas for how, when and if to talk about 
spirituality with our clients with aphasia. I will discuss practical implications for further 
developments of the topic, including recommendations for stakeholders such as 
commissioners of SLT services, and higher education institutions that teach SLT student 
practitioners. Finally, I will evaluate the research and explore ways in which this research may 
be developed in the future. 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Patient-centred care (Koubel and Bungay, 2008) – or relationship-centred care (Dewar and 
Nolan, 2013) – hinges on the ability of healthcare professionals to care for the whole person. 
Personhood may be viewed as tripartite in nature, comprising body, mind and spirit (Frankl, 
2011, p 34; Narayanasamy, 2010, p 38). We may be relatively secure in what we mean by body 
(being the physical) and mind (being the psychological), but by contrast definitions of spirit and 
spirituality are multifarious, not just in the health literature but in general. This inability to be 
definitively defined, however, has not stopped a rich array of studies related to spirituality in 
healthcare appearing over the last thirty years. Indeed, it is perhaps this veƌǇ ͞ǀagueŶess͟ 
(Swinton and Pattison, 2010) which lends the term its power. Nursing leads the way in terms of 
liteƌatuƌe peƌtaiŶiŶg to spiƌitualitǇ aŶd the Ŷuƌse͛s ƌole, ǁith the theƌapies – particularly 
speech and language therapy – lagging behind. 
Although they consider themselves to be holistic practitioners, speech and language therapists 
rarely, if ever, consider the spiritual aspect of their clients (MacKenzie, 2015, p 132). Despite 
this, it is generally recognised that people undergoing serious illness or dealing with disability 
may benefit from being able to voice their existential questions (Burke and Neimeyer, 2012, p 
127), that this telling of the illness narrative may actually lead to increased healing (Koenig, 
2012) or an enhanced ability to coŵe to teƌŵs ǁith a ĐhaŶge iŶ fuŶĐtioŶ, oƌ, to use FƌaŶk͛s 
(2013) typology, to enter the quest narrative. What is it like to do this if you have aphasia? 
What is the lived experience of the stroke multidisciplinary team working with people with 
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aphasia, when discussing spirituality? The stories of spirituality give an essence of this, and as 
part of the gathering of these stories, I asked each participant what spirituality meant for 
them. 
6.2 What is spirituality?: the perspective of the people with aphasia 
 
The paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies shoǁ that spirituality is a personal and unique experience for each 
individual, and is experienced differently by each person. This chimes with the definitions of 
spirituality first discussed in chapter one, and bears testament to the usefulŶess of a ͞ǀague͟ 
defiŶitioŶ of spiƌitualitǇ ;“ǁiŶtoŶ aŶd PattisoŶ, ϮϬϭϬͿ also pƌoǀiŶg ͞useful͟ ǁheŶ talkiŶg to 
people with aphasia. 
All the participants (except Rosemary) in the study were able to give some form of definition of 
spirituality, or give the essence of what gives their life meaning, either through speech, or 
speech augmented by non-verbal means. For Joel, spirituality equated fully with his religious 
belief, and Amy, similarly, relates her definition of spirituality to religious practice. 
For Lindy, also a practising Christian, her spirituality encompasses both God and nature, and 
she intimates that the act of walking in nature also has a positive effect on her physical 
wellbeing in terms of her neurology. The concept of spirituality does not resonate for Peter, 
but as soon as I talk about meaning and purpose, he is unequivocal, and he, too, relates this to 
nature in the form of his garden. Daǀid͛s thoughts on spirituality encompass both religious 
ideas but also positive qualities not necessarily related to religion. Life-meaning and purpose 
are exemplified in his being a father. 
Although the relationship with her parents is alluded to several times within the conversation, 
FƌaŶĐesĐa͛s defiŶitioŶ is faƌ ŵoƌe general and all-encompassing and, because of her obvious 
love of the arts, and her erudition, I wonder if this is in fact her definition of spirituality, or 
whether her aphasia is limiting her ability to convey what spirituality means for her. 
Liam does not respond at all when I ask the ƋuestioŶ ͚ǁhat does spiƌitualitǇ ŵeaŶ to Ǉou?͛ As 
discussed in his story, this may have been related to the busyness and noisiness of the 
environment, or to the fact that he was unable to contemplate questions of such an abstract 
nature, when his basic needs were barely being met. He does, however, tell me that both his 
cat and sport are important meaning-makers in his life. 
All these ideas of what constitutes spirituality resonate ǁith “ǁiŶtoŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϵͿ defiŶitioŶ 
of ͞ŵeaŶiŶg, puƌpose, ǀalue, hope aŶd loǀe͟, as ǁell as ǁith FƌaŶkl͛s ;ϮϬϬϰ, p ϰϵͿ ŶotioŶ that 
relationship and love are integral to spirituality and spiritual freedom. They also illustrate the 
contention posited at the beginning of the thesis, that spirituality may encompass religion, but 
may also be separate from it (Egan et al, 2011, p 3). 
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6.3 What is spirituality?: the perspective of the multidisciplinary team 
 
The members of the multidisciplinary team were more likely than the participants with aphasia 
to mention religion in their definitions of spirituality. The lay chaplain͛s definition is predictably 
Bible-based, and completely rooted in his religious beliefs. The physiotherapist also begins his 
definition with religion, but then broadens this out to incorporate ideas about connections 
between the past and the future. The occupational therapist also immediately begins to talk 
about religion but then in a characteristically holistic way, she explains how a definition of 
spirituality can be very broad and mean many different things to many different people. 
The speech and language therapist considers other possible definitions of spirituality before 
mentioning religion, and, like Vanier (1999, p 97) she also believes it to be an integral facet of 
humanness. Of all the MDT members, only the nurse does not explicitly mention religion in her 
ideas of what constitutes spirituality. That said, she is very aware of her remit in terms of 
ƌespoŶdiŶg to patieŶts͛ aŶd faŵilies͛ ƌeligious Ŷeeds, for example referring to the chaplaincy 
team. 
There was clear understanding amongst group 3 participants that spirituality, although 
encompassing religious beliefs, was not confined to religion and faith; this reflects the 
literature, where spirituality may be seen as multiperspectival in nature, including the 
religious, but also the geŶeƌiĐ ;peƌtaiŶiŶg to the ͞huŵaŶ uŶiǀeƌsal͟ ;“ǁiŶtoŶ, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϭϵͿͿ aŶd 
biological (Swinton, 2010, p 21). All professionals were cognisant of the need to treat the 
whole person in a client-centred way, and were therefore very open to include the spiritual.  
 
Although all the MDT members expressed a willingness to engage in spiritual conversations 
with their clients with aphasia, speech and language therapists are one of the best-placed 
healthcare professionals to help those with communication impairment to express their 
spirituality because of their skills and training in facilitation and listening skills. People with 
aphasia can become adept at the use of so-called total communication, creating 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ͞MosaiĐs͟ ;Claƌk, ϮϬ01) in order to convey concepts, thoughts and feelings. 
Despite living with an altered communication method, people with aphasia are often able to 
engage in in-depth and meaningful discussions around spirituality through these Mosaics of 
words, pictures, objects and gestures.  
Interviewing various members of the multidisciplinary stroke team provided a unique insight 
into how these professionals viewed their role, and how spirituality entered their work. None 
of the five professionals dismissed spirituality as unrelated to their day-to-day clinical work; I 
was surprised by the ease with which they spoke about their own spirituality and that of their 
patients. 
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All members of the team bar the lay chaplain describe the physical proximity necessary in the 
care of the patients as being conducive to sensitive issues being discussed. This then 
engenders a relationship where other sensitive and personal issues may be brought to the 
fore.  
Getting to know the patient fully is highlighted by the occupational therapist, and this includes 
knowing about all aspects of them. The SLT, too, focusses on identity, both on how identity can 
be stripped away by a stroke but also on how a good therapeutic relationship can acknowledge 
and bolster a sense of identity. If we accept that spirituality is an intrinsic aspect of identity, 
these healthcare professionals are appreciating that aspect of their tripartite clients. 
Similarly, the NHS core values of dignity and respect (NHS England) are upheld by the 
healthĐaƌe pƌofessioŶals͛ attitude to ĐaƌiŶg foƌ the ǁhole peƌsoŶ. A peƌsoŶ͛s digŶitǇ is 
maintained by recognition and appreciation of their personhood; that personhood comprises 
all of what it means to be fully human. 
Time is identified by the OT and the SLT as vital to having in-depth conversations about 
personal and sensitive issues such as spirituality. They recognise that within their remit there is 
time to explore other issues. This luxury is sadly often denied the nurse; it is in the busyness of 
the clinical day that the biomedical model of care reasserts itself, as targets must be met and 
outcomes proven.  
In line with Mathisen et al͛s (2015, p 2318) opinion on the importance of recognising and 
takiŶg iŶto aĐĐouŶt ĐlieŶts͛ spiƌitual Ŷeeds, teaŵ ŵeŵďeƌs ǁeƌe ĐogŶisaŶt of ŵakiŶg therapy 
ƌeleǀaŶt aŶd aǀoidiŶg its ďeĐoŵiŶg ͞supeƌfiĐial ďǇ Ŷot iŶĐludiŶg ƌeligious oƌ spiƌitual ďeliefs͟.  
Having listened to the stories of, in particular, Joel, Lindy, David and Peter in group 2, one 
begins to recognise how intrinsic spirituality is to the iŶdiǀiduals͛ liǀes, aŶd hoǁ igŶoƌiŶg this iŶ 
the therapy room could be detrimental to overall, holistic care. 
The OT explains how she and the other professionals on the stroke unit are particularly 
perceptive when it comes to communicating with people after stroke, especially those with 
reduced language skills. Without this facilitative help, Mathisen et al͛s (2015, p 2318) concept 
of clients not being able to access meaningful spiritual resources or practices which may help 
ǁith the ͞ƌestoƌatiǀe, healiŶg or educational processes that would enhance or sustain therapy 
goals͟ ŵaǇ ďe ƌealised.   
As well as providing the therapeutic environment to discuss spiritual concerns by giving time, 
being a listening ear, and being involved with other personal aspects of care, the MDT 
members recognised their role as one of facilitating discussion between the patient and 
͚spiƌitual pƌofessioŶal͛, suĐh as the ĐhaplaiŶ. The “LT desĐƌiďed faĐilitatiŶg ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs 
between the client with aphasia and visiting priests, and the OT and nurse both describe 
referring patients on to chaplaincy once spiritual needs have been identified. The nurse 
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interestingly mentions patients not requiring spiritual consideration; I had naively thought that 
nursing staff always made a cursory assessŵeŶt of a patieŶt͛s spiƌitualitǇ oŶ adŵissioŶ to a 
ward, but in her interview, the nurse intimated that only a question specifically about religion 
(as opposed to spirituality) was asked during clerking in. 
The nurse is the only professional interviewed who mentioned further training and guidance in 
the area of spirituality in healthcare. Spirituality has become more of a core subject on pre-
registration nursing courses over the last twenty years (The Quality Assurance Agency, 2001a), 
and has also been incorporated into occupational therapy training (The Quality Assurance 
Agency, 2001b), but is not so far a recognised prerequisite standard curriculum item on speech 
and language therapy (The Quality Assurance Agency, 2001c) nor physiotherapy (The Quality 
Assurance Agency, 2001d) pre-registration courses in the UK, so it is intriguing that the nurse is 
the only professional to suggest further training would be beneficial. 
Team members were very aware of their remit and were sensitive about not overstepping 
boundaries. The physiotherapist, in particular, was mindful of treading roughshod over 
patieŶts͛ pƌeĐious ďeliefs, oƌ of ĐoŶtƌaǀeŶiŶg Tƌust poliĐǇ oƌ pƌofessioŶal ƌeŵit. 
Just as there is arguably scope for improving education of healthcare professionals regarding 
patieŶts͛ spiƌitual Ŷeeds, the MDT iŶteƌǀieǁs iŶdiĐate that kŶoǁledge aŶd skills aďout 
communicating with someone with aphasia could be shared with the lay chaplain. Lay 
members of chaplaincy teams are volunteers from all walks of life, with multifarious 
experience. Communicating with people with speech and language difficulties may be outside 
their experience prior to volunteering, so it is incumbent upon trained healthcare 
professionals, particularly speech and language therapists, to offer advice and guidance, so 
that the chaplaincy team feels confident in ministering to those with limited communication 
skills.    
The participants with aphasia, and those of the multidisciplinary team, therefore gave 
multifarious definitions of spirituality and what it means to them. In order to explore further 
what it is like to eǆpƌess oŶe͛s spiƌitualitǇ ǁheŶ oŶe has aphasia, or to be a professional 
working with people with aphasia expressing their spirituality, I used some ideas propounded 
by Merleau-Ponty. 
6.4 The relevance of Merleau-Ponty 
 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s eǆploƌatioŶ of the ĐoŶĐepts of aŵďiguitǇ, ǁoŶdeƌ, laŶguage aŶd thought, aŶd 
lived body have helped in the understanding of the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies ;see Đhapteƌ ϱͿ. His 
philosophy provided a framework on which to hang various themes which emerged from the 
conversations, but also various ways of being which may have clinical relevance. 
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6.4.1 Ambiguity and its clinical relevance 
 
The concept of ambiguity in this thesis exists in the subject matter, the methods whereby the 
stories were collected, the methodology, and in the way the stories were told. The term 
spirituality is an ambiguous one, with myriad meanings to different people. The language of 
aphasia can present ambiguities of comprehension and expression, as concepts are 
misconstrued or expressed inaccurately because of impaired processing of language. As the 
chosen methodology, phenomenology also offered up ambiguity in the form of, for example, 
confusion over the epoché, and the role of researcher versus that of therapist.  
6.4.1.1 Ambiguity and the concept of spirituality 
 
Spirituality may not be able to be definitively defined, yet the concept resonated with most of 
the participants in the study, so that nearly all of them were able to express what spirituality 
meant to them. Difficult, nebulous, partially formed ideas and concepts can be broached with 
people with aphasia, if we are prepared to dwell with the ambiguity. Spirituality may be at the 
liminal edge of SLT practice, but most of the participants (bar Rosemary and Liam in group 1) 
were willing and able to engage with the topic with an SLT researcher. The multidisciplinary 
team members – including the SLT - were also all open to discussions related to spirituality. 
This is in contrast to Spillers et al͛s fiŶdiŶgs ;ϮϬϬϵͿ, ǁheƌe a ŵiŶoƌitǇ ;ϯϱ%Ϳ of pƌaĐtisiŶg “LTs 
felt that addressing spirituality was part of their professional remit. A larger scale project to 
eǆploƌe “LTs͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of spiƌitualitǇ iŶ ƌegaƌd to theiƌ pƌofessioŶal ƌeŵit is ŵeƌited, iŶ 
order to mitigate this ambiguity around role; the results of this could impact on future SLT pre-
registration training. 
6.4.1.2 Ambiguity and the language of aphasia 
 
Aphasia can create an atmosphere of ambiguity and misunderstandings. Salient features of 
expressive aphasia include word retrieval difficulties, which may result in neologisms, 
paraphasias, fillers or circumlocution. Syntax may be elusive, so that sentence structure 
becomes simplified or constrained. Receptive aphasia is characterised by impaired 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ, eǀeŶ of oŶe͛s oǁŶ output, aŶd laŶguage ŵaǇ ďeĐoŵe eŵptǇ aŶd ŶoŶ-specific. 
The inherent ambiguity within aphasic language, however, may be construed as a benefit 
when one is discussing hazy, unformed concepts, such as spirituality. McGilchrist (2010, p 83) 
speculates that the right hemisphere of the cerebral cortex is more comfortable with 
ambiguity and haziness than its left hemisphere cousin: 
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͞the left heŵispheƌe͛s affiŶitǇ foƌ ǁhat it itself has ŵade ;heƌe laŶguageͿ, ǁell-worn 
familiaritǇ, ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aŶd fiŶitude, aŶd, oŶ the otheƌ, the ƌight heŵispheƌe͛s affiŶitǇ foƌ all that 
is ͚otheƌ͛, Ŷeǁ, uŶkŶoǁŶ, uŶĐeƌtaiŶ aŶd uŶďouŶded.͟ 
In most individuals, language predominantly inhabits the left hemisphere of the cerebral 
cortex. Patients with aphasia following stroke usually have their site of lesion in the left 
hemisphere.  There exists the possibility that people with an impaired left hemisphere, where 
certainty abounds, use their unimpaired hemisphere to embrace ambiguity and all that is 
uncertain and unproven. They may revel in the ambiguity of the master hemisphere, and 
therefore be more amenable to discussions of a numinous nature than their right-hemisphere-
damaged counterparts, or, indeed, those with no impairment of the cerebral cortex. 
McGilchrist further contends that in order to comprehend the whole in a narrative – that is, to 
understand not just the grammatical structure and lexical choice with which the left 
hemisphere deals, but also the nuances of prosody, inference and metaphor which are the 
preserve of the right (Bryan, 1988) – one is reliant on the master hemisphere:   
͞the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of Ŷaƌƌatiǀe is a ƌight heŵispheƌe skill: the left heŵispheƌe ĐaŶŶot folloǁ a 
narrative. ͞ ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϳϲͿ.  
The emissary (left) hemispheƌe ͞has a paƌtiĐulaƌ affiŶitǇ foƌ ǁoƌds aŶd ĐoŶĐepts foƌ tools, ŵaŶ-
ŵade thiŶgs, ŵeĐhaŶisŵs aŶd ǁhateǀeƌ is Ŷot aliǀe͟ ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϱϱͿ, ǁheƌeas foƌ the 
ƌight heŵispheƌe, ͞its utteƌaŶĐes aƌe iŵpliĐit͟ ;MĐɑilĐhƌist, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϳϯͿ, aŶd theƌefoƌe may be 
more adept at expressing the non-specific.  
One might contend, then, that the right hemisphere and its propensity for the ill-defined and 
nuanced is better equipped to consider and communicate issues of a spiritual nature, perhaps 
not in words but through Mosaics (Clark, 2001) of intonation, gesture and facial expression. 
Lindy, in particular, has become adept at using her sometimes ambiguous aphasic language to 
express clearly her thoughts about nebulous topics. 
Despite my intact left hemisphere, perhaps I am drawing on my right hemisphere, too, as I 
listeŶ to the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes, aŶd atteŵpt to uŶdeƌstaŶd theiƌ output. It ŵaǇ ďe that, 
as healthcare professionals, we need to dwell with this ambiguous output more, in order to 
understand our clients with aphasia. The chaplain who once reported to me that they 
habitually walked past the patients with aphasia on the stroke ward because of the inherent 
difficulty of ministering to people who have no words may be encouraged to dwell with that 
same patient by understanding more the ambiguity of aphasia. 
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6.4.1.3 Ambiguity and identity 
 
Throughout the study I have been struck by how identities were sometimes obfuscated. As 
people with aphasia often experience a change or loss of identity (Ellis-Hill and Horn, 2000; 
Shadden, 2005), I attempted to emphasise their identities by giving them pseudonyms as 
opposed to a number or letter, and I also gave their identity as I perceived it having spoken to 
them, albeit briefly (such as Peter, the gardener). My identity, too, was unclear at times.   
When visiting participants in hospital, I carried a Trust research passport which enabled me to 
come and go as I pleased as if I were an employee. However, staff members did not always 
recognise me, so I frequently had to explain who I was and what I was doing on the ward. I felt 
like the clinician I had once been at times, falling easily into the infection control procedures, 
or pulling curtains around the bed for privacy. At the same time, however, I patently was not a 
clinician; my remit was to talk to these patients, not to assess their language or plan their 
management. This ambiguity of my identity could be uncomfortable; I often felt I should be 
doing more, helping more. I remember feeling how utterly anachronistic it seemed to be 
talking to Liam (group 1) about spirituality when his basic needs were not even being fully met. 
My identity was equally nebulous when interviewing the participants in group 2. With some, 
such as Lindy and Joel, a friendship of sorts was forged. With others (such as Francesca and 
David), connection was lacking, and the interviews became less like a chat between friends and 
more like a formal interview. This must have had a bearing on how comfortable the 
participants felt in talking with me, and therefore on what they were willing and able to 
convey.  
In clinical practice, clarity of role and identity in terms of spirituality may be beneficial. 
Professional and regulatory bodies, for example, could be explicit about the expectations, vis à 
vis addƌessiŶg ĐlieŶts͛ spiƌitual Ŷeeds, of the healthĐaƌe pƌofessioŶals that ďeloŶg to theŵ. 
Higher education establishments could impart clear guidance and training on addressing 
spiritual issues with clients. 
6.4.1.4 Methodological ambiguity 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrates the journey through various epistemological stances throughout the 
study, finally arriving at phenomenology as my methodology. Phenomenology as a research 
approach has been used sparingly in the field of speech and language therapy to date, possibly 
because of its emphasis on verbal data, in the form of the spoken or written word. As a 
methodology, therefore, phenomenology also occupies a liminal, hazy space within speech and 
language therapy, untested and potentially untapped as a way of looking with fresh eyes at a 
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pheŶoŵeŶoŶ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, pheŶoŵeŶologǇ͛s eŵphasis oŶ lookiŶg at a pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ďǇ, to 
paraphrase Husserl, going back to the thing itself, is congruent with a client-centred 
therapeutic approach, and enables the therapist/researcher to be fully present with the client. 
Full presence implies that the researcher or clinician also employs a sense of genuine curiosity 
and wonder. 
This study employed both a descriptive and interpretive phenomenological approach, 
ŶotǁithstaŶdiŶg FiŶlaǇ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭ, p 120) assertion that the distinction between these two 
methods is somewhat blurred. Listening to and transcribing the data demanded openness, a 
readiness to embrace newness, and a lack of judgement, in a manner akin to descriptive 
phenomenology. Analysis of the stories, however, demanded a hermeneutic approach, where 
the tales were interpreted through the lens of some of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ideas. The ďluƌƌiŶg of 
these two phenomenological approaches adds to the aura of ambiguity throughout. 
6.4.2 Wonder and its clinical relevance 
 
Part of viewing phenomena in this naïve way is the adoption of a sense of wonder, as 
propounded by Merleau-Ponty. To wonder at an object, or indeed a story, is to welcome it 
with eagerness and interest. Van Manen (2016) develops this idea of viewing phenomena with 
fresh eyes and with an attitude of awe and curiosity by encouraging practitioners to adopt a 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;p ϯϮͿ, as theǇ look oŶ theiƌ suďjeĐt aŶd theiƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁith a 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal gaze͟ ;p ϯϴͿ.  I ďelieve this phenomenological stance is beneficial to 
researchers and clinicians alike, as they strive to keep the client at the centre. A client or 
participant who is listened to with a sense of wonder is one that feels valued, acknowledged 
and heard. This is particularly apposite when one is talking to individuals with reduced 
communicative capital, where the power is often with their interlocutor ;O͛MalleǇ, ϮϬϭϭ, p 
94), and where necessary time and space to formulate responses is sometimes not 
forthcoming. In common with other subject matter of an emotional nature, spirituality as a 
topic demands an accepting and open attitude which is conducive to allowing the client space 
to express herself. 
A seŶse of ǁoŶdeƌ suggests ĐuƌiositǇ, ͞aŶ eŵotioŶ eǆĐited ďǇ ǁhat is unexpected, unfamiliar, 
oƌ iŶeǆpliĐaďle͟ ;Oǆfoƌd DiĐtioŶaƌies, ϮϬϭϭͿ. DuƌiŶg the iŶteƌǀieǁs, alloǁiŶg ŵǇself to ǁoŶdeƌ 
at the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stoƌies of stƌoke aŶd spiƌitualitǇ eŶaďled ŵe to aĐĐept aŶd ƌespeĐt ǁhat 
ǁas ďeiŶg ĐoŶǀeǇed ǁith Moustakas͛ ͞uŶfetteƌed staŶĐe͟ ;ϭϵϵϰ, p ϴϱͿ aŶd aŶ attitude of 
genuine interest.  Some of the stories of spirituality contained supernatural occurrences (Lindy 
and David in group 2). Some participants (Amy and Liam in group 1) identified seemingly quite 
mundane meaning-makers in their lives. My opinion of the contents of these stories is 
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immaterial; the fact that they were real and meaningful to the storyteller demands that we, as 
researchers and clinicians, afford the narrator respect by listening with wonder to what might 
be, to us, inexplicable. 
Adoption of a sense of wonder may have clinical application, as speech and language 
therapists listen to stories of the stroke journey, medical treatment, hope for recovery, and 
myriad other patient concerns. Acceptance and wonder may be even more of a therapeutic 
iŵpeƌatiǀe ǁheŶ the patieŶt͛s ƌeduĐed ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiǀe ĐoŵpeteŶĐe ƌeŶdeƌs theŵ less 
͚listeŶed to͛ daǇ-to-day.  
6.4.3 Language and thought and clinical relevance 
 
Listening with a sense of wonder and openness becomes of paramount importance when we 
consider Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ideas oŶ laŶguage aŶd thought, espeĐiallǇ the ŶotioŶ that iŶ oƌdeƌ to 
realise a thought it must in some way be conveyed to another via language (2002, p 174). If 
thought must be realised through expression, it is incumbent upon healthcare professionals to 
do all they can to facilitate the expressive abilities of people with limited language. The stories 
in this study show how people with aphasia are able to convey thought via multiple Mosaic 
(Clark, 2001) means including, but not limited to, spoken language. They tell of their previous 
occupations, the stroke event, of their life meaning-makers. Speech and language therapists 
are very used to providing communication charts or apps to enable their clients to 
communicate their basic needs, but Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ideas oŶ thought peƌhaps iŵpel us to 
consider how we enable clients to express more than basic needs, including concepts which 
are emotive, difficult or complex, in order for them to be fully realised. 
6.4.4 Lived body and its clinical relevance 
 
Even complex ideas may be conveyed through many different communication means, not just 
speech, and this is borne out in the study. Joel (group 2), for example, is able to converse with 
me about the Trinity, and Holy Communion, through use of objects of reference, intonation, 
and a shared culture. Peter (group 2) is able to express the importance of gardening to him 
(even to the extent that being unable to garden affects his mental health) by not only speech 
but also creative use of gesture and intonation. Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ideas aďout ŶoŶ-verbal 
communication and aids such as the white stick of the blind person being an extension of their 
own body (Lewis and Staehler, 2010, p 165) chime very much with the SLT concept of total 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, aŶd ǁith Claƌk͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ MosaiĐ appƌoaĐh ǁith ǇouŶg ĐhildƌeŶ. Just as ǀeƌǇ 
young, even pre-verbal, children are able to convey complex ideas through using, for example, 
photography and pictures, along with guided discussion with a professional, so people who are 
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essentially post-verbal, whose language is impaired through disease or accident, can be 
encouraged to discuss complex ideas, even nebulous ideas like spirituality, with a facilitative 
listener, who is willing and able to accept the liǀed ďodǇ as paƌt of a peƌsoŶ͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
apparatus.  
It appears from this study that there are many variables at play when one considers the use of 
communication Mosaics with people with aphasia. The participants in group 1, for example, 
were all close to their stroke event, and used very little in the way of total communication 
strategies. Liam, who appeared the most entrenched in a chaos narrative, as evidenced by the 
fact that he was in a hospital bed, with paraphernalia of hospitalisation very much in evidence 
(nasogastric tube, incontinence pads) used no communication strategies other than speech. 
Amy used some gestures very effectively, but also largely relied on her spoken output. Her 
dominant narrative seemed to be restitution, as she ached to be allowed home. Although a 
very small sample, these two participants and their use of alternative/ augmentative 
communication contrasts with participants in group 2, whose illness narratives had shifted 
away from chaos and come closer to quest, and who adopted myriad alternative and 
augmentative communication methods. 
This is clinically pertinent, as practitioners strive to help patients come to terms with their 
disability, and embrace an altered method of communicating, in a new stage of life which 
Đould ďe teƌŵed the ͞Ƌuest͟ phase ;FƌaŶk, ϮϬϭϯͿ. “peeĐh aŶd laŶguage theƌapists ĐaŶ aŶd do 
explore multifarious compensatory communication strategies with their clients with aphasia. 
The stories in this study re-emphasise the importance of these strategies, and confirm that 
they can be usefully employed to enable the person with aphasia to express not only basic 
needs but also issues of a less concrete nature. 
6.5 The relevance of Frank’s illness narratives 
 
FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ideas aƌouŶd speĐifiĐ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes that seem to accompany various stages of 
illness could be adopted and adapted to apply to people with permanent disability as a result 
of illness (Couser, 2016), such as aphasia as a result of stroke. The narratives were familiar to 
me as I thought back to the different patients I had worked with over the years as an SLT. 
Often patients themselves and those around them would be in an initial state of confusion 
straight after the stroke had occurred. This was often followed by questions about prognosis, 
number of therapy sessions available and requests for exercises to improve speech or 
language, as a restitution narrative became dominant. Further down the rehabilitation line, 
patients might start to come to terms with the permanence – or at least longevity - of an 
impaired language system and begin to explore alternative/augmentative communication 
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methods and adapt to these new methods. These phases are not linear, and a patient may 
vacillate between stages; in this study, for example, Lindy in group 2 was adept at using 
written words to augment her spoken output (a sign of entering a quest narrative), but also 
talked iŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁ aďout heƌ aspiƌatioŶ to ďe flueŶt iŶ heƌ speeĐh output iŶ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs͛ 
time (a restitution narrative).  
Experience of working with people who had had a stroke also taught me that there is a need to 
tell and retell the illness narrative; patients (and carers) would often regale me with the details 
of the day the stroke occurred; where they were, who was or was not with them, the horror of 
the situation. Interestingly, Lindy had advised me to begin my conversations with the 
participants with aphasia by asking them about their stroke journey; this usually took the form 
of ŵǇ saǇiŶg ͞tell ŵe ǁhat happeŶed to Ǉou.͟ FƌaŶk ;ϮϬϭϯ, p ϯͿ suggests that theƌe eǆists ͞the 
need of ill people to tell theiƌ stoƌies͟, in order to make sense of what has happened to them. 
Although not a question relating to their spirituality per se, Lindy was right to recommend this, 
as the stroke narrative provided a natural way in to discussion of spiritual and existential issues 
ƌelated to ďeiŶg a stƌoke suƌǀiǀoƌ. FƌaŶk͛s illŶess ;oƌ disaďilitǇͿ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes pƌoǀed a useful 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk oŶ ǁhiĐh to ǀieǁ the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ spiƌitual stoƌies. PaƌtiĐipaŶts eǆpƌessiŶg a 
current chaos narrative were more likely to be closer in time to the stroke event. Other 
participants expressed having been through a chaos narrative at the time of the stroke and 
shortly thereafter, but were subsequently entering a different narrative.  Several participants 
expressed having been through restitution, usually in the form of indicating that their language 
skills had improved. Participants who had been living with their stroke for the longest were the 
most likely to express their narrative in the form of quest.  
Quest also seemed to be the state required for most participants to be willing or able to enter 
into conversations around spirituality. Lindy, Joel, Francesca, and Peter were all several years 
post-stroke, and were able to express their spiritual thoughts. David was nearer in time to his 
stroke than the other members of group 2; however, he, too, was showing evidence of 
entering a quest narrative (for example, by exploring art again), and he was also able to take 
part in a conversation about life meaning with me. Group 1 participants were far more likely to 
show a chaos narrative, where physical needs seemed to take precedence over self-
aĐtualisatioŶ, oƌ ͞soul ǁoƌk͟ ;“pilleƌs, ϮϬϭϭ, p ϮϯϭͿ.  
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ thoughts oŶ aŵďiguitǇ, ǁoŶder, language and thought, and lived body 
also aligŶ ǁith FƌaŶk͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ tǇpologǇ. WithiŶ the Đhaos Ŷaƌƌatiǀe, aŵďiguitǇ is ƌife; pƌogŶosis 
is unclear, physical health is compromised and aphasia is at its most severe. Frank (2013) 
explains how people locked in a chaos narrative are in such a state of confusion and despair 
that they are unable to narrate their story. This concept is even more poignant when we 
consider those individuals in a chaotic state whose ability to narrate their illness story is not 
254 
 
only compromised by the chaos but also by aphasia. Ambiguity is perpetuated when clarity of 
language and narration of events is denied.  
Ambiguity is also evident in the restitution narrative, where individuals hope for complete 
resolution of language skills, even after many months or even years, in the midst of medical 
Đlaiŵs that despite soŵe lost aďilities ďeiŶg ͞ƌeƌouted thƌough eǆistiŶg uŶiŵpaiƌed pathǁaǇs͟ 
(Papathanasiou, Coppens and Ansaldo, 2013, p 51), language levels may never reach 
premorbid levels. 
Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s eŵphasis oŶ ǀieǁiŶg pheŶoŵeŶa ǁith a seŶse of ǁoŶdeƌ alloǁs ĐliŶiĐiaŶs to 
listen to and acknowledge new ways of communicating using the lived body, and as thought is 
realised through communication, narratives are expressed and stories told. As other SLTs have 
disĐussed ;MitĐhell, “kiƌtoŶ aŶd MoŶƌouǆe, ϮϬϭϬͿ, Ŷaƌƌatiǀe tǇpes ĐaŶ ͞assist people ǁith 
reflection and may enable theŵ to gaiŶ uŶeǆpeĐted iŶsights͟ (p 333), as they make their way 
along the stroke journey. 
If speech and language therapy involves accompanying the client from chaos to quest, then 
embracing spiritual concerns constitutes an integral part of this journey, and embracing 
ambiguity and wonder, whilst facilitating realisation of thought using total communication is 
the “LT͛s ƌemit. 
6.6 The use of narrative inquiry 
 
Despite the potential contradiction of using narrative inquiry with people with language 
difficulties, even the participants with the most limited expressive spoken language, such as 
Liam and Joel were able to create their own spiritual narratives. Kim (2016, p 73) talks about 
the ͞opeŶ-eŶdedŶess͟ of stoƌies, ǁheŶ ͞the ƌeal ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ďegiŶs ǁheƌe the oƌdiŶaƌǇ plot 
eŶds͟. As faƌ as these spiƌitual stoƌies aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed, the ͞oƌdiŶaƌǇ plot͟ Đould ďe ĐoŶstƌued as 
the prosaic, the non-ŶuŵiŶous, the eǀeƌǇdaǇ, ďut it ŵight also peƌtaiŶ to ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ laŶguage, as 
opposed to the eǆtƌaoƌdiŶaƌǇ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ŵethods eŵploǇed heƌe. The teƌŵ ͚Ŷaƌƌatiǀe iŶƋuiƌǇ͛ 
can and does include non-speech narratives, and can be a powerful method by which to gather 
data pertaining to experiences of people with communication impairment. Narrative within 
this study ironically encompassed the non-verbal; participants in groups one and two 
successfully told their narratives using not only their speech, but also their facial expression, 
intonation, writing, gesture and objects of reference. Narratives were constructed with 
communication Mosaics (Clark, 2001). 
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6.7 Spirituality in times of severe illness or distress 
 
Although the literature suggests that individuals do tend to seek answers to existential 
questions at times of crisis and severe ill health (Burke and Neimeyer, 2012, p 127), this was 
apparent in only some of the current stories (Lindy and Joel in group 2).  These overtly spiritual 
or existential accounts are unusual in the stories, however. Although other participants, such 
as Peter, David and Francesca, make reference to spiritual issues in the form of life meaning-
makers, they do not explicitly relate their spiritual concerns to the stroke event. 
It is clear, therefore, that some participants did not talk about their spiritual concerns in the 
face of the catastrophe of stroke – at least not to me.  It is possible that no such spiritual 
concerns exist. It might also be, however, that such issues exist but cannot – or at least were 
not – expressed. Some people with severe expressive aphasia may be unable to put into 
words, or into any other expressive means, their spiritual issues. This may also be hindered by 
lack of skill in facilitation on the part of the listener. 
People at the early stages post-stroke may be experiencing acute symptoms, such as chest 
infection, and they require their physiological needs to be met before self-actualisation can be 
broached, including asking or answering questions of existence and life-meaning. 
For some participants, perhaps so much time had elapsed since the time of the stroke episode, 
those immediate existential questions no longer pertained. Francesca, for example, although 
she sighs and leaves a long gap before answering, insists that her stroke has not made her ask 
existential questions, but rather has given her a stoical attitude. 
Participants in the study may have wanted and indeed needed to express their spiritual 
concerns but were unable to do so with me. Lack of trust in me, lack of a true relationship with 
me, the fact of being recorded, may all have contributed to a situation unconducive to relaying 
issues of a spiritual nature. It might be that participants who did not convey much about their 
spirituality with me may have done so with another researcher, or with me if a longer period 
had enabled us to create a deeper relationship. 
It is argued, then, that people facing serious illness seek answers to existential questions, and 
participants such as Lindy pay testament to this. However, is it possible that they may also 
have an enhanced ability to access these answers or the source of these answers? 
6.8 Privileged access to the divine 
 
Early on in the research process, I was introduced to the concept of the ͞pƌiǀileged aĐĐess to 
the diǀiŶe͟ ;Claƌk Poǁeƌ et al, ϮϬϬϴ, p ϯϳϱͿ, the idea that people ǁith disaďilities oƌ 
undergoing illness and suffering might in some way have this path to the spiritual that is not 
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necessarily granted to the well. Lindy mentioned in one of her emails the writings of Meister 
EĐkhaƌt aŶd his idea that ͞oŶe ŵust ďe dead to see ɑod͟ ;pƌiǀate eŵailͿ. “he asks ǁhǇ she had 
to suffer a stroke; it is as if she has concluded in order to be close to God, one has to suffer in 
this way. 
Historical and literary figures have claimed to have found God in times of physical trial, from 
DostoǇeǀskǇ, ǁho suffeƌed fƌoŵ epilepsǇ, aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶed that he had ͞touĐhed ɑod͟ thƌough 
his ĐoŶditioŶ ;Fosteƌ, ϮϬϭϬ, p ϱϰͿ to JuliaŶ of NoƌǁiĐh ǁho eǆpeƌieŶĐed ͞supƌeme spiritual 
pleasuƌe iŶ [heƌ] soul͟ ;JuliaŶ of NoƌǁiĐh, ϭϵϵϴ, p ϭϰͿ duƌiŶg aŶ aĐute illŶess. VaŶieƌ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ 
sees this pƌiǀileged aĐĐess to the diǀiŶe eŶjoǇed ďǇ ŵeŵďeƌs of the l͛AƌĐhe ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ǁho 
have a learning disability. Foster (2010) discusses the well-researched phenomenon of near-
death experiences, where people describe seemingly spiritual phenomena such as tunnels of 
light, divine beings or the appearance of dead relatives. Spiritual sensibility may be enhanced 
in severe illness and disability (McSherry and Ross, 2012, p 213), and as clinicians we perhaps 
need to be open to this fact and therefore willing to facilitate discussions pertaining to 
spirituality. 
Whether these are true numinous experiences or a result of neurological, physiological or 
pharmacological events in a way does not matter – it is the individual͛s opiŶioŶ of these, theiƌ 
ability to communicate what they mean to them, and the possible effect of this on their 
recovery and sense of well-being which is of importance. Of all the participants with aphasia, 
only Lindy reported experiences associated with her illness which could be deemed 
supernatural, in the form of visions seen whilst in a coma. Most did not report such events, but 
whether this meant they did not have them, had them but did not remember, had them but 
were unable to articulate them or had them but did not want to tell me, is unclear.  
Other participants did, however, express what gave their life meaning. Peter had his garden 
and Joel his religious belief; Francesca had opera and Amy her home-making. Clinicians need to 
be ready and open to listen to these expressions of spirituality, but how can we do this? Is the 
phenomenological attitude clinically useful? 
6.9 The phenomenological attitude as a therapeutic strategy 
 
The stories came from three different groups of people: those who had just had their stroke, 
those who had been living with the effects of their stroke (including aphasia) for some months 
or years, and those who worked professionally with people with aphasia. Throughout my 
listening to the stories, and my attempts to understand them, I strove to adopt a 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϮͿ of ǁoŶdeƌ, aǁe, ĐuƌiositǇ aŶd atteŶtiǀe 
listening. All the details in the stories were novel and unexpected. In order to engender trust 
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and to offer complete respect, I wanted to hear the stories in a fresh way, uncluttered by 
previous opinions or experiences. 
The traditional phenomenological technique of complete bracketing, of epoché, however, 
proved an unattainable, and possibly, undesired imperative, in that I found I had to bring of 
myself to the interviews, the analysis and the writing. Sitting better with the design of the 
pƌojeĐt, the tǇpe of paƌtiĐipaŶts aŶd ǁith the suďjeĐt ŵatteƌ ǁas ɑadaŵeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ Đoncept of 
fusion of horizons. So it was, for example, that when Joel counted to twelve in a given context, 
our horizons which both contained Christianity fused, and I was able to understand that the 
ĐoŶĐept he ǁas ĐoŶǀeǇiŶg ǁas ͚disĐiple͛. BǇ ĐoŶtƌast, ďut also attempting to employ a 
pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude, I listeŶed to aŶd aĐkŶoǁledged Liaŵ͛s life ŵeaŶiŶg-makers of 
sport, despite their not necessarily being part of my own spiritual horizon. 
Total communication demands an open and attentive listening stǇle. VaŶ MaŶeŶ͛s 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϮͿ, ǁhiĐh iŶĐoƌpoƌates a seŶse of ƌefleĐtiǀe ǁoŶdeƌ, 
allows us to view a phenomenon with fresh and accepting eyes. A subject such as spirituality, 
with all its nuance and idiosyncrasy, perhaps demands above all other topics to be received 
with this type of attitude. The stories in the thesis are rife with events and opinions open to 
controversy, such as visions of dead relatives, celestial beings and everlasting life. It was vital 
that I, as researcher, maintained this phenomenological, non-judgmental yet congruent stance 
in order to engender trust and an open dialogue. In the same way, it is vital that we, as 
therapists and other healthcare professionals, listen to our clients with openness, whatever 
they may be conveying to us. It is a mark of dignity and respect to listen attentively (Sinclair 
and Chochinov, 2012, p 288). The SLT and OT both cite time as one of their therapeutic tools, 
particularly when listening to someone communicate about emotive issues; ͞it͛s a ƌule of 
ŵiŶe, I do Ŷot ƌush͟ seeŵs to ďe oŶe of the “LT͛s aphoƌisŵs. 
As clinicians, we also bring of ourselves to the clinical encounter and, rather than being viewed 
as too subjective or unprofessional, this fusion should be applauded as an important 
component of rapport-building and trust engendering. Particularly when topics of an intimate 
or personal nature are being discussed with clients with aphasia, adopting a 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϮͿ aŶd seeiŶg ouƌ ĐlieŶts ǁith a 
͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal gaze͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϮϬϭϲ, p ϯϴͿ ĐaŶ oŶlǇ eŶhaŶĐe iŶteƌaĐtioŶ aŶd ŵake foƌ 
ŵoƌe suĐĐessful ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ. The pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal attitude ŵaǇ help faĐilitate a ͞theƌapeutiĐ 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd effeĐtiǀe ĐliŶiĐal eŵpathǇ͟ ;“ǁiŶtoŶ et al, ϮϬϭϭ, p 650) vis à vis spirituality 
in SLT. 
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6.10 Use of the Mosaic approach 
 
The extraordinary narrative techniques employed in telling the spiritual stories created rich 
Mosaics (Clark, 2001), comprising myriad non-verbal expressions. As Kim (2016, p 72) states, 
͞it is iŵpoƌtaŶt to alloǁ eaĐh of ouƌ stoƌǇtelleƌs to speak foƌ theŵselǀes͟ ǁhiĐh, ǁheŶ 
extrapolated to the world of aphasia, can be translated as to communicate for themselves.  
Although the language of aphasia can bring with it a certain ambiguity, as target words 
become elusive or grammatical constructs cannot be achieved, this ambiguity in language can 
be and is mitigated at times by skilled use of augmentative and alternative communication 
methods. People with long-standing aphasia in particular accrue enormous skill over time in 
finding methods other than spoken language to convey meaning. Lindy uses the written word 
almost as naturally as the spoken, and her notebook and pen become an extension of her 
communication apparatus. The listener soon becomes accustomed to looking down at the 
shared piece of paper, as well as maintaining eye contact with her, in a way that is 
pragmatically acceptable. Her output becomes a lasting sign of her thought processes and acts 
as a permanent referent throughout the telling of the story. 
The use of total communication strategies seems to be an outward sign of achieving or 
beginning to achieve a quest narrative (Frank, 2013). A participant still deep within the chaos 
narrative, such as Liam, never utilised ramps to augment his spoken output. Those still living 
the restitution narrative – such as Joel, whose awaited restitution was divine in nature – also 
used total communication strategies less readily than those overtly living a quest narrative, 
such as Lindy. Joel seemed content to accept his spoken communication as it is now, in the 
hope of restored communication skills in life after death. 
Complex and abstract issues within this study could be expressed using total communication. 
Maybe this is a lesson to SLTs but also other healthcare professionals not to shy away from 
addressing complex and sensitive issues with people with aphasia. The lay chaplain admits to 
shutting down conversation when verbal output is limited. There is a duty for all healthcare 
professionals there to engage fully with people with aphasia, whatever it is they are trying to 
communicate. 
6.11 Evaluation of the research 
 
At the conclusion of a project, one inevitably reflects on what was successful and on what one 
might do differently next time. I used the 4 Rs propounded by Finlay and Evans (Finlay, 2011, p 
264), namely rigour, relevance, resonance and reflexivity, in order to evaluate the research. 
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6.11.1 Rigour 
 
Finlay and Evans (Finlay, 2011, p 264) fiƌst pose the ƋuestioŶ: ͞has the ƌeseaƌĐh ďeen 
ĐoŵpeteŶtlǇ ŵaŶaged aŶd sǇsteŵatiĐallǇ ǁoƌked thƌough͟?  I haǀe eŶdeaǀouƌed to guide the 
reader through the literature related to the subject of aphasia and spirituality, my 
methodological decisions, as well as through the methods employed.  I believe 
phenomenology was a useful and apt methodology. It felt congruent both with the subject 
matter of spirituality and with my desire to keep the participants with aphasia at the centre of 
the project, researching with them not on them. Perceiving phenomenon as they were 
presented to me with an open attitude tallied with my desire to acknowledge and respect the 
participants. I rejected ethnography as a methodology, recognising that people with aphasia 
were not a homogenous social group with whom to integrate; however, the principle of being 
ǁith a gƌoup of people foƌ a pƌoloŶged peƌiod of tiŵe Đould ƌesult iŶ ƌiĐh, deep, ͞thiĐk͟ 
(Geertz, 1973) data. 
Creating stories as my results chimed with allowing the participants with aphasia to have a 
voice, a principle to which I was keen to adhere. By quoting substantial excerpts of 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ǀeƌďal aŶd ŶoŶ-verbal output, I hope that I have given the reader a flavour of the 
͞esseŶĐe͟ ;ǀaŶ MaŶeŶ, ϭϵϵϬ, p ϭϬͿ of theiƌ tƌue selǀes, ͞uŶŵediated thƌough the falliďle ǀoiĐes 
of otheƌs͟ ;MuŶdle, ϮϬϭϭͿ. Like ŵe, soŵe ƌeseaƌĐheƌs haǀe iŶĐluded the ǀoiĐe of people ǁith 
aphasia in their research (Mitchell, Skirton and Monrouxe, 2010; Martinsen, Kirkevold and 
Sveen, 2012; Barrow, 2008; Bronken et al, 2012) by using some direct quotations from their 
interviews with people with aphasia, but recognise, as I did, that this is unusual and that some 
research projects (Simeone et al, 2014; Schulz, 2005) have excluded people with aphasia 
because of the perceived reduction in data quality and increase in research time. A true 
participatory approach, including participants contributing to design of the project, would have 
further positioned the participants at the centre of this research.  
Viewing the stories through the prism of Merleau-PoŶtǇ͛s ideas on ambiguity, wonder, 
language/thought aŶd liǀed ďodǇ, aŶd also thƌough FƌaŶk͛s tǇpologǇ of illŶess Ŷaƌƌatiǀes, 
allowed me to make sense of the data, and develop suggestions for clinicians interested in 
talking about spiritual issues with their clients. 
Rigour was also aĐhieǀed thƌough assiduous use of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐtual ǁoƌds, a research diary 
and a reflective journal. I also encouraged participants to look at and comment on the data. 
This was more successful with some participants than others (as discussed in Chapter 2). An 
improved way of ensuring rigour in the future would be to endeavour to visit participants at 
least twice in order to talk through data previously collected. Sending written data for 
participants with aphasia on which to comment could also be construed as non-inclusive; this 
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could be mitigated in future studies by factoring in follow-up interviews, where data could be 
presented in an accessible format and scrutinised by the participant and researcher together. 
Further rigour could have been achieved by enabling a second researcher to listen to the 
interviews, dwell with the stories and draw out themes. 
In listening to the stories, I made the decision not to use a video camera, because of my 
concerns relating to infringement of dignity. However, the benefits of filming non-verbal 
behaviour remain useful to the research process, and would allow for more in-depth analysis 
of non-verbal communication. Having conversations with fewer participants but more 
frequently over a longer period of time would enable deeper relationships of trust to be 
forged, meaning participants may be willing to be filmed and the researcher may feel more 
comfortable in doing so. 
6.11.2 Relevance 
 
In chapter 1, I discussed how spirituality as a topic is relatively new to the speech and language 
therapy literature (Spillers, 2007; Mathisen et al (2015); MacKenzie, 2015; MacKenzie, 2016), 
and has not before been explored in relation to adults with acquired communication 
impairment. In contrast to Paley (2008) in the nursing literature who maintains that spirituality 
is ͞aŶ iŶǀeŶtioŶ of the late ϮϬth ĐeŶtuƌǇ͟ ;p ϵͿ aŶd that spiƌitual distƌess does Ŷot eǆist, I ǁould 
like to offeƌ a ŵoƌe iŶĐlusiǀe ŵodel of Đaƌe, ǁheƌe iŶdiǀiduals͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aƌe listeŶed to aŶd 
valued, regardless of how they are labelled.  
Being a new concept in speech and language therapy, there are as yet no published SLT 
dissenters of spirituality in the literature. This project has hopefully served to open up the 
dialogue around spirituality in the speech and language therapy arena. It has also helped to 
show how total communication strategies may be usefully employed to convey myriad facets 
of the human condition. In our bid to practise in an holistic manner, SLTs may wish to continue 
this exploration of the spiritual aspect of their tripartite clients.  
6.11.3 Resonance 
 
FiŶlaǇ ;ϮϬϭϭ, p ϮϲϱͿ defiŶes ͚ƌesoŶaŶĐe͛ as the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ƌeadeƌ is touĐhed oƌ affeĐted 
ďǇ the ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd its fiŶdiŶgs, aŶd adŵits that this ĐaŶ ͞pƌoďaďlǇ oŶlǇ ďe judged iŶ the eye 
of the ďeholdeƌ͟.  Storytelling and story-listening have been at the forefront of my 
methodology, and I have therefore crafted the thesis like a work of literature, rather than a 
scientific text. As such, I have dispensed with traditional chapter headiŶgs suĐh as ͚method͛ 
aŶd ͚ƌesults͛, and instead labelled the chapters in a way that prepares the reader for what lies 
ahead, including a prologue and an epilogue, as one might find in a novel. Each chapter has its 
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own quotation – sometimes from the spirituality or health literature, sometimes from novels 
or poems; the aim of this was to create an atmosphere of creativity and wonder.  I have 
ƌefeƌƌed to the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ data as ͚stoƌies͛ to fuƌtheƌ pƌoŵulgate this seŶse of ŶeǁŶess aŶd 
wonder, and narrated them in the present tense in order to ensure the reader and the writer 
met in the same space at the same time. 
To ensure the people with aphasia were at the centre of this research, I have included their 
expressions of spirituality verbatim (in the case of their spoken output) and accurately 
described (in the case of their non-verbal output), including phonetically transcribed 
paraphasias and pauses. I have the sound and sight of the participants in my head, but I hope 
this also gives the reader a flavouƌ of the esseŶĐe of the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ spiƌitual stoƌies. 
6.11.4 Reflexivity 
 
I have attempted to position myself clearly throughout the thesis. Firstly, I have used the first 
person throughout and, where applicable, I have used my own clinical and life experience to 
illustrate a point. As HollidaǇ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p ϭϯϳͿ Ŷotes, iŶ a ͞postŵodeƌŶ Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh 
paƌadigŵ͟ suĐh as this, ͞the pƌeseŶĐe aŶd iŶflueŶĐe of the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ aƌe uŶaǀoidaďle, aŶd 
indeed a resource, ǁhiĐh ŵust ďe Đapitalized upoŶ.͟ Secondly, I foregrounded my fore-
meanings in chapter 2, in order that the reader might have an understanding of the cultural, 
societal and, indeed, spiritual influences in my life and how these might have impacted my 
listeŶiŶg to aŶd ƌelatiŶg of the paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ stories.  I have explained to the reader the 
phenomenological imperative of the epoché and why this was considered but adapted using 
the thoughts of Gadamer (2013) and van Manen (2016, p 32Ϳ, to pƌoduĐe a ͞pheŶoŵeŶologiĐal 
attitude͟. AĐkŶoǁledgiŶg ŵǇ foƌe-meanings, whilst attempting to be open and attentive 
during the interviews and when making sense of the stories, sat better with me both as 
researcher and as clinician.  
Connection was identified as an important constituent in the success or otherwise of the 
encounters. In a further development of this study, therefore, I would want to carry out fewer 
interviews but in more depth. In this way, I would be able to forge a relationship with 
participants, perhaps creating an atmosphere more conducive to intimate conversations about 
spirituality. Visiting and conversing with people on several occasions would also help me to 
understand better their preferred method of communicating, possibly even exploring new 
ones with them.  Revisiting Joel knowing how important his Christian faith was to him, armed 
with relevant artefacts, opened up our dialogue and allowed the conversation to reach depths 
that ŵaǇ Ŷot haǀe ďeeŶ possiďle ǁithout the ƌefeƌeŶt Đlues. Claƌk͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ MosaiĐ appƌoaĐh to 
communicating without words, or supplementary to words, in the research arena encourages 
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us to explore novel ways of communicating, perhaps more encompassing than the traditional 
concept of total communication. Use of artefacts, photographing and map-making may all 
serve to enrich the expressive communication of people with aphasia. 
6.12 Developing the project 
 
This project was exploratory in nature. At the beginning, I was unsure as to how the idea of 
exploring spirituality in SLT clients would be viewed by my SLT and other colleagues. I 
wondered if I would be derided for considering it; as a concept, spirituality was rarely, if ever, 
discussed within SLT and I feared I may have been wide of the mark. Although other healthcare 
professionals such as nurses had pioneered the concept of being open to the spiritual side of 
their patients, this had barely been discussed in the field of SLT. 
Before I embarked on the interviews with the participants, I had no idea how they would 
respond; they might well have had nothing to communicate to me, or I might well not have 
had the skills or sensitivity to ask the right questions. I am again indebted to Lindy for allowing 
ŵe to iŶteƌǀieǁ heƌ fiƌst, aŶd also to ŵǇ studeŶt ͚guiŶea pigs͛, so that ŵǇ Đouƌage ǁas 
͞sĐƌeǁed to the stiĐkiŶg plaĐe͟ ;Macbeth, Act 1 Scene 7) and my skills of interviewing about 
such a sensitive topic were, if not honed, at least chiselled. Now that the concept of spirituality 
and how clients with aphasia may express spiritual issues has been further explored, my hope 
is that this will open up dialogue within the profession, and lead to further exploration of the 
topic both with people with aphasia and also clients with other aetiologies affecting their 
speech and language, such as learning disability and dementia. 
Further total communication or Mosaic (Clark, 2001) methods of communicating spiritual 
issues could be explored. Clark (2001) often uses cameras with the children in her studies, to 
enable them to take photographs of objects that are meaningful to them. The children are 
then encouraged to talk about the image. This facilitative technique could also be beneficial to 
people with aphasia; if possible concomitant physical disability allows, they may be able to 
take photographs of objects whose lexical label they are not able to find, or for whom the 
image may aid in the word-fiŶdiŶg pƌoĐess. Photogƌaphs, like LiŶdǇ͛s ǁƌitteŶ ǁoƌds, also 
provide a permanent referent and can be useful to refer to as the discussion progresses. This 
use of photographs is akin to the Photovoice technique (Wang and Burris, 1997) used in some 
qualitative health investigations, such as in Levin et al (2007), Catalani and Minkler (2010), 
Burke and Evans (2011), Thomas et al (2013), and Ulmer et al (2016). Photographs taken by 
participants with aphasia could act as a useful referent for discussion, similar to the use of 
artefacts in the interviews with Joel.  
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Mosaics might also include established alternative/augmentative communication strategies, 
such as Talking Mats™, adapted to include pictures related to spirituality. Non-verbal 
individuals would be able to express their spiritual needs and opinions by using relevant 
pictures placed on the mat, with facilitation from a carer.  
If, as a profession, we intend to embrace the spiritual domain with our clients, more research 
could be carried out with different SLT clients, such as those with learning disabilities, or with 
dementia, again making use of Mosaic (Clark, 2001) techniques in order to empower clients to 
͚talk͛ aďout theiƌ spiƌitualitǇ. 
6.13 Conclusion 
 
What I had hoped for when embarking on this study was to stimulate debate in the area of 
spirituality and the allied health professions. Spirituality has not traditionally been a part of SLT 
input, despite SLTs considering themselves to be holistic practitioners. The literature states – 
and the stories in this thesis bear testament to the fact – that spirituality is difficult to define 
and is revealed diffeƌeŶtlǇ iŶ eaĐh iŶdiǀidual. A peƌsoŶ͛s spiƌitualitǇ ŵaǇ ŵaŶifest itself iŶ 
religion and belief, but, as we have seen, it may also reside in being in nature, in art or in 
gardening.  
Literature suggests (Koenig, 2012) that encouraging spiritual expression can contribute to the 
healing process, and can offer some bolstering of coping mechanisms in people who are at the 
end of life (McClain, Rosenfeld and Breitbart, 2003). Berg et al (2012) suggest that people 
suffering severe, life-limiting illness tend to engage in more spiritual or religious conversations. 
What of those patients who have suffered a severe, life-changing illness, who are not able to 
voice their spiritual issues? 
Speech and language therapists are the members of the multidisciplinary team whose remit 
and expertise is in communicating with people for whom communication is problematic. Not 
only does our training incorporate attentive listening and therapeutic rapport-building, but we 
also have in-depth knowledge of how language may be affected by a neurological condition 
such as stroke, and how communication in these instances may by facilitated. It is incumbent 
on us as a profession to empower other members of the multidisciplinary team to 
communicate as effectively as possible with people with communication disorders about a 
variety of issues, including spirituality. Koenig (2012) posits that all healthcare professionals 
should shaƌe the ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ assessiŶg patieŶts͛ spiƌitual Ŷeeds ďǇ takiŶg a spiƌitual Đase 
history, and it may fall to the SLT in multidisciplinary teams to facilitate this with clients with 
communication impairment. In chapter 1, I cited Mathisen et al (2015, p 2318) who suggest 
that there are potential negative outcomes of not considering the spiritual aspects of the 
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clients with whom we work. They question whether therapy is superficial if important facets of 
the client are ignored, or whether not addressing spiritual concerns may negatively impact on 
achieving SLT communication goals. Added to this, they claim, is the role SLTs may play in 
enabling clients to access again life resources which sustain or make a person whole, such as 
church liturgy. 
Speech and language therapy student practitioners are not, however, encouraged on their pre-
registration training programmes to consider the spiritual needs of their clients. No UK SLT 
training institution, to my knowledge, includes modules or sessions on spirituality in 
healthcare. SLT practitioners would perhaps feel more confident in facilitating expressions of 
spirituality with their clients with communication impairment if they had some understanding 
of spirituality and how spiritual wellbeing may correlate with physical wellbeing. SLTs may also 
feel more confident in helping their multidisciplinary colleagues in their spiritual conversations 
with people with communication impairment, if they had received further training in that area.  
The more that spirituality is discussed within healthcare in general, and in speech and 
language therapy in particular, the more SLTs and SLT students are likely to consider it as just 
one of the several aspects of the human condition that can enter into the therapy room. 
IŵpliĐit iŶ the WHO͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ fouƌth ĐlassifiĐatioŶ of fuŶĐtioŶiŶg, ŶaŵelǇ ǁellďeiŶg aŶd the 
ŵitigatioŶ of distƌess, is the ĐoŶĐept of aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s spiƌitualitǇ: 
͞What ĐoŶtƌiďutes to a peƌsoŶ͛s health aŶd ďƌiŶgs aďout healiŶg does not simply involve 
pharmacological agents or clinical interventions but convictions made manifest in the 
humanity of care and our faith in that which gives our lives meaning and purpose.͟ ;Coďď, 
2012,p 117). 
As such, all healthcare professionals, including speech and language therapists, need to be 
mindful of the spiritual aspect of their clients, and be ready to address spiritual needs, distress 
and well-being, by listening attentively to and facilitating the telling of spiritual stories. 
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Epilogue 
 
͞VoiĐes ŵaǇ ƌeaĐh us…ďut ǁhat theǇ saǇ to us is iŵďued ǁith the oďsĐuƌitǇ of the ŵatƌiǆ out 
of which they come, and, try as we may, we cannot always decipher them precisely in the 
Đleaƌeƌ light of ouƌ oǁŶ daǇ.͟ 
  (The HaŶdŵaid’s Tale, Margaret Atwood) 
If part of the purpose of telling stories is to help us make sense of life-changing events (Frank, 
2010, 2013; Barrow, 2008; Ross, 2010; Hurwitz, Greenhalgh, and Skultans (2004)), these 
narratives are as important for people with aphasia following stroke as for those individuals 
who have suffered other catastrophic events. Part of that sense-making narrative may well 
include issues of a spiritual nature. 
With this in mind, and with the current healthcare driver of atteŶdiŶg fullǇ to patieŶts͛ digŶitǇ 
(The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry, 2013; NHS England), it is incumbent on 
all healthcare professionals to enable all patients to express their illness narratives, including 
the spiritual aspects. Speech and language therapists have a particular role to play in terms of 
facilitating these narratives with people with aphasia. 
Healthcare professionals need to be mindful of the aetiology focus that has become prevalent 
in the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first, with professionals perhaps 
not paying enough heed to the psycho-social-spiritual side of their patients.  As Swinton (2014, 
p ϮϲͿ poiŶts out, ͞the tasks of the daǇ ĐaŶ easilǇ oǀeƌpoǁeƌ the eǆpeƌieŶĐes of the ĐlieŶt͟ iŶ a 
busy healthcare environment. In this post-modern era, carrying out care duties seems to have 
taken over from care itself, with patients/clients being seen increasingly as bodies to be cured 
whilst tasks are ticked off and targets met. Sometimes lost is the essence of the patient as a 
fully integrated tripartite being, encompassing body, mind and spirit. One of my hopes for this 
project is that it will encourage all healthcare professionals – and speech and language 
therapists  in particular – to shift their focus and fully embrace holistic care; care of the body, 
mind and spirit.  
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Appendix I: The Cognitive Neuropsychological Model of Language 
Processing 
(based on Patterson and Shewell͛s 1987 Iogogen model) 
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284 
 
Appendix II: Consent forms and information sheets 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM (groups 1 and 2) 
Centre Number:  
Study Number: 
Participant Identification Number for this trial: 
Title of Project: Exploring stories of spirituality with people with aphasia 
Name of Researcher: Sophie MacKenzie 
  
1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated May 2014 for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time 
without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to being recorded but understand that I can ask for recording to stop at 
any time  
 
4. I understand that any personal information that I provide will be kept strictly 
confidential     
 
5. I agree to my General Practitioner being informed of my participation in the study. 
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
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Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of Person  Date    Signature 
taking consent 
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Information Sheet (groups 1 and 2) 
Exploring stories of spirituality with people with aphasia 
A Research Project by Sophie MacKenzie 
A research project is being conducted by Sophie MacKenzie of Canterbury Christ 
Church University (CCCU). Sophie is a speech and language therapist and PhD student. 
This is part of her PhD research. 
       
 
Sophie wants to shed light on how people with aphasia express spirituality. 
Sophie intends to interview people with aphasia about spirituality and what gives their 
life meaning. 
What would you be required to do?: 
Have a conversation with Sophie for about 1 hour 
 
Talk about what spirituality means to you. 
Use writing/ photos/ drawings/ gesture if it helps. 
Be videorecorded. 
To participate in the project you must be someone who has aphasia following a 
stroke. 
Procedure: 
Sophie will come to your house or somewhere else of your choice. You and Sophie will 
have a conversation for about 1 hour. Sophie may take notes and you will be filmed. A 
video will help the researcher look at things like drawing and gesture. You can ask for 
the filming or the interview to stop at any time. 
Benefits to you: you will be able to talk about your thoughts and feelings around 
spirituality to an interested listener. 
Possible disadvantages to you: discussing spirituality may bring up some deep 
emotions for you. 
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Feedback: 
Sophie will send you a summary of the conversation. You can give your comments. 
Confidentiality 
All data (including the video) and personal information will be stored securely within 
CCCU pƌeŵises iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith the Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ aŶd the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s 
own data protection requirements.  Data will be stored on a password protected 
memory stick. Data can only be accessed by Sophie MacKenzie.  After completion of 
the study, all data will be made anonymous (i.e. all personal information associated 
with the data will be removed). Data will be kept for no longer than 6 months after the 
end of the study. 
Results of the project 
The study will be written up as a thesis. A summary of the thesis may be submitted as 
a journal article. Some information from the study may be presented in lectures. 
Deciding whether to participate 
-  you do not have to take part in this study 
- Please contact Sophie if you have any questions or concerns 
- You are free to stop being part of this study at any time – Ǉou doŶ͛t haǀe to 
give a reason. 
Any questions? 
Please contact Sophie at: 
Email Telephone Address 
S.R.Mackenzie@gre.ac.uk 0208 331 8924 Nelson Building 
Central Avenue 
Chatham Maritime 
ME4 4TB 
Sophie.mackenzie@canterbury.ac.uk   
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Consent form (group 3) 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
Title of Project: Exploring stories of spirituality with people with aphasia 
 
Name of Researcher: Sophie MacKenzie 
Contact details:   
Address:  School of Health and Social Care (Nelson 003) 
Central Avenue 
Chatham Maritime 
ME4 4TB 
 
   
   
   
Tel:  0208 331 8924 
   
Email:  S.R.Mackenzie@gre.ac.uk 
 
Please initial 
box 
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.   
3. I understand that any personal information that I provide to the 
researchers will be kept strictly confidential   
4. I agree to take part in the above study and to be audio 
recorded.   
 
 
________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
_________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
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Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
___________________________ ________________             ____________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
Copies: 1 for participant 
 1 for researcher 
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Information sheet (group 3) 
 
Exploring stories of spirituality with people with aphasia 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
A research study is being conducted at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) by Sophie 
MacKenzie.   
Background 
During this study, Sophie intends to explore how people with severe expressive aphasia 
following stroke express their spiritual distress/ needs/ well-being. She will be interviewing 
people with acute and chronic aphasia, and also members of the multidisciplinary team (MDT). 
What will you be required to do? 
 
Participants in this study will be required to: 
- Take part in an interview with the researcher, during which you will have the 
opportunity to discuss the issues relating to spirituality when working with people with 
expressive aphasia 
- Be recorded 
To participate in this research you must: 
 
- Be a member of a multidisciplinary team, working with people who have aphasia 
following a stroke 
- Have experience of talking to and listening to people who have had a stroke 
Procedures 
 
A mutually convenient time and place for the interview will be negotiated with you. The 
interview should take about one hour. The interview will be recorded to enable analysis of the 
discussion. 
Feedback 
 
Interviews with members of the multidisciplinary team will form part of the qualitative data 
for this study. Eventually the thesis will be available to be read by participants. 
 
 
291 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All data and personal information will be stored securely within CCCU premises in accordance 
ǁith the Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ aŶd the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s oǁŶ data pƌoteĐtioŶ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts.  
Data can only be accessed by Sophie MacKenzie.  After completion of the study, all data will be 
made anonymous (i.e. all personal information associated with the data will be removed). The 
job title of the MDT participants will be included in the study, as this may have direct 
relevance. 
Dissemination of results 
The study will be written up as a thesis. A summary of the thesis may be submitted as a journal 
article. 
Deciding whether to participate 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the nature, procedures or requirements for 
participation do not hesitate to contact me.  Should you decide to participate, you will be free 
to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
Any questions? 
Please contact Sophie MacKenzie at: 
 
Sophie.mackenzie@canterbury.ac.uk 
 
S.R.Mackenzie@gre.ac.uk 
 
School of Health and Social Care 
University of Greenwich 
Nelson 003 
Central Avenue 
Chatham Maritime 
ME4 4TB 
 
Tel: 0208 331 8924 
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Appendix III: Referral information request sheet (group 1) 
 
 
 
Exploring stories of spirituality with people with aphasia 
Checklist for Group 1: people with severe, acute aphasia 
To be completed by qualified Speech and Language Therapist 
Patient name: 
Please tick either yes or no to each question: 
 
Is the person: yes no 
medically stable?   
presenting with severe expressive aphasia? *   
presenting with good auditory comprehension? **   
able to give consent?   
 
May I approach the person and explain the study to them?   
 
*expressive language is telegrammatic/ relies heavily on total communication strategies to 
convey ideas/ severe word-finding difficulties 
**able to understand utterances containing 3 information-carrying words or more 
 
If you have ticked yes to every question, this person may be eligible for the study. 
Please send form to Sophie MacKenzie (sophie.mackenzie@canterbury.ac.uk) on completion. 
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Appendix IV: Topic guides 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring stories of spirituality with people with aphasia 
Interview topic guide (groups 1 and 2) 
The plan is that the interviews will be unstructured, but topics that may be 
covered include: 
 
- Can you tell me a bit about what happened to you? (tell me about 
your stroke) 
 
- Can you tell me something about what is really important to you? 
 
 
- What gives your life meaning? 
 
 
- What does the ǁoƌd ͞spiƌitualitǇ͟ ŵeaŶ to Ǉou? 
 
 
- Do you talk over spiritual issues with anyone? If so, who? 
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Topic guide: MDT members (Group 3) 
 
I am interested in the experience of different healthcare professionals in working with people 
with severe aphasia. Specifically, I am interested in how people with severe aphasia convey 
issues relating to spirituality. 
 
Fiƌst of all, I͛d like to ask Ǉou ǁhat Ǉou kŶoǁ aďout aphasia. 
 
What is your experience of working with people with severe aphasia. 
 
Can you tell me about ways you help people with aphasia to express themselves? 
 
Do you think there are some issues that are easier and some that are more difficult for people 
with aphasia to express? Which issues/ concepts are easier? Which are more difficult? 
 
What does the teƌŵ ͞spiƌitualitǇ͟ ŵeaŶ to Ǉou? 
 
Do you think it is part of your role to help people with aphasia express spiritual issues? 
 
(if not, whose role is it?) 
 
(if yes, can you tell me a bit about how you might do this?) 
 
Can you tell me how you help people with aphasia express spiritual issues? 
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Appendix V: Example of transcribed interviews 
 
Amy, group 1 
“: “o, AŵǇ, ǁheŶ Ǉou͛ƌe at hoŵe, do Ǉou go to ĐhuƌĐh oƌ aŶǇthiŶg like that? 
A: Yeah 
S: Do you? Ah – which church? 
A: Go [lɪəʊ] go same place 
S: Do you? Ah, is that important to you? 
A: Yeah (gestures praying with both hands) 
S: Yeah – saying prayers 
A: WaŶt to kŶoǁ…ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ Đoŵe iŶ [t࠲tʃ] (church) (gestured prayer) 
S: to pray, yeah 
A: yeah 
 
Joel, group 2 
S: So, last time we talked a bit about how important your faith was to you 
J: Yes 
S: Yes 
J: Yes [ࠧɨ ] Ǉes [ࠧɨ ] ;emphatic intonation) (laughs) 
S: AďsolutelǇ…iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou. AŶd ǁe talked aďout goiŶg to ĐhuƌĐh…eƌ 
J: Yeah, yeah 
S: Are you still going to church? 
J: Yes, all the time, yeah 
S: Brilliant. And I notice here (at the side of the rooŵ, there is a flipĐhart, ǁith the ǁords ͞JohŶ 
10
27 heariŶg God͟ ǁritteŶ oŶ it) 
J: Yeah 
S: Did you have Bible study here? 
J: Yes (laughs) 
S: John 10: 27
 
hearing God 
J: Yes (laughs) 
S: Excellent – that͛s gƌeat. “o does that happen regularly? 
J: Yes (emphatically) yes [ࠧɨ ] Ǉes [ࠧɨ ] Ǉes  
S: So do you and your wife run that group? 
J: Yes, ǁell foƌ Ŷoǁ eƌ…eƌ…Oh ɑod…foƌ Ŷoǁ 
S: for now 
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J: Yes 
“: OK, so it͛s Ŷot a ƌegulaƌ thiŶg? 
J: No…Ǉeah, Ǉeah, Ǉeah 
“: OK, so people Đoŵe to Ǉouƌ house…? 
J: No Ŷo Ŷo…eƌ…ŵe aŶd Ǉou 
S: Ah, OK, you and your wife 
J: Yes 
“: Ah, I see, so it͛s Ŷot a gƌoup? 
J: No no no 
S: It͛s pƌiǀate studǇ 
J: Mmm 
 
SLT, group 3 
“: “o thiŶkiŶg aďout Ǉouƌ ĐoŶĐept of spiƌitualitǇ aŶd that͛s kiŶd of, it͛s Ǉouƌs, do Ǉou eǀeƌ 
discuss things of a spiritual nature with your patients? 
SLT: Yes. 
S: Or they with you? 
“LT: Yes.  I ǁas goiŶg to saǇ Ǉes, soŵetiŵes…  OK, ǁheŶ Ǉou appƌoaĐh a peƌsoŶ at the ďedside 
there are maybe clues, so for example there may be a crucifix lying on their bedside table or a 
bible or a daily devotional, or sometimes there are clues in the greeting cards, so people will 
saǇ soŵethiŶg like ͚ǁe ŵiss Ǉou iŶ ĐhuƌĐh, ɑod ďless, ǁe aƌe all pƌaǇiŶg foƌ Ǉou oŶ “uŶdaǇ͛ Ǉou 
kŶoǁ, so those ǁheƌe people aƌe… theǇ aƌe spiƌitual aŶd I ǁould Đall that ƌeligious. 
And then there are people who, listening to their stories and their concerns, you know, like I 
ŵeaŶ just… just soŵe eǆaŵples aƌe theƌe͛s a ϵϴ Ǉeaƌ old ǁoŵaŶ ǁho, she had soŵe ŵiŶoƌ 
language problems that resolved with the thrombolysis but she was 98, compos mentis, able-
ďodied, ďut I ǁas assessiŶg heƌ laŶguage to ŵake suƌe that she didŶ͛t ƌeƋuiƌe a folloǁ-up in 
the community or perhaps she did.   
But she started talking with me about how her mother died when she was a little girl, when 
she was 4 years old aŶd hoǁ she ǁeŶt to liǀe ǁith aŶ auŶtǇ aŶd hoǁ she hadŶ͛t thought of heƌ 
ŵotheƌ uŶtil Ŷoǁ aŶd so ǁe had a ŵeaŶiŶgful ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ aďout life, …Ǉou kŶoǁ, so just 
ďeiŶg… ŶeediŶg people ǁheƌe theǇ͛ƌe at, Ǉeah. 
S: And do you think, just thinking of the 98-year-old ǁoŵaŶ, do Ǉou thiŶk … Theƌe ǁas 
something about you as a speech and language therapist which helped her open up and 
eǆploƌe that aƌea aƌouŶd heƌ ŵuŵ aŶd heƌ ŵuŵ dǇiŶg aŶd stuff… 
“LT: I kŶoǁ so, I kŶoǁ so aŶd it͛s siŵplǇ sittiŶg doǁŶ, takiŶg the tiŵe aŶd Ǉou do do.  It͛s … Ǉou 
aƌe doiŶg the teĐhŶiĐal ďits, Ǉou kŶoǁ, lookiŶg iŶ a peƌsoŶ͛s ŵouth, askiŶg theŵ the 
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biographical questions and so on but then in between that, having the meaningful 
conversation, yes, yes. 
Yeah, Ǉeah.     Do Ǉou kŶoǁ it͛s fuŶŶǇ… I ǁas just lookiŶg at… as I ǁas thiŶkiŶg aďout this 
iŶteƌǀieǁ, ĐeƌtaiŶ thiŶgs that… ƌules that I liǀe ďǇ – I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if Ǉou ǁould like to heaƌ theŵ. 
S: I would love to hear them. 
“LT: I feel like the ǁoƌk that I do ;aŶd I doŶ͛t ŵeaŶ to souŶd like a flake) but I think it is sacred 
work because I think if you need to see me, you are obviously having a bad day, you know, you 
haǀe had a stƌoke, Ǉou aƌe OK….  “o I do ďelieǀe it's saĐƌed ǁoƌk.   The thought of… I tƌǇ to 
make my work an act of kindness and the thiƌd thiŶg is… ǁell ͚do Ŷo haƌŵ͛, Ǉeah. 
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Appendix VI: Examples of annotated script and themes table 
 
Example of annotated script (Peter, group 2) 
 
 
Example of themes table (Peter, group 2) 
Theme Subthemes Examples in transcript Interview Page 
Relationship Family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People at the 
stroke group 
“o ďut eƌŵ that͛s ǁhat it is ǁith 
me. I go out and visit people er my 
daughter, she live in C er and and 
my wife she [lɨd] (lives) in S 
 
 
 
Oh, Ǉes. I ĐouldŶ͛t, Ŷo, I ĐouldŶ͛t 
talk at all and er then C (name of 
speech and language therapist) at 
the…eƌ..;cat descends from back 
of Đhair ďehiŶd P͛s head aŶd ǁe 
both smile and laugh) 
 
P: erm (pauseͿ…people that I ĐaŶ 
talk to is the stroke group (many 
attempts) 
S: A and the other people at the 
stroke group? 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
7 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
4/5 
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P: Yes 
S: So you get support from them? 
P: (long pause) we tend to just 
talk about anything 
Trauma of stroke Difficulty 
articulating 
trauma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difficulty 
verbalising 
trauma to 
medical staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difficulty 
verbalising 
trauma to 
chaplain 
 
S: could you ask him for help? 
P: eƌŵ ;shaƌp eǆhalatioŶͿ I doŶ͛t 
kŶoǁ eƌŵ I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
eƌŵ… 
 
Eƌ…eƌŵ…I d..d…spoke about what 
had happened erm but then I 
didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ feel eƌŵ ǁhat ǁe 
ǁeƌeŶ͛t I thiŶk ǁe ǁeƌeŶ͛t eƌ 
(looks away, frowning, taps thigh) 
I think (long pause, taps thigh) 
 
The thing was…it was a case 
of...er…I ƌeallǇ ĐouldŶ͛t use the 
ǁoƌds, so… 
 
P: eƌ the people iŶ Đhaƌge…ǁaǇ 
above them (gestured ͞aďoǀe͟) 
theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t talk ŵe like 
a…eƌ…theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t talk to ŵe 
about (hand gestures) what 
happened because they 
were…er… (pause) erm no 
because then as I say I really 
ĐouldŶ͛t talk to theŵ aŶǇǁaǇ, so. 
S: Are these like doctors and 
consultants and that sort of 
person? 
P: Ǉes, that͛s ǁhat I thiŶk, Ǉes 
 
P: No…I ǁould talk to ͚eŵ…eƌ…ďut 
not knowing what I had erm I 
ĐouldŶ͛t talk to them anyway 
(nods) 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Garden Importance of 
garden 
 
 
 
 
Passion/ 
enthusiasm for 
garden 
 
 
 
 
 
“: What͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to Ǉou? 
P: (with energyͿ ǁhat͛s 
[ɨmpɔtət](important) to me is 
getting on with the garden 
(smiles) 
 
what I did then, I [dʌk] (dug) out 
some of the plants anyway, others 
I erm cut them in two. I bought 
one half so I had six hundred 
plants erm erm erm but then I 
bought them with me so 
 
S: So, what do you get, working in 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
8 
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Effect on mental 
health when 
unable to garden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eloquence and 
clarity of 
gestures when 
talking about 
garden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wanting to get 
back to 
gardening after 
cancer diagnosis 
the garden? What does it do for 
you? 
P: Ah (shakes head, shrugs 
shoulders – as if to say ͞so ŵuĐh! 
– smiles) eƌ…pause…I do [lʌb] 
(love) ...I loǀe ŵǇ gaƌdeŶ…I like 
the flowers but I also like the birds 
and the bees and everything else 
eƌŵ…eƌŵ…;gesture – animated) 
 
Oh, yes, 
Ǉeah…eƌŵ…this…this…the ďest 
tiŵe of Ǉeaƌ ǁheŶ it͛s it [ďɔm] 
;ǁaƌŵͿ aŶd ǁheŶ it͛s ǁaƌŵ…I 
don͛t…I eƌŵ...liǀe…I liǀe a ďit…I 
get…;pause) (shakes head, sighs) 
(pauseͿ ǁheŶ it͛s Ŷot ŶiĐe out 
there, I get a bit low 
 
I did erm this was three different 
plants and I (gesture with both 
hands, finger of left hand crossing 
fingers of right) then er er created 
plants er er and then erm oh they 
would just small bits of erm they 
were just small bits of garden and 
I joined all of the things together 
and made it what I did was er if I 
can hoe (gestures hoeing) 
 
“o Ŷoǁ I ƌeallǇ thiŶk that I doŶ͛t..I 
ĐaŶ͛t I ĐaŶ͛t do do it aŶǇŵoƌe…I 
thiŶk I͛ll get oŶ ǁith ŵe gaƌdeŶ 
aŶd eƌ that͛s …aŶd that͛s ;gesture) 
that͛s ďeĐause I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to I 
doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to eƌ…I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt 
aŶǇthiŶg I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt aŶǇthiŶg 
eƌ…;pause – shakes head) 
“: Ǉou͛ǀe had Ǉouƌ fill of ďeiŶg ill 
P: yes, I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt aŶǇŵoƌe 
S: You, you just want to get on 
with the garden? 
P: yes 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
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Appendix VII: Summary of themes 
 
Summary of the themes in groups 1 and 2 
Theme Participant 
Family and relationships Amy 
Liam 
Francesca 
David 
Peter 
Pets Amy 
Liam 
Art Lindy 
Francesca 
Sport Liam 
Faith, church and religious belief Amy 
Lindy 
Joel 
David 
Visions Lindy 
Joel 
Resurrection Lindy 
Joel 
Chaplains and priests Amy 
Lindy 
Joel 
David 
Liturgy Lindy 
Joel 
Pilgrimage Lindy 
Loss Liam 
Joel 
Francesca 
Nature Lindy 
Peter 
Busyness and work Francesca 
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Summary of the themes in group 3 
Theme Participant 
Spirituality/ having spiritual conversations SLT 
OT 
PT 
Lay chaplain 
Sacredness SLT 
Spirituality as part of MDT remit SLT 
OT 
Nurse 
PT 
Overstepping remit PT 
Skills of therapist/ MDT SLT 
OT 
Danger of proselytising PT 
Dignity SLT 
Identity SLT 
OT 
Rapport/ relationship SLT 
OT 
Lay chaplain 
Time SLT 
OT 
Lay chaplain 
Love Lay chaplain 
Loss SLT 
OT 
Referral on to others SLT 
OT 
PT 
Nurse 
Avoiding people with aphasia Lay chaplain 
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Appendix VIII: Example of total communication   
 
Joel͛s ;gƌoup ϮͿ ǁƌitiŶg 
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Appendix IX: Examples of artefacts used in interview with Joel (group 
2) 
 
 
 
 
Trinity symbol sculpture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hospitality of Abraham icon 
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HolŵaŶ HuŶt͛s Light of the 
World picture 
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Appendix X: Accessible summary of the thesis 
 
After an illness, people often have difficult questions and 
thoughts that they want to express. These may be about 
life,    
meaning 
 or God. 
 
It is important for people with aphasia to be able to talk about 
their spirituality – especially after a stroke.  It can help in coming 
to terms with what has happened to them. 
 
I wanted to find out: 
- How do people with aphasia talk about spirituality? 
- Are professionals happy to talk about spirituality with 
people with aphasia? 
 
What did I do? 
 
 
I had conversations with 8 people with aphasia.  
I also had conversations with:  
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- a speech and language therapist 
- an occupational therapist 
- a physiotherapist 
- a nurse 
- a lay chaplain 
 
What did I discover? 
People with aphasia can and do talk about spirituality. They use 
speech but also gestures, tone of voice and writing. They talk 
about complex and sensitive things. 
It helps if the listener gives time. 
It helps if the listener is open and accepting. 
 
What does this mean for people with aphasia? 
Therapists can help people with aphasia to express their 
spirituality.   
 
What does this mean for speech and language therapists? 
Speech and language therapists should be happy to talk to 
people with aphasia about everything. 
If they listen openly, with a sense of wonder, people with 
aphasia will feel heard. 
 
 
 
 
 
